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Report | Doc. 11536 | 20 March 2008
Observation of the presidential election in the Russian Federation (2 March 2008)
1. Introduction
1. The Bureau of the Assembly
decided, at its meeting on 17 December 2007, to set up an ad hoc committee
of 30 members to observe the presidential election in the Russian
Federation (2 March 2008), subject to receipt of an invitation,
and authorised a pre-electoral mission consisting of five members
– one from each political group who were also members of the ad
hoc committee. Following an invitation by Mr Boris Gryzlov, Speaker
of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,
the Bureau, at its meeting on 25 January 2008, approved the composition
of the ad hoc committee and appointed me as its chairperson.
2. Following the proposals of the political groups, the ad hoc
committee was composed as follows (asterisks indicate those members
who also attended the pre-electoral mission):
- Socialist Group (SOC)
- Mr Zigmantas Balčytis, Lithuania
- Mr Vidar Bjørnstad, Norway
- Ms Anna Čurdová, Czech Republic
- Mr Andreas Gross (**), Switzerland
- Mr Tadeusz Iwiński, Poland
- Group of the European People’s Party (EPP/CD)
- Ms Donka Banović, Serbia
- Mr Holger Haibach, Germany
- Mr Raffi Hovannisian, Armenia
- Mrs Danuta Jazłowiecka, Poland
- Ms Corien Jonker, Netherlands
- Mrs Nadezhda Mikhailova (**), Bulgaria
- Mr Vjačeslavs Stepanenko, Latvia
- Mr Egidijus Vareikis, Lithuania
- Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
- Mrs Kerstin Lundgren, Sweden
- Mr Andrea Rigoni, Italy
- Mrs Darinka Stantcheva, Bulgaria
- Mr Han Ten Broeke, Netherlands
- Mr Paul Wille, Belgium
- European Democrat Group (EDG)
- Mr Sergej Chelemendik, Slovakia
- Mr Nigel Evans, United Kingdom
- Mr Øyvind Vaksdal, Norway
- Group of the Unified European Left (UEL)
- Mr Tiny Kox, Netherlands
- Mrs Maria Postoico (**), Moldova
3. Regrettably, members from the EDG and ALDE groups had to cancel
their participation in the pre-electoral mission at the last moment
due to unforeseen circumstances.
4. Mr Dronov, Mr Chahbazian, Ms Jamal, Mr Ferrer, Ms Mason and
Ms Bargellini provided secretarial support to the ad hoc committee,
with Mr Dronov, Ms Godfrey and Mr Macdonald also supporting the
pre-electoral mission.
5. The pre-electoral mission visited Moscow from 7 to 8 February
2008. It met with members of the Russian Federation’s delegation
to the Parliamentary Assembly, three of the four presidential candidates
and the campaign manager of the fourth candidate, Mr Medvedev. It
also met with the Chairperson of the Central Election Commission
(CEC), members of the diplomatic corps accredited in Moscow, as
well as a cross-section of representatives of the civil society
and the media. The mission further met with Mr Mikhail Kasyanov,
a would-be candidate denied registration by the CEC on the grounds
of an excessive number of “bad signatures” on the lists of his supporters.
6. In its statement issued at the end of the visit (Appendix
I), the pre-electoral mission expressed its concern over the prospects
for free and fair presidential elections in the Russian Federation
in 2008. The concerns focused on an almost prohibitive registration
procedure for independent candidates not sponsored by a registered
party, as well as on what it regarded as the unequal media access
available to the candidates. The mission, in particular, decried
the fact that the candidate known as the successor commanded the broadcast
media due to his official position as a Deputy Prime Minister.
7. The ad hoc committee conducted its observation mission from
28 February to 3 March 2008. At its meeting on 1 March, it decided
on the deployment plan for the observation of elections in Moscow,
greater Moscow, in St Petersburg, greater St Petersburg and in Yaroslavl.
8. The ad hoc committee was the only parliamentary delegation
to observe the presidential election in the Russian Federation.
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
found it impossible to deploy its long-term observation mission
due to time constraints imposed on it by the Russian CEC, as well
as due to numerical limitations imposed on it in terms of observers.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
PA, NATO Assembly and the Nordic Council decided not to observe
either. The European Parliament had not been invited. The press
statement was presented by the head of the Assembly delegation for
the observation of the presidential election in the Russian Federation
at a press conference held on 3 March 2008 at 11.30 a.m. (Appendix
I).
9. The ad hoc committee held meetings with three candidates competing
in these elections: Mr Zyuganov, Mr Zhirinovsky, and Mr Bogdanov,
as well as with Mr Sobyanin, Campaign Manager of Mr Medvedev. The
ad hoc committee also met Mr Churov, Chairperson of the CEC; Ambassador
Augustin Cisar, Slovakia, representing the chairmanship of the Council
of Europe Committee of Ministers; Ambassador Marc Franco, Head of
the EU Office in Moscow; Mr Kosachev, chairman of the delegation
of the Russian Federation in the Assembly; and Mr Pligin, Chairman
of the Legal Affairs Committee, Russian Parliament. In addition,
in my capacity as chairperson of the committee, I met with Mr Belykh,
leader of the Union of Right Forces, and Mr Yavlinsky, leader of
the Yabloko, as well as with our colleagues Mr Kosachev and Mr Slutsky.
2. Political background, legal framework, political party registration and the election campaign
10. The presidential election took
place only a few months after the parliamentary elections in the
Russian Federation, which took place on2 December 2007. During these
elections, the incumbent President was precluded from standing for
re-election as a result of the constitutional limit of two consecutive
terms, which the incumbent President had the wisdom not to change,
even though the two-thirds majority needed for this in the Duma
would have allowed him to do so. In this election, which had more
the character of a plebiscite in this country over the last eight
years, the people of the Russian Federation voted for the stability
and continuity associated with the incumbent President and the candidate
promoted by him.
11. The Presidential Election Law (PEL) and the Law on Basic Guarantees
of Electoral Rights provided the legal framework for the presidential
elections.
12. The legal requirement to submit 2 million signatures, which
in the case of this election had to be collected within thirty days
(with not more than 50 000 coming from any one subject of the federation)
to the CEC in support of persons seeking registration as independent
candidates was considered by the observers as an unreasonable hurdle.
This provision made it almost impossible for independent presidential
hopefuls to register.
13. The CEC registered four candidates: three were nominated by
parties represented in the Duma – the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and United
Russia (UR) together with Just Russia – and one candidate was nominated
by a party not represented in the Duma, the Democratic Party of
the Russian Federation. An independent presidential hopeful, Mr Kasyanov,
was disqualified from running on the grounds of an excessive number
of bad signatures collected in his support.
14. The outcome of the election was clear from the outset since
the incumbent President – broadly associated in the Russian Federation
with stability, economic growth, as well as Russia’s re-emergence
on the world scene as an important player – threw his support behind
Mr Medvedev, the first Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of
the Russian Federation, as the candidate for the presidential post.
15. Furthermore, Mr Medvedev, as a candidate, announced in December
2007 that, if elected President of the Russian Federation, he would
offer the post of Prime Minister to the incumbent President. On
17 December 2007, at the United Russia party conference, President
Putin accepted this proposal. From that day onwards, the outcome
of the 2 March vote became even more evident.
16. During this presidential campaign, the major concern of the
authorities of the Russian Federation was voter turnout in view
of the fact that the outcome of the election was predictable. The
turnout figures were considered central to the legitimacy of the
new President. In this regard, the election campaign was characterised
by different propaganda ploys launched by the CEC, and federal,
regional and local authorities aimed at encouraging people to vote.
Election related paraphernalia was broadly used as handouts, and
first-time voters were given presents, not just flowers as is otherwise
customary in the Russian Federation.
17. The ad hoc committee heard allegations regarding the wide-scale
abuse of administrative resources (the state infrastructure, funds
and personnel on the public payroll) in support of Mr Medvedev.
For example, we were told that local authorities were instructed
to hamper Mr Zyuganov’s meetings with voters in the region of Ulianovsk,
and that, in some cases, the publishing houses refused to publish
the opposition candidates’ election campaign materials. The ad hoc
committee could neither disprove, nor confirm these allegations.
18. Compared to the Duma elections of 2 December 2007, the presidential
campaign was rather low key. Given Mr Medvedev’s refusal to engage
in televised debates, the latter were considered by most of our interlocutors
as lacking in interest. The debates were marred by an incident in
the course of which Mr Zhirinovsky publicly abused and man-handled
Mr Bogdanov’s campaign representative.
19. He who tries to understand the Russian Federation has to understand
ambivalence. While 70% of the Russians were prepared to accept whoever
the incumbent President earmarked as his successor, 45% believed
that the 2 March 2008 presidential election would not be an example
of fair play.
3. The media environment
20. In the absence of a long-term
OSCE/ODIHR presence, the delegation did not have a credible independent
media monitoring analysis which an ODIHR mission would normally
make available to parliamentary observer delegations.
21. In the past, the Assembly delegations observing the parliamentary
and presidential elections in the Russian Federation expressed their
concern over the lack of a strong and independent media and in particular, electronic
media, which could provide a balanced coverage of the campaign.
Once again, this was the case in the 2 March 2008 election. According
to the media monitoring analysis done by the Centre of Studies of Political
Culture in the Russian Federation (which nobody, including the authorities,
put into question), while there was parity in the usage of air time
allocated to the candidates, 80% of the coverage during prime-time
(7-10 p.m.) was dedicated to Mr Medvedev in his capacity as Deputy
Prime Minister. While there is no legal requirement in the Russian
Federation for people in high office running for new offices to
step down, it has to be decided how in the future such high office
holders should behave if they run for new public office.
22. We were told that, while the printed media provided a wide
range of opinions, the state-owned or state-controlled television
stations with nationwide coverage failed to demonstrate impartiality
in political reporting. At the same time, the print media – in particular,
the more independent news – do not have a wide audience. Such a
media environment was not conducive to a truly democratic process.
The candidate of the ruling party was omnipresent on television.
This kind of problem could be resolved through the establishment
of a genuinely independent system of public service broadcasting.
23. The ad hoc committee reiterated the necessity for equal access
for all candidates to television channels as a crucial issue in
the case of the Russian Federation because of the fact that, according
to independent analysts, about 90% of information the citizens received
was via the television.
4. The election day
24. The ad hoc committee split
into 14 teams. Each team visited between 10 and 15 polling stations, observing
the opening of polling stations, the voting and the vote count in
and around Moscow, in and around St Petersburg, and in Yaroslavl.
The overall impression of the organisation and conduct of the voting
was positive.
25. Credit should be given to the election administration which
ensured the efficient and professional conduct of the voting process
and the vote count.
26. However, some irregularities were observed by the members
of the ad hoc committee on the election day. Regrettably, the practice
of open voting, which had been reported by the Assembly election
observation mission during the last parliamentary elections, was
also widespread during the presidential election. In some cases,
the ballot boxes were not securely sealed. Booths in many polling
stations did not provide, in our opinion, adequate secrecy. Electronic
voting machines were regarded by us as particularly detrimental
to secrecy, since a great proportion of the voters using them fed
their ballot papers face up, completely compromising the concept
of secrecy.
27. Another source of concern was an extremely heavy presence
of uniformed policemen and plain clothes security officers at many
polling stations.
28. Observers reported some problems during the vote count and
tabulation, including cases where the number of signatures on the
voting lists did not correspond to the numbers of ballot papers
received. In St Petersburg, in polling station No. 1430, a claim
by a domestic observer of the Communist Party was rejected under
visible pressure from a representative of the Territorial Election
Commission.
5. Results of the elections
29. According to the information
of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, Mr Medvedev
won the Russian Federation’s presidential election with 70.28% of
the votes, and 64.21% of the electorate took part in the elections.
30. The Communist Party candidate, Mr Zyuganov, received 17.72%
of the vote, the Liberal Democratic Party candidate, Mr Zhirinovsky,
received 9.35% and the Democratic Party candidate, Mr Bogdanov,
received 1.30% of the vote (see Appendix II).
6. Conclusions and recommendations
31. The ad hoc committee concluded
that the results of the presidential election held on 2 March 2008
in the Russian Federation are a reflection of the will of an electorate
whose democratic potential was, unfortunately, not tapped.
32. In the presidential election, which had more the character
of a plebiscite on the last eight years in this country, the people
of the Russian Federation voted for the stability and continuity
associated with the incumbent President and the candidate promoted
by him. The President-elect will have a solid mandate given to him
by the majority of Russians.
33. At the same time, the ad hoc committee highlighted that this
election repeated most of the flaws revealed during the Duma elections
of December 2007, as well as during the visit of the Assembly pre-electoral
mission in February 2008. None of the concerns of the pre-electoral
mission were dealt with ahead of the 2 March vote. Candidate registration
concerns could not be accommodated, putting into question the degree
of how free the election was. The equal access of the candidates
to the media and the public sphere in general did not improve, putting
into question the fairness of the election.
34. Candidate registration procedures should be simplified to
be more inclusive and less cumbersome for independent candidates.
The legislation on campaign funding should also be improved to increase
the transparency of the process.
35. Complaints of participating candidates, their parties, independent
observers and others should be examined thoroughly and lead, when
necessary, to appropriate measures and amendments of electoral procedures
in the future.
36. The ad hoc committee supported the project of the CEC chair
that, in the future, television debates should be made attractive
to the public, the candidates and the broadcasters in such a way
that no candidate would wish to opt out.
37. The ad hoc committee appreciated the will of its Duma colleagues
and the CEC to evaluate the existing electoral legislation in the
light of the experiences of the 2007 Duma and 2008 presidential
elections. As already proposed in the 2004 and 2007 election observation
reports, the delegation recommended conducting further reforms for
the independence of the media in the Russian Federation, in particular
putting into place a genuinely independent public broadcasting system
that would be free of state influence and control, and not subject
to manipulation by other vested interests, as it believed that the
creation of a public and independent television would serve the
cause of democracy. In this context, modification of existing electoral
legislation should be carried out in closer co-operation with the
experts of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.
38. The ad hoc committee deplored the absence in the field of
its traditional election observation partners, notably, the long-term
observers from the OSCE/ODIHR and called on the President-elect,
as one of his first acts, to have sufficient confidence in his own
country and his own democracy to welcome in the future a much larger
representation of official observers over a longer period of time.
39. The ad hoc committee concluded that the voting was well administered,
although it observed the same flaws as the ones seen during the
last Duma elections. For an election to be good, it takes a good
process, not just a good election day. Nonetheless, the delegation
felt that, even if those concerns had been addressed, the outcome
of the vote – amounting, in effect, to a vote of confidence in the
incumbent President – would most probably have been the same.
held exchanges
of view with three of the four presidential candidates and the campaign
manager of the fourth, as well as with Mr Kasyanov, whose candidacy
was refused.