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Report | Doc. 11579 | 15 April 2008
The functionning of democratic institutions in Armenia
Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)
Summary
While the outbreak of public resentment in Armenia, following the presidential election of 19 February 2008 and culminating in the tragic events of 1 March 2008, may have been unexpected, the Monitoring Committee considers that the underlying causes of the crisis are deeply rooted in the failure of the key institutions of the state, including the parliament and courts, to perform their functions in full compliance with democratic standards and the principles of the rule of law and the protection of human rights.
The Monitoring Committee condemns the arrest and continuing detention, without adequate judicial control, of scores of persons, including more than 100 opposition supporters and three members of parliament, on what appear to be politically motivated charges.
For Armenia to put an end to the current crisis and move forward with urgently needed reforms mentioned in the report, an open and constructive dialogue between all the political forces in Armenian society should be initiated. For such a dialogue to start, a number of pre-conditions should be met:
- an independent, transparent and credible inquiry into the events of 1 March and the circumstances that led to them, including the alleged excessive use of force by the police, should be carried out immediately. The international community should be ready to monitor and assist such an inquiry;
- the persons detained in connection with the recent events on allegedly artificial and politically motivated charges should be released at once;
- the recent amendments to the Law on Conducting Meetings, Assemblies, Rallies and Demonstrations, which run counter to European standards, should be revoked with immediate effect.
Unless these conditions are met and an open dialogue on the reforms is seriously engaged between the political forces in Armenia, the credibility of Armenia as a member of the Council of Europe is put into doubt. Therefore, in the committee’s opinion, the Assembly should consider the possibility of suspending the voting rights of the Armenian delegation to the Assembly at the opening of its June 2008 part-session, if no considerable progress has been made on these requirements by then.
A. Draft resolution
(open)1. On 19 February 2008, presidential
elections took place in Armenia. Although “administered mostly in
line with Council of Europe standards”, the ad hoc committee which
observed this election found a number of violations and shortcomings,
the most important of which were: unequal campaign conditions for
all candidates, lack of transparency of the election administration
and a complaints and appeals process that did not give complainants
access to an effective legal remedy. In addition, a number of cases
of electoral fraud were witnessed.
2. The Parliamentary Assembly regrets that the violations and
shortcomings observed did nothing to increase the currently lacking
public confidence in the electoral process and raised questions
among the Armenian public with regard to the legitimacy of the outcome
of the election. This lack of public confidence was the basis for
the peaceful protests that ensued after the announcement of the
preliminary results, initially tolerated by the authorities.
3. The Assembly deplores the clashes between the police and the
protesters and the escalation of violence on 1 March 2008, which
resulted in eight persons being killed and hundreds being injured.
The exact circumstances that led to the tragic events of 1 March,
as well as the manner in which they were handled by the authorities,
including the imposition of the state of emergency in Yerevan from
1 to 20 March 2008 and the alleged excessive use of force by the
police, are issues of considerable controversy and should be the
subject of a credible independent investigation.
4. The Assembly condemns the arrest and continuing detention
of scores of persons, including more than 100 opposition supporters
and three members of parliament, on what appear to be politically
motivated charges. This constitutes a de facto crackdown on the
opposition by the authorities.
5. In a welcome development, and upon an initiative of the new
President, Mr Serzh Sargsyan, four of the five parties in parliament
signed, on 21 March 2008, an agreement to form a coalition government.
However, the fact that the Heritage Party, as well as the extra-parliamentary
parties which supported the candidature of Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan
did not join the coalition reduces the chances that this agreement
will put an end to the current crisis in Armenia.
6. While the outbreak of public resentment, culminating in the
tragic events of 1 March 2008, may have been unexpected, the Assembly
believes that the underlying causes of the crisis are deeply rooted
in the failure of the key institutions of the state to perform their
functions in full compliance with democratic standards and the principles
of the rule of law and the protection of human rights. More specifically:
6.1. the national assembly of Armenia
has so far failed to play its role as a forum for political debate and
compromise between the different political forces. This leaves the
opposition little other option than to take its case to the streets.
Based on a “winner takes it all” attitude, the current political
system excludes the opposition from any effective participation
in the decision-making process and governance of the country;
6.2. as a result of a flawed electoral process, a considerable
part of the political spectrum in Armenia is not represented in
the current national assembly. The lack of public trust in this
process also generally undermines the legitimacy of the outcome
of the elections in the eyes of the Armenian public. This is further
compounded by the lack of impartiality of the election administration,
the ineffective handling of election complaints and appeals and
the lack of transparency of the vote count and tabulation procedures;
6.3. despite legislative reforms, the courts still lack the
necessary independence to inspire the public’s trust as impartial
arbiters including in the context of the electoral process; this
explains the low number of electoral-related complaints filed with
them. The same lack of judicial independence is also reflected in
the fact that the courts do not appear to question the necessity
of keeping in detention persons pending trial and generally grant
relevant requests by the prosecutors without properly weighing the grounds
given for this, as required by Article 5, paragraph 3, of the European
Convention on Human Rights;
6.4. in the absence of adequate judicial control, the arrest
and continuing detention of persons solely for their participation
in the protest after the presidential election – without proof that
they have committed violent crimes themselves – or on seemingly
artificial charges after contesting the fairness of the presidential
election, can only but point to the political motivation of such
acts and thus the existence of what are alleged political prisoners
in Armenia. This is unacceptable in a Council of Europe member state
and cannot be tolerated by the Assembly;
6.5. the current level of control by the authorities of the
media and their regulatory bodies, as well as the absence of a truly
independent and pluralist public broadcaster, impede the creation
of a pluralistic media environment and further exacerbate the lack
of public trust in the political system.
7. A few days before the expiry of the state of emergency, on
17 March 2008, upon the government’s proposal, the national assembly,
in an extraordinary session and without any debate, adopted a series
of amendments to the Law on Conducting Meetings, Assemblies, Rallies
and Demonstrations which considerably limit the right of freedom
of assembly and give great discretionary powers to the authorities
to prohibit political rallies and demonstrations. They thus run
counter to European standards, as enshrined, inter
alia, in Article 11 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, and are in breach of Armenia’s obligations and commitments as
a member state of the Council of Europe. In a joint draft opinion,
the European Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council
of Europe (Venice Commission) and the OSCE/ODIHR also considered
these amendments to be unacceptable.
8. In view of the above, the Assembly recalls its Resolution 1532 (2007) on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Armenia
and urges once more the Armenian authorities to undertake the following reforms
without further delay:
8.1. the
political system should be reformed with a view to giving a proper
place and proper rights to the opposition;
8.2. the electoral process needs to be thoroughly reformed
with a view to ensuring in particular: an impartial election administration
that is free from control by one particular political force; a fully transparent
administration of the election process especially with regard to
the vote count and tabulation process, and a complaints and appeals
process that gives electoral stakeholders the fullest possible access
to a legal remedy in case of perceived electoral violations; an
equal playing field in practice for all political forces both during
the official campaign period, but also prior to it, must be guaranteed;
8.3. the independence from any political interest of both the
National Television and Radio Commission and the Public Television
and Radio Council must be guaranteed. In addition, the composition
of these bodies should be revised in order to ensure that they are
truly representative of Armenian society. The recommendations made
by the Venice Commission and Council of Europe experts in this respect
must finally be taken into account. The Assembly reiterates that,
apart from reforming the legislation, the authorities must take
steps to ensure freedom and pluralism of the public television and
radio on a day-to-day basis. Also, the harassment by the tax authorities
of opposition electronic and printed media outlets must be stopped;
8.4. freedom of assembly must be guaranteed in both law and
practice, in compliance with Article 11 of the European Convention
on Human Rights; this requires that the amendments recently adopted
by the national assembly on the Law on Conducting Meetings, Assemblies,
Rallies and Demonstrations be revoked with immediate effect;
8.5. the authorities should step up their efforts to guarantee
a truly independent judiciary and enhance the public’s trust in
the courts;
8.6. arbitrary arrests and detentions, as well as the illtreatment
of detainees, in particular during police custody, should be stopped.
An effective public control mechanism over the police must be guaranteed both
in law and in practice.
9. For their part, all opposition forces should recognise the
authority of the Constitutional Court’s decision which confirmed
the results of the elections as announced by the Central Electoral
Commission. This should not be interpreted as the obligation to
accept the merits of the court’s decision. All electoral contestants
have the right to challenge this decision by the legal means available
to them, including the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
10. The Assembly believes that the only way to put an end to the
current institutional crisis in Armenia and allow the country to
move forward with the above-mentioned urgently needed reforms is
the initiation of an open and constructive dialogue between all
political forces in Armenian society. The Assembly had already pointed
out the need for such a dialogue as a requirement to ensure the
effective implementation of the constitutional reform when adopting
its Resolution 1532 (2007) more than a year ago.
11. Taking into account that a considerable part of the political
spectrum in Armenia is not represented in the current national assembly,
such dialogue should include both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political
forces. The Assembly stands ready to mediate between the different
forces and ensure the full involvement of the expert bodies of the
Council of Europe in this process, most notably that of the Venice Commission.
12. However, the Assembly considers that, for such a dialogue
to start and be successful, a number of conditions need to be met
as a matter of priority, in order to build confidence vis-à-vis
the opposition and provide proof that the ruling majority is seriously
committed to pursuing further reforms:
12.1. an independent, transparent and credible inquiry into
the events of 1 March and the circumstances that led to them, including
the alleged excessive use of force by the police, should be carried
out immediately. The international community should be ready to
monitor and assist such an inquiry;
12.2. the charges against all opposition supporters and members
of parliament arrested after the presidential election who did not
personally commit any violent acts should be dropped and the detained persons
– who are alleged political prisoners – should be freed at once;
12.3. the amendments recently adopted by the national assembly
to the Law on Conducting Meetings, Assemblies, Rallies and Demonstrations
should be revoked with immediate effect.
13. Unless these conditions are met and an open dialogue on the
reforms mentioned in paragraph 8 above is seriously engaged between
the political forces in Armenia, the credibility of Armenia as a
member of the Council of Europe is put into doubt. The Assembly
should therefore consider the possibility of suspending the voting
rights of the Armenian delegation to the Assembly at the opening
of its June 2008 part-session, if no considerable progress has been
made on these requirements by then.
14. The Assembly will continue to follow closely the situation
in Armenia on the basis of information provided by its Monitoring
Committee, in particular as regards progress in the fulfilment of
the above-mentioned preconditions.
B. Explanatory memorandum, by Mr Colombier and Mr Prescott
(open)1. Background
1. On 19 February 2008, presidential
elections took place in Armenia. This election was considered to
be a touchstone for the political will and ability of the authorities
to organise genuinely democratic elections and to consolidate democratic
progress in Armenia. In addition, it was also considered an important
indicator regarding the future political direction of the country
as the incumbent President, Robert Kocharyan, could not stand for
re-election as a result of the constitutional two-term limit.
2. The dynamics of this election changed with the unexpected
candidature of former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who was the
first President of Armenia from 1991 to 1998. His candidature considerably
increased the competitive nature of this election, which would otherwise
have been considered won in advance by the candidate of the ruling
Republican Party, Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan, and substantially
sharpened the rhetoric in the run-up to these elections.
3. An ad hoc committee of the Bureau of the Parliamentary Assembly
observed the election as part of the International Election Observation
Mission (IEOM), which also included delegations of the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly (OSCE-PA), the European Parliament (EP) and the Election
Observation Mission of the Organization for Co-operation and Security
in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(OSCE/ODIHR). The report of the ad hoc committee was presented to
the Assembly in Doc. 11564 (2008). In this memorandum we will only make reference
to its main findings and conclusions.
4. In its statement of preliminary findings and conclusions,
delivered the day after the election, the IEOM concluded that “The
presidential elections in Armenia, on 19 February 2008, were administered
mostly in line with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards
[…] However, further improvements and commensurate political will
are required to address remaining challenges such as: the absence
of a clear separation between state and party functions, the lack
of public confidence in the electoral process and ensuring equal
treatment among election contestants”.
5. The lack of public confidence in the electoral process and
its outcome has been one of the main obstacles for the conduct of
democratic elections in Armenia. For the Pre-electoral Mission that
visited Armenia from 29 to 31 January 2008, this lack of trust was
considered to be the main challenge for the authorities with respect
to the conduct of this presidential election. Regrettably, the ad
hoc committee that observed the election concluded in its report
that the unequal campaign conditions, the problems noted during
the vote count and tabulation, as well as with the handling of election
related complaints, did nothing to increase the public trust in
the election process.
6. On 24 February, the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Armenia
announced the final results of the election which showed that, with
a 70% turnout, Mr Serzh Sargsyan from the ruling Republican Party
won the election with 52.7% of the votes, making a second round
unnecessary. Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan gained 21.5% of the votes and
former Speaker Mr Artur Baghdasaryan 16.7% of the votes.
7. Immediately after the announcement of the preliminary results
on 20 February 2008, Mr Ter-Petrosyan claimed that the elections
were marred by “widespread falsification and violations” and that
in reality he had won the election. In addition, Mr Artur Baghdasaryan
questioned the legitimacy of the election as a result of alleged
violations and Mr Vahan Hovhannisyan, who came in fourth in the
election, resigned from his post as Deputy Speaker of the national
assembly as a result of the irregularities he alleged had occurred
during the elections.
8. Taking into account the lack of public confidence in the election
process and the denunciation of the election as fraudulent by most
of the opponents to Serzh Sargsyan, it is not surprising that many
people rallied behind Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan when he called for
rallies to protest the outcome of the election. And this despite
that fact that he had already declared the election as fraudulent
before it had taken place. Following the announcement of the preliminary
election results, daily peaceful protest rallies were organised
by the campaign of Mr Ter-Petrosyan and a permanent tent camp was
put up on Freedom Square.
9. The protest rallies and marches were initially tolerated by
the authorities. However, on 23 February, President Kocharyan hardened
the official discourse when he classified the protests as an “illegal
attempt to take power”.
10. The opposition received a boost in support when a number of
high-level state officials publicly denounced the election as fraudulent
and announced their support for Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan. These officials were
subsequently dismissed from their positions and a number of them,
as well as several opposition activists, were arrested on seemingly
artificial charges, which left the impression that their prosecution
was politically motivated. According to the Helsinki Association
of Armenia, a total of 14 persons were arrested and placed under
investigation in the period from 20 to 29 February 2008.
11. On 26 February, Prime Minister and President-elect, Serzh
Sargsyan, extended an offer for co-operation to the other presidential
candidates. On 29 February 2008, this offer was accepted by Artur
Baghdasaryan after reaching a political agreement on the content
of their co-operation.
12. Presidential candidates Mr Tigran Karapetyan and Mr Levon
Ter-Petrosyan appealed the results of the election with the Constitutional
Court on 27 and 29 February 2008 respectively. In line with legal
provisions, these two cases were joined by the Constitutional Court,
which then had up to 10 days, until 9 March 2008, to issue its judgment.
13. The exact circumstances that led to the tragic events of 1
March 2008, as well as the manner in which they were handled by
the authorities, including the declaration of the state of emergency,
must be subject to an official independent investigation. However,
according to the official version, in the early morning of 1 March 2008,
the police attempted a search of the tent camp on Freedom Square.
After they met with resistance from the protesters, the police took
the decision to clear the tent camp. During this action, 31 persons
were injured – according to official information – and Mr Levon
Ter-Petrosyan was placed under de facto house arrest. 
The protesters
reconvened later in the afternoon in another part of Yerevan, which
led to clashes between the police and protesters. In the evening
of 1 March, the situation had deteriorated to such an extent – with
seven protesters and one policeman dead (according to official figures)
– that President Kocharyan decided that the situation was affecting
the stability of the country and declared a state of emergency in
Yerevan.
The protesters
reconvened later in the afternoon in another part of Yerevan, which
led to clashes between the police and protesters. In the evening
of 1 March, the situation had deteriorated to such an extent – with
seven protesters and one policeman dead (according to official figures)
– that President Kocharyan decided that the situation was affecting
the stability of the country and declared a state of emergency in
Yerevan.14. Following the declaration of the state of emergency, a considerable
number of supporters of Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan were arrested on
criminal charges, including the attempt to overthrow the government,
in what can only be considered as a de facto crackdown on the opposition.
This crackdown has exacerbated the already tense and polarised atmosphere
in the country.
15. On the request of the President of the Parliamentary Assembly,
the chairman of the ad hoc committee that observed the presidential
election, Mr John Prescott, visited Armenia, on 7 and 8 March 2008,
in order to assess the post-electoral situation on the spot and
explore avenues to defuse the political crisis and promote dialogue.
His findings and conclusions were presented to the Monitoring Committee
at its meeting in Paris, on 18 March 2008, and led to the adoption
of a statement by the Committee. They are an integral part of the present
report.
16. On Saturday, 8 March, the Constitutional Court issued a decision
on the appeals filed by Mr Tigran Karapetyan and Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan,
in which it rejected the appeals and confirmed the results of the election
as announced by the CEC. However, the Constitutional Court also
found that certain aspects of the complaints and appeals process
should be clarified in the Election Code and referred a number of
election violations to the office of the general prosecutor for
investigation and prosecution.
17. Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan refuses to accept the validity of the
Constitutional Court’s decision as this decision was made under
the state of emergency. According to him, the state of emergency
precludes any decision on an election appeal, as the constitution
stipulates that an election, including its appeal process, cannot
be held under a state of emergency. This argument was rejected by
the Constitutional Court.
18. Two provisions of the decree establishing the state of emergency
were lifted on 10 March 2008 and the provisions regarding the media
where partially lifted on 13 March 2008. The rest of its provisions
were lifted on 20 March 2008 when the decree expired. However, three
days before its expiry, on 17 March 2008, the parliament, in extraordinary
session, adopted a series of controversial amendments to the law
on conducting meetings assemblies, rallies and demonstrations. These
amendments, which will be discussed more in detail later in this
report, considerably limit the right of freedom of assembly and
give great discretionary powers to the authorities to prohibit political
rallies and demonstrations. As a result, not only the relevant provisions
of the decree establishing the state of emergency remained de facto
in force, but also their scope of application was extended to cover
the whole territory of Armenia.
19. After the state of emergency was lifted, several thousand
people congregated in the centre of Yerevan to remember those who
died during the events of 1 March. In addition, several forms of
protests, such as silent marches and human chains were both organised
and erupted spontaneously. In reaction the police arbitrarily detained
scores of people, including, reportedly, innocent bystanders for
their alleged participation in these protest actions. Most protesters
were released, without being charged, several hours later. The detention
of opposition activists for their participation in the protest before
and on 1 March continues unabated, undermining the possibilities
for a constructive dialogue between the authorities and the opposition.
20. In a welcome development, four of the five parties in parliament
signed, on 21 March 2008, an agreement to form a coalition government.
However, the fact that the Heritage Party, as well as the extra-parliamentary
parties which supported the candidature of Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan
during the elections, did not join the coalition reduces the chances
that the latter could lead to an end of the current crisis in Armenia.
21. While the events following the presidential election may have
come unexpected, the underlying causes for the current crisis in
Armenia have been long-standing concerns of the Assembly and were
all raised in previous reports by the Monitoring Committee. They
include: the total lack of public trust in the electoral process
and its outcome, the polarised political environment and the lack
of political dialogue between the authorities and the opposition,
as well as the absence of freedom of the media and an increasing
control of the ruling forces over society.
2. Electoral process
22. Until 2007, none of the elections
organised in Armenia were considered to be in line with Council
of Europe standards for democratic elections. In its Resolution 1361 (2004), adopted in January 2004, the Assembly urged the Armenian
authorities to reform its Election Code and to make clear steps
to end the impunity for electoral fraud and election related offences.
In line with this recommendation, the authorities amended the Election
Code in 2005. Further amendments were adopted in 2006, following
the constitutional reform which modified the electoral system in
Armenia. The Election Code was further amended in 2007, in the run-up
to the parliamentary elections that were scheduled for 12 May 2007.
23. In its joint opinion on the amended Election Code, the Venice Commission and the
OSCE/ODIHR concluded that the Election Code provides an adequate
basis for the conduct of democratic elections, if the electoral
stakeholders exercise the necessary political will and if the Election
Code is implemented in good faith.
the Venice Commission and the
OSCE/ODIHR concluded that the Election Code provides an adequate
basis for the conduct of democratic elections, if the electoral
stakeholders exercise the necessary political will and if the Election
Code is implemented in good faith.24. The joint opinion also raises a number off important issues
that remain to be addressed and which are of concern to the Assembly,
such as, inter alia, the limitations
of passive voting rights for Armenians holding dual citizen-ship, the
provisions regulating election complaints and appeals, as well as
the decision not to introduce the inking of voters’ fingers as a
mechanism to prevent multiple voting by the same person.
the
provisions regulating election complaints and appeals, as well as
the decision not to introduce the inking of voters’ fingers as a
mechanism to prevent multiple voting by the same person.25. On 12 May 2007, parliamentary elections took place in Armenia,
which showed a welcome improvement in the conduct of the electoral
process. The IEOM for these elections, of which the Assembly was
part, unanimously concluded that these elections “demonstrated improvement
and were conducted largely in accordance with Council of Europe
and OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections.
The Armenian authorities and other actors in the electoral process
took steps to address previous shortcomings, but were unable to
fully deliver a performance consistent with their stated intention
that the elections would meet international standards and some issues
remained unaddressed”. However, in its report to the Assembly, the
ad hoc committee that observed these elections also noted that “shortcomings
and irregularities, some of which were serious, observed during
the crucial vote count and tabulation processes stain the positive
[…] assessment”.
26. In the run-up to the presidential election, the authorities
frequently stated their clear intention to consolidate the improvements
in the electoral process noted during the 2007 parliamentary elections
and to hold a presidential election that would be fully in line
with international standards. The legal framework for the elections
was subsequently further amended in November and December 2007.
Although the Venice Commission was not in a position to deliver
an opinion on the latest changes to the Election Code, most amendments
seemed to address previous recommendations made by the Venice Commission,
as well as by the Assembly.
27. As mentioned, a key requirement for the translation of the
improvements in the Election Code into a more democratic conduct
of elections, is the implementation of its provisions in good faith
by all electoral stakeholders. Regrettably, as noted in the report
of the ad hoc committee that observed the presidential election,
while the authorities made improvements to the legal framework,
they did not demonstrate commensurate political will to ensure its
full implementation. This was especially true with regard to three aspects
that had a significant impact on the public confidence in the electoral
process: the election administration, the handling of election complaints
and appeals and the transparency of the vote count and tabulation
procedures.
28. As mentioned in the opinion of the Venice Commission, the
Election Code is highly detailed. As a result of this, as well as
of the several cycles of amendments to the code, several inconsistencies
and incoherencies exist that can lead to varying interpretations
which, in turn, can be used by different stakeholders for their political
purposes.
29. The Election Code stipulates that all election commissions
are composed in a manner that, in theory, guarantees a politically
balanced election administration. However, during the presidential
election, the leadership positions on commissions at all levels
were, by a very large majority, filled by representatives from the
parties that supported the candidature of the Prime Minister, or
by representatives of the President, who also openly supported his
candidature. A similar imbalance in the composition of the leadership
of the election commissions was also noted during the 2007 parliamentary
elections. This raises serious concerns about the control over the
election commissions by one political force, and seriously undermined
the confidence of the public and election contestants in the impartiality
of the election administration.
30. During the presidential election, the CEC held few formal
sessions, instead opting for informal working sessions. It is allowed
to do so by law, but this undermined the transparency of the election
administration.
31. Complaints against decisions, actions or inactions of subordinate
election commissions can be filed with the CEC. However, the Election
Code does not specify that the CEC must make a formal decision on complaints
received. As a result, the CEC did not consider most of the complaints
filed with it in a formal session. Moreover, decisions were often
made without giving due attention to the merits of the complaints
and often in the absence of the complainants. The manner in which
the election administration handled the complaints and appeals process
did not give complainants access to an effective legal remedy and,
again, undermined public confidence in the impartiality of the election
administration.
32. Reports of the ad hoc committees that observed the parliamentary
elections in 2007 and presidential election in 2008, noted that,
despite welcome efforts by the election administration, shortcomings
still exist with regard to the transparency of the counting and
tabulation processes. In the absence of such transparency, allegations
of electoral fraud can neither be confirmed nor dismissed by the
public itself. Given the lack of trust in the authorities, the public
will therefore be bound to attach more value to allegations and
rumours than to any official account by the authorities.
33. In this respect, the apparent lack of trust in the independence
of the judiciary as impartial arbiters in election disputes is a
further aggravating factor which explains the relatively few formal
complaints filed with the courts. Equally disturbing is the fact
that the report of the ad hoc committee notes that
a number of different interlocutors mentioned that the lack of formal
complaints may also have been caused by a fear of reprisal from the
authorities.
notes that
a number of different interlocutors mentioned that the lack of formal
complaints may also have been caused by a fear of reprisal from the
authorities.34. The Election Code provides for equal campaign conditions and
media access for all election contestants during the official campaign
period. However, the official campaign period is very short in comparison
to what can be considered as the de facto campaign period. While
the reports on both parliamentary and presidential elections showed
that unequal campaign conditions in favour of the ruling faction
already existed during the official campaign period, these unequal
conditions were exacerbated before this period. An equal playing
field for all political parties clearly does not exist in Armenia,
neither during, nor outside, the official campaign period. The remarks
by the President-elect that he would favour further shortening the
official campaign period are especially worrying in this respect.
3. Political system
35. In 2005, the Constitution of
Armenia was amended with close support from the Council of Europe,
most notably by its Venice Commission. This constitutional reform
improved the separation and balance of powers and made the system
of government more consistent with European standards for democracy
and the rule of law.
36. However, the report on the honouring of obligations and commitments
by Armenia, that was debated at the January 2007 part-session of
the Assembly, stressed that “effective implementation of the new
system of government requires an improvement in the political climate
and the institution of dialogue between the ruling coalition and
the opposition.”
37. Regrettably, very little progress in this regard has been
achieved in Armenia since this report was issued, which is one of
the underlying reasons for the current political crisis.
38. The political climate in Armenia is highly polarised and based
on the notion of “the winner takes it all”, where the ruling coalition
sets and implements its political agenda without any consultation
with, or regard for, the minority view of the opposition. As a result,
the opposition is ostracised and has no role in, or responsibility for,
the decision-making process and governance of the country. This
bypasses the rightful role of the national assembly as a forum for
political debate and compromise and leaves the opposition very few
other options than to take their case to the streets.
39. Regrettably, this is a self-perpetuating system. The exclusion
of the opposition; the unequal playing field between opposition
and ruling faction; an election system that is controlled by the
ruling majority; as well as often ill-conceived and obstructionist
strategies by the opposition – such as the boycott of the constitutional referendum
– have resulted in a fragmented opposition, which, in turn, has
reduced its representation in parliament.
40. It is clear that the current political system in Armenia does
not foster dialogue between the ruling faction and parliamentary
opposition. Moreover, as a result of this system, a significant
part of the political spectrum in Armenia is not represented in
parliament. Any constructive dialogue to resolve the current political
crisis should therefore include both parliamentary and extraparliamentary
political forces.
4. Media pluralism and freedom of expression
41. Media pluralism and the freedom
of the media in Armenia have long been a concern of the Assembly. In
their report to the Assembly, in January 2007, the co-rapporteurs
noted that the existence of pluralist media is one of the cornerstones
for a genuinely democratic election process. Regrettably, the concerns
in this respect voiced by the rapporteurs at that occasion continue
to be valid.
42. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media noted that
“limited pluralism in broadcasting remains a major problem” and
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe mentioned, in December
2007, that despite improvements in the legislation “the current
situation of Armenian media in general does not meet the standards
of the Council of Europe”.
43. The main regulatory body for the media is the National Television
and Radio Council, while public television and radio are overseen
by the Public Television and Radio Commission. The independence
of these two bodies is a main point of concern. All members of the
council are appointed by the President, while the members of the
commission are for one half appointed by the President and for one
half by the national assembly. Given the already described dynamics
in the Assembly, de facto this means that all members on these two
bodies are representatives of the ruling political faction. In addition,
these members can be dismissed at will by the President or national
assembly, which makes them vulnerable to political pressure.
44. As noted in the last report of the co-rapporteurs to the Assembly,
this lack of independence of the main regulatory body for the media
raises concerns about possible government influence over the media
that are regulated by it. The fact that two independent broadcasters,
A1+ and Noyan Tapan TV, have had their licences revoked seems to
confirm this.
45. In addition, the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions
of the IEOM that observed the presidential election, on 19 February,
noted that the campaign of the Prime Minister was consistently shown
in a positive fashion and with similar footage by all private media
outlets, which gave the impression that specific editorial policies
were applied and which raised questions about the editorial independence
of the broadcasters.
46. The composition of the Public Television and Radio Commission
and its lack of political independence hinder the pluralism of public
service news broadcasts, as was evident from the manner in which
the public broadcasters covered the post-election period. During
this period, public media gave extensive coverage of the views of
the authorities but ignored those who raised concerns about the
conduct of the 19 February elections.
47. Of specific concern is the harassment by the tax authorities
of media outlets that do not adhere to the policy line of the authorities.
Gala TV was subject to a tax inspection and fined 25 million DRAM
(approximately €56 000) after it aired footage of a rally by Levon
Ter-Petrosyan in September 2007 in which he attacked the government
record. In addition, tax inspections were reportedly launched against
four opposition dailies (Chorrord Ishkhanutyun,
Zhamanak-Yerevan, Haykakan Zhamanak, Aravot).
48. The print media in Armenia are more diverse and independent,
but, due to low circulation, only reach a limited number of people.
Moreover, the above-mentioned tax inspections against four opposition
dailies raise questions about how long pluralistic print media will
be tolerated by the authorities.
49. The absence of a pluralistic media environment had a strong
impact on the political atmosphere in the aftermath of the elections.
With the public having little or no trust in the official version
of the events, disproportional credit is given to rumours on the
street which, in return, undermines any attempt to restore trust in
the authorities and the political system.
5. State of emergency and mass arrests
50. On 1 March 2008, arguing that
the protests were deteriorating and affecting the stability of the
country, President Kocharyan declared the state of emergency in
Yerevan. The decree entered into force immediately after its announcement.
In line with constitutional provisions, the declaration of the state
of emergency was confirmed by the national assembly during a special
session on 2 March 2008.
51. The decree on the state of emergency laid down the following
temporary limitations in the territory that is subject to it:
i. prohibition of meetings, rallies, demonstrations, marches and other mass actions and events;
ii. prohibition of strikes and other events or actions that would hinder or stop the activities of organisations;
iii. limitation of the movement of individuals and allowing the searching of means of transportation by law enforcement bodies in case this is necessary;
iv. limitation of reporting and news coverage concerning the state and internal political issues by the mass media exclusively to official press releases of the state bodies;
v. prohibition of the dissemination of news flyers and other types of political propaganda without the permission of the corresponding state bodies;
vi. temporary cessation of the activities of parties and other public organisations that are hindering the elimination of circumstances that gave ground for the declaration of the state of emergency;
vii. expulsion of individuals that have breached the legal regime of the special rule and do not reside in the given territory, on account of their own means, and in the case of the absence of such means, on the account of the means of the state budget of the Republic of Armenia, on condition of later reimbursement of such expenses.
52. On 3 March 2008, pursuant to its obligations under the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and in accordance with Article
15, the Armenian authorities informed the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe of the derogation from, or limitation of, Article
8, paragraph 1, Article 10, paragraph 1, Article 11, paragraph 1,
as well as Article 2, paragraph 1, of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR
during the state of emergency.
53. Although the state of emergency was formally only declared
in Yerevan, a large number of provisions, especially those related
to the media and the activities of political parties and NGOs, had
a nationwide application. A number of broadcasters stopped operating,
either by their own decision, or forced by the national security
service. In addition, a number of news websites were taken offline
after intervention by the national security service. Restrictions
on rallies and demonstrations were not limited to Yerevan alone,
but also applied to other major cities in Armenia.
54. On 10 March 2008, the President of Armenia lifted the restrictions
on the freedom of movement, the restrictions on activities of parties
and public organisations, as well as the possibility of deportation
of non-Yerevan residents.
55. On 13 March, the President partially lifted the restrictions
on the media by changing them to “prohibit publications or disseminations
by mass media outlets of obviously false or destabilising information
on state and internal issues, or of calls to participate in unsanctioned
(illegal) activities, as well as publication and dissemination of
such information and calls by any other means and forms”.
56. However, the report of the Commissioner for Human Rights of
the Council of Europe, who visited Armenia from 12 to 15 March 2008,
noted that the changed media provisions had very little practical
effect on the news reporting and that the previous level of censorship
was de facto maintained.
57. The decree establishing the state of emergency expired on
20 March 2008 and its provisions were lifted.
58. Following the declaration of the state of emergency, scores
of people were arrested for their participation in the protest on
and prior to 1 March 2008. On 17 March 2008, the Helsinki Association
of Armenia published a detailed list of 61 persons who were detained
since the presidential election on 19 February, including 14 persons
who were detained in the period between 20 and 29 February 2008.
The prosecutor general announced that as of the end of March, 106
persons had been arrested in connection with the events of 1 March
2008, including three of the four MPs whose immunity was lifted
by parliament after they were charged with incitement or attempt
to usurp public power or coup d’etat under Article 300 of the Criminal
Code. In addition, according to official figures, 14 persons were
arrested between 20 and 29 March and 21 persons since the lifting
of the state of emergency. Reports by several non-governmental organisations
estimate the number of arrested persons considerably higher than
the official figures. Moreover, the detention of opposition figures
for their participation in the protest has continued unabated up
to the moment of writing this explanatory memorandum.
59. The report of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council
of Europe notes with concern allegations of possible ill-treatment
and use of excessive force by the police in connection with these
arrests.
60. Most persons arrested are charged with inciting mass disorder
(Article 225-3 of the Criminal Code), violence against a representative
of the authorities (Article 316 of the Criminal Code) and usurpation
of power (Article 300 of the Criminal Code). As also noted in the
report of the Commissioner, the wording of these provisions leaves
a great deal of discretion to the prosecutor and especially the
definition of usurpation of power “allows for a very broad interpretation
and fails to give clear guidance on the dividing line between legitimate
expressions of opinion and incitement to violence.”
61. The courts generally grant the prosecutors’ requests for a
two-month detention on remand without properly weighting whether
such detention is justified (see Article 5, paragraph 3 ECHR). This
fact raises questions about the independence of the judiciary and
the effectiveness of the courts’ role as a “check and balance” vis-à-vis
the powers of the prosecutors.
62. The arrest of persons solely for their participation in the
protest after the presidential election – without proof that they
committed violent crimes themselves – or on seemingly artificial
charges after voicing their opinion that the presidential election
was fraudulent, can only be construed as a crackdown by the authorities on
the opposition. This crackdown is undermining the possibilities
for a constructive dialogue between all political forces in Armenia.
In addition, the co-rapporteurs are seriously concerned about the
existence in Armenia of what are alleged political prisoners as
a result of the continued recourse to politically motivated detentions.
6. Amendments to the Law on Conducting Meetings, Assemblies, Rallies and Demonstrations
63. On 17 March 2008, in an extraordinary
session, the national assembly of Armenia, upon the government’s
proposal, adopted, in first and second reading on the same day,
the “Law on Amending and Supplementing the Republic of Armenia Law
on Conducting Meetings, Assemblies, Rallies and Demonstrations”.
This law was promulgated by the President of the Republic and entered
into force on 19 March 2008. On 21 March 2008, the Speaker of the
national assembly, Mr Tigran Torosyan, requested the opinion of
the Venice Commission on these amendments.
64. On 28 March 2008, the Venice Commission of the Council of
Europe and the OSCE/ODIHR issued a draft joint opinion on the amendments, which
was transmitted to the Speaker of the national assembly. In this opinion
the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR concluded that they do “not
consider the proposed amendments to be acceptable, to the extent
that they restrict further the right of assembly in a significant fashion”.
which
was transmitted to the Speaker of the national assembly. In this opinion
the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR concluded that they do “not
consider the proposed amendments to be acceptable, to the extent
that they restrict further the right of assembly in a significant fashion”.65. The most important amendments significantly extend the grounds
for imposing limitations upon, or prohibiting public events.
66. According to the original version of Article 6, paragraph
4.iii, of the law, public events could be prohibited “if such events
are aimed to overthrow forcibly the constitutional order, instigate
national, racial or religious hatred, campaign for violence or war”.
The amended text of this provision currently prohibits public events
“If, according to credible data, they are aimed at forcibly overthrowing
the constitutional order, or inflaming ethnic, racial, or religious
hatred, or preaching violence or war, or may lead to mass disorder
and crime, or to undermining the national security, the public order,
and the health and morality of society, or to encroachments on the
constitutional rights and freedoms of others. Such data may be considered
credible, if the police or the national security service adjunct
to the Government of the Republic of Armenia has issued an official
opinion on the data. In the same manner, the aforementioned bodies
issue an opinion on the discontinuance of such grounds. Such an
opinion is also issued in the event of paragraph 6 of this article.”
67. In addition, a new paragraph 6 was added to Article 9 that
added another ground for prohibiting mass public events: “In cases
when mass public events have turned into mass disorder that has
led to human casualties, then, in order to prevent new crimes, if
other means of prevention have been exhausted, the authorised body
may temporarily prohibit the conducting of mass public events until
discovering the crime circumstances and the persons that committed
crimes”.
68. While Article 11, paragraph 2, of the ECHR allows for restrictions
on the right to freedom of assembly, the interpretation of the grounds
for such restrictions needs to be rigorous and consistent and a
very high threshold needs to be overcome before prohibiting a public
event. As mentioned in the Venice Commission-OSCE/ODIHR opinion,
the touchstone for restricting or banning a public assembly should
be the imminent threat of violence. Merely prohibiting an assembly
on the grounds that it promotes views which are unconstitutional
or objectionable would border on content-based restrictions and
would amount to an unjustifiable incursion on the freedom of assembly.
69. In addition, the notion of credible data and what would amount
to such credible data is of concern. The provision that an official
opinion by the police or national security service would be sufficient
to prohibit a public event would give significant discretionary
powers to these services and is excessive. Moreover, the wording
of this article seems to imply that such an opinion would not have
to be justified by the police or national security service and would
be final. This would foreclose any review by an independent tribunal
or court and therefore the right of effective remedy for a significant
limitation on the fundamental right of freedom of assembly.
70. The new paragraph that allows the authorities to prohibit
mass public events “where mass events have turned into mass disorder
and has led to human casualties” creates the potential for arbitrary
restrictions and blanket prohibitions of unrelated mass events.
It should be noted that the original law already provided adequate
powers to terminate an assembly which resulted in loss of life.
Moreover, violence by a minority of participants should not automatically
result in the dispersal of the entire event itself. The new provision
would also potentially allow the police to disperse a public event
where loss of life was the result of the excessive use of force
by the authorities themselves.
71. An amendment to Article 10 of the law removes the reference
to non-mass public events that grow spontaneously into mass public
events. This amendment de facto prohibits assemblies of a spontaneous nature,
despite the fact that such assemblies fall within the scope of the
guarantees of Article 11 of the EHCR. In addition, the implication
of the amendment would appear to be that the police could disperse
an event merely because more than 100 people are
present in the place of the event. Moreover, a person may be charged with
taking part in an unlawful assembly, even if he or she was not aware
of the unlawful nature of this assembly.
are
present in the place of the event. Moreover, a person may be charged with
taking part in an unlawful assembly, even if he or she was not aware
of the unlawful nature of this assembly.72. Other amendments extend the minimum time of notice that organisers
of a mass event need to give to the authorities from three to five
working days, allow the authorities three working days before they
need to start considering such a request – instead of 12 noon the
next day under the original text of the law – and remove the time-limit
before a decision needs to be reached. The combined effect of these
amendments would appear to give the authorities the discretion to
limit the right of freedom of assembly by avoiding a decision on a
request for the organisation of a public event.
7. Conclusions and recommendations
73. While the outbreak of public
resentment, culminating in the tragic events of 1 March 2008, may
have been unexpected, the co-rapporteurs believe that the underlying
causes of the crisis are deeply rooted in the failure of the key
institutions of the state to perform their functions in full compliance
with democratic standards and the principles of the rule of law
and the protection of human rights. These causes have been long-standing concerns
of the Assembly and were raised in previous reports by the Monitoring
Committee.
74. More specifically, the national assembly has so far failed
to play its role as a forum for political debate and compromise
between the different political forces in Armenia. The current political
system is based on a “winner takes it all” attitude, whereby the
opposition is ostracised and excluded from any participation in
the decision-making process and governance of the country. Therefore,
political reform needs to be initiated with a view to giving a proper
place and proper rights to the opposition in the political system
in Armenia.
75. There is little public trust in the electoral process in Armenia,
which in turn undermines the legitimacy of its outcome in the eyes
of the Armenian public. While the authorities made improvements
to the legal framework in the run-up to the presidential election,
they did not demonstrate commensurate political will to ensure its
full implementation. This was especially true with regard to three
aspects that had a significant impact on the public confidence in
the electoral process: the impartiality of the election administration,
the handling of election complaints and appeals and the transparency
of the vote count and tabulation procedures.
76. Therefore, the electoral process needs to be thoroughly reformed
with a view to ensuring: an impartial election administration that
is free from control by one particular political force; a fully
transparent administration of the election process especially with
regard to the vote count and tabulation process and a complaints
and appeals process that gives electoral stakeholders the fullest
possible access to legal remedy in the event of, perceived, electoral
violations.
77. Despite legislative reforms, the courts still lack the necessary
independence to inspire the public’s trust as impartial arbiters
including in the context of the electoral process; this explains
the low number of electoral-related complaints filed with them.
The same lack of judicial independence is also reflected in the
fact that the courts do not appear to question the necessity of
keeping in detention persons pending trial and generally grant relevant
requests by the prosecutors without properly weighing the grounds
given for this, as required by Article 5, paragraph 3, of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
78. Furthermore, the charges should be dropped against all opposition
supporters arrested after the presidential election who did not
personally commit any grave violent acts and the persons in question
should be freed at once. The existence of what are alleged political
prisoners in a member state of the Council of Europe is unacceptable
and cannot be tolerated.
79. The existence of free and pluralistic media is a cornerstone
for the consolidation of democracy in Armenia. The current level
of control by the authorities of the media and their regulatory
bodies, as well as the absence of a truly independent and pluralist
public broadcaster, further exacerbate the lack of public trust
in the political system. The de facto independence from any political
interest of both the National Television and Radio Commission and
the Public Television and Radio Commission needs to be guaranteed.
In addition, the composition of these bodies should be revised in
order to ensure that they are truly representative of Armenian society.
Also, the harassment of opposition electronic and printed media
outlets should be stopped.
80. The amendments to the Law on Conducting Meetings, Assemblies,
Rallies and Demonstrations run counter to European standards and
would appear to be to all intents and purposes in breach of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Armenia’s obligations and
commitments vis-à-vis the Council of Europe. These amendments should
be revoked by the national assembly with immediate effect. The co-rapporteurs welcome
in this respect the intention expressed in the inaugural speech
of the new President to revisit these amendments.
81. For their part, all opposition forces should recognise the
authority of the Constitutional Court’s decision with regard to
the outcome of the presidential election. This should not be interpreted
as the obligation to accept the merits of this decision. All electoral
contestants have the right to challenge the court’s decision by
the legal means available to them, including the European Court
of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
82. The co-rapporteurs welcome the steps by the President-elect
to establish a government of national unity. However, the non-inclusion
of supporters of Levon Ter-Petrosyan in this political agreement
will seriously undermine the effectiveness of this initiative as
a mechanism to rebuild the public trust in the authorities.
83. In the co-rapporteurs’ view, the only way to put an end to
the current institutional crisis and allow Armenia to move forward
with the above-mentioned urgently needed reforms is the start of
an open and constructive dialogue between all political forces in
Armenian society. Our Assembly had already pointed out the need
for such a dialogue as a requirement to ensure the effective implementation
of the constitutional reform in its Resolution 1532 (2007) on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Armenia
more than a year ago.
84. Taking into account that a considerable part of the political
spectrum in Armenia is not represented in the current national assembly,
such a dialogue should include both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political
forces.
85. The Assembly could both mediate between the different political
forces in Armenia and ensure the full involvement of the expert
bodies of the Council of Europe in this process, most notably that
of the European Commission for Democracy through Law.
86. However, the co-rapporteurs believe that for any dialogue
to start and be successful, a number of prerequisites need to be
in place:
- an independent, transparent and credible inquiry into the events of 1 March and the circumstances that led to them, including the alleged excessive use of force by the police, should be carried out immediately. The international community should be ready to monitor and assist such an inquiry;
- the charges against all opposition supporters and members of parliament arrested after the presidential election who did not personally commit any violent acts should be dropped and the detained persons – who are alleged political prisoners – should be freed at once;
- the amendments recently adopted to the Law on Conducting Meetings, Assemblies, Rallies and Demonstrations should be revoked with immediate effect.
87. Unless these conditions are met and an open dialogue on the
reforms mentioned in paragraph 8 above is seriously engaged between
the political forces in Armenia, the credibility of Armenia as a
member of the Council of Europe is put into doubt. The Assembly
should therefore consider the possibility of suspending the voting
rights of the Armenian delegation to the Assembly at the opening
of its June 2008 part-session, if no considerable progress has been
made on these requirements by then.
88. The co-rapporteurs will continue to follow closely the situation
in Armenia and will report back to the Monitoring Committee at its
meeting in May, in particular as regards progress in the fulfilment
of the above-mentioned conditions.
Reporting committee: Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee).
Reference to committee: Reference No. 3415 of 14 April 2008.
Draft resolution unanimously adopted by the committee on 15 April 2008.
Members of the committee: Mr Serhiy Holovaty (Chairperson), Mr György Frunda (1st Vice-Chairperson), Mr Konstantin Kosachev (2nd Vice-Chairperson), Mr Leonid Slutsky (3rd Vice-Chairperson), Mr Aydin Abbasov, Mr Avet Adonts, Mr Pedro Agramunt, Mr Miloš Aligrudić, Mrs Meritxell Batet Lamaña, Mr Ryszard Bender, Mr József Berényi, Mr Aleksandër Biberaj, Mr Luc Van den Brande, Mr Jean-Guy Branger, Mr Mevlüt Çavuoğlu, Mr Sergej Chelemendik, Ms Lise Christoffersen, Mr Boriss Cilevičs, Mr Georges Colombier, Mr Telmo Correia, Mr Valeriu Cosarciuc, Mrs Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Mr Joseph Debono Grech, Mr Juris Dobelis, Mrs Josette Durrieu, Mr Mátyás Eörsi, Mr Jean-Charles Gardetto, Mr József Gedei, Mr Marcel Glesener, Mr Charles Goerens, Mr Andreas Gross, Mr Michael Hagberg, Mr Holger Haibach, Ms Gultakin Hajiyeva, Mr Michael Hancock, Mr Davit Harutyunyan, Mr Andres Herkel, Mr Raffi Hovannisian, Mr Kastriot Islami, Mr Miloš Jevtić, Mrs Evguenia Jivkova, Mr Hakki Keskin, Mr Ali Rashid Khalil, Mr Andros Kyprianou, Mr Jaakko Laakso, Mrs Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Mr Göran Lindblad, Mr René van der Linden, Mr Eduard Lintner, Mr Younal Loutfi, Mr Pietro Marcenaro, Mr Mikhail Margelov, Mr Bernard Marquet, Mr Dick Marty, Mr Miloš Melčák, Mrs Assunta Meloni, Mrs Nursuna Memecan, Mr João Bosco Mota Amaral, Mr Theodoros Pangalos, Ms Maria Postoico, Mr Christos Pourgourides, Mr John Prescott, Mr Andrea Rigoni, Mr Dario Rivolta, Mr Armen Rustamyan, Mr Oliver Sambevski, Mr Kimmo Sasi, Mr Andreas Schieder, Mr Samad Seyidov, Mrs Aldona Staponkienė, Mr Christoph Strässer, Mrs Elene Tevdoradze, Mr Mihai Tudose, Mr Egidijus Vareikis, Mr Miltiadis Varvitsiotis, Mr José Vera Jardim, Mrs Birutė Vėsaitė, Mr Piotr Wach, Mr Robert Walter, Mr David Wilshire, Mrs Renate Wohlwend, Mrs Karin S. Woldseth, Mr Boris Zala, Mr Andrej Zernovski.
NB: The names of the members present at the meeting are printed in bold.
See 16th Sitting, 17 April 2008 (adoption of the draft resolution, as amended); and Resolution 1609.