1. Procedure
1. At its meeting on 12 December
2013, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights appointed
me rapporteur on “Access to justice through online instruments”.
According to the motion
at the origin of the report,
my mandate was to consider the potential benefits that online instruments
may offer for alleviating the difficulties European citizens encounter
in exercising their right of access to justice. I thus address two
broad topics in the present report: online dispute resolution (ODR)
and the use of information and communications technology (ICT) in
the judiciary.
2. For the sake of greater clarity, and upon my proposal, the
committee, at its meeting in Strasbourg on 29 September 2014, agreed
to change the title of the report to “Access to justice and the
Internet: potential and challenges”. I prefer this title since I
believe the term “online instruments” does not adequately reflect
the key human rights challenges arising in the context of access
to justice in the Internet age.
3. On 30 October 2014, the committee held a hearing to gather
testimony regarding the present report, with the participation of
Mr Arno Lodder, Professor of Internet Governance and Regulation
at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Mr Graham Ross, Founder and
President of
TheMediationRoom.com and member of the Advisory Group on Online Dispute Resolution
appointed by the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales. On 23
June 2015, the Legal Affairs Committee held another hearing, with
the participation of Ms Iveta Havlova, Strategic Alliances Director
for the ODR provider
Youstice. I should like to thank these three experts for their insightful
and enlightening observations and comments.
2. “Access to justice” in the Internet
age: innovations and challenges
4. Access to justice is the cornerstone
of any democratic State based on the rule of law. Yet, there continue to
exist various constraints to European citizens’ effective enjoyment
of this right, evidenced for example by the staggering number of
cases in which the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’)
finds a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (
ETS
No. 5, “the Convention”) on account of the excessive length
of domestic judicial proceedings.
Surveys and academic research appear to
confirm that accessing the justice system often entails high costs,
not only in terms of time but also of money.
5. At least partly in response to these limitations, efforts
are being made in a number of States to reform court processes in
order to accelerate procedures and make them more affordable. In
particular, the use of modern forms of ICT is on the rise.
6. At the same time, one may observe that – both in the practice
of several European States as well as in academic discussions –
courts are no longer considered as the only fora of justice. Quasi-judicial
and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures,
that is mechanisms
of dispute settlement outside the courts, are being used with increased
frequency, with some (mostly European Union member) States even
requiring that parties first seek to resolve particular types of
disputes by means of mediation before resorting to the courts.
7. This diversification of dispute resolution systems has been
influenced by Internet-age developments. The growing use of the
Internet has impacted the ways in which individuals purchase goods,
receive information and communicate. Both private- and public-sector
bodies are increasing their Internet presence and fuelling the rise
of e-commerce, e-governance and e-justice. These initiatives have
simplified and improved interaction between individuals and businesses,
governments and the courts and created wider opportunities for accessing
information. In light of this, it may not be surprising that ADR
providers have also begun to use the Internet, giving rise to online
dispute resolution (ODR) procedures.
8. It is against this background that I seek to examine in the
report how the innovative use of technology within courts on the
one hand, and ODR on the other can help individuals overcome impediments
to accessing justice.
2.1. Defining
“access to justice” by reference to the legal framework provided
by the Council of Europe
9. A principal difficulty when
discussing this issue appears to be the prevailing uncertainty as
regards the definition of the notion of “justice”. For the purposes
of this report, and in line with
Opinion
No. 7 on “justice and society” of the
Consultative
Council of European Judges (CCEJ), I understand “justice” broadly, as a process aiming
to resolve disputes between parties and serving as an essential
element of democratic societies.
10. My understanding of “access to justice” – which “is a descriptive
expression rather than a legal concept”
– is informed by the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights in respect of Articles 6.1 (right to a fair trial)
and 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention
on Human Rights. These provisions protect the right of access to
an independent and impartial body providing (judicial) protection
of fundamental rights, the right to a fair trial and to effective
remedies, and fair and equitable outcomes of proceedings providing
redress for violations suffered. I should like to recall, in this
connection, Parliamentary Assembly
Resolution 2054 (2015) on equality and non-discrimination in the access to
justice, which pointed out that:
“Both
of these rights are encompassed by the broader concept of access
to justice, which refers to the various elements leading to appropriate
redress against the violation of a right, such as information on rights
and procedures, legal aid, legal representation, legal standing
or general access to courts.”
11. The Court’s earliest commentary on access to justice can be
traced back to the case of
Golder
v. the United Kingdom,
in
which the Court established that Article 6.1 confers on individuals
not merely the right to a fair trial in proceedings already pending
against them, but also a right to access the courts to commence
an action.
12. Since then, the Court has repeatedly emphasised the detrimental
effect that practical barriers can have on an individual’s access
to justice. According to the Court’s well-established case law,
the rights enshrined in the Convention must not be “theoretical
or illusory”, but “practical and effective”.
This conception of Article 6 has
led the Court to find violations of the Convention in cases where
such practical obstacles, for example the inability to afford legal
counsel, impeded applicants’ access to the justice system. The emphasis
on the effective exercise of rights has also resulted in a number
of cases on the provision of legal aid in civil cases in order to
foster equality of arms in dispute resolution.
13. The Court has further acknowledged the impact of time-consuming
judicial procedures on access to justice. Article 6.1 of the Convention
embraces the concept of expeditious justice, stating that everyone
is entitled to a fair hearing “within a reasonable time”. Reasonableness
is assessed in light of the circumstances of each individual case.
Tackling the excessive length of
judicial proceedings has become a priority for the Court, which
has identified the problem as systemic in a number of recent pilot
judgments in respect of several High Contracting Parties.
14. In the same vein, Committee of Ministers
Recommendation
CM/Rec(2010)3 on “effective remedies for excessive length of proceedings”
highlights that “excessive delays in the administration of justice
constitute a grave danger, in particular for respect for the rule
of law and access to justice”.
15. Similarly, the CCJE’s
Magna Carta
of Judges, which codifies the main conclusions of opinions adopted by
the CCJE and identifies access to justice as one of its fundamental
principles, stresses the importance of “swift, efficient and affordable
dispute resolution”. It is interesting to note that the Magna Carta
of Judges does not have an exclusive focus on judicial proceedings.
This corresponds to my own approach and that of my colleague Mr
Badea, whose above-mentioned report unequivocally described the
notion of “access to justice” as including ADR mechanisms (paragraph
10) such as mediation, conciliation or arbitration.
16. While not providing a clear definition of “access to justice”,
the Court’s case law and the aforementioned texts by other bodies
of the Council of Europe provide some guidance. I believe they constitute
an adequate basis for assessing ODR procedures and the use of ICT
in court proceedings in this context.
2.2. Online
dispute resolution – out-of-court settlement of disputes
17. Online dispute resolution is
a form of alternative dispute resolution which utilises ICT and
the Internet to simplify and expedite the resolution of disputes.
Today, it is most commonly (but not exclusively) used to settle disputes
arising from online commercial transactions, for instance on e-commerce
platforms such as eBay, but also domain name disputes or disputes
involving other intellectual property issues. Like offline alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) procedures, ODR systems can be structured in various
ways, depending on the nature of the disputes concerned. ODR systems
can include a human intermediary or may only feature the two parties
engaging in an entirely automated procedure. One commonly differentiates
between three categories of ODR, for each of which I will provide
an example below: automated and assisted negotiation, online mediation
and online arbitration.
18. The increase in ODR procedures raises a number of legal and
human rights-related questions that I will seek to answer in this
section:
- What advantages do
ODR procedures have when compared to traditional litigation; Are
there any empirical studies exploring whether any potential benefits
are being realised in practice?
- What risks and challenges exist?
- What types of disputes and areas of law would be most
suited to ODR procedures?
- Conversely, are there any disputes that should never be
resolved by ODR?
- Will the appropriateness of the use of ODR be dependent
on whether it is voluntary or mandatory, both as regards the initiation
of the process and the compliance with its outcome?
- Is the mandatory use of ODR procedures to resolve certain
types of disputes before resorting to the courts compatible with
the rights enshrined in the Convention? In particular, is such a(n
initial) denial of access to a court legitimate and proportionate
under Article 6.1 of the Convention?
- What procedural safeguards does an ODR procedure have
to contain in order to comply with Article 6 of the Convention,
especially in terms of equality of arms between the parties?
- Does the level of safeguards vary depending on whether
the ODR procedure culminates in a binding or non-binding decision?
2.2.1. Online
negotiation (or e-negotiation)
19. Online negotiation is often
used for the online settlement of financial claims. One of the first
experiments with ODR began in 1996 with the creation of
Cybersettle, a website facilitating the negotiation of damages in a
civil trial between two parties. Cybersettle was created mainly
for cases where liability had already been established and the parties
only had to consent to a damage figure – an issue for which litigation
is often not cost-effective. Parties using Cybersettle each enter
three blind bids. If the two bids in any of the rounds come close
enough to one another (within a previously agreed percentage), the
midpoint figure will be deemed accepted. If the parties come close
to such a solution, a facilitator will contact both parties to suggest
another round of bidding.
20. Whereas the “blind-bidding” model employed by Cybersettle
and other providers is also known as “automated negotiation”, other
platforms (including eBay and PayPal) offer so-called “assisted
negotiation”, by outlining, based on prior experience from similar
cases, a number of possible remedies to the parties to a dispute.
2.2.2. Online
mediation (or e-mediation)
21. This form of negotiation is
often coupled with a mediation stage. An oft-cited example of online
mediation is that of eBay, which, in conjunction with the Internet
start-up SquareTrade, introduced an online dispute resolution system
which allowed buyers and sellers to settle various contentious issues
in a structured format.
Parties
are asked to answer questions on a customised complaint form and
provide supporting documentation for their claim. SquareTrade will
transmit the form to the other party and encourage that party to
respond. If the parties fail to reach a compromise, either party
can initiate mediation. The dispute resolution mechanism established
by Wikipedia works in a similar fashion and is another prominent
example of online mediation.
2.2.3. Online
arbitration
22. Finally, one may observe that
ODR, though originally conceived as a mechanism for resolving disputes occurring
purely in the online (commercial) space, is increasingly moving
into settling offline disputes as well.
A number of countries
have begun to harness the potential of the Internet in order to
expedite and simplify the dispute resolution process for ordinary
citizens – a trend that should be welcomed, in my view. A noteworthy example
is that of British Columbia, a province of Canada (Canada enjoys
observer status with the Council of Europe). British Columbia is
in the process of setting up a
Civil Resolution Tribunal, expected to begin operation by the end of the year.
The
tribunal represents North America’s first online tribunal for small
claims and aims to utilise the Internet throughout all stages of
the dispute resolution process. The procedures before the Tribunal
go beyond the above-mentioned examples in that, if no settlement
is reached at either the initial (‘self-help’) stage or by pursuing
a mediation-like approach, parties may choose to move to the adjudication stage,
at which an adjudicator discusses with the parties online, by phone,
or through videoconferencing, collects evidence online and issues
a binding decision on the case.
2.2.4. Recent
ODR developments in Europe
23. Espousing a more limited model
of ODR, the European Union, in 2013, adopted
Directive
2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes
(the “ADR Directive”) and
Regulation
524/2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes (the
“ODR Regulation”).
24. Acknowledging the barriers to cross-border e-commerce – and
thus the internal market – arising from the lack of fast and low-cost
dispute resolution mechanisms, the
ADR
Directive stipulates that member States ought to ensure the availability
of quality ADR mechanisms for consumer complaints relating to the
provision of goods and services. Each country is required to set
up a competent authority for monitoring the functioning of certified
ADR providers.
25. In accordance with the provisions of the
ODR
Regulation, the European Union is currently in the process of creating
an ODR platform, aimed at enhancing the accessibility of ADR schemes
online.
This
platform will become operational in January 2016. It will serve
as a single connection point for EU-based traders, consumers and
ADR entities and will apply strictly to online transactions between
these parties, both domestic and cross-border.
26. It will allow both consumers and traders to file an electronic
complaint form in any of the European Union’s official languages,
attach relevant documents, and choose an ADR entity competent to
handle the dispute. The platform will then transmit the form to
the other party. Subject to the latter’s agreement to resolve the
dispute through ADR and with the help of the chosen ADR entity,
the platform will transmit the information to that entity. ADR providers
may, but are not required to, conduct the dispute resolution procedure
through the ODR platform. Importantly, any ADR entity wishing to
be included in the ODR platform must become accredited with their
respective national competent authority, which presupposes that
the provider comply with European legal standards pertaining to:
i) their independence and impartiality; ii) transparency; iii) effectiveness; iv) fairness;
v) liberty; and vi) legality.
27. Like many scholars and practitioners, I regard these two pieces
of legislation as an important step towards guaranteeing minimum
quality standards for ADR providers. They also promise to contribute
to raising people’s awareness of the availability of ADR/ODR mechanisms,
and to make these procedures more accessible. I therefore encourage
those member States that are also members of the European Union
to contribute to the swift and successful implementation of the
ODR
Regulation.
28. Another noteworthy development is the establishment of
Working
Group III on Online Dispute Resolution by the
United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). This working group is tasked with creating
a model legal framework for the use of ODR in business-to-business
and business-to-consumer disputes for low-value, high-volume disputes.
The group’s draft procedural rules on ODR for cross-border electronic
commerce transactions may be incorporated into parties’ contractual
agreements but will apply only to the extent the terms are enforceable
by the applicable national law. The proposed rules embrace a two-track procedure:
the process begins with online negotiation between the two parties,
moves on to a facilitated settlement stage, and then switches either
to track I (binding online arbitration) or track II (non-binding adjudication).
The
two tracks reflect a lack of consensus within the Working Group
(as well as within national jurisdictions) on whether ODR procedures
should culminate in a binding process, and the fact that not all countries
allow pre-dispute arbitration agreements to be binding for consumers.
2.2.5. The
Council of Europe’s work on (online forms of) alternative dispute
resolution
29. To date, the Council of Europe
has mainly focused its work pertaining to alternative dispute resolution on
offline procedures. Yet, since a lot of the features of ODR, including
potential benefits and disadvantages, resemble those of offline
ADR procedures, the work undertaken on ADR is certainly instructive
in determining the potential value of ODR in facilitating individuals’
access to justice.
30. Most notably, the CCJE’s
Magna Carta
of Judges calls on judges to facilitate the use of ADR and utilise appropriate
case management methods. The
European
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), too, has analysed the connection between ADR
and access to justice, most recently in a
report on “Access to Justice in Europe”. In addition, the Committee
of Ministers has addressed matters relating to alternative forms of
dispute resolution in a number of recommendations.
Recommendation
No. R (81) 7 on “Measures facilitating access to justice” called,
in its appendix, for measures to encourage the use of conciliation
and mediation.
Recommendation
No. R (98) 1 on “Family mediation” states that, in light of the particular
problems posed by family disputes, family mediation may promote
consensual solutions and lower the social and economic costs associated
with divorce and separation. In its
Recommendation
Rec(2001)9 on “Alternatives to litigation between administrative
authorities and private parties”, the Committee of Ministers welcomed
the use of alternative means of resolving administrative disputes,
considering that it might bring administrative authorities closer
to the public and allow for speedier and less expensive dispute
settlements. At the same time, it emphasised that “alternative means
to litigation must respect the principles of equality and impartiality
and the rights of the parties”. In the same vein,
Recommendation
Rec(2002)10 on “Mediation in civil matters” underscored the importance
of an efficient, fair and easily accessible judicial system, noting
that parties using mediation should remain free to avail themselves
of the courts, since “access to the court … constitutes the ultimate
guarantee for the protection of the rights of the parties”.
31. The most relevant judgment issued by a European court in the
context of ODR did not emanate from the European Court of Human
Rights, but from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
But the latter referred to the Strasbourg Court’s case law when
determining, in the 2010
Rosalba
Alassini case,
that the mandatory use of mediation in
certain disputes between providers and end users prior to engaging
the courts was permissible and did not violate the principle of
effective judicial protection enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of
the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of the European
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (
2000/C
364/01). It may be important to stress, in this context, that
the time limit for completion of the out-of-court settlement procedure
was only 30 days, after which the parties were free to bring court proceedings.
In arriving at its conclusion, the CJEU acknowledged that the requirement
to first pursue ODR was aimed at “the quicker and less expensive
settlement of disputes relating to electronic communications and a
lightening of the burden on the court system” (paragraph 64). At
the same time, the CJEU noted that the exercise of particular rights
“might be rendered in practice impossible or excessively difficult
for certain individuals – in particular, those without access to
the Internet – if the settlement procedure could be accessed only
by electronic means”.
The CJEU concluded that effective
judicial protection was secured as long as electronic means were
not the sole means for accessing the settlement procedure.
I
cannot but congratulate the CJEU on its very nuanced reasoning.
32. Pronouncements by the European Court of Human Rights on ADR/ODR
are to date rather scarce. A positive comment on ADR can be found
in Judge Malinverni’s concurring opinion in
Stempfer
v. Austria concerning
the question of whether preventive or compensatory remedies should
be favoured in cases pertaining to excessively lengthy proceedings.
He argued that preventive measures, including offering alternative
dispute resolution in private-law cases, should be prioritised over
compensatory remedies. However, the Court has to date not had the
opportunity to clarify its position on the adequacy of ADR or ODR procedures
in light of the fair trial guarantees enshrined in Article 6 of
the Convention. Still, some guidance may be derived from its case
law, especially if one differentiates between voluntary and mandatory
participation in ADR/ODR.
33. If individuals voluntarily decide to use (online or offline)
ADR, the Court’s statements in a number of waiver cases appear to
be instructive. The Court has stated that a waiver of the right
to have access to a court does not in principle violate the Convention
in light of the individual and public advantages it entails.
Given the importance of the right
to a fair trial, consent to a waiver must be freely given and not
be “tainted by constraint”.
Crucially, the Court stressed that
an ADR procedure must contain certain procedural safeguards in order
to comply with Article 6 of the Convention. Moreover, a waiver may
not be permissible for all Article 6 rights, such as the right to
an impartial judge.
34. When it comes to States requiring individuals to first use
ADR/ODR before resorting to the courts, the key question revolves
around whether such a restriction on access to a court is legitimate
and proportionate under Article 6.1 of the Convention. In this context,
the Court’s case law on the compatibility of decisions of administrative
authorities with Article 6.1 guarantees may serve as an indicator
of what is likely to be permissible. Acknowledging that “[d]emands
of flexibility and efficiency … may justify the prior intervention
of administrative or professional bodies and, a fortiori, of judicial
bodies which do not satisfy the said requirements [set out in Article
6.1] in every respect”,
the Court has
consistently stated that no violation of this provision will be
found if the proceedings before bodies which do not satisfy the
requirements of Article 6.1 of the Convention are “subject to subsequent
control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction”.
2.2.6. Potential
benefits of ODR
35. The question is thus whether
ODR procedures are in fact more flexible and efficient than court proceedings.
More generally: what are the potential benefits of ODR?
36. First of all, ODR has the potential to lower economic barriers
to access to justice. Pursuing traditional litigation can be costly,
particularly due to lawyers’ and court fees and travel expenses
(especially for cross-border disputes). The cost of litigation often
discourages individuals from attempting to resolve disputes or enforce
their rights, leaving many without access to effective remedies
capable of providing redress. This is particularly common in low-value
disputes such as those arising from many e-commerce transactions,
where ODR procedures may represent an important mechanism of consumer
protection.
37. Access to justice is influenced not only by socioeconomic
status but also by geography, and geographical access to justice
threatens to become increasingly difficult because of a trend towards
reducing the number of courts.
Technology has
the ability to improve access to dispute resolution mechanisms especially
for individuals residing in rural areas. The Australian Government
has been particularly keen on harnessing the power of ODR in facilitating
access to justice for individuals residing in outlying areas of
the country.
I believe that European States,
too, should step up their efforts in exploring such possibilities.
38. Depending on the nature of the disputes, the use of ODR tools
may also lower the costs associated with legal advice and representation,
although this is certainly not to suggest that parties participating
in ODR procedures may not require such legal services. It would
be a fallacy to assume that the comparably low value of most claims
dealt with through ODR today necessarily correlates with legal simplicity.
In
light of the importance that the Council of Europe attaches to legal
aid,
I
regard it as essential that governments play an active role in promoting
and safeguarding minimum standards of justice in terms of equality
of arms, including, if need be, by providing legal aid or representation.
39. The length of judicial proceedings, increased by resource
limitations within court systems, represents another hurdle for
access to justice. ODR may serve as an important tool for increasing
the availability of expeditious dispute resolution mechanisms while
easing the courts’ caseload. ODR permits parties to resolve disputes
quickly and flexibly. Because the process can be conducted asynchronously,
parties may participate in negotiation at their convenience. This
benefit is particularly salient for cross-border disputes, especially
those involving parties situated in different time zones.
40. When discussing potential benefits of ODR, it must be stressed
that online dispute resolution goes beyond simply moving traditional
dispute settlement into cyberspace. Rather, the principles and values
upon which ODR procedures are based differ from those of litigation
in courts:
the ODR/ADR model aims at achieving social
harmony through consensual solutions. Unlike traditional judicial
dispute resolution mechanisms that tend to be more adversarial and
end with an authoritative, top-down judgment, ODR/ADR procedures
can emphasise compromise and mutually agreeable outcomes or “win-win”
situations. This can be particularly important for parties wishing
to preserve their (commercial or other) relationship (as well as,
in the commercial field, their reputation in the relevant market)
in the future.
As
I noted above with reference to
Recommendation
No. R (98) 1 on “Family mediation”, family law disputes tend to call
for consensual solutions. Conceivably, this greater variety of possible
remedies (including, in particular, remedies of a non-financial nature)
may also enhance parties’ satisfaction with the dispute resolution
procedure.
41. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that additional
benefits of ODR procedures largely correspond to the advantages
of traditional, offline ADR procedures when compared with conventional
litigation before courts of law. Like ADR procedures, ODR may offer
more flexibility for parties vis-à-vis traditional legal mechanisms,
both in terms of
the procedures employed and the remedies prescribed.
ODR
structures are often created for narrow categories of disputes (such
as online settlement of financial claims). They may hence be modified
to accommodate the specific characteristics of the dispute and permit
a greater variety of procedures, outcomes and evidentiary requirements.
Moreover, the system might be more tailored to the needs of the
parties because, whereas litigants often feel they lack control
over courtroom proceedings, the informal nature offered by online
mediation may facilitate the parties’ autonomy, self-empowerment
and ownership of the dispute resolution process.
2.2.7. Limitations
and drawbacks of ODR, and possible ways to overcome them
42. Although the above observations
suggest that the integration of the Internet into dispute resolution processes
has the potential to increase access to justice, empirical studies
confirming the positive implications of ODR in terms of efficiency,
costs, party satisfaction, etc. are still lacking.
Moreover, over-reliance on online instruments
may entail disadvantages and risks for some individuals.
43. Traditional mediators saliently criticise online mediation
as impersonal. Customarily, mediation is considered as a process
which inherently relies on personal connections and understanding
for achieving successful, mutually agreeable results.
Email-based
mediation limits the ability of mediators to build a personal relationship
with the parties. However, I am of the opinion that the integration
of other technological tools into ODR procedures – in particular
videoconferencing technology – may, to a certain extent, mitigate
this apparent disadvantage.
44. Moreover, Internet users may encounter technical difficulties
when using self-directed online instruments, and ODR processes may
not reach the most vulnerable populations at all.
While the process itself may be
simple and mostly self-explanatory, I regard it as critical to bear
in mind that dispute resolution often entails questions of law beyond
the grasp of persons lacking legal training. ODR procedures should therefore
not generally exclude the possibility for individuals to avail themselves
of legal advice. The possibility to consult with a legal professional
should exist as a safeguard in order to ensure the continued protection
of Article 6 fair trial rights for individuals who choose to engage
in ODR procedures.
45. Relatedly, it should be noted that, even today, the Internet
is not accessible to everyone. Thus, potential benefits in terms
of access to justice flowing from ODR may not be shared evenly.
This is illustrated by the 2012
E-communication
Household Survey published by the European Commission, which shows that,
while 64% of EU households have Internet access and access continues
to grow each year, country-specific percentages range from 93% (Netherlands)
to 42% (Greece). I would expect that similar, if not greater differences
exist among Council of Europe member States. The Assembly, in
Recommendation 1586 (2002) on the digital divide and education, acknowledged the
risk of digitalisation creating a digital divide and stressed the
importance of ensuring fair access to digital material.
46. The European Commission’s survey also revealed that a digital
divide tends to exist across socio-demographic lines. Lower levels
of Internet access have been observed among rural populations and
the elderly, as well as poorer segments of societies. While the
actual extent of the digital divide may be less drastic than figures
suggest because some people may be secondary or proxy users of the
Internet – that is indirect beneficiaries of the Internet through
the assistance of other individuals
or capable of using
online services at work or school
– its existence tends
to suggest that at least at the present time, ODR cannot be a substitute, but
only a supplement for a fair and efficient court system. I therefore
suggest that there should be opportunities for introducing ODR alongside
other, more traditional dispute resolution instruments in order
to avoid placing parties without access to the Internet at an unfair
disadvantage.
47. Linked to the risk of inequalities in access to ODR procedures
is the issue of equality of arms.
ODR systems may favour repeat
players, namely parties that often utilise the same dispute resolution
provider.
By establishing a relationship
with mediators, such parties (usually businesses, large institutions
and government agencies) may gain an advantage vis-à-vis one-time
users (specifically consumers); the latter “may feel pressurized
to settle on less favourable terms than the case merits because
of financial need, the leveraging of access [to children] and/or
a lack of resources to proceed to litigation where legal aid is
unavailable”.
This risk of inequality of bargaining powers
putting one party in a disadvantageous position may be mitigated through
proper structuring of the mediation process to exclude biases as
much as possible. ODR providers should take adequate steps to safeguard
the impartiality of the dispute resolution process.
48. One possible way to ensure independence and impartiality would
be to provide a preselected list of ODR providers from which the
consumer can choose so as to guarantee that neither the consumer
nor the retailer relate directly to that organisation. This should
be combined with a unified system of trustmarks, that is a common
label that only certified providers may display on their respective
websites in order to enhance individuals’ trust in the process.
Governments can and should play a crucial role in this respect,
namely that of certifying such providers and continuously monitoring
their activities and rights compliance.
49. Critiques of ODR (or ADR more generally) further caution that
diverting disputes away from the public (i.e. courts of law) and
into the confidential or private (ODR) sphere may curtail the development
of the law and undermine the precedent-setting role of courts.
While I believe that some disputes
should not be dealt with by means of ADR/ODR as doing so would undermine
the social function of adjudication,
I would argue that ODR processes can
in fact go beyond an individualistic resolution of isolated disputes.
As mentioned above, ODR providers use their experience from earlier
settlement agreements in similar cases to give recommendations on
possible remedies, by using technology to identify recurring patterns
of disputes and categorising complaints. This has prompted commentators
to conclude that “ODR has particular appeal when investigations
involve systemic events, or when there are multiple complaints on
a file”.
Seen
from this angle, ODR may not only be a means for resolving disputes,
but possibly also an opportunity for preventing them, including
by way of changing the behaviour of traders.
50. Another concern is that respondents may refuse to participate
in ODR when invited by the initiating party. Still, there was consensus
among the experts testifying before our committee that the engagement
in ODR should continue to be voluntary. ODR providers can be expected
to design their systems and provide their services in a manner that
will enhance potential users’ trust in their fairness and efficiency.
It appears logical to assume that if the parties are not satisfied
with the handling and resolution of their complaint – which does not
necessarily depend on whether they “won” their case or not
– they will stop using it. Nevertheless,
I am convinced, as noted above, that governments can play a key
role in promoting this trust, thus creating incentives for the use
of ODR procedures.
51. Further, even when a party does agree to participate voluntarily,
there is a risk that the losing side may fail to comply with the
outcome, giving rise to the question of how ODR decisions can be
enforced. Here again, a trustmark system might provide a solution:
it could be envisaged, for instance, that if a company wants to bear
an official trustmark, it must undertake to implement a certain
percentage (namely 98%, as in the case of Youstice, the company
of one of our experts) of the decisions made by the adjudicator.
In this vein, I tend to agree with what Ms Havlova suggested during
the committee’s second hearing, namely that ODR should be binding
on the stronger party (i.e. the retailer or trader) but not on the
weaker party (i.e. the consumer or customer), at which point the
latter may then initiate a new proceeding in court if dissatisfied
with the outcome of ODR. Importantly, in my view, there must either
be a clear time limit for the ODR process so that the party does
not forfeit the right of access to court because the statute of
limitation period has expired, or it must be ensured that this limitation
period be suspended while the ODR procedure is underway.
52. While being a proponent of the right to a judicial appeals
procedure, I am conscious that it is inherent in the nature of ODR
decisions that instituting an appeal procedure within the ordinary
court system may be impractical, notably since the reasons that
prompted the parties to engage in ODR in the first place may prevent them
from availing themselves of the court system for the appeals procedure.
I therefore see a need for developing practical and effective methods
of out-of-court enforcement.
In
the future, I would envisage that “cyber-courts” that are either
supervised or provided by State authorities and that satisfy all
the requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights could carry out this function.
53. There may be additional challenges to designing ODR procedures
in such a way as to ensure respect for the basic rights of its users.
For example, ODR providers, probably to an even larger extent than
courts, must pay acute attention to safeguarding the privacy and
authenticity of communications. ODR users will send documents, forms,
and identifying information over the Internet to the other party
and possibly also to mediators or arbitrators, which opens up the
possibility of tampering with records containing confidential or
sensitive personal information. It would appear that one possible
solution for ensuring data security is encryption. Similarly, in
online arbitration and mediation, ensuring the confidentiality of
the neutral third party will generally be crucial.
In order to promote participation
in ODR procedures, potential participants need to feel reassured that
there is low risk involved with respect to violations of privacy.
ODR providers should inform users up front of
the ways in which their information is stored, used and disposed
of.
54. Finally, and having regard to the Court’s case law outlined
above (in paragraphs 32 to 34), it is clear that the essence of
the rights enshrined in the Convention, such as the right to an
independent and impartial third party and the right to have a dispute
settled within a reasonable period of time, must not be sacrificed.
But the level of safeguards
in online out-of-court dispute settlement procedures will vary with
the specifics of the ODR system in question. The different levels
of procedural safeguards within the ODR process must be set by the
State, which must also ensure minimal procedural protections.
55. Aside from these risks, there exist practical obstacles to
further expanding the use of ODR procedures: first and foremost,
potential users’ lack of awareness of the benefits of ODR and trust
in the system. Scholars as well as the experts before our committee
have pointed to the significant role that governments can play in spreading
information about ODR and encouraging potential users to trust in
the process. Governments can – and I would encourage them to – accredit
ODR facilities and continuously monitor their compliance with European
standards of due process, transparency, fairness, impartiality and
consistency. They can establish clearing houses like the EU system
described above, and provide for online appeals procedures.
The Council of Europe can contribute
to the promotion of ODR by continuing to take stock of ODR procedures
utilised by member States to ensure that the procedures and practices
promote judicial efficiency while continuing to protect the rights
of their users.
56. Another potential impediment to the development of ODR relates
to translation needs. An integral element of ODR systems which aim
to tackle cross-border disputes will have to be translation support.
The EU ODR portal places significant emphasis on translation by
making complaint forms available in all official languages of the
European Union, translating the complaint form into the respondent’s
language and translating information necessary for the resolution
of the dispute. One limitation of the EU system is that, although
the portal itself is offered in all EU languages, the actual dispute
resolution process will be conducted in the language chosen by the
ADR entity.
Further development of, and emphasis
on, multilingual mediation may facilitate the creation of a process
of more seamless and comfortable communication between mediators and
parties to the disputes.
I invite member States to reinforce
their efforts in this respect.
2.2.8. Some
concluding remarks on ODR
57. ODR procedures involve complex
legal and human rights considerations. In this respect, some types
of disputes may lend themselves well to ODR, whereas for others,
resorting to online forms of dispute settlement may be inappropriate
for reasons related, for instance, to a potential risk of creating,
perpetuating or even deepening inequalities of arms.
58. Typical disputes for which ODR may be well suited are evidenced
by the types of disputes dealt with by existing ODR systems, and
could include: commercial disputes between a buyer and a seller;
disputes involving debts or damages where liability is not challenged;
recovery of personal property; specific performance of an agreement
on services or personal property; landlord-tenant disputes and certain
family law cases in which the family members are separated by great
geographical distance.
59. Conversely, there may be cases for which online dispute resolution
would be inappropriate. Here, I would distinguish disputes that
could be appropriate for face-to-face ADR but not ODR, from disputes
which would be inappropriate for ADR generally. As to the former,
and taking up the last example just given, one may argue that offline
mediation should be favoured to court proceedings in child custody
disputes, for it bears the potential of preserving existing relationships.
Conducting such proceedings online may unduly depersonalise these
highly personal matters, thus undercutting the very objective of
out-of-court settlement. Also, most criminal cases, in particular
those involving a large amount of physical evidence are ill-suited
for online dispute resolution. An example of the latter relates
to Article 48.1 of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (
CETS
No. 210), which prohibits mandatory alternative dispute resolution
processes in domestic violence cases. I fully endorse both the approach
taken in the convention and the assessment thereof made in Mr Badea’s
above-mentioned report. A non-adversarial setting is not adequate
for cases involving allegations of violence.
60. On a more general note, I agree with the view expressed by
the three experts who testified before the committee that engaging
in ODR should not be mandatory.
ODR processes should be voluntary
in nature and employed in situations where their advantages best
come to bear.
61. Besides, I would argue that there should always be a possibility
for judicial review of ODR outcomes. I believe it would not only
promote people’s trust in online out-of-court settlement, but also
ensure that the fair trial guarantees enshrined in the convention
are upheld, if ODR mechanisms were supplemented with procedural
safeguards that include an opportunity for judicial review by a
body capable of reviewing both the facts and the law underlying
the ODR decision, and of overturning the latter for failure to comply
with minimum standards of due process.
62. It can also be concluded that ODR, while potentially able
to help many persons to resolve their disputes, is certainly not
a panacea. It is true that one of the advantages of ODR vis-à-vis
conventional litigation seems to be ODR’s lower cost. But the promotion
of alternative forms of dispute resolution, whether online or offline, cannot
be the sole response to cost-related challenges in the courts. The
judicial system itself can and should be made more efficient (and
cost-effective). This leads me to the last point in my report, namely
the integration of information and communications technology (ICT)
in the courtroom, which could help make conventional courts more
accessible.
2.3. Integrating
information and communications technology in the courtroom
2.3.1. The
use of ICT in court proceedings
63. Integrating ICT in judicial
proceedings is not a novel issue for the Council of Europe. In
Resolution 2054 (2015) on equality and non-discrimination in the access to
justice, the Assembly called on member States to “promote and improve
legal awareness by exploring and implementing specific information
mechanisms and innovative communication strategies” (paragraph 4.1).
CEPEJ, in its 2013
Revised
Guidelines on the creation of judicial maps to support access to
justice within a quality judicial system, and the CCJE, in its
Opinion
No. 14 on “Justice and information technologies (IT)”, have
advocated the increased use of ICT in the courts. Whereas the former
examines whether ICT may alleviate the negative effects of the above-mentioned
recent trend towards court consolidation (merger of local courts)
on access to justice, the latter explores the role of ICT in reinforcing
the safeguards enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention and concludes
that ICT may improve access to justice and decrease the length of
judicial proceedings.
64. ICT can be integrated into the judicial system in two different
ways. First, courts may utilise ICT in their external communication,
which includes, but is not limited to, the use of videoconferences
for remote witness testimony, paperless procedures and audio and/or
video recording of hearings. Videoconferencing allows a witness
to testify from a distant or undisclosed location or from a room
adjoining the courtroom to avoid directly facing the accused; this
is considered a useful tool for protecting witnesses.
The Assembly welcomed the increased use of
video-link technology for witness testimony in
Resolution 1784 (2011) on the protection of witnesses as a cornerstone for
justice and reconciliation in the Balkans. Paperless procedures
refer to the use of electronic summons, filings and signatures.
The use of paperless procedures is growing within national court systems
around Europe. The European Union has also encouraged the use of
e-filing through the recently created
European
Small Claims Procedure, a written procedure for resolving cross-border claims
under 2 000 euros in national courts. The procedure allows claimants
to transfer information and evidence to the court online to the
extent permitted by the member State with jurisdiction over the
claim. However, attempts to promote e-filing and electronic submissions
are currently limited to a few countries only, whilst most member States
continue to require documents to be sent by mail.
65. The second category of ICT usage, namely in courts’ internal
communication,
inter alia entails
the incorporation of automated case management systems, electronic
case law databases and sentencing support. Automated case management
systems allow court employees to schedule hearings, assign cases
to judges and carry out other functions electronically, expediting
these tasks when compared to paper-based case management. Electronic
case law databases assist judges and (where applicable) staff lawyers
in researching case law. Sentencing support systems provide judges
responsible for sentencing decisions with easy access to sentencing
information on similar cases, whilst not restricting the judges’
judicial discretion,
with the aim of ensuring greater consistency
in the practice of different courts and thus fostering equal treatment
and legal certainty.
2.3.2. Maximising
the benefits of ICT in court proceedings
66. The aforementioned examples
suggest that the incorporation of ICT into judicial systems can
increase public knowledge about individuals’ rights and court proceedings.
Besides simplifying access to the justice system and to information
on the progress of pending procedures, ICT also has the potential
to improve communication between courts and the public. For instance,
automated case management systems could speed up court proceedings.
Technologies such as electronic case law databases and sentencing
support systems may contribute to fairer, more equal and more predictable
outcomes.
67. Still, there are some obstacles. In many countries, integrating
ICT within the judicial system runs into resource constraints. In
the short term, introducing such technologies and training court
personnel in their use requires significant investments.
Specific
figures regarding costs versus savings of courtroom technology are elusive,
and governments should continue to monitor technological developments
in order to determine the most cost-effective and efficient methods
of digitalising courtroom procedures while ensuring that due process guarantees
are not negatively affected. Relatedly, the fact that the risk of
short-run productivity declines after ICT is introduced highlights
the importance of phasing in new technologies. Courts should be
aware of the learning curve associated with the integration of new
technologies, particularly given the fact that short-term declines
in efficiency can limit future investments in ICT. The advanced
IT-based case management system of the European Court of Human Rights
could serve as an example for the administration of justice in member States.
68. Another factor impeding a greater use of ICT in court proceedings
is the potential prejudice to parties unfamiliar with information
technology. As mentioned before, many persons still lack access
to the Internet. Thus, it may be necessary for some time to preserve
traditional means of communication with the courts while offering,
though not requiring, paperless procedures.
69. In order to be successful, the use of ICT requires the active
involvement and support of judges. As ICT becomes further embedded
within the judicial system, judges will likely have an important
role to play in identifying and limiting potential risks to parties’
procedural rights flowing from ICT.
The
CCJE’s
Opinion
No. 14 stresses the positive role judges can play in limiting
possible prejudice to parties from the integration of ICT and addressing
the current needs of the judicial system. I would argue that technology
developers should strive to better understand the justice system
and collaborate with judges and court staff to ensure that ICT architecture
meets the needs of both the courts and the public.
70. Achieving openness and efficiency through the integration
of ICT also comes with certain risks regarding data privacy and
security. A breach in security could result in forgery, or the disclosure
of confidential information (which constitute only two among a number
of problems regarding the admissibility of electronic evidence).
Against this background, courts must consider mechanisms for enhancing
data security and possibilities for creating paperless procedures
with a level of safety equivalent to that of traditional paper-based procedures,
having regard, in particular, to the Convention for the Protection
of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data
(
ETS
No. 108). Courts should consider the use of encryption for non-public
court records, as mentioned above with respect to ODR.
71. An example of both the risks and opportunities involved in
ICT is witness testimony by videoconference. The growing use of
videoconferencing may reduce barriers to participation in trials,
particularly for individuals with disabilities restricting their
mobility, i.e. their physical access to the courtroom, or their
ability to communicate in person;
those residing in remote
areas; and witnesses taking part in certain sensitive cases. Videoconferencing
can potentially broaden opportunities for hearing relevant testimony
in cross-border cases. It permits the judge, defence counsel, defendant,
prosecution and others present in the courtroom to hear and see
the witness in real-time transmission. The location of the witness
may be protected through encryption.
72. National courts have already begun to use videoconferencing
technology in respect of certain categories of witnesses.
Although a number of
countries permit videoconferencing for witnesses having to travel
long distances within a country, videoconferencing is generally
limited to vulnerable witnesses (such as children), anonymous (protected)
witnesses and witnesses living abroad. Videoconferencing is not
common for witnesses who do not fall within these narrow categories.
At the international level, the International Criminal Court and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda are increasingly
relying on videoconferencing.
73. However, I am aware that one important limitation of videoconferencing
is the inability to benefit from face-to-face interaction. Although
video technology provides high-quality transmission and continues
to improve, certain key aspects of face-to-face interrogation –
including aspects of body language – may be lost. Additionally,
transmissions may be intercepted, and the location or identity of
the witness may be revealed. Finally, certain types of evidence
that a witness may be called upon to identify during his or her
testimony may be difficult to authenticate by videoconference.
74. Against this backdrop, courts that use videoconferencing should
continue to explore ways to mitigate these disadvantages, such as
pursuing technological advances that would improve the quality of
the videoconference and encrypting the video signal to protect against
interception. Lawyers, judges and court staff should also familiarise
themselves with common differences between in-person testimony and videoconference
testimony in order to increase their awareness of how these differences
may have certain implications for videoconference testimony. For
example, persons testifying via videoconference tend to look at
the screen to see the other person rather than into the camera,
therefore eliminating the appearance of direct eye contact with
the people in the courtroom.
Understanding
this and other differences can help lawyers, judges and courtroom
staff to modify their expectations of videoconference testimony,
as opposed to in-person testimony.
75. The same is true for other information and communications
technologies in court proceedings: if used properly, and if there
is a concerted effort of all actors involved to overcome the challenges
involved in their introduction and use, ICT can make court proceedings
more predictable and more time- and cost-efficient.
3. Conclusions
76. I wish to conclude by stating
that both ODR and ICT, though not by any means panaceas, can help provide
greater access to the judicial system by offering solutions to the
problems of judicial inefficiency, the high cost of litigation and
geographical barriers. ODR and ICT nevertheless have some drawbacks,
and member States should continue to invest in the development of
safer, more effective and more accessible ODR and ICT.
77. The Assembly and its members should recognise and utilise
their crucial roles in encouraging the development of ODR and ICT
procedures within the Council of Europe and its member States. The
Council of Europe and its member States should continue to assess
the successes and potential risks of ODR and ICT in terms of access
to justice, and keep an eye on developing technologies and their
use in ODR and courtroom procedures.