1. Introduction
1. On 14 October 2008, Ms Hägg (Sweden, Socialist Group)
and a number of her colleagues tabled a motion for a resolution
entitled “Women’s access to lawful medical care: the problem of
unregulated use of conscientious objection” (
Doc. 11757). This motion pointed out that, in the majority of the
member states of the Council of Europe, the practice of conscientious
objection in the medical field is inadequately or largely unregulated.
The absence of a comprehensive and effective legal and policy framework
governing the practice of conscientious objection by health-care
providers may severely affect individuals’ health and lives in a number
of Council of Europe member states. The signatories of the motion
were particularly concerned about the way in which the unregulated
occurrence of this practice disproportionately affects women, notably
those having low incomes or living in rural areas.
2. The motion was referred to this committee for report (which
appointed me rapporteur), and to the Committee on Equal Opportunities
for Women and Men for opinion (which appointed Ms Circene, Latvia,
EPP/CD, rapporteur for opinion). The Social, Health and Family Affairs
Committee organised an exchange of views with two experts on this
issue
at
its meeting in Paris on 13 November 2009, and held a further exchange
of views with two experts in Paris on 4 June 2010.
This report also draws on my fact-finding
visit to Austria and the Czech Republic in June 2009, as well as
on the expertise of Ms Christina Zampas, whom I would like to thank
for her contribution to this report.
3. Based on the facts, and after proposing a brief definition
of the phenomena, I wish to examine international and European human
rights law and international medical standards on this issue. I
will then address various facets of the issue, illustrating them
through the practice of conscientious objection in different member
states and set forth examples of the impact that non-regulation
can have on individuals’ health and lives. Lastly, I would like
to propose lines of action to be followed at the national and European
levels.
2. Conscientious
objection in its various aspects
4. Conscientious objection in the medical field is generally
based on personal convictions and ethical values of medical professionals
of various professional categories (health-care providers). Their
convictions, very often linked to religion, can stand against their
readiness to provide certain medical information and services. These
consist, for example, of certain family planning services and reproductive
technologies, safe abortion services where legal, and pain-relief
by life-shortening means for terminally ill patients.
5. The phenomenon of conscientious objection in the medical field
is highly controversial and its appraisal depends on various legal
and social factors in a given national context. The debate on the
issue is motivated by the wish to balance doctors’ rights not to
act contrary to their beliefs, on the one hand, and patients’ rights to
access lawful medical procedures on the other.
6. Those who are against the idea of conscientious objection
argue that a medical professional’s conscience has little place
in the delivery of modern medical care. Some even believe that if
health-care providers are not prepared to offer legal, efficient
and beneficial care to a patient because it conflicts with their values,
they should not practise medicine or related professions. In line
with this attitude, the door to “value-driven medicine” is often
seen as a door to a Pandora’s box of idiosyncratic, bigoted and
discriminatory medicine. The partisans of such attitudes quite frequently
support the idea that doctors who compromise the delivery of medical
services to patients on grounds of conscience should be punished
through the removal of their licence to practise and other legal
mechanisms.
7. The argument in favour of allowing conscientious objection
is that to fail to do so harms the health-care providers and constrains
their autonomy. Regardless of the position taken towards the issue
as a whole, there is widespread belief that health-care providers
who have a conscientious objection to certain medical interventions
should not be marginalised professionally.
In order to ensure patients’ access to
lawful medical services, however, health-care providers should be
obliged, also by law, to refer patients to other colleagues willing
to provide the service in question. The fact that this does not
occur very often is of particular concern.
8. In the context of this report, it is important to note that
most of the examples given are in the context of reproductive health,
as this is the field in which the practice of conscientious objection
most often arises, and most concerns women. However, the standards
of access to medical care which are illustrated through the examples
given are applicable in any situation where there is an objection
by a health-care provider.
3. Conscientious objection
in international and European human rights law and medical standards
9. International and European human rights law recognises
an individual’s right to freedom of religion, conscience and thought
as well as a state’s obligations to respect that right. States also
have an obligation to ensure access to lawful medical services,
including reproductive health-care services. Where these come into conflict,
states should ensure that a health-care service provider’s refusal
to provide medical care or deliver health-related products does
not unduly disadvantage or deny access to health-care services which
patients are legally entitled to receive.
10. International human rights treaty monitoring bodies, such
as the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, which monitors states’ compliance with the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(“CEDAW Convention”), have repeatedly affirmed that states have
a positive obligation to regulate the invocation of conscientious
objection by health professionals so as to ensure that women’s access
to health and reproductive health is not limited.
Overall, the regulation
of the right to conscientious objection should implement “the right
of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective,
affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice,
as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility
which are not against the law.
11. At European level, Article 9 of the European Convention on
Human Rights guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion and provides that this right is “subject to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and as are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public
… health, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.
This limitation on an individual’s right to conscientiously object
was explicitly recognised by the European Court of Human Rights
in the context of access to contraceptives.
12. Under international human rights law, states have a duty to
ensure that health-care providers’ exercise of conscientious objection
does not harm the health and rights of their patients. This means
that regulation of the right to conscientious objection should ensure
the functioning of administrative procedures that provide immediate
alternatives to women when conscientious objection would otherwise
deny the women access to a legal procedure.
13. International medical ethical standards, such as those established
by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Federation
of Gynaecology and Obstetrics (FIGO), provide further guidance on regulating
the right to conscientious objection. WHO and FIGO both direct that
physicians who conscientiously object to performing a procedure
have a duty to refer the patient to another provider who does not
object. Such physicians also have a duty to treat an individual
whose life or health is immediately at risk, and to provide timely
care when referral to other practitioners or delay would jeopardise
the patient’s health and well-being.
14. As regards hospitals and indirect service providers, WHO makes
it clear that hospital managers should ensure that trained staff,
whatever their perspective, “are available at all times” to assist
in cases of abortion complications,
and
that a public hospital, clinic or health centre cannot endanger
women’s lives or health by refusing services allowed by law.
Lastly,
FIGO affirms that physicians have “an ethical obligation, at all
times, to provide benefit and prevent harm”.
4. Regulation and
practice in Council of Europe member states
15. Many member states have enacted laws, ethical codes
and occasionally regulations or guidelines, guaranteeing the right
to conscientious objection in health-care settings, and the national
courts of some countries have developed jurisprudence on this topic.
However, many countries facing problems in the area of conscientious
objection in health-care settings lack a comprehensive and effective
legal and policy framework, as well as oversight mechanisms to govern
the practice of conscientious objection by health-care providers.
16. Some member states have constitutional protections for freedom
of conscience, but have not elaborated on this right, and others
only recognise the right to conscientious objection in the context
of a specific medical procedure. Some countries do not regulate
this practice at all,
while others inadequately
implement the regulatory framework in respect of conscientious objection.
17. Health-care providers who invoke conscientious objection have
certain legal and ethical duties that aim to protect the patient.
States should ensure that regulations on conscientious objection
clearly specify these duties. The absence of effective legal and
policy frameworks in some member states means that individuals are
unable to access the health-care services that they are entitled
to receive, undermining,
inter alia,
their rights to health-care services and to privacy, and potentially
constituting a breach of the duty of care and abandonment of patients.
4.1. Obligation to ensure
availability and accessibility of lawful health-care services through adequate
personnel
18. According to international human rights law and medical
standards, countries have an obligation to ensure the adequate availability
and accessibility of quality sexual and reproductive health-care
services by,
inter alia, employing
staff who are available and willing to competently deliver services
in a timely manner and within a convenient distance.
19. Regulations on conscientious objection should establish clear
procedures within health-care facilities for medical personnel to
report in advance their refusal to provide certain services, including
the establishment of a register of objecting providers, and should
clearly establish the duties of objecting health-care providers
(see sub-sections below on specific duties). Objecting health-care
providers have the burden of proving that their objection is grounded
in their conscience or religious beliefs and that the refusal is
in good faith.
20. Many countries regulate conscientious objection only, or primarily,
in the abortion context, recognising that this is one of the most
common medical procedures that health-care providers may conscientiously
object to. Hence, the examples given and many of the issues that
arise do so in the abortion context. For example, in Croatia, it
has been reported that some doctors will say they object to providing
an abortion, but then offer the patient an abortion in a private
setting, for financial gain. In Norway, regulations on conscientious
objection require health-care providers to give written notice to
their employing hospital if they refuse to assist with abortions,
and those hospitals, in turn, have to report it to government authorities.
In Slovenia, the Health Services Act allows for conscientious objection
in accordance with international rules on the practice. It requires health-care
workers to report their conscientious objection to their employing
institution, and the institution to ensure that patients’ rights
to health care are accessible “without disruption”. This enables
member states to ensure that medical professionals willing to perform
health-care services are available.
21. Some countries have organised their health-care system and
personnel recruitment in such a way as to ensure that there are
doctors willing and able to provide services. For example, guidelines
on the appointment of doctors to hospital posts issued by the United
Kingdom National Health Service recommend that termination of pregnancy
duties should be a feature of the job when adequate services for
termination of pregnancy “would not otherwise be available”, that
the job description should be explicit about termination of pregnancy
duties, and that applicants should be “prepared to carry out the
full range of duties which they might be required to perform if
appointed”, including duties related to termination of pregnancy.
22. Other contexts where the issue of conscientious objection
can be of relevance are “end of life situations” and the field of
assisted reproduction. As far as the former is concerned, doctors
are generally expected to treat patients in their best interest
and notably to provide treatment if there are chances of recovery
for the patient. Euthanasia is forbidden by law in many Council
of Europe member states, such as in Austria, which is examined for
the purpose of this report. The professional rules generally impose
on medical professionals the duty to provide pain relief. The absence
of a clear legislative framework, however, makes relevant decisions difficult
for medical professionals. The health-care providers’ fear of litigation
and challenge often leads to life-prolonging measures. Regarding
this issue, reference must be made to the Parliamentary Assembly’s
Resolution 1649 (2009) on palliative care, based on a report prepared by Wolfgang
Wodarg (Germany, SOC), which stated that that “liberal constitutional
states cannot leave ethical questions concerning the life and death of
individuals unanswered”.
23. According to the Austrian Law on Living Wills of 2006, patients
can refuse treatment in end of life situations in advance. This
is an ideal precondition to avoid demands for euthanasia legislation
and has also made it easier for medical staff to deal with conflicting
opinions of family members. It also creates better conditions for
people who want to be able to die with dignity. Related to this
issue and as a follow-up to
Resolution
1649 (2009), the committee is currently working on a report on “living
wills and the protection of health and human rights”.
24. The field of assisted reproduction has been regulated by a
number of member states. Relevant laws were, for example, introduced
in the Czech Republic recently. Assisted reproduction is allowed
for heterosexual couples with prior consent of the donors. Three
cycles would generally be covered by the health insurance, so that
even poor people can receive treatment and be fully reimbursed.
Anonymous donors are allowed but are not paid. Surrogacy is not
allowed at all. The issue of individual conscientious objection
is, however, less problematic in this field, given the fact that
only specialised centres offer such treatments anyway. The main
issue arising here is one of (collective) ethics and the way it
is expressed by the legal limits set in specific situations (homosexual
couples, anonymous donors, surrogacy, etc.).
4.2. Conscientious objection
applies to individuals, not institutions
25. According to international human rights law, the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is an individual
right and, therefore, institutions such as hospitals cannot claim
this right. Health-care institutions, as state entities, have a
duty to provide legal health services to the public.
26. In France, a Constitutional Council decision recognised that
conscientious objection is a right afforded to individuals, not
institutions, and upheld the repeal of paragraphs in the Code of
Public Health, removing the possibility for department heads of
public health establishments to refuse to allow the provision of
abortion services in their departments. The Constitutional Council
clarified that freedom of conscience is individual, not institutional or departmental.
27. In Germany, the Federal Administrative Court, in upholding
the decision of the Bavarian Higher Administrative Court, indicated
that public hospitals must provide abortions, enabling women to
realise their entitlement to abortion under the law.
4.3. Duties of health-care
providers
28. Regulations on conscientious objection in health-care
settings recognise the right of health-care providers to object
to certain health-care procedures, but also impose certain obligations
on providers to ensure that patients receive the medical care they
need and are legally entitled to receive. These obligations include the
duty to provide information to patients about all the treatment
options available, regardless of whether such information would
induce the patient to pursue treatment to which the health-care
provider objects.
29. Health-care providers also have a duty to inform patients
in good time of any conscientious objection to a procedure, and
in these circumstances to refer patients to another health-care
provider. Furthermore, the conscientious objector has a duty to
ensure that any patient whom she or he refers receives quality treatment from
the new health-care provider. Additionally, in situations in which
a referral to another health-care provider is not possible, or in
cases of emergency, the conscientious objector must provide the
desired treatment to which the patient is legally entitled.
Patients’ right to information
30. Conscientious objection regulations apply only to
medical services; a health-care provider cannot invoke the right
to conscientious objection in relation to the provision of information.
Even if they object to providing certain services, health-care providers
have the duty to offer accurate and non-biased information about
all the medical procedures legally available, including the risks,
benefits and alternatives to treatment, so that the patient can
make an informed choice about the treatment to pursue. In order
to enable the patient to make informed decisions about her or his
health care, health-care providers must provide diagnostic care
services, such as prenatal examinations to detect foetal impairment,
to all patients, whether or not the results of such care may lead
to an objectionable act by the patient.
31. Additionally, in the United Kingdom, the General Medical Council
guidelines indicate that in a situation in which a doctor conscientiously
objects to the provision of certain services, she or he must ensure
that the patient has sufficient information about the available
treatment options. The doctor must discuss with the patient the
information that she or he has and that the patient might need.
Furthermore, the doctor has an obligation to personally meet with
such a patient and provide him or her with printed materials about
any treatments or procedures which the doctor chooses not to provide
him- or herself because of a conscientious objection.
Timely notice to patients and
duty to refer
32. Conscientious objectors also have a duty to inform
the patient in a timely manner of their conscientious objections
to a specific procedure, and similarly, to refer such patient, in
a timely manner, to a health-care provider who is willing and able
to perform the health-care procedure or treatment and who is conveniently accessible.
This
requirement for timely notice and referral should apply from the
moment the patient first requests medical intervention from a health-care
provider.
33. For example, Portugal’s Medical Association Code of Ethics
mandates that a physician “immediately communicate” to patients
his or her objection, while Law 16/2007 requires that physicians
communicate their objections to patients in a “timely fashion”.
In France, doctors who conscientiously object also have a legal
duty to a woman seeking an abortion to give her the name of experts
to perform the procedure. In Poland, Croatia and Hungary, laws require
physicians to inform patients of any conscientious objection to
a procedure and refer such patients to other doctors, but they do
not have an oversight mechanism to ensure that this happens, leaving
many patients without a referral.
34. In the United Kingdom, guidelines issued by the British Medical
Association (BMA)
and the Royal College
of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG), which have informed
the implementation and judicial interpretation of the conscientious
objection provisions of the 1967 Abortion Act, oblige physicians
who conscientiously object to providing abortion services to take
preparatory steps to arrange for an abortion and provide referrals
to another doctor without delay. The BMA guidelines explicitly provide
that “[i]t is not sufficient simply to tell the patient to seek
a view elsewhere since other doctors may not agree to see her without appropriate
referral”. The RCOG has issued recommended referral times for abortion
services.
35. In addition, the United Kingdom National Health Service guidelines,
which are issued to provide guidance to practitioners, note that
all doctors who conscientiously object to “recommending termination
should quickly refer a woman who seeks their advice about a termination
to a different [general practitioner]. … If doctors fail to do so,
they could be alleged to be in breach of their terms of service”.
Similarly,
in the Netherlands and France, laws place a legal obligation on
health-care professionals and physicians, respectively, to immediately
communicate to a pregnant woman their refusal to perform an abortion.
Duty to treat if referral is
not possible
36. In situations in which the health-care provider is
unable to guarantee that women will receive quality treatment elsewhere,
that health-care provider must provide treatment to the patient,
regardless of whether it conflicts with her or his conscience.
In Norway,
for example, a physician may not refuse to treat a patient unless
the patient has reasonable access to another doctor who can provide
the treatment. In San Marino, a physician who conscientiously objects
to the performance of a procedure must refer the patient to another medical
professional who can provide adequate treatment, and the physician
must ensure that the patient continues to receive care during the
transition period.
4.4. Conscientious objection
applies to health-care professionals directly performing medical treatment
or procedures
37. While all countries that recognise conscientious
objection in the health-care context or in relation to a specific
medical procedure extend such right to physicians, the application
of this right to other health-care personnel is often unclear and
therefore problematic for defining the scope of the right. Conscientious
objection should only be invoked by the personnel who are directly
involved in the medical procedure and not by those who are involved
indirectly, such as hospital administrators, nurses, etc. The resulting
lack of clarity with regard to whom such a right extends may delay
women’s access to reproductive health services.
38. Norway’s abortion regulations, for instance, establish that
the right to refuse to participate in an abortion can only be claimed
by those who are performing or assisting with the performance of
the procedure and not by staff providing care or treatment to the
woman before or after the procedure. Similarly, Italy’s abortion
law does not exempt health-care personnel from providing pre- and
post-abortion care.
39. The case of
Pichon and Sajous v.
France, in the European Court of Human Rights, illustrates
how accommodations to conscientious objection are not unlimited.
The Court held that pharmacists who refused to sell contraceptives
cannot impose their religious beliefs on others. The Court explained
that the right to freedom of religion, as a matter of individual
conscience, does not always guarantee the right to behave in public
in a manner governed by that belief. The Court stated that “as long
as the sale of contraceptives is legal and occurs on medical prescription
nowhere other than in a pharmacy, the applicants cannot give precedence
to their religious beliefs and impose them on others as justification
for their refusal to sell such products”.
4.5. Exceptions to the
invocation of conscientious objection
40. Surveys show that only a limited number of Council
of Europe member states expressly prohibit the invocation of conscientious
objection in the case of emergency or risk of death as well as danger
to the patient’s health.
This
is an area that should generally be regulated in order to clarify
the rights of both health-care providers and their patients.
4.6. Accountability
and complaint mechanisms
41. Member states have an obligation to put in place
effective monitoring and accountability mechanisms to ensure that
conscientious objection clauses do not, in practice, unduly disadvantage
patients or deny them access to lawful health-care services. Many
countries have a general health-care complaint mechanism as recourse
for patients who believe their rights have been violated, through
which illegal exercise of the right to conscientious objection can
presumably be addressed. While a separate complaint mechanism may
not be necessary for the issue of conscientious objection, laws
and regulations that grant a right to conscientious objection should
clarify that the exercise of this right in violation of the law
will be subject to such member state’s general complaints procedure
and that individuals have a right to an effective remedy in a timely
manner.
42. Every member state should have a complaint mechanism with
a clear procedure available to individuals against a health-care
professional or institution who allegedly acts in violation of the
law while providing medical services. All responses to complaints
should be issued in a well-justified written decision available
to all parties.
43. In the Czech Republic, for example, in the context of abortion,
the law provides for a complaint mechanism with a timely appeals
process, for when a gynaecologist denies a patient an abortion.
While this mechanism does not explicitly make reference to conscientious
objection, the time guidelines in this law are extremely important
in ensuring that a woman is not denied access to abortion because
of administrative delays that could be caused solely by a health
professional’s personal objections to the procedure. In cases in which
a woman’s right to access lawful health services is violated, legislation
should establish appropriate sanctions and remedies.
5. The impact on women’s
access to lawful medical care
44. In practice, various factors can lead to situations
where women’s access to lawful medical care is affected. The most
widely observed reasons are the lack of oversight mechanisms ensuring
the implementation of existing legal provisions and policies, the
non-respect of legal duties with regard to the information of patients,
the absence of regulations requiring or facilitating timely action
(notification of conscientious objection, appeals processes, etc.)
as well as the lack of regulation regarding the scope of conscientious
objection provisions.
5.1. Lack of oversight
mechanisms
45. A recent report by Italy’s Ministry of Health demonstrates
the impact of the lack of oversight mechanisms that ensure the availability
and accessibility of health-care providers in the context of abortion.
The report shows that nearly 70% of gynaecologists in Italy refuse
to perform abortions on moral grounds, despite a strong legal framework
in this area. The report found that between 2003 and 2007, the number
of gynaecologists invoking conscientious objection in their refusal
to perform an abortion rose from 58.7% to 69.2%. The percentage
of anaesthetists who refused to assist in an abortion rose from
45.7% to 50.4%. In the southern parts of the country, the numbers
are even higher.
46. According to the International Planned Parenthood Federation
(IPPF), in Austria, a woman faces a number of challenges in obtaining
an abortion, even though the country expressly recognises a right
to abortion, because health-care professionals frequently conscientiously
object to performing this procedure. There are no specific legal
guidelines regarding conscientious objection in Austria, but in
practice, doctors can refrain from abortion if the only reason for
the intervention is unwanted pregnancy, although no objection is possible
if the mother’s life is in danger. It has been reported that there
is a difference of practice between the eastern and the western
part of Austria (abortion being less accessible in the latter) and
that few doctors are willing to perform abortions in rural areas
of the country. As a result, women must travel to another region
of Austria or even another country to obtain an abortion.
In any case,
the women concerned would have to pay themselves for medical services
linked to abortion.
47. The ability of public institutions to conscientiously object
to health-care services impedes women’s ability to exercise their
right to legal sexual and reproductive health services, and oversight
mechanisms are crucial in ensuring that this practice does not occur.
For example, in Slovakia and Poland,
conscientious objection is often abused
by the top management of hospitals, who frequently have an unwritten
policy banning some interventions (usually abortions or sterilisations)
throughout their hospital, regardless of the opinion of the health-care
staff. In Poland, many institutions do not have a formal policy
of conscientious objection and, in many instances, individual providers
do not formally invoke their right or express it in terms of conscientious objection.
In the capital city of Slovakia, Bratislava, for instance, one of
the public hospitals does not perform abortions. In the large regional
capital of Trnava, no hospitals perform abortions.
5.2. Non-respect of
legal duties with regard to information of patients
48. Breaches of the duties that conscientious objectors
owe to their patients may also have dire consequences for women.
For instance, if health-care providers do not provide information
to their patients about various treatment options, including diagnostic
care, they deprive them of the opportunity to make informed decisions
about the health-care procedures that are in their best interest.
Health-care providers should not be allowed to invoke conscientious
objection with regard to health-care information, including diagnostic
care that may or may not lead to objectionable treatment. Regarding yet an earlier “stage”
of information, it has been observed that the number of abortions
decreases with the availability of contraception. Accordingly, the
Ministry of Health of the Czech Republic has, until very recently,
observed a significant long-term trend of decrease in abortions.
This shows the importance of timely educational measures for the prevention
of medical situations (such as abortion) where the issue of conscientious
objection might arise.
49. A 2003 United Kingdom High Court judgment sheds some light
on the potential unlawfulness of such acts. It found a doctor negligent
for failing to properly counsel – in part because of his religious
beliefs – his patient about her increased risk of giving birth to
a baby with Down’s syndrome and the availability of prenatal screenings
for such abnormalities. The doctor, a devout Catholic, noted that
he did not routinely and explicitly discuss screening for abnormalities
with every pregnant woman. He testified that he thought pregnancy
was a happy event and would want to “soothe, not alarm patients”,
but that he expected he would have told someone of the plaintiff’s
age that she was “at a slightly raised risk” for foetal abnormalities.
The court noted that “[o]n his own account [the physician’s] approach
to the subject [of informing patients about screening for abnormalities]
was coloured by his belief in Roman Catholic doctrine”. The court
ultimately found that if the doctor had used the phrase “slightly
raised risk,” as he testified, “it would have been seriously misleading”; considering
that experts testified that the risk of foetal abnormalities increases
significantly at the plaintiff’s age.
As a result of the doctor’s
failure to provide such information, the patient could not make
an informed choice about whether or not to carry her pregnancy to
term, given the risk that her child could have Down’s syndrome.
5.3. Absence of regulations
requiring or facilitating timely action
50. In the absence of regulations requiring timely notification
of a health-care provider’s conscientious objection to a specific
procedure, accompanied by a timely referral to another provider,
women may be unable to locate another health-care provider to perform
such procedure in a timely manner, which prevents them from accessing
the health-care services to which they are legally entitled.
51. For example, in Denmark, in response to a situation in which
a woman who scheduled an appointment at a clinic to undergo an abortion,
but was not informed by the doctor of his/her conscientious objection
to the performance of abortions, nor was the patient provided with
a timely referral, a representative of the Danish National Board
of Health commented that doctors must immediately inform the patient
of any conscientious objection. The failure to do so or to provide
a referral could delay the time period within which a woman can legally
exercise her right to a voluntary termination of pregnancy. Such
a delay could cause the woman to exhaust the twelve-week period
during which she may legally procure an abortion, and thereby cause
her to unwillingly forego her right to this procedure.
52. In addition, the necessity for a timely appeals process cannot
be overstated, since reproductive health issues can easily be rendered
moot by a slow encumbered system, with devastating results such
as death or permanent health disability. For example, in the case
of
Tysiac v. Poland, the European
Court of Human Rights stated that states must ensure access to lawful
health-care services and set up appeal mechanisms for women who
are denied such services.
In that case, doctors
refused to issue a certificate granting an abortion, despite serious
health risks of delivery, and the woman’s eyesight seriously deteriorated
as a result of the childbirth; with a timely appeals process the
woman would have been able to challenge the doctors’ refusal to
grant an abortion in time to obtain treatment that would have saved
her from a permanent disability.
5.4. Lack of regulation
regarding the scope of conscientious objection provisions
53. Furthermore, the lack of regulation in regard to
whom and in respect of which services conscientious objection provisions
apply prevent women from accessing the health care to which they
are legally entitled. Legal “loopholes” might possibly allow ancillary
health-care providers to object to the provision of subsidiary services,
which may then delay or obstruct women’s access to reproductive
health care.
54. For example, the scope of the conscientious objection clause
in the United Kingdom’s abortion law was clarified by a 1988 House
of Lords decision, which made clear that the clause applies only
to participation in treatment. The case involved a doctor’s secretary
who objected to signing an abortion referral letter on grounds of
conscience. The House of Lords held that such an act did not constitute
part of the treatment for abortion and, thus, was not covered by
the conscientious objection clause of the abortion law. The decision
supports the proposition that doctors cannot claim exemption from
giving advice or performing the preparatory steps to arrange an
abortion if the request for abortion meets legal requirements.
6. Conclusions
55. Member states should enact comprehensive and clear
regulations that balance the right of the health-care provider to
conscientiously object to the performance of a procedure, and ensure
that patients can exercise their right to access lawful health services.
In situations in which such regulations exist, many member states
lack oversight and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that health-care
providers act in accordance with them. Such regulations should establish
mechanisms to ensure the accessibility and availability of health-care providers
when other health-care providers may conscientiously object, and
mandate the creation of a registry of conscientious objectors.
56. National regulations should recognise that the right to conscientious
objection extends only to individuals, not to public or state institutions.
Additional safeguards should delineate the duties of health-care providers
to their patients in the context of conscientious objection, which
include a duty to:
- provide
information to patients about all treatment options;
- inform patients of any conscientious objection and provide
a referral to another health-care provider, in a timely manner;
- ensure that the health-care providers to which patients
are referred will provide quality treatment, or in the absence of
an appropriate referral or in emergency situations, require the
conscientious objector to provide the necessary care.
57. National policies should define the scope of the right to
conscientious objection in respect of the type of services and health-care
professionals to whom it applies, and carve out appropriate exceptions
for emergency situations.
58. Lastly, all national regulations should establish effective
complaint mechanisms that can address abuses of the right to conscientious
objection and provide women with an effective and timely remedy.
59. The enactment by member states of regulations which include
these principles will ensure that the interests and rights of both
health-care providers and individuals seeking legal health care
are respected, protected and fulfilled.