Report | Doc. 419 | 14 October 1955

Common European Policy at future East-West conferences

Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy

Rapporteur : Mr François de MENTHON, France

1. INTRODUCTION

1. The next political debate in the Assembly will take place between the first Geneva Conference, at the level of Heads of Governments, and the second, at the level of Foreign Ministers. As the spokesman of European public opinion, the Assembly will thus have an opportunity to comment on the results of the first preliminary meeting and to offer a timely opinion on the aims which should be pursued by the Western representatives in the negotiations now about to start. Debates on this subject have been or will be held in the national Parliaments; hut the Assembly-has its own part to play : to place on record the preoccupations of a Europe in search of its security and unity. The members of our Assembly will be sufficiently alive to their responsibilities to refrain from complicating the task of the Western negotiators, but, on the contrary, they will seek to ensure that our debates reinforce their position.

2. 2. The United Kingdom and France are the only Member States of the Council taking part in the Four-Power Conferences, and their representatives in the Assembly must act as spokesmen for all the Members of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe is interested in the forthcoming negotiations from two standpoints : those of international policy and European unification. Nothing should be accepted which would frustrate or make more difficult the establishment of a free, united Europe embracing all European countries. Another important point is that the Ministers of the two Member States should be aware of, and faithfully interpret, the aspirations of the member countries not represented at the Four-Power Conferences. It is here that the public debate in the Assembly can be of particular service. The Governments of member countries belonging also to N. A. T. 0. are, of course, kept in touch with the position by the three Western Powers at meetings of the NATO Council, but preparations for a conference of this degree of importance should surely not be made only behind the locked doors of chancelleries. It is not certain, moreover, that the meetings of the NATO Council have always been sufficient to achieve the desired object.

2. PART I - General considérations on the Four-Power Conference of Heads of Governments

3. The Four-Power Conference of Heads of Governments led to no practical results on any of the questions examined; nevertheless, it did produce what has come to be called " th e Geneva spirit ", in other words, an atmosphere of " détente ". How are we to explain this paradox?

4. The answer is that the Soviet Government has abandoned the crude tactics of Stalin's day the violence of which served only to stir the Western peoples to opposition. The risk had become too great in this age of devastating nuclear Aveapons. Korea and In-do-China had only too clearly demonstrated the possibility of a local war expanding into a world conflagration. Apart from this, it seems that the U. S. S. R. must harness all its energies to the immense task with which it is faced at home, and wishes therefore to lighten the burden imposed upon it by the cold war. It is increasingly evident that the U. S. S. R. and its satellites are in urgent need of developing their trade with the Western countries. The Soviet Government has accordingly, for the time being and in present circumstances, given up employing the methods of the cold war.

5. The world at large may welcome the new diplomacy of the Soviets as having lessened the danger of a new war synonymous with the end of civilisation. The West may congratulate itself on having contributed to this development by the unity achieved among the democratic countries, more especially in the defensive alliance of N. A. T. 0., by the rearmament effort they shouldered, and by their refusal to yield to Soviet pressure.

6. Nevertheless, this satisfaction would only be justified if the real causes of tension between. East and West disappeared. Easier relations between the Great Powers have created a favourable climate for negotiations. There can be fuller understanding of respective points of view; leaders and peoples alike can approach each other in a spirit of greater mutual trust. That is the tribute we must pay to the " Geneva spirit ". In fact, the first Geneva Conference did not achieve concrete results; but this was only a preliminary meeting, for the purpose of re-opening discussion.

7. The Soviet Union remained entrenched behind its fundamental positions regarding the questions over which West and East have been so long divided : German reunification, European security, the creation of a'.free and united Europe, the subversive activities of international communism, etc. The Soviet attitude may, indeed, be said to have stiffened in that, even after the West had recognised, and this was—to begin with—at the instance of the Russians themselves, that German reunification and European security were interrelated questions, the Soviet Union-came forward with a demand that the first of these problems should be held in abeyance until a security system had been set up : in other words, until the,status quo in Europe had been recognised for an indefinite period.

8. It is clear from its attitude in Geneva that the Soviet Government hopes, by its own policy of " détente ", to disarm the West morally. By announcing an easing of tension, its aim is to compel the Western Powers to preserve the territorial status quo. It will try to induce them to remove the present trade restrictions. If the Western Powers refuse to do either of these things they could easily be accused of being hostile to the easing of tension—and the Soviets rely on public opinion in the democracies to ensure that this accusation has the desired effect on the Governments. Finally, the Soviets' aim is that, as a result of this relaxed atmosphere, the Communist Parties in each free country will be treated on the same basis as other parties, which would give them incomparably greater scope in their propaganda and action.

9. What does the U. S. S. R. expect to gain by its so-called policy of " détente ".

a. A guarantee of the status quo in Europe such as would be implicit in the conclusion of the collective security treaty proposed at Geneva or the almost identical treaty proposed at Berlin. This would sanction the partition of Germany until the second stage envisaged had been reached; it would perpetuate the situation in the Eastern European countries, whose present Governments would be co-signatories ;

b. An additional guarantee of non-aggression pending the establishment of the security system in accordance with the proposal put forward by Marshal Bulganin on 21st July, 1955;

c. The resumption of trade, a subject referred to several times by Marshal Bulganin (cf. his opening address at Geneva, 17th July, 1955— AS/AG (2) 1);

d. L'amélioration de la situation intérieure tant en U. R. S. S. qu'en Chine et dans les pays satellites par le commerce extérieur et la réduction des charges militaires;

e. La réduction des troupes de la République Fédérale à 150.000 hommes ou 200.000 hommes (les Accords de Paris prévoient 12 divisions, soit 500.000 hommes), par le truchement des propositions soviétiques tendant à réduire les forces armées ;

f. La reprise des échanges commerciaux, dont le maréchal Boulganine a parlé à plusieurs reprises (voir son discours inaugural à Genève le 17 juillet 1955 —• AS/AG (7) 1);

g. Improvement of the domestic situation in the U. S. S. R., in China and in the satellite countries by foreign trade and a reduction of the armaments burden ;

h. The reduction of Federal German forces, in pursuance of Soviet disarmament proposals, to 150,000 or 200,000 men, as against the 12 divisions totalling 500,000 men provided for by the Paris Agreements;

i. An improvement in the situation of communist parties in Western countries, in particular an end to the opprobrium in which they have been held throughout the cold war period. The establishment of new Popular Front groupings in France and Italy;

j. The undermining of the powers of resistance still subsisting in the eastern European countries ;

k. The progressive neutralisation of the European countries by the creation of Popular Fronts, with the consequent disruption of the Atlantic Alliance;

l. The withdrawal of American and British troops from a European continent which would have become politically unstable.

10. The foregoing list would seem to be a fair picture of what the U. S. S. R. hopes to gain in this new phase of international politics. A number of these effects would, obviously, likewise be of advantage to the West, for example the reduction of the armaments burden, while others would bo disastrous. This does not mean, however, that the Western countries are bound from the outset to be losers in this new phase in East-West relations. On the contrary, when faced with the intransigent Soviet attitude at Geneva, the Western statesmen stood firm by their position. The last few weeks have seen a greater firmness in their attitude, which is only to be welcomed. Moreover, the democratic forces in our countries are strong enough to resist not only subversive activity but also any attempt to form Popular Fronts, which., if they came to power, would soon adopt a policy of neutrality and abandonment of the Atlantic Pac

11. The West's reply to the new Soviet tactics must be clear and precise : the Western countries have always formally rejected recourse to war as a means of settling disputes. They wish to replace the cold war which was in fact begun by the Soviet Union, by a genuine peace, eliminating all cause of conflict and of tension. The Western Powers have given proof of their desire to reach agreement. If the U. S. S. R. wishes to benefit by the " détente ", it must itself make a contribution. It would be paradoxical to agree with the Soviet Union that security is already assured, when the Red Army still occupies half of Europe and the U. S. S. R. continues to use the Communist parties in the democratic countries to serve the long-term aims of international Communism

12. The problems for which a general solution must be found before we can speak of genuine peace are the following : guarantee of European security, disarmament, re-unification of Germany. These problems are interdependent, since no one of them can be solved without a solution of the others. There can, for instance, be no stable system of European security without a unified Germany. Similarly, the creation of a system of European security is bound up with the progress of negotiations on world disarmament. The constitution of a united Europe, moreover, appears indispensable to the consolidation of peace, since it will mean that armed conflict or even acute tension between European nations will become impossible. Each of these problems is discussed separately in a subsequent chapter.

13. If the West is to succeed in achieving genuine peace on a satisfactory basis, it must maintain a united front. So long as the U. S. S. R. can hope to break up the unity of the Western Powers it will be disinclined to make the slightest concession. It is more difficult to maintain unity of action among democratic countries in calm periods than in periods of tension, yet such unity is perhaps more important now than in any previous period of the cold war. In particular, this unity should be applied to whatever is the best means of exerting pressure still open to the West, that is, the restoration of normal trade relations. Nothing could be more dangerous than a race to Moscow in which each country tries to obtain better terms at its neighbours' expense. This new phase in East-West relations also involves the risk of premature optimism

which would weaken the West's position. Until this temporary armistice has been replaced by a genuine peace, we must continue our efforts to attain security. The period of détente may also have a favourable influence on developments within the Soviet Union. For the first time for many years the Russian people have been able to read, A'erbatim, the statements made by Western politicians. The Soviet leaders have been induced to relinquish some of their slogans about warmongering statesmen in the Western democracies. Visas have been issued to tourists and to journalists, and foreign travel permitted to a greater number of Soviet nationals. These human contacts, like the exchange of ideas with the outer world and the establishment of cultural relations between East and West, are likely to have a favourable effect in giving the Russian people a better understanding of the Western democracies. There has been much talk in recent months about the visits by parliamentarians of the democratic countries to the U. S. S. R. Members of Parliament regard such visits as no more than an opportunity to gain firsthand information. Their hosts construe them, however, as an implied recognition of the democratic character of Soviet institutions. Such an interpretation is entirely unwarranted. In short, the new Geneva spirit may have favourable consequences provided it is the precursor of a genuine peaceful coexistence. This will require long and patient efforts by the combined Western Powers with the object of securing for the world a structure affording guarantees of a stable peace.

3. PART II - Security and disarmamentt

14. At the outset it should once more be recalled that there can be no question of European security as long as Soviet troops remain in the heart of Europe against the will of peoples deprived of all right to free expression. The Soviet policy of arming and com-munising Central and Eastern Europe by force has made it necessary to establish and then to strengthen the Atlantic Pact. There can be no question of radically changing overnight a situation resulting from many years of cold war. As world disarmament progresses, this situation must be replaced step by step by a new system of collective security

.The objection has frequently been raised that land forces are no longer as important as they used to be. Nevertheless, pending disarmament, we are obliged to take into consideration both categories of weapons, conventional as well as atomic. The aggression in Korea proved that wars could, for strategic or political reasons, be waged without the use of atomic weapons. In such cases the land forces regain their importance of former years.

15. The objection has frequently been raised that land forces are no longer as important as they used to be. Nevertheless, pending disarmament, we are obliged to take into consideration both categories of weapons, conventional as well as atomic. The aggression in Korea proved that wars could, for strategic or political reasons, be waged without the use of atomic weapons. In such cases the land forces regain their importance of former years.

16. Both during the Geneva Conference and the German-Soviet talks in Moscow, the Soviet leaders argued that in the present circumstances neither of the two parties could afford to abandon the guarantee of security offered by the position of their armies. From this they inferred that both security systems must remain in force for the moment, with both of them including a part of Germany. They considered it necessary, first of all, to establish a system of collective security whereby the existing agreements would remain intact during the first stage, being supplemented only by a pact of non-agression and for the peaceful settlement of disputes. In the second stage, this system would replace N. A. T. 0., W. E. U. and the Warsaw Treaty. As an alternative to this proposal the Western Powers have suggested an idea which takes into consideration both the need for German reunification and the desire of the major Powers to maintain their strategic position for the moment. They have reaffirmed that N. A. T. 0. and W. È. U. have purely defensive aims. If a reunified Germany, possessing full freedom of choice, decides to remain a party to these agreements, as is probable, such a decision need imply no threat to the Soviet Union. However, it might be offered certain additional guarantees concerning the military status of the new Germany. M. Edgar Faure has suggested something to this effect : that after reunification the maximum level of the German Army should remain at the figure now fixed for the Federal Republic. He also proposes that the "Big Four " should undertake a two-fold commitment withdrawing the Atlantic Pact guarantees from any Government resorting to violence, and taking note of the Federal Rerjublic's declaration not to have recourse to arms. Lastly, M. Faure has proposed that the new Germany should be incorporated in a general security system which should supersede the present defence arrangements. Sir Anthony Eden has proposed that the " Big Four " and reunited Germany should conclude a mutual security pact against all aggression (in other words, a new Locarno), linked with a scheme for the mutual limitation of armaments and for control to be established in Germany and neighbouring countries, and the creation of a demilitarised zone between East and West. Since then the Western Powers have combined their various suggestions into one single proposal, which will be presented to the Soviet Government at the forthcoming meeting in Geneva. This proposal provides for the setting up of a " zone of reduced tension " on either side of the Oder-Neisse line of demarcation. This zone would not be entirely demilitarised, but the strength of the forces on both sides of the line would be considerably reduced, and they would be stationed at points fixed by mutual agreement. The unified Germany would remain free to join N.A.T.O if it so desired. The establishment of such a zone would, obviously, have to be associated with a gradual limitation of armaments on a world-wade scale; otherwise it would lead to what would amount to a neutralisation of Europe, surrounded by world Powers continuing to arm. The present proposal to create a " zone of reduced tension " seems at first sight more satisfactory than the one made at Geneva to establish a completely demilitarised zone. It goes without saying that in the minds of its authors the latter proposal Avas bound up Avith the reunification of Germany. But even in that context it presented considerable strategic risks. At all events, a demilitarised zone even including only a part of the Federal Republic might expose not only Germany itself but also Denmark and perhaps Benelux, and might make any defence of Western Europe against aggression strategically impossible. It might thus lead to a ale facto neutralisation of Western Europe. Conversely, the demilitarisation of the present Soviet zone of occupation in Germany would not have proportionate consequences for the Eastern forces, owing to the depth of their hinterland.

17. To the extent that the opposition to German reunification is due to fear of a surprise attack, such control and the reduction of forces in the zone of reduced tension to the level indispensable for defence would serve to allay the fears of the Soviet Government, while avoiding too serious strategic risks. It should be recalled that the commitments undertaken by the Federal Republic in the framework of W. E. U. already stipulate the voluntary and supervised renunciation of certain heavy armaments, without which aggression is in any case impossible. Any violation of these commitments would lead to sanctions of the severest kind. We are now entitled to ask the Soviet Government to make an equivalent gesture of appeasement by accepting the partial demilitarisation of territories under its military control. In the Paris Agreements (Resolution of Association of the North Atlantic Council with the tripartite declarations) the Federal Republic also undertook " never to haA'e recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic ". The Western Powers agreed to guarantee this undertaking. The Government of a unified Germany would probably be as. willing as that of the Federal Republic to renew this pledge with regard to the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, applying it more particularly to the renunciation of any attempt to modify the Oder-Neisse demarcation line by force. Such an undertaking would not imply recognition of this frontier. Despite affirmations to the contrary by the Soviet Union, repeated in the TASS statement published immediately after Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Moscow, the Potsdam Agreement which bears the signature of the Heads of the Govcrnmerits of the " Big Three " stipulates in its Chapter V that, " pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement ", any changes in the Eastern frontiers of Germany would only be of a provisional character. This attitude was reaffirmed by the member countries of N. A, T. 0. in the Paris Agreements (Resolution of Association of the NATO Council with the tripartite declarations) which state that " the final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement " (i. e. peace settlement). The Western Foreign Ministers emphasised this position once more in the communiqué published in New York on September 28th and in the Western Note to the Soviet Government of October 3rd. It is when the peace treaty is in process of negotiation that a just solution should be found to this problem.

18. This scheme would be completed by a non-aggression pact, which, though it would in no way affect the obligation already contracted under the United Nations Charter which all democratic countries would at all times respect, might, nevertheless, prove a further means of allaying the fears of the U. S. S. R.

19. Mutual security must at the present time also include safeguards against any interference, either direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of other countries, a principle which the U. S. S. R. has proclaimed in many of its official statements. A disbanding of the Çominform would logically follow, and should not merely be a formal gesture but a severance of all links between Moscow and the various Communist parties. It is to be regretted that this request was not'stated in more vigorous terms by the Heads of the Western Governments in Geneva, when it had already been submitted at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandoeng, as well as by Prime Minister Nehru.

20. Although limited to the continent of Europe such a settlement of European security should be linked with a world plan for disarmament. Security in our time is indivisible. Negotiations for the establishment of this system of European security must be conducted in close connection with the negotiations on disarmament. With regard to the reduced level lo be reached by the forces of the countries concerned, the acceptance by the U. S. S. R. of the figures proposed in the Franco-British plan provides negotiators with a common point of departure for determining mutual objectives. In spite of the demobilisation—-which, incidentally, cannot be verified—of 640,000 soldiers of the Red Army, there are still, according to Western estimates, four million Soviet men under arms. Mr. Stassen has stated before the United Nations that the American forces amount to 2.9 millions. The figures supplied on this occasion arc further proof of the extent to which the United States demobilised at the end of the last war. Rearmament has been imposed upon them, as on the Western European countries, only by the maintenance and reinforcement of the Red Army and satellite forces. Moreover, the Soviet Government is constantly raising the problem of the evacuation of bases on foreign territory. The abandonment of the Soviet base at Porkkala on Finnish territory was presumably to be the sign for beginning the evacuation of American bases in Europe. However, there is obviously no connection between a military base imposed on a foreign country and military bases set up under a defensive alliance and by mutual agreement among allied countries. So far as control is concerned, the interesting development at Geneva was the abandonment of former plans for total and permanent inspection in favour of new methods of protection against surprise attack. In his letter to President Eisenhower, dated September 22nd, Marshal Bulganin declared that he agreed in principle with the Eisenhower proposal concerning exchange of aerial photographs provided this step was taken as part of a total plan for progressive disarmament. In his reply of 13th October, President Eisenhower expressed his agreement in principle with the proposals made by the U. S. S. R. on 10th May, 1955, and later at the Geneva Conference, to establish international supervision of ports, railway centres, arterial highways and airfields of all countries signatory to the Disarmament Convention. Experience has shown, however, that, so long as the activity of the international control officials is confined to these objects alone, their efficacy will be small, as was evident in the case of the Armistice Commission in Korea. The action of control groups is directly proportionate to their liberty of movement. 11. would, above all, appear that the U. S. S. R. maintains its view that any control authority should be linked with the Security Council and thus subject to the right of veto. Such a right would render all control illusory. The Western Powers should continue to insist on the establishment of an effective system of control such as can alone instil the confidence necessary to encourage the Powers to reduce their forces. Such a system of control should be incorporated in the draft disarmament treaty which the United Nations Commission was instructed to draw up in 1952. Every possible effort should be made forthwith to ensure the preparation of a general draft embodying specific undertakings on conventional and nuclear weapons, on the reduction of armed forces and on control. With a view to creating the basis for genuine confidence, within a limited experimental field, Great Britain has proposed that there be established, under present political circumstances, a " controlled zone comprising areas situated on either side of the Iron Curtain ". The Soviet and NATO High Commands would begin by declaring the forces,' armaments and installations which they possessed in the zone. The two sides would be equally represented in a controlling body. This controlling body would appoint joint inspection teams which would enjoy the fullest freedom of movement and would have right of access to all installations. Admittedly, such a project would provide both sides with useful experience, but if such a measure were adopted in Germany in isolation from the problem of reunification it would mean postponing the solution of that problem. To establish a zone of this exceptional nature on German territory would give that territory the character of a partially demilitarised zone. This, as we have said above, is feasible, in spite of some risks, but it can be conceived only as a concession to the U. S. S. R. in return for the reunification of Germany. The simultaneous search for a solution of the problems which divide East and West in Europe would be facilitated by some real progress towards the reduction of armaments and disarmament. Conversely, a solution of these problems would encourage the Powers to accept armaments reductions. Hence the necessity for progress in both spheres simultaneously.

21. The problems of European security which concern all European countries cannot, of course, be solved in their absence. A quadripartite agreement presupposes prior consultation with the other interested countries. When this quadripartite agreement has been concluded, under these conditions, with regard to general principles it will be the task of a full Conference, in which all interested countries will participate, to lay down the detailed application of these principles.

4. PART III - German unity

22. The Assembly should place the strongest emphasis on the need for the immediate peaceful establishment of German unity. Marshal Bulganin stated at Geneva that the time for reunification had not yet come—an opinion which has no valid political, economic or social arguments, still less moral arguments, in its favour. The German people has been arbitrarily divided for ten years, and there is no reason for depriving it of its right to regain unity by peaceful means in accordance with its wishes. The events of 17th June, 1953 in East Berlin proved that the desire for reunification is as strong to the East as to the West of the Elbe; it differs only in that to the inhabitants of the Eastern Zone unity also means freedom. Whatever treaties may be signed, it is not until Germany is reunited that Europe will feel secure. Being fully alive to this risk, the Assembly should strongly emphasise the inadequacy and danger of concluding any agreement with the U. S. S. R. which does not make specific provision for German reunification. A connection should be established between the adoption of a system of European security and the reunification of Germany, and successive parallel stages should be laid down for the realization of those two objectives. Such a procedure does not in any way imply that the solution of the German problem is recognised as a preliminary condition to the solution of the other. However, the two questions are so closely bound up with each other that they cannot be settled separately. This was recognised by the three Western Foreign Ministers when they declared in the communiqué issued at the close of the Conference in New York on September 28th : " They have decided, in particular, to give priority to the reunification of Germany as part of a plan for European Security.

23. The tactics which the Soviet Government intends to pursue in this connection became clear when Chancellor Adenauer visited Moscow. Ever since the Berlin Conference of February, 1954 the Soviet leaders had been asserting that any settlement of European problems must be founded on the premise of two existing German States. But Chancellor Adenauer recently stated that not more than 10 % of the inhabitants of the Eastern Zone support the present Communist régime, which owes its existence entirely to Soviet support. To give it the appearance of real sovereignty, the Soviet Government on 20th September, just after the visit of Dr. Adenauer, signed a treaty at Moscow with a delegation of the Pankow Government, Article 1 of which states that : " The German Democratic Government is free to take decisions on internal or external questions, including relations with the German Federal Republic and the development of its relations with other States. " On the strength of this provision, the Soviet leaders will maintain more insistently than ever that reunification is primarily a matter to be settled between the two German Governments. However, the Soviet Government has deliberately preserved the principle of Four-Power responsibility for all-German affairs by giving its Pankow Ambassador the duty of " maintaining the necessary relations with the representatives of the United States, Great Britain and France in regard to questions concerning Germany as a whoie arising out of the decisions of the Four Powers." On the lines of the Paris Agreements, which provide for revision in the event of reunification (Annex I to the Protocol on the cessation of the occupation régime in the Federal Republic of Germany) a clause has been inserted in the Moscow Treaty (Art. 6) describing this agreement as provisional pending the restoration of German unity. It seems, moreover, that the U. S. S. R. has now arranged to impart an official character to the rearmament of the Eastern Zone—• a step which had, in fact, been carried out a long time previously, though the question was reserved when the Warsaw Treaty was signed. Following upon this Treaty, the Soviet Union will doubtless redouble its efforts to persuade the greatest possible number of non-Communist Governments to recognise the Pankow régime. The ultimate aim is that both the Western Powers and the Federal Republic will give way to this pressure and acknowledge the equal rights of Pankow and of Bonn. The Soviet Government, indeed, may not hesitate to further this purpose by bringing pressure to bear upon the Western troops in Berlin through the East German authorities

. Once the Government of Eastern Germany is placed on an equal footing with the. Federal Republic, there is a good chance, the Soviets think, that eventual reunification will lead to an extension of the Communist system to the whole of Germany, as the East German leaders already maintain,

24. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the U. S. S. R. and the Federal Republic of Germany forms part of the process— and to achieve it the Soviet Government did not hesitate to use coercion with regard to the German prisoners still held in the U. S. S. R. It should be remembered that most German ex-prisoners-of-war were released by the Western countries at least six years ago. The fact remains that the Soviet Government has been careful to divide the credit for setting them free between Chancellor Adenauer and his rival, M. Grotewohl. In face of the link made between the liberation of 10,000 ox-prisoners and an unknown number of civilian internees, and the establishment of diplomatic relations, Dr. Adenauer was forced to accept an exchange of ambassadors without being able to enter upon any serious discussion of German reunification, as a preliminary to the negotiations which it rests with the four Great Powers to undertake. What Head of a democratic Government could have done otherwise? This decision by the Federal Government may produce the happy effect of enabling its representatives to help their Western colleagues in the delicate task of dispelling by direct contacts the mistrust constantly nurtured by the U. S. S. R. with regard to German policy. There is no reason at all to doubt the direction of German policy, which is based, as before, on the attachment of the Federal Republic to the Western community of nations. All the Western countries must realise that the aim of the Soviet Government is to arouse misgivings in them regarding Germany and so trouble the existing relations within the Western community. It is worth recalling a sentence from the Introductory Report of July, which stated that " the representatives from the other Member States of the Council of Europe " know that " German concern for reunification does not imply 'deserting friends' but reflects an attitude which would equally be that of other representatives were their countries similarly divided." The Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany has since approved the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U. S. S. R., subject to the two specific reservations already expressed by Chancellor Adenauer in a letter to Marshal Bulganin dated 14th September

. The two German reservations are in accord with the terms of the Paris Agreements (Resolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Council associating itself with the Three Power Declaration) which stipulate inter alia that the member countries of N. A. T. 0. " consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representatives of the German people in international affairs " and that " the final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await a peace settlement ". Thus the Western countries which are Members of N. A. T. 0.—and it is to be hoped that for the sake of solidarity other Members of the Council will follow suit—are entitled to reject the Soviet demand for recognition of the Pankow Government. A request to this effect will probably be made at the next Geneva Conference. The Western Foreign Ministers have already replied in advance to this request by stating in the New York Communiqué of September 28th, after reiterating the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreements, that they do not recognise either the régime introduced in Eastern Germany or the existence of a State in the Soviet zone. This attitude is confirmed in the recent Western Note to the Soviet Government delivered on 3rd October. The same applies to the Soviet request that representatives of the two Germanies should participate in the Four-Power Conferences— a request which has already appeared in the communiqué on the conference between Soviet and East German leaders. The participation of Western Germany in the Four-Power negotiations cannot be bargained against an acknowledgement that the Eastern Government has equal rights.

25. The forthcoming Geneva Conference will certainly see a resumption of the discussion on the manner in which the unification of Germany should take place. The Western proposal -will probably not depart from the Eden plan presented at the Berlin Conference in 1954 (free elections throughout the country under international control, followed by the formation of a central Government which would negotiate a final peace treaty). Marshal Bulganin expressed the hope in Moscow on September 10th that the representatives of the two Germanies would be able to reach common ground on the question of reunification. The Soviet Union has not moved from its previous position of asking first for tho formation of a central Government by putting the two existing Governments together. It is clear that in view of the complete absence of any democratic features in the Pankow Government, the Soviet argument cannot be accepted now any more than it could be in 1954.

5. PART IV - European unity

26. For the peoples brought together in the Council of Europe the achievement of European unity is a primary requirement and profound wish. It forms a basic contribution to European security and international peace. The creation of a United Europe bringing together all the European peoples constitutes, as stated in its Resolution 44, the best guarantee of security both for the peoples of Europe and for any neighbouring country. Their recent experience, as well as their geographical position, would always impose a strict policy of peace on Europeans. From this point of view there is no better guarantee for the U. S. S. R., should it really wish for a consolidation of peace, than the establishment of a United Europe.

27. We are bound to point out that the West cannot accept as final any settlement which would sanction the suppression of national independence and political liberty for a large number of peoples in Central and Eastern Europe. The schism of the Continent is one of the most serious forms of tension and insecurity. Acceptance of the status quo would imply an abandonment of democratic principles by the very countries which claim to defend them. Such an attitude would have a disastrous effect on the populations of Central and Eastern Europe where, as a result of the shortcomings of the Geneva Conference, the democratic elements are already likely to become discouraged and feel they are being abandoned by the West. Western use of force to modify the present situation in those countries will find no serious popular support. It is through peaceful negotiations that the freedom of all countries to decide their own political régime and social structure should be restored.

28. The aims which the Assembly could call to the attention of the Geneva negotiators are the establishment of a system of true security, the reunification of Germany and the forging of a Europe united in freedom. The promise of approaching these objectives has been improved by the spirit created by the direct and friendly contacts established in the course of the first Geneva Conference. Nevertheless, the atmosphere of euphoria resulting from relaxed tension, and its psychological effects on the democratic nations, involve the risk of weakening the position of our negotiators, of dividing them, and inducing them to grant ever-increasing concessions which would endanger the peace and independence of the European peoples. On the contrary, if the " Geneva spirit " is combined with a renewal of staunch and unfaltering European and Atlantic solidarity, it will lead to the consolidation of true peace.