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Report | Doc. 11746 | 14 October 2008
Attitude to memorials exposed to different historical interpretations in Council of Europe member states
Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy
Summary
The totalitarian regimes and wars of the 20th century in Europe have left behind a number of graves and memorials which have acquired divergent historical and political connotations after the collapse of these regimes.
Disputes relating to divergent interpretations of history can only be resolved with time and through a process specific to each nation, the final decision on the fate of such memorials being a sovereign one of the state in which the monument is located. Council of Europe member states, however, should initiate broad and inclusive discussions on the complexity of the historical background of these monuments and their meaning to different segments of society, with a view to facilitating the shaping of a collective memory.
As regards war graves and other burial sites, Council of Europe member states should respect the relevant norms of international conventions and bilateral agreements; in addition, a good practice should be developed to consult any other member state concerned, prior to the taking of any action to exhume foreign soldiers and war victims, even outside the framework of existing agreements.
A. Draft resolution
(open)1. The totalitarian regimes and wars of 20th century
in Europe have left behind a number of graves and memorials which
have acquired divergent historic-political connotations after the
collapse of these regimes and subsequent revision of history in
the countries in which they are located. In recent years, several
such memorials have been relocated or demolished, in particular
in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, new controversial commemorative
monuments have been erected, arousing fierce political disputes
both internally and at international level. In broader terms, the
question of how to make peace with the past while facing up to the
challenges of the current century is of common concern to all European
countries that have experienced totalitarian regimes or have been
subjected to foreign occupation.
2. The Parliamentary Assembly believes that disputes relating
to divergent interpretations of history can only be resolved with
time and through a process specific to each nation. In this regard,
the Assembly recalls its Resolutions 1096 (1996) on measures to
dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems, 1481
(2006) on need for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian
communist regimes and 1495 (2006) on combating the resurrection
of Nazi ideology and Recommendation
1736 (2006) on need for international condemnation of the Franco
regime and reiterates its conviction that, in order to enable individual Council
of Europe member states to come to terms with the controversies
of their recent past, Europe must unequivocally reject and unreservedly
condemn all forms of dictatorial regimes such as National Socialism, fascism
and totalitarian communism.
3. The decisions adopted by Council of Europe member states on
the fate of controversial monuments have taken extremely varied
forms: in some cases demolition, in others relocation to museums
or new open-air museum parks; some monuments have been preserved
as they stood and others (buildings or complexes, for instance)
preserved but given a new function or converted into museums, sometimes
dedicated to the victims of the regimes which built them.
4. The Assembly, while drawing attention to its Recommendation 898 (1980) on memorials, which suggests conserving “monuments set
up by invaders or by a regime regarded as oppressive or hated” in museums
as an alternative to their demolition, expresses its belief that
the final decision on the fate of such memorials is a sovereign
one of the state in which the monument is located; it should, nevertheless,
be based on the norms of international conventions and bilateral
agreements.
5. In this context, however, the Assembly deems it necessary
to distinguish between war graves and victory monuments erected
to glorify totalitarian regimes or former occupation forces – or
at least perceived as such by the mainstream population. It underlines
that, where graves and burial sites containing the remains of foreign
soldiers and war victims are concerned, national decisions must
fully abide by the respect of the dead, often victims rather than
occupiers, and bilateral or multilateral agreements, notably Protocol
I of the Geneva Convention relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts.
6. The Assembly regrets that up till now there exists no complete
list of war graves located on the territory of the Council of Europe
member states. It recalls its appeal made to the Committee of Ministers
almost thirty years ago in Recommendation
898 (1980), to engage in a general study of memorials in member
states which might lead, inter alia,
to proposals on systematic recording, on protection against destruction
or on responsibility for upkeep. The Assembly reiterates the need
for drawing up a common database in view of better protection of
burial sites and further facilitation of conclusion of new bilateral
agreements between member states. Furthermore, the Assembly encourages
the development of a good practice comprising consultation of any
member state concerned, prior to the taking of any action to exhume
foreign soldiers and war victims, even outside the framework of
agreements which already exist.
7. Because of the controversial nature of such memorials, the
Assembly calls on Council of Europe member states to initiate the
broadest possible discussions of historians and other experts on
the complexity of the historical background of these monuments,
their meanings to different segments of the societies internally
and, if appropriate, internationally.
8. The Assembly emphasises the need for deeper mutual understanding
and for conciliatory action to be taken in order to prevent memorials
of disputed symbolic significance becoming a source of tension in
intra-state relations. It appears vital to seek consolidation of
all major political forces representing different approaches when
discussing the fate of such memorials with a view to reach final
decisions on the basis of sustainable social majority opinion. Similarly,
the Assembly underscores that under no circumstances should memorials
become tools for advancing foreign policy goals or incitement of
tensions by third states.
9. In the light of the above, the Assembly invites Council of
Europe member states to:
9.1. initiate
the broadest and most inclusive possible debate about the fate of
memorials exposed to different interpretations, involving historians,
active members of civil society and political leaders, and organising
conferences, colloquies and seminars on the subject;
9.2. support the creation of a European centre of expertise
to help member states with historiographical and archaeological
investigation and elucidation of memorials;
9.3. welcome establishing a common database including a complete
list of war graves and memorials within the territory of Council
of Europe member states. To this end, open up all national archives
that may contain relevant information on the location of burial
places in full compliance with Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation
Rec(2000)13 on a European policy on access to archives;
9.4. consider creating historical museums and provide these
with support;
9.5. continue to honour their commitments under bilateral or
multilateral treaties on the maintenance and conservation of monuments,
including those containing the remains of foreign soldiers or war victims;
9.6. consider concluding such treaties where none exist;
9.7. consult the relatives or the states concerned and relevant
NGOs before exhuming any foreign soldiers or war victims buried
in their territories.
9.8. avoid and condemn any incitement of tensions around memorials,
in particular as this may entail sharp confrontations between different
segments of society in these countries.
B. Draft recommendation
(open)1. Referring to its Resolution ... (2009) on the attitude
to memorials exposed to different historical interpretations in
Council of Europe member states, the Parliamentary Assembly draws
attention to the numerous activities carried out by the Council
of Europe in relation to museums, history and the cultural heritage.
2. The Assembly believes that it is the Council of Europe’s duty
to continue to play a major role in supporting activities which
facilitate the shaping of collective memory in its member states.
The Council of Europe should also create opportunities to facilitate
constructive and open dialogue between historians and member states’
experts on controversial historical questions which concern several
member states, and, where appropriate, about the fate of memorials
exposed to different historical interpretations.
3. Consequently, the Assembly recommends to the Committee of
Ministers to:
3.1. organise and/or
promote the organisation of international conferences of experts,
and to facilitate international exchanges concerning controversial
historical questions of interest to several member states, and,
where appropriate, on the fate of memorials exposed to different
historical interpretations;
3.2. create a European centre of expertise for helping member
states with historiographical and archaeological investigation and
elucidation of memorials;
3.3. set up a common European database on war graves and memorials
located in Council of Europe member states in line with the Assembly’s
previous Recommendation
898 (1980) on memorials;
3.4. urge member states to revise national legislation with
a view to making it comply fully with Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation
No. R (2000) 13 on a European policy on access to archives;
3.5. continue to give its support to activities in relation
to museums, history and cultural heritage, including the activities
of the European Museum Forum (EMF);
3.6. develop good practices relating to the fate of controversial
memorials.
C. Explanatory memorandum, Mr Eörsi
(open)1. Introduction
1. Near to the Budapest city boundaries lies a very
unusual park containing statues and monuments from the communist
era put up in celebration of both communist ideology and the liberation
of Hungary by the Red Army in 1945. It is an open-air museum created
in 1993 in response to popular and political demand for these symbols
of the past to be done away with. The City of Budapest decided to
invite tenders for the creation of a museum park where those interested,
visitors and tourists could come to see all the statues and monuments concerned.
The underlying idea was that these monuments and statues – regardless
of having any artistic value or not – should be preserved as reminders
of a bygone era so as to help shape Hungarians’ collective memory.
This is not the only park of its kind: for instance, Lithuania has
its Grütas Park close to the town of Druskininkai, containing 86
Soviet-era statues.
2. Humankind has always faced the question of what to do with
the symbols and monuments of previous regimes, and several waves
of iconoclasm (literally “destruction of images”) have occurred
over the course of history. The various totalitarian regimes and
wars in Europe in the 20th century have also left behind an array of
war graves, memorials and monuments, but also controversial street
and place names and buildings with highly symbolic connotations.
Governments have faced a dilemma as to whether to destroy or preserve
these “features of the past”. How is it possible to prevent them
from becoming places of commemoration and rehabilitation for anyone
nostalgic for these ideologies?
3. The present report stems from a motion presented by Mr Hancock
and others following the Estonian Government’s decision in early
2007 to relocate the statue of the Bronze Soldier from central Tallinn
to the capital’s military cemetery and events surrounding memorials
in Hungary and Poland in 2007. However, the Political Affairs Committee
deemed it desirable to go beyond these country-specific cases and
to present a more holistic approach on how a collective historic
memory of nations is shaped through attitudes to the symbols of
the past.
4. My conviction is that all European countries that experienced
totalitarian regimes or that have been subjected to foreign occupation
in their recent history will at one point in history come face to
face with the problem of how to deal with controversial symbols
on their territory, mismatched to the prevailing ideologies of the
day. It is therefore important that best practices from all over
Europe be learnt from, especially with regard to maximum de-politicisation
of controversial memorials. It should be mentioned though that this
memorandum in no way seeks to present a comprehensive overview of
how different member states have dealt with the vestiges of their
past regimes, liberators or occupiers.
5. When discussing attitudes and modalities of disposing controversial
memorials it is important to distinguish between graves and cemeteries
(including those containing the remains of foreign soldiers or war victims),
and memorials, places and buildings commemorating totalitarian regimes
or glorifying the victory of former occupation forces. The former
often enjoy special status under international law, especially under several
bilateral treaties. They need to be treated with the utmost respect
to the dead who were mostly victims of a totalitarian regime. In
short, they must not be subject to any politicisation.
6. On the other hand, it is, in several cases, more difficult
to avoid other types of symbols and memorials of past regimes or
ideologies from serving political ends. This is particularly worrying
when the intention is to foster divisions and hatred among different
groups of the population, or to fuel a bilateral or even an international
controversy. In today’s context of growing concern over ever-increasing
xenophobia and intolerance in many Council of Europe member states,
it is important that this specific aspect gets properly addressed
by pan-European forums such as our Parliamentary Assembly.
7. I should like to point out that the latest recommendation
on memorials (Recommendation
898 (1980)) was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly as long ago
as 1980. Even if the context back then was very different from today’s,
I nevertheless feel that this recommendation is no less relevant
now, specifying as it does that, “even where it is felt necessary
to remove monuments set up by invaders or by a regime regarded as
oppressive or hated, some consideration should be given to their
conservation in a museum”. 
It
is of regret that only one of the four resolutions and recommendations
of the Assembly condemning authoritarian regimes of the past, namely Recommendation 1736 (2006) on the need for international condemnation of the Franco regime,
mentions the question of memorials.
It
is of regret that only one of the four resolutions and recommendations
of the Assembly condemning authoritarian regimes of the past, namely Recommendation 1736 (2006) on the need for international condemnation of the Franco regime,
mentions the question of memorials.2. Examples in western Europe
8. international investigation of the crimes committed
by them. Moreover, the authors of these crimes 8. In the second
half of the last century, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
had to decide what to do with the symbols and monuments of the National
Socialist, fascist or other totalitarian regimes of their past.
These countries have gone through long and difficult debates on
how to deal with historical symbols, even where the ideology that
the latter represented was commonly rejected and where no different
interpretations were at stake. In most cases, the ideologies and
vices of the past regimes have been condemned and most modern European
societies have successfully come to terms with the horrors of their
past in the process of construction of a common Europe based on
the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
9. In some cases, however, democratic governments succeeding
totalitarian regimes decided to sweep the controversial issues under
the carpet for years to come, which has prolonged the “healing process”.
Such was the case in Spain after the defeat of the Franco regime:
at the end of the period of dictatorship, Spain’s democratic forces
of both right and left observed a “pact of silence”, whereby no
public accusations were to be made of involvement in the previous
regime, and there was to be no legislation to punish retrospectively
the crimes committed by the regime or to enable the families of
the victims of Franco’s repression to seek “moral and financial
redress”. Thus no detailed public debate of the Franco period ever
took place, leading some political forces, at the present time,
to complain of an inability to come to terms with national history,
whereas others regard this as a way of avoiding reopening wounds
which have already healed.
10. In addition, monuments and symbols dating from the period
of dictatorship were left in place. The best known of which is probably
in the Valley of the Fallen (El Valle de los Caídos), a monumental
site built by republican political prisoners, which is the burial
place of 40 000 soldiers and combatants from both sides who died
during the Spanish Civil War. A basilica, built on the mountain,
also contains the tombs of Francisco Franco and José Antonio Primo
de Rivera.
11. The Spanish Parliament therefore showed considerable courage
when it declared 2006 the Year of Historical Memory. That same year,
the government tabled a bill which, for the first time, declared
the killings committed by the Franco regime unjust, proposed the
exhumation of the victims buried in mass graves, proposed changes
to street names celebrating the Franco regime, and
provided for, inter alia,
the Valley of the Fallen to be rededicated to the memory of all
Spaniards killed in the civil war, irrespective of their political affiliations.
This bill triggered much discussion and argument as part of a lively
political debate, and has now been passed by both houses of the
Spanish Parliament, despite the opposition of some political parties.
The Historical Memory Act came into force on 28 December 2007.
and
provided for, inter alia,
the Valley of the Fallen to be rededicated to the memory of all
Spaniards killed in the civil war, irrespective of their political affiliations.
This bill triggered much discussion and argument as part of a lively
political debate, and has now been passed by both houses of the
Spanish Parliament, despite the opposition of some political parties.
The Historical Memory Act came into force on 28 December 2007.12. The Spanish example shows that the legacy of the past is still
capable of dividing the political forces of a modern European country
after thirty years of peace and stable democracy, and that the question
of memorials cannot be considered without taking into account the
way in which a society and its political forces face up to their
past.
13. Further, numerous examples from western Europe show that it
is unnecessary, in order to eliminate the symbolic significance
of monuments erected by past totalitarian regimes, to demolish them.
An example of this is Italy’s Foro Italico, originally given the
name Foro Mussolini, a huge sports complex near Rome inaugurated in
1932. There were two reasons for planning the Foro Mussolini: the
first was to provide an imposing setting for sports events through
which the fascist regime wished to impress, and the second was to
build a place symbolic of the power of the new Roman Empire that
the regime intended to create. This is why several sports facilities
were housed in the Foro Mussolini, close to the monuments erected
in the honour of Il Duce’s regime: statues of athletes, frescoes
and mosaics and the inscriptions of the day bear witness to the
almost sacred nature of this symbol of fascist power. After the
Second World War, it was decided not to demolish the complex, but
to rename it Foro Italico, and the buildings and facilities were
made available for sports and other events. For a while, it even
housed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
14. Another very well-known example is connected with the Nazis
who led another European totalitarian regime. This is the Kehlsteinhaus,
or Eagle’s Nest, a chalet near Berchtesgaden in the German Alps
which was given to Hitler as a 50th birthday present. It was intended
as a place where the Führer could rest and entertain his distinguished
guests. After the war, it was initially used by the Allies as a
command post, but was later returned to the Bavarian government
in 1960. The chalet, despite the weight of its political past, is
now a mountain restaurant and tourist attraction. It is run by a
foundation, and its profits are used for charitable purposes. The
Bavarian government has successfully demystified this place of memory
by drawing off its Nazi symbolism.
15. Thus it is also possible to strip the original political significance
and demystify monuments symbolic of dictatorships by simply putting
them to a different non-political use.
3. Memorials of totalitarian communist regimes and the Second World War in central and eastern Europe
16. Earlier totalitarian regimes of the previous century
(National Socialism, fascism, the Franco regime, etc.) have all
been largely condemned, which has helped these nations to successfully
face up to their past, to the extent that there is little nostalgia
towards those regimes among the mainstream populations concerned.
The totalitarian communist system that prevailed in the Soviet Union
and central Europe from the 1930s to the 1980s and the atrocities
committed by this regime have not been subjected to the same universal condemnation.
As emphasised in the Assembly’s Resolution 1481 (2006), “the fall of totalitarian communist regimes in central
and eastern Europe has not been followed in all cases by an have
not been brought to trial by the international community, as was
the case with the horrible crimes committed by National Socialism (Nazism)”.
This prevents many countries formerly under Soviet rule from coming
to terms with their 20th-century history.
17. In order to comprehend today’s attitudes towards the existing
Soviet symbols and monuments as well as towards many new disputed
projects to commemorate victims of the communist regime, their historical context
needs to be considered. Firstly, troops of the Soviet Union brought
Nazism to an end in most central and eastern European countries,
so those whose lives were under imminent threat during Nazism, perceived the
Soviet troops as liberators, even when they turned into occupiers.
Secondly, the communist regime prevented any detailed and open discussions
of the reasons why National Socialism and communism arose, and pretended
that National Socialism was fighting communists only. In the eyes
of those, who had neither personal experiences, nor sufficient knowledge
about National Socialism but understandably hated the Soviets, this
approach made crimes committed by the Nazis somewhat forgivable.
Thirdly, the Soviet regime tried to impose a vision on history that
wiped out or denied Stalinist crimes in this era; it could not erase
the living memories of the survivors of the Great Famine, deportations,
designing influence zones in 1939 or war-time genocides, etc. It
is estimated that not less than 20 million people perished
as a consequence of Stalin’s policies. Some 7 to 10 million people
alone died in the Great Famine known as Holodomor (artificial
famine) in Ukraine and other parts of the then Soviet Union in 1932-33.
perished
as a consequence of Stalin’s policies. Some 7 to 10 million people
alone died in the Great Famine known as Holodomor (artificial
famine) in Ukraine and other parts of the then Soviet Union in 1932-33. 18. It was only in the late 1980s when these countries started
their transition towards democracy that it became possible to reconsider
the recent past. In the countries of central and eastern Europe
that had enjoyed longer or shorter periods of independence before
the Second World War, and in particular in those whose aim after
the collapse of the Berlin Wall became reintegration into European
and Euro-Atlantic institutions, most Soviet-era symbols and monuments
were demolished or relocated immediately in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
indicating a strong political will to break with the past. Everyone
in Europe remembers seeing the statue of Lenin in Berlin being taken
down in 1989, followed by many other statues of Lenin, Stalin or
the much-idealised “socialist labourer” sharing the same fate.
19. It is interesting to note, for instance, that several attempts
have been made in different parts of Ukraine to remove Soviet-era
monuments after the Orange Revolution – even in regions that have
historically been more aligned to Russia. In May 2006, the Lviv
City Council decided to remove two monuments classified as “symbols
of imperial-Bolshevik domination” and to create a commission that
would define memorials that will remain in the city. In October
2007, the Donetsk oblast governor
gave an assignment to the heads of regional and city executive councils
to prepare and submit for consideration the issue on dismantling
of monuments and memorial signs devoted to persons who participated
in the organisation of the Holodomor.
20. All in all, throughout countries in central and eastern Europe,
formerly controlled by the Soviet Union, symbols, monuments and
memorials of this era are being considered. Now firmly integrated
in the West through European Union and NATO membership, many countries
are showing renewed eagerness to erase the more visible vestiges
of communism. In 2005 members of the European Parliament from the
former satellite countries of the Soviet Union demanded that communist
symbols be banned along with the swastika, citing the death toll
inflicted by communist dictatorships. The initiative was rejected.
In 2007, Poland’s governing Law and Justice Party proposed a law
calling for changing street names that have a communist taint and
giving local authorities the right to remove memorials of the communist
era. Romania issued a 650-page report detailing and condemning communist
atrocities. The Estonian Parliament adopted a law on the removal
of war memorials and relocated the Bronze Soldier memorial to a
military cemetery. Latvian lawmakers have drafted legislation making
it a crime to deny the occupation by the Soviet Union. In Hungary,
200 000 signatures were collected, calling for a referendum on removing
a prominent Soviet war memorial in the heart of Budapest. In May
2007, opposing interpretations clashed in Auschwitz, where Polish
curators of a museum at the former death camp did not allow Russia
to open its exhibits.
21. Particular attention should be drawn to the interpretation
of the Second World War monuments in the states formerly dominated
by the Soviet Union and the divergent attitudes towards the way
that these memorials, commemorating the liberation, are perceived
in these countries. There are altogether more than 20 000 military
cemeteries and major monuments commemorating the soldiers of the
Soviet Union fallen throughout Europe, many of them on the territory
of states that were once part of the Soviet Union.
22. Soviet troops are widely acknowledged to have played a very
important part amongst the Allies fighting against Nazi Germany.
The Soviet Union suffered great loss of life in the Second World
War. Those millions of brave men and women who lost their lives
and were buried outside the Russian Federation’s current boundaries
during the Second World War were not the occupiers, but they were
both victims of the war and, many of them also victims of the inhuman
Soviet regime. It is not surprising that respect for the memory
of its fallen soldiers is an extremely sensitive matter for the
Russian Federation. Regrettably, however, Russian authorities are,
like many countries in similar situations, somewhat one-sided in
the interpretation of history: they see Russia only as the victim
of the Second World War, without acknowledging the effects of the
secret pacts, which Stalin concluded with Nazi Germany in 1939 or
with the Allied Forces later in Yalta, and the dictatorial systems
they imposed on the countries which they liberated from occupation
by the Third Reich. Such an unbalanced approach certainly has an
effect in the countries concerned, namely to counterbalance Russia’s
interpretation of history.
23. History is often seen as “black and white”. The difficulty
of the interpretation of 1945 lies also in the fact that the liberators
became occupiers. Some, who perceived the Soviets only as liberators
from National Socialism, were reluctant to condemn their occupation
and vice versa, some, who saw the Soviets only as occupiers, were
reluctant to acknowledge the role they played in defeating Hitler’s
Germany. This latter one is even more difficult in countries that
were partitioned between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich. A
secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed in August
1939, which divided the independent countries of Finland, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania into Nazi and Soviet spheres
of influence, anticipating “territorial and political rearrangements”
of these countries’ territories. All were subsequently invaded,
occupied, or forced to cede territory by the Soviet Union, Nazi
Germany, or both. However, even before they were invaded by the
Nazi troops in 1940-41, the local populations in the Soviet sphere
of influence, forcefully incorporated in the Soviet Union by then,
were purged of “anti-Soviet or potentially anti-Soviet elements”
with tens of thousands of people having been executed and hundreds
of thousands being deported to far eastern regions of the Soviet
Union and to Gulag work camps, where many perished. The sensitivities and
sometimes unbalanced approach to history of the victims of forced
geopolitical divisions and the communist regime therefore should
also be understood.
24. Violence continued also after the defeat of Nazi Germany,
and in the areas that had been liberated by the Red Army, with large
numbers of women being raped and men either being killed or deported
to labour camps in the Soviet Union. Over a million Soviet persons
– taken prisoner of war by Nazi Germany – were killed or perished
in Soviet gulags after a secret agreement was signed with the Allied
Forces in Yalta, requiring the United States and Great Britain to
forcibly return Russian imprisoned soldiers liberated from German
prisoner of war camps into the clutches of Joseph Stalin. The former
liberators did not hand power back to democratically elected leaders.
Quite the contrary, these democratic leaders were arrested and thrown
into prison, many being tortured and killed. Their governments were
forced to become puppet regimes of the Soviet Union.
25. The fracas around the removal of the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn,
Estonia, which also triggered this report, is a good example of
such divergence of sentiments. To Russians, the statue embodied
a tribute to their overwhelming losses in the Second World War and
to the heroes who rescued the three Baltic states from the Nazi
regime. In the collective memory of many Estonians, however, it
was a reminder of a half century of Soviet occupation during which
the Soviet regime shot thousands of Balts, sent hundreds of thousands
to Siberia, moved hundreds of thousands of Russians in to take their
places, and tried to eradicate their culture, language and any memory
of independence. The continuing reluctance by the Russian Federation
to recognise the occupation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union
further aggravated the tensions around the war memorial.
26. In addition to wide media coverage, the case of the Bronze
Soldier gave rise to demonstrations, which according to the Estonian
Government were orchestrated from Moscow and which degenerated into
rioting and looting which ended in a human casualty and many people
injured. It also triggered a cyber-attack which for several days
paralysed the highly computerised Estonian Government system. In
violation of the Vienna Convention, the Estonian Embassy in Moscow
was attacked.
27. The relocation of Estonia’s Bronze Soldier was not the only
case of its kind: tension had also flared up between Poland and
the Russian Federation in May 2007 over the draft bill to allow
local authorities to remove memorials of the communist era, and
similar debates about the usefulness of preserving such monuments have
also taken place in Latvia and Hungary. In the Russian Federation
itself, several monuments and memorials of the Second World War
have been dismantled in the last couple of years without any public
debate and for the purpose of making way for new construction sites
and highways: in 2006 in Stavropol and in 2007 in Chimky near Moscow
and in Krasnaya Gorka, near St Petersburg.
28. However, there also exist examples of countries opting for
other solutions than destruction or relocation. For example, the
authorities in Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia have decided to leave
highly symbolic monuments as they are, in their original positions.
In some cases, this has been due to particular agreements. For example, when
a petition calling for the Soviet liberator’s monument in Budapest
to be demolished was started in April 2007 by two associations,
the authorities responded by saying that it was protected by an
agreement with the Russian Federation dated 6 March 1995 prohibiting
destruction of the monument. Similarly, in the case of the Red Army’s
Victory monument in Riga, when in 2006 plans emerged to demolish
it, the then President, Mrs Vaira-Vike Freiberga, declared that
the monument could not be demolished and would be left in place,
in accordance with a 1994 agreement on social protection for retired
servicemen of the Russian Federation.
29. In the light of the above, I may conclude that the states
of central and eastern Europe, formerly liberated then occupied
by Soviet forces, now face a difficult decision: whether to make
a break with the past by destroying the symbols and monuments of
that past, or whether to keep them to help to promote understanding of
their past and their identity. This is their sovereign decision,
although the decision cannot fail to have implications for parts
of their population nostalgic for the Soviet past. Politically and
legally, it is a particularly difficult decision when the monuments
concerned are also the burial places of Second World War soldiers
and victims. Where agreements between states exist, they have to
be complied with. National decisions must fully abide by the respect
of the dead who were victims rather than occupiers.
4. International legal framework
30. The former Soviet Union signed several bilateral
agreements with European states (including Finland, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) that are still in force today,
with the Russian Federation as the successor state, and which contain
provisions relating to the status, protection and restoration of
certain monuments and cemeteries.
31. These bilateral treaties relate primarily to cemeteries, graves
and monuments containing the remains of Soviet soldiers and of war
victims. All of them relate, inter alia,
to the relocation of the burial places of soldiers and war victims,
which inevitably involve exhumation. They stipulate that there can
be no reburials or decisions about the places to which graves are
to be transferred unless an agreement has been reached between the two
states concerned. In
contrast, no agreements of this kind exist with those states that
were once annexed to the Soviet Union.
In
contrast, no agreements of this kind exist with those states that
were once annexed to the Soviet Union.32. Some provisions applicable to memorials and military cemeteries
are also found in the Geneva Conventions on international humanitarian
law, which have been signed by all Council of Europe member states.
In particular:
- according to the Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the authorities of the state in which the burial places are situated must ensure that prisoners of war who have died in captivity are honourably buried and that their graves are respected, suitably maintained and marked so as to be found at any time. Responsibility for the care of these graves and for records of any subsequent movement of the bodies rests on that state (Article 120);
- according to the Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, as soon as circumstances and the relations between the parties permit, the states in whose territories graves are situated must conclude agreements in order to: a. facilitate access to the burial sites by relatives of the deceased; b. protect and maintain such burial sites permanently; and c. facilitate the return of the remains of the deceased and of personal effects to the home country upon its request or, unless that country objects, upon the request of the next of kin (Article 34);
- the same protocol stipulates that the state in whose territory the burial sites are situated is authorised to exhume the remains only when exhumation is a matter of overriding public necessity, including cases of medical and investigative necessity, in which case the state concerned must respect the remains and give notice to the home country of its intention to exhume the remains, together with details of the intended place of reburial.
5. Depoliticising monuments: museums and cemeteries
33. A monument as such can mean different things to different
people, perhaps symbolising liberation in some people’s eyes and
oppression to others. It may both help to shape a nation’s collective
memory and incite hatred between different population groups. Hence
the vital need to engage in historical research in relation to those
monuments of disputed symbolic significance. Not only political
players, but also historians and active members of civil society
have a part to play in the discussions on the future of such monuments.
34. In my view, museums may offer a way of dealing with the past
without reducing it to political slogans. Historical museums should,
ideally, be more scientifically oriented, and offer more explanations
and information than most memorials, placing events in their context.
A monument placed in a historical museum very often loses its political
and symbolic connotations and becomes an “exhibit”, a subject of
scientific study. Historical museums are not places of pilgrimage,
but places where history is preserved.
35. Museums can also offer fairly powerful ways of drawing off
the political symbolism that a building originally had. One example
is the highly popular Museum of Genocide Victims in Vilnius, better
known as the KGB museum. Housed in the building which was once home
to the Soviet secret services in Lithuania, it illustrates the work
done by the secret services and the extent of the repression during
the Soviet occupation of Lithuania. Another example is Berlin’s
Stasimuseum, in the building once occupied by the Ministry for State Security
(known as the Stasi). This
now contains a research centre, a documentation centre and a museum showing, inter alia, the setting in which
members of the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) secret services went
about their daily work. A place of both commemoration and research,
this museum offers a view of the dark days of the history of the
GDR, based on the story of everyday life in East Germany, mainly
as impressively researched by German historians.
36. The concept of the museum as a place of both commemoration
and history may also be a broader one: monument parks such as those
located near Budapest and Druskininkai are open-air museums containing collections
of Soviet monuments, which are thereby placed in their context.
37. The Council of Europe is fully aware of the importance of
museums, pledging to support them and to promote the creation of
new ones, especially through the European Museum Forum (EMF). Among
the events organised by the EMF are the European Museum of the Year
Award and international seminars at which museum curators are able
to hone their skills. It also offers an expert advice service to
European museums and has set itself the objective of raising the
standard of museums throughout Europe.
38. Placing controversial war memorials in cemeteries is an alternative
way to depoliticise them. This is what the Estonian Government aimed
at achieving when relocating the monument at the peak of tensions,
which was becoming dangerous for national security. A year on from
the heated discussions and riots in the streets of Tallinn, the
issue is off the political agenda of the country and the new location
has become accepted by the population.
39. I am persuaded that the participation of scientists and of
civil society in the collective memory debate may help to lessen
political manipulation of monuments and to overcome the divisions
that emerge from this painful process of facing up to the past.
Museums can play an important role in this context, making it possible to
consider the monuments concerned from an academic viewpoint.
6. Conclusions and recommendations
40. In this report I have tried to show that the question
of the attitude to memorials exposed to different historical interpretations
concerns all Council of Europe member states, since every state
has painful memories from either its recent or its more distant
past.
41. Disputes relating to divergent interpretations of history
can be resolved only with time and through a process specific to
each state. Civil society and historians play a very important role
in the development of a vision of the past that is as complete as
possible. Countries of central and eastern Europe have only recently started
reviewing their painful past. It is a highly complex exercise that
will take a long time and give rise to numerous clashes. It requires
nations, governments and citizens to accept responsibility for their
historical roles. It will take time, considerable effort, empathy,
and often a self-critical capacity for a society to achieve broad
consensus about its history and the effects of this on the nation
and its citizens.
42. Where the fate of monuments exposed to different historical
interpretations is concerned, I am convinced that it is for each
country to decide whether or not they should be preserved or whether
new ones should be erected.
43. The international agreements in force concerning the status
of certain monuments, particularly those which contain the remains
of soldiers or combatants from other countries, should be scrupulously
complied with. Consideration should be given to concluding such
agreements where none exist. At all events, Council of Europe member
states should always favour political dialogue with all the players
concerned, at national and international level, even if there is
no legal obligation to do so.
44. The appalling crimes of fascist and National Socialist regimes
and their reign of terror are no excuse for the dreadful crimes
of communism, and vice versa. While they should not all be lumped
together, National Socialism, fascism and totalitarian communism
must be rejected and utterly and unreservedly condemned by the Council
of Europe, its Assembly and its member states.
_____________
Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee.
Reference to committee: Reference No. 3346 of 24 May 2007.
Draft resolution and draft recommendation unanimously adopted by the committee on 29 September 2008.
Members of the committee: Mr Göran Lindblad (Chairperson), Mr David Wilshire (Vice-Chairperson), Mr Björn VonSydow (Vice-Chairperson), Mrs Kristiina Ojuland (Vice-Chairperson), Mrs Fátima Aburto Baselga, Mr Francis Agius, Mr Miloš Aligrudić, Mr Alexander Babakov (alternate: Mr Ilyas Umakhanov), Mr Denis Badré, Mr Ryszard Bender, Mr Fabio Berardi, Mr Radu Mircea Berceanu (alternate: Mrs Cornelia Cazacu), Mr Andris Bērzinš, Mr Aleksandër Biberaj, Mrs Guðfinna Bjarnadóttir, Mr Predrag Bošković, Mr Luc Van den Brande, Mr Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Mr Lorenzo Cesa, Ms Anna Čurdová, Mr Rick Daems, Mr Dumitru Diacov, Ms Josette Durrieu (alternate: Mr Laurent Béteille), Mr Frank Fahey (alternate: Mr Patrick Breen), Mr Joan Albert FarréSanturé, Mr Pietro Fassino, Mr Per-Kristian Foss, Ms Doris Frommelt, Mr Jean-Charles Gardetto, Mr Charles Goerens, Mr Andreas Gross, Mr Michael Hancock (alternate: Mr Nigel Evans), Mr Davit Harutyunyan (alternate: Mr Avet Adonts), Mr Joachim Hörster, Mrs Sinikka Hurskainen, Mr Tadeusz Iwiński, Mr Bakir Izetbegović, Mr Michael Aastrup Jensen, Mrs Birgen Keleş, Mr Victor Kolesnikov (alternate: Mrs Olha Herasym’yuk), Mr Konstantin Kosachev, Ms Darja Lavtižar-Bebler, Mr René van der Linden, Mr Dariusz Lipiński, Mr Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Mr Younal Loutfi, Mr Gennaro Malgieri, Mr Mikhail Margelov (alternate: Mr Guennady Ziuganov), Mr Dick Marty (alternate: Mrs Liliane MauryPasquier), Mr Frano Matušić, Mr Mircea Mereuţă, Mr Dragoljub Mićunović, Mr Jean-Claude Mignon, Ms Nadezhda Mikhailova, Mr Aydin Mirzazada (alternate: Mr Sabir Hajiyev), Mr João Bosco Mota Amaral, Mrs Miroslava Nĕmcová, Mr Zsolt Németh, Mr Fritz Neugebauer, Mr Hryhoriy Omelchenko, Mr Theodoros Pangalos, Mr Aristotelis Pavlidis, Mr Ivan Popescu, Mr Christos Pourgourides, Mr John Prescott (alternate: Mr John Austin), Mr Gabino Puche (alternate: Mr Pedro Agramunt), Mr Oliver Sambevski (alternate: Mr Zoran Petreski), Mr Ingo Schmitt, Mr Samad Seyidov, Mr Leonid Slutsky, Mr Rainder Steenblock, Mr Zoltán Szabó, Mr Mehmet Tekelioğlu, Mr Han Ten Broeke, Lord Tomlinson, Mr Petré Tsiskarishvili, Mr Mihai Tudose, Mr José Vera Jardim, Ms Birutė Vėsaitė, Mr Luigi Vitali, Mr Wolfgang Wodarg (alternate: Mr Johannes Pflug), Ms Gisela Wurm, Mr Boris Zala.
Ex officio: MM. Mátyás Eörsi, Tiny Kox.
NB: The names of those members present at the meeting are printed in bold.
Secretariat of the committee: Mr Perin, Mrs Nachilo, Mr Chevtchenko, Mrs Sirtori-Milner, Ms Alléon