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Addendum to the report | Doc. 11793 Addendum II | 24 January 2009
Visit of the Presidential Committee to Georgia to discuss the implementation of Assembly Resolution 1633 (2008) on “the consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia”
1. Introduction
1. Following the adoption of Assembly Resolution 1633 (2008) on
“The consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia”, the Bureau
of the Assembly, at its meeting on 3 October 2008, decided to place
on the agenda of the Standing Committee meeting in Madrid, on 27
November 2008, an item on “the follow-up given to Resolution 1633 (2008)”
and to include in the preliminary draft agenda of the Assembly’s
January 2009 part-session a report on the implementation of Assembly Resolution 1633 (2008).
The Monitoring Committee was seized on this matter for report and
the Political Affairs Committee and the Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights for opinion. The Bureau also asked the Committee
on Migration, Refugees and Population to prepare a report on the
“humanitarian consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia”
which could also be debated during the January 2009 part-session.
In addition, the Bureau decided to instruct the Presidential Committee
to visit Tbilisi and Moscow to discuss with the authorities, at
the highest level, the implementation of Assembly Resolution 1633 (2008) and
to report back to the Standing Committee on the follow-up given
to this resolution.
2. The visit to Tbilisi took place from 30 to 31 October 2008.
3. During the visit to Tbilisi, the delegation met with the Speaker
of the Parliament, Mr David Bakradze; the Minister of Internal Affairs,
Mr Ivane Merabishvili; the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Giga
Bokeria; the Deputy State Minister for Reintegration, Mr Dimitri
Manjavidze; the Secretary of the National Security Council, Mr Alexsander
Lomaia; the Prime Minister designated, Mr Grigol Mgalobishvili;
as well as with the members of the Georgian delegation to the Assembly.
In addition, the delegation met with Ambassador Mr Hansjoerg Haber,
Head of the EU Monitoring Mission and Mr Gottfried Hanne, Deputy
Head of the OSCE Mission in Georgia. The President of Georgia, Mr Mikheil
Saakashvili, was, together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on
an official State visit to Norway during the time of our visit and
they could therefore not meet us. Unfortunately, alternative dates
for our visit proposed by the Georgian authorities were not convenient
for the majority of the members of the Presidential Committee.
4. I wish to thank the Parliament of Georgia, as well as the
Special Representative of the Secretary General in Georgia and his
staff, for the excellent programme and support provided to the delegation.
2. Recent developments
5. In the view of the Georgian authorities, with Resolution 1633 (2008) the
Assembly has taken a well balanced and impartial position towards
the war between Georgia and Russia. Even if the Georgian authorities do
not agree with all its conclusions, they feel that the Resolution
provides a concrete and constructive contribution to the international
efforts to resolve the current crisis between the two countries.
Therefore, the authorities expressed their clear commitment to fully
implement the demands made by the Assembly from the Georgian authorities.
I welcome this clear expression of political will, as well as the
constructive and realistic approach towards the many challenges
as a result of the war, which was displayed by the Georgian authorities during
our visit.
6. An independent international investigation into the precise
circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the war, as well as the
exact sequence of events in August, is one of the key demands of
the Assembly expressed in Resolution
1633 (2008). The Georgian authorities reiterated their
full support for the establishment of such an independent international
inquiry, as well as their readiness to give it their full co-operation.
Different formats for such an investigation are currently being
discussed. One of the possibilities circulating is for the investigation
to be carried out by the Geneva based Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission.
However, by its mandate, an investigation carried out by this body
would be limited to humanitarian issues, would only be based on
information provided by the two parties, and its conclusions would be
confidential. Under those conditions, an inquiry carried out by
this body would not meet the PACE requirements for such an investigation.
7. Independent of the outcome of the discussions on an international
investigation, the Parliament of Georgia has started its own inquiry
into the circumstances of the war, the exact sequence of events
in August, and the decisions taken by the Georgian executive authorities.
For this purpose, the Parliament established, on 7 October 2008,
a special ad hoc Commission which is chaired by a member of the
parliamentary opposition, Mr Paata Davitaia. The Inquiry Commission
will report back to the Parliament, but has the power to refer issues
to the General Prosecutor for investigations, if it finds that possible
criminal actions may have taken place.
8. The commission started its work on 10 October and, to date,
has heard testimonies from, inter alia, the Minister of Integration,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of the National Security
Council and the Head of the Security Services, the Chief of Staff
of the Georgian Armed Forces and the former Prime Minister. The
ruling party has publicly stated that any of its officials that
fail to fully co-operate with the inquiry commission will face dire
political consequences. While the Commission does not have the Constitutional
power to summon the President to testify, the Chairman of the Commission
considered it unlikely that President Saakashvili would refuse an
invitation to appear before it. Indeed, on 8 November, at a meeting
of the Anti Crisis Council, President Saakashvili stressed that
“not a single official is immune” from being questioned by the inquiry commission
and that he would be ready “to come and answer all questions” put
to him by the commission.
9. In order to ensure the fullest transparency of its work, the
commission meets in public, unless issues affecting national security
are discussed, and its meetings are broadcast live on television.
In addition the full transcript of its proceedings is published,
in both Georgian and English on the website of the Georgian parliament.
Moreover, the public has been exhorted to provide information as
well as questions they wish to see answered to the commission.
10. From our meetings with the Chairman of the commission, I am
convinced of the clear political will of the Committee to fully
investigate the circumstances of the war and to address the many
questions that have been raised in its context. If the commission
follows its stated intention to hear all those that may have relevant information,
including the President and those that have been critical of the
government’s actions, the inquiry commission will be an important
instrument not only to provide more clarity regarding the circumstances
and conduct of the war, but also to strengthen the democratic processes
in Georgia itself.
11. In the view of the Georgian authorities, the war was also
a direct attack on the democratic nature of the Georgian society.
In response, it was decided by the authorities to strengthen the
functioning of democratic institutions and to give a new impetus
to the further consolidation of democracy in Georgia. A comprehensive package
of democratic reforms was therefore adopted with the view to, inter
alia, strengthen the institutional role of the parliament vis-à-vis
the executive, strengthen the role if the opposition in the work
of the parliament, as well as in state oversight institutions –
including in those that oversee the defence and national security sectors
-, strengthen the independence of the judiciary, enhance media pluralism
and improve the election code.
12. The Prime Minister of Georgia was dismissed just before our
visit to Georgia. In Tbilisi we held an informal exchange of views
with the Prime Minister designate Mr Grigol Mgaloblishvili, who
till the time of his nomination had been Georgia’s Ambassador to
Turkey.
13. The 6 point Ceasefire agreement that was signed on 12 August
foresees, inter alia, the withdrawal of Georgian military forces
to their usual bases and the withdrawal of Russian military forces
to the lines they held before the hostilities broke out. Following
a delay in the implementation of the cease fire agreement by Russia, in
particular with respect to the withdrawal of troops from Georgian
territory, President Sarkozy, together with Mr José Manuel Barroso,
Mr Javier Solana, and Mr Bernard Kouchner, travelled to Moscow on
8 September 2008 to press the Russian authorities to unconditionally
implement the Ceasefire agreement, as well as to discuss the initial
phase of its implementation. In the agreement reached at this meeting,
the so-called Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement, the Russian the Russian
authorities reaffirmed their commitment to fully implement the 6-point
Ceasefire agreement and agreed, inter alia, that Russia would withdraw
its troops from the areas adjacent to Abkhazia and South-Ossetia
within 10 days after the deployment of an EU monitoring mission
on 1 October 2008.
14. In line with the Ceasefire agreement, Georgian troops have
in general withdrawn to their usual bases, with the exception of
those that are in areas that are under the control of the Russian
Federation.
15. On 9 October, the Russian Federation completed its withdrawal
of troops from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
after the deployment of the EU observers in these areas on 1 October
2008. However, Russian Forces maintain a checkpoint in Perevi on
the administrative border with South Ossetia, but within Georgia
proper, in violation of both the ceasefire and Sarkozy-Medvedev
agreements.
16. A main issue of concern is the continuing presence, and even
strengthening, of Russian troops in the break-away regions of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia over and above the positions and numbers allowed
in the Ceasefire agreement. However, the Russian authorities assert
that, with the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia by the Russian Federation, the presence of Russian
troops in these two regions is now governed by bilateral agreements
with the de facto authorities of these regions. Therefore, they
maintain that, with the withdrawal from the zones adjacent to these
regions, Russia has fulfilled its obligations under the Ceasefire
agreement.
17. It is clear that the continued presence of Russian troops
over and above the positions ex ante the war are in direct violation
of the Ceasefire agreement as well as the Assembly demands expressed
in Resolution 1633 (2008).
However, this issue also highlights the controversy regarding the
exact status of the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement of 8 September. While
the international community and the Georgian authorities insist that
the 8 September agreement outlines the first phase of the implementation
of the 12 August Ceasefire agreement and in no manner supersedes
it, the Russian position seems to be that this agreement replaces certain
aspects of the Ceasefire agreement, most notably with regard to
the withdrawal of Russian troops. This was also clear during the
Assembly’s debate on the consequences of the war between Georgia
and Russia, when the Russian delegation attempted to replace references
to the Ceasefire agreement with references to the “Sarkozy-Medvedev”
agreement of 8 September 2008.
18. In line with the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement of 8 September
the UNOMIG mandate was extended by the UN Security Council, allowing
the continuing presence of UN monitors in Abkhazia. However, Russian
and the de facto Authorities in South Ossetia have refused access
of OSCE observers to South Ossetia, in violation of the Sarkozy-Medvedev
agreement as well as PACE demands, and EU observers have not been
granted access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as demanded by the
international community, including the Assembly in Resolution 1633 (2008).
19. Following the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the zones
adjacent to the break-away regions of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia,
Georgian Police Forces moved into these zones to ensure the security
in those areas. In general, the situation in these regions is relatively
calm although there are increasing reports of violent incidents
and provocations along the administrative borders of the two break-away
regions. International monitors have reported several incidents
of shootings with small arms and grenade launchers on Georgian villages
and police posts, as well as kidnappings of Georgian citizens by
South Ossetian marauders. Allegations of similar shootings of Ossetian
villages and checkpoints from the Georgian side can not be verified by
international monitors due to due to the refusal by Russia and the
de facto authorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to allow access
of EU and OSCE monitors to these territories.
20. The incidents and provocations are clearly increasing the
tension in the zones around the administrative borders of the break-away
regions. In our meetings with the international monitors, it was
mentioned that the number of reported incidents and provocations
started to approach the levels seen in the months before the outbreak
of the military hostilities in August, raising fears for a possible
new escalation in these volatile regions. The Georgian authorities
informed us that the Georgian Police Forces are under strict orders
not to respond to any provocations ad to refrain from any actions
that could heighten the tension around the administrative borders.
That notwithstanding, it is clear that the access of international
observes to South Ossetia and Abkhazia would dramatically reduce
tensions and increase the overall security situation long the administrative borders.
21. Following the re-establishment of a security environment in
the zones adjacent to the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia many IDPs have returned to these regions. However, the return
of IDPs to Georgian ethnic villages in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
is considerably more difficult, if not impossible. Amidst reports
of acts of ethnic cleansing, most IDPs fear for their safety if
they return, especially in the absence of independent international
monitors from the EU and OSCE. In addition, most ethnic Georgian villages
in South Ossetia have been looted and razed.
22. The return of ethnic Georgian IDPs is further complicated
by the insistence of the de facto authorities that IDPs returning
to the breakaway region accept the Abkhaz or South Ossetian nationality
and rescind the Georgian one. On a limited number of “border points”,
mostly in the Akhalgori district of South Ossetia, civilians from
neighbouring villages are reported to be allowed to cross the administrative
border into South Ossetia. However, they have reportedly been told
that as from 1 January they will need a visa to cross the administrative border.
23. The situation in the Akhalgori district of South Ossetia,
which is a predominantly ethnic Georgian area that was not directly
affected by the war in August and prior to the war never under the
control of the de facto authorities, is a matter of special concern.
Many ethnic Georgians have left the area out of safety concerns, while
more are expected to leave as a result of the requirement to accept
South Ossetian citizenship.
24. The deputy Minister of Integration informed us that most IDPs
had returned to the former “buffer zones”. A priority for the Ministry
is the reconstruction of houses and reestablishment of social services
in these areas. The relations between ethnic Georgians and Ethnic
Ossetians living in these areas were good and no problems or tensions
were reported. The main challenges at this moment are the return
of IDPs from Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the situation of ethnic
Georgians still living in the two break away regions. The return
of IDPs to these areas is for the moment impossible and temporary
shelters had to be constructed rapidly before the winter would start.
The main problems with regard to the ethnic Georgians still living
in South Ossetia are the continuing acts of ethnic cleansing which
have led to a new influx of IDPs. In mixed villages in South Ossetia, the
situation was somewhat better. A main problem for the ministry was
the lack of access to South Ossetia, including by civilians with
agricultural lands in the two break-away regions. It was feared
that that situation would exacerbate with the replacement of military
personal on the checkpoints by Russian border guards as foreseen
in the recently ratified friendship and co-operation agreements
between Russia and the two break-away regions.
25. The deputy Minister of Integration expressed his deep appreciation
for the financial support agreed on the donor conference, which
greatly assisted the Ministry in its reconstruction and IDP return
efforts. As a reconciliation measure, it had been considered to
use part of the financial support for the reconstruction of Ossetian
villages destroyed in the War. However, this idea has currently
been shelved, due to the refusal of the South Ossetian de facto
authorities to give access to ministry officials to the break-away
region, or to allow aid coming in via, and from, Georgia. In addition,
it is felt that such programmes should be conditional on the possibility
for ethnic Georgians to return to their villages in South Ossetia,
as well as on the freedom of movement over the administrative border.
26. Humanitarian aid has been arriving in the two break away regions,
but significant obstacles remain for the access of humanitarian
organisations and aid, as a result of the insistence of Georgia
that access to the two break-away regions takes place via Georgia
on the one hand, and the insistence of Russia and the de facto authorities
that cess takes place via Russia on the other hand. In this respect,
I raised my concerns about the possible negative impact on humanitarian
situation by the draft law on the Occupied Territories that is being discussed
in the Georgian Parliament.
27. UN and other international (humanitarian) organisations have
been given unrestricted access by the Georgian authorities to the
zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Regrettably, the de
facto authorities have only allowed limited access for these organisations,
with the exception of the ICRC, to the territories under their control.
28. All Georgian authorities stressed the potential importance
of the Geneva talks foreseen in the Ceasefire agreement, not only
as a mechanism to address the long term consequences of the war,
as well as the relation between Georgia and Russia, but also as
an important instrument to improve the situation and stability on
the ground within Georgia. However, the authorities doubted that
the upcoming round of talks in Geneva, foreseen for 17 November
2008, would lead to any results due to Russia’s insistence that
the representatives of the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia would be given the same status as those of Russia
and Georgia, which is unacceptable for Georgia as well as the co-sponsors
of the Geneva talks. This issue had been the main stumbling point
behind the breakdown of the talks on 15 October 2008. The Georgian
authorities reiterated that they did not object to the participation
of the representatives of the de facto authorities in the informal
working groups that are part of the talks, but on the condition
that all representatives of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples
would be able to participate in these working groups, including
those that favour integration of the two regions with Georgia.
29. Similarly, the Georgian authorities were open to initiatives
in the field of parliamentary diplomacy under the aegis of the Assembly,
but were sceptical that such initiatives would make any concrete
contribution to the improvement of the current situation, given
that the recognition of the independence of the two break away regions
had been initiated by the Federal parliament of the Russian Federation
and that the State Duma and Council of the Federation had recently
unanimously ratified the Friendship and Co-operation Treaties signed between
Russia and the two break-away regions, despite the demands made
by the Assembly.
30. It is clear that the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia not only violates the Cease fire agreement, as
well as international law and Russia’s obligations to the Council
of Europe, but is also an impediment to the resolution of the current
situation, including the implementation of the Ceasefire agreement,
which is affecting the stability in the region.
3. Conclusions
31. I welcome the constructive and realistic approach
taken by the Georgian authorities in regard to the current situation.
The same holds for their preparedness to engage in a constructive
dialogue with the international community and the other parties
to the conflict, to address the many challenges facing the country, and
to ensure the stability within Georgia as well as in the wider region.
I made a statement to this effect at the end of our visit. It is
attached to this memorandum.
32. As a result of our visit, I am satisfied that Georgia has
fully complied with the demands of the Assembly expressed in Resolution 1633 with
regard to:
- the unconditional implementation of the six point Ceasefire agreement (§ 22.1 of the Resolution);
- allowing full access of, and giving its fullest co-operation to, international monitors to the territories under its control (§ 22.2 and 23.3);
- taking measures to ensure the safety – including from mines and unexploded ordnances – of citizens in, and allowing for the voluntary return of IDPs to, the territories under its control (§ 23.1, 23.2 and 23.4);
- allowing free access by the press to the part of the conflict zone under its control (§ 22.9);
- making full use of available means of peaceful conflict resolution (§ 22.10);
- working towards a new peace-keeping format and working to internationalise the peace keeping force (§ 22.4);
- participating unconditionally in the Geneva negotiations foreseen in point 6 of the Ceasefire agreement (§ 22.5).
With respect to § 22.5, the condition from the Georgian authorities that the participation of the de facto authorities of the two break-away regions should not be taken to signify any implicit recognition of them, is justified and does not contradict the Assembly’s corresponding demand.
33. The Georgian authorities have stressed that they
would welcome the establishment of, and would co-operate unconditionally
with, an independent international inquiry into the war and its
circumstances (§ 22.3). They can therefore be said to have taken
all the necessary steps to comply with this demand of the Assembly, even
though a final judgment can only be made when the inquiry has been
completed and Georgia’s co-operation in it has been fully evaluated.
34. The Georgian authorities have taken concrete measures fully
and effectively to implement the six principles formulated by the
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, in compliance with
§ 23.7 of Resolution
1633 (2008). However, I take note of the fact that the
exchange of prisoners of war and persons detained as a result of
the conflict – as also raised in § 23.5 – and the provision of adequate
housing to IDPs who cannot return to their place of original residence
are still ongoing. In his report the Human Rights Commissioner expressed
concern that certain provisions in the draft law on the occupied
territories may be at odds with principles of international human
rights law, including the European Convention on Human Rights. I would
therefore recommend that the Georgian authorities submit this draft
law to the Venice Commission for opinion, and implement its recommendations.
This would also ensure full compliance with § 22.7 of Resolution 1633
(2008).
35. The Assembly has demanded that Georgia investigate all allegations
of Human Rights violations committed by it in the course of the
war and its aftermath, and that the country hold any perpetrators
to account before a domestic court (§ 22.8). The resolve of the
Georgian Parliament to investigate the conduct and causes of the
war is commendable. The Chairman of the ad hoc Inquiry Commission
informed us that the committee would look into allegations of human
rights abuses committed by Georgia in the course of the war. This Commission
has the power to refer any indications of criminal behaviour encountered
by it to the General Prosecutor for investigation. However, I am
not aware that the Inquiry Commission has started any such investigation
into alleged human rights abuses by the Georgian side. Furthermore,
to my knowledge no independent investigation has been commenced
by the General Prosecutor. I therefore consider full compliance
with § 22.8 still pending.
36. Regrettably, Georgia has not yet signed the United Nations
Convention on Cluster Ammunitions and its rhetoric vis-à-vis Russia
is still very much influenced by the war. I therefore consider that
Georgia at this moment has not yet complied with § 22.6 and 22.11.