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Progress report | Doc. 11720 Addendum II | 29 September 2008
The situation on the ground in Russia and Georgia in the context of the war between those countries
Introduction
1. The Bureau of the Assembly,
at its meeting on 5 September 2008, decided to set up an ad hoc committee
to study the situation on the ground in the Russian Federation and
Georgia from 21 to 26 September 2008. The ad hoc committee was composed
of the co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee for Russia, myself
and Mr Theodoros Pangalos (Greece, SOC); the co-rapporteurs of the
Monitoring Committee for Georgia, Mr Mátyás Eörsi (Hungary, ALDE)
and Mr Kastriot Islami (Albania, SOC); the Chairperson of the Political
Affairs Committee, Mr Göran Lindblad (Sweden, EPP/CD); the Chairperson
of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, Ms Corien
Jonker (Netherlands, EPP/CD); the Chairperson of the Socialist Group,
Mr Andreas Gross (Switzerland); the Chairperson of the Unified European
Left Group, Mr Tiny Kox (Netherlands); and the first Vice-Chairperson
of the European Democrat Group, Mr David Wilshire (United Kingdom).
2. The delegation visited Russia from 21 to 23 September 2008
and, subsequently, Georgia from 24 to 26 September 2008. During
their visit in the two countries, the delegation met with high-level
state authorities, representatives of international organisations,
as well as representatives of civil society and the diplomatic community.
In addition, during the visit in Georgia, the delegation visited
the so-called “buffer zone” and South Ossetia. The delegation wishes
to thank the national delegations of Russia and Georgia to the Assembly,
as well as the Special Representative of the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe in Tbilisi, for the excellent programme and
logistical support provided to the delegation.
3. The itinerary of the delegation led to prolonged discussions
with our Russian counterparts, who felt that the itinerary decided
by the Bureau would not allow the Russian side to respond to the
Georgian points of view – while this possibility existed for the
Georgian side – and would not allow time for a visit to North Ossetia.
They therefore proposed that the delegation should travel to Vladikavkaz
(North Ossetia) and from there directly to South Ossetia via the
Roki tunnel. The delegation reconfirmed that it was willing to travel
to Vladikavkaz in the framework of the programme in Russia, but
that it could, and would, only enter Georgia via a border under
the control of the Georgian authorities, also in order to avoid
any implicit recognition of the self-proclaimed independence of
South Ossetia. However, the Chairperson of the Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Population was willing to return to Moscow and Vladikavkaz,
while three members of the delegation were willing to return to
Moscow on Friday 26 September, in their individual capacity, to
meet Prime Minister Putin, who had indicated that he was interested
in meeting members of the delegation on that day. The original itinerary
for the delegation was therefore maintained, but, unfortunately,
the meeting with Mr Putin could not take place due to scheduling
problems, while the visit to Vladikavkaz could not be organised
at such short notice.
4. The delegation visited several villages in the “buffer zone”
and South Ossetia, including Tskhinvali. The delegation was able,
and allowed, to visit a majority of the villages on the list it
had previously provided to the Russian military authorities and
the visits in the villages themselves took place completely unimpeded.
The delegation wishes to thank the Russian military authorities
for their logistical support and security provided during this part
of the programme. The delegation was, however, surprised and concerned
about being welcomed by a member of the Russian State Duma and of
our Assembly, Mr Slutsky, at the Karaleti checkpoint to the “buffer
zone”, which is deep inside Georgia proper. Mr Slutsky indicated
his understanding for the position of the delegation, but informed
us that it would not be possible for the Russian military authorities
to provide us with access to the “buffer zone” and South Ossetia
without his presence.
5. On request of the de facto authorities in Tskhinvali, the
delegation met with Mr Kokoity and other Ossetian de facto authorities
The exchange of views with Mr Kokoity was frank and open and allowed
the delegation to be better informed about the different positions
of the de facto authorities.
Outbreak of the war
6. During their meetings with
the Russian and Georgian authorities, the delegation was presented
with diametrically opposed versions about the circumstances that
led to the outbreak of the hostilities, as well as the exact events
on 7 and 8 August as such.
7. According to the Russian authorities, the tension and outbreaks
of violence, involving small arms and light artillery fire, between
the Georgian and South Ossetian sides had been steadily escalating
over the summer months mainly as a result of, but not exclusively,
Georgian provocations and this despite all efforts by the Russian
peacekeepers to calm both sides down and bring them back to the
negotiating table. At approximately
8. 10.38 p.m. on 7 August, the Georgian authorities then initiated
an unprovoked and, in their opinion, clearly premeditated, full-scale
military attack on Tskhinvali and Ossetian villages in the security
zone, including a “massive and indiscriminate” shelling with heavy
artillery and multiple rocket systems of Tskhinvali. When reports
of heavy civilian casualties and attacks on Russian peacekeepers
became clear, the Russian authorities launched their counter-offensive
and sent troops through the Roki tunnel into Georgia.
9. According to the Georgian authorities, tensions in South Ossetia
had been steadily escalating for several months as a result of provocations
and attacks on Georgian villages by South Ossetian separatist forces,
which were not prevented by Russian peacekeepers. Repeated attempts
by the Georgian side to stop the hostilities by peaceful means were
met with a refusal from the South Ossetian side, with the tacit
approval of the Russian peacekeepers. On 6 and 7 August, the escalations
reached unprecedented heights, which risked destabilising the country.
When, on the 7 August in the late evening, the Georgian authorities
received multiple intelligence reports that Russian military troops,
including tanks and heavy artillery, were crossing the Roki tunnel
and building up in South Ossetia, a counter-attack was launched
in self-defence of the Russian invasion of Georgian territory.
10. The Russian authorities strongly deny that Russian troops
passed the Roki tunnel before the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali
and point out that the intelligence information to that effect made
public by the Georgian authorities is widely considered to be at
best inconclusive and not independently verified. The delegation
was surprised to be informed that neither Russia nor the United
States possess satellite images that could help either confirm or
contradict the Georgian assertion that Russian troops passed the
Roki tunnel prior to the attack on Tskhinvali.
11. The Russian authorities presented the delegation with what
they allege to be captured Georgian military plans for the invasion
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the Russian opinion, these plans
are the proof that the attack on South Ossetia was planned and prepared
well in advance. The Georgian side strongly denies any prior preparation
and planning for such an invasion. The delegation itself considered
that military forces in most, if not all, countries would have plans
for hypothetical military situations that could occur, and that therefore,
even if these plans were genuine, the existence of such plans would
not per se constitute the
proof that the attack on Tskhinvali was premeditated and prepared
in advance. Moreover, members of the international community in
Georgia asserted that the level of disorganisation during the Georgian
military action in South Ossetia, as well as the chaotic retreat,
would seem to belie the notion that this attack was prepared well
in advance.
12. From our exchanges with the Georgian and Russian authorities,
as well as with members of the international community, it is clear
that at present it is impossible to fully establish what happened,
and what led to the events on 7 and 8 August. However, it is equally
clear to us that the conflict and the escalation and deterioration
of the situation leading to it did not start on 7 August and that
the peacekeeping process had broken down well before that date.
However, the start of the shelling of Tskhinvali by Georgian troops,
on 7 August 2008, initiated a new level of escalation, namely that
of open and fully-fledged warfare. The delegation therefore called
for an independent international investigation into the circumstances
that led to the war, as well as into the exact sequence of events
on 7 and 8 August 2008. The Georgian authorities indicated that
they would welcome such an international inquiry. Our parliamentarian
counterparts in Russia have also indicated that they would not object
to such an independent international investigation.
The immediate aftermath of the war
13. During our talks with the Russian
authorities, the delegation made it clear that the unilateral recognition by
the Russian Federation of the self-proclaimed independence of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia violated the principle of the territorial integrity
of Georgia and is in contravention of international law and the
obligations of Russia as a member state of the Council of Europe.
14. The Russian authorities stressed that a decision not to recognise
the self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia would
have led to strong reactions in the Northern Caucasus republics,
which would have had a potential destabilising effect on this volatile
region of the Russian Federation. Moreover, while agreeing that
Kosovo and South Ossetia are completely different and incomparable
cases, the Russian authorities stressed that the recognition of
Kosovo by several European countries, in their opinion, had opened a
Pandora’s box in this respect.
15. The delegation stressed the need for all parties to fully
implement the provisions of the Sarkozy ceasefire agreement, which
was signed by both Presidents Medvedev and Saakashvili, especially
with regard to the withdrawal of troops.
16. The delegation is seriously concerned about the issue of withdrawal
of Russian troops to their pre-war positions and strengths. According
to the recent negotiations between Presidents Sarkozy and Medvedev, Russian
troop withdrawal from the so-called “buffer zone” is foreseen to
have been completed on 1 October, after the arrival of EU monitors,
although the delegation received indications that the withdrawal
may only start on 10 October. However, the Russian authorities informed
us that the presence of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
is no longer part of the ceasefire agreement as the Russian authorities
have recognised the independence of these two regions. According
to the Russian authorities, troop presence in those two regions will
now be governed by bilateral agreements. This is a matter of serious
concern to the delegation, as this would be in clear violation of
the ceasefire agreement.
17. The recognition by Russia of the independence of these two
regions also complicates the provision of humanitarian aid as well
as monitoring of the implementation of the ceasefire agreement by
independent monitors. International organisations are refused entry
to South Ossetia via Georgia proper, while European Union (EU) and
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors
are prevented from entering South Ossetia and Abkhazia at all.
18. Several interlocutors informed the delegation they feared
that various forms of provocation could be used to justify a prolonged
presence of Russian troops in the “buffer zone”, which could lead
to increased tensions.
Humanitarian and human rights concerns
19. The visit to the villages in
the “buffer zone” and South Ossetia made clear the extent of the
human rights violations in these areas. The delegation saw evidence
of large-scale looting and destruction of property and heard accounts
of assaults and robberies. According to the Georgian villagers the
delegation spoke to, the looting and destruction of houses started
mostly after the ceasefire agreement was signed on 12 August and is
continuing unabated to this day. While the looting, assaults and
destruction of property take place mostly during the night, we were
informed that they also occur during the day.
20. When asked, the Georgian villagers indicated that these crimes
were committed by South Ossetian irregular troops and gangs but
also by so-called volunteers from the Northern Caucasus. Russian
troops were not reported to have been involved in the looting and
burning themselves, but allegedly had done nothing to stop these
practices, often turning a blind eye. These accounts were confirmed
by independent reports from Russian human rights organisations who
had been present in South Ossetia both during and after the outbreak of
hostilities.
21. The delegation was informed by international humanitarian
and relief organisations, as well as human rights organisations
and the diplomatic community in Georgia, about systematic acts of
ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages in South Ossetia by South
Ossetian irregular troops and gangs. This pattern seemed to be confirmed
by the visit of the delegation to the Georgian village of Ksuisi
in South Ossetia, which had been completely looted and virtually
destroyed. The delegation received reports that, in some cases,
entire villages have been bulldozed over and razed.
22. The delegation is seriously concerned about these reports
of ethnic cleansing, as well as of the looting and destruction of
property it saw during its visit. The delegation stressed that Russia,
under international law, bears full responsibility for any crimes
and human rights violations committed on the territories that are
under its effective control.
23. During our visit to Tskhinvali, the delegation saw several
residential areas, as well as public buildings, that had been completely
destroyed by indiscriminate shelling by Georgian troops in the initial
phases of the war, as well as in the course of subsequent battles
between Georgian and Russian troops over the city. The delegation
stressed that the use of indiscriminate force and weapons in civilian
areas can be considered a war crime and called for a full investigation
in order to establish the facts in this respect.
24. The number of deaths as a result of the conflict is a matter
of controversy, although all sides agree that the initial high numbers
were inflated. Independent reports put the total number of deaths
at between 300 and 400, including the military. However, it should
be stressed that even one victim is a victim too many.
25. In the initial phases of the conflict, around 35 000 to 40
000 South Ossetian refugees were recorded in North Ossetia. All
interlocutors highlighted the efficient manner in which this refugee
stream was managed by the Russian authorities. Most of these refugees
have now returned to their place of residence, while an estimated
2 000 remain in North Ossetia with their families.
26. According to different sources, the conflict initially led
to 130 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Georgia, of which
60 000 currently remain. Another 29 000 are expected to be able
to return when Russian troops have withdrawn from the so-called
“buffer zone” and security for the population has been re-established. A
total of 31 000 IDPs (25 000 from South Ossetia and 6 000 from Abkhazia)
are considered to be “permanently” unable to return to their original
place of residence. These numbers should be seen in the context
of the approximately 300 000 already existing IDPs from these areas
as a result of the 1992 conflict.
27. The humanitarian situation is further exacerbated by the uncertainty
regarding the “buffer zone”. The current serious security vacuum
needs to be urgently addressed but there seem to be conflicting
views regarding the role of the EU monitors and Georgian police
forces. While the EU is sending strictly civilian monitors to observe
the security situation, and considers it to be the role of the Georgian
law enforcement forces to provide security to the population in
that area, the Russian authorities seem to be of the view that civilian
protection will be also the responsibility of the EU monitors and
have reservations about the idea of armed Georgian police in this
area. This issue needs to be urgently resolved to avoid even greater
decline of security in this area.
Conclusions
28. The delegation is extremely
concerned that two member states of the Council of Europe, who committed themselves
to resolve all conflicts, including old ones, by peaceful means,
did not live up to this commitment. This cannot be tolerated and
both countries share responsibilities for escalating this conflict
into war. Taking into account the complexity of the situation, the
diametrically opposed views of the parties in the conflict, the mutually
exclusive national public discourses, the negation by both states
of any share of responsibility, as well as the short time that the
delegation had at its disposal, it is impossible for the delegation
to establish all the facts regarding the exact sequence of events
on 7 and 8 August, as well as the circumstances that led to them, which
are necessary to draw precise conclusions. The exact facts, as well
as the precise responsibility of each of the parties in this conflict,
including the outbreak of the war, can only be properly established
in the framework of a thorough and independent international investigation
as suggested in point 11 in this memorandum. Truth is a prerequisite
for reconciliation. This is of utmost importance as similar conflicts
exist in other parts of this geographical region and it must be
made clear that, for the Council of Europe or its Assembly, it cannot
be acceptable that such conflicts escalate into war.
29. It is clear that both sides did not do enough to prevent the
war and that grave human rights violations were committed and continue
to be committed up to this day. There can be no impunity for such
violations and for alleged ethnic cleansing. The Council of Europe
has an important role to play in this respect. All alleged human
rights violations should be investigated and perpetrators held to
account before the courts. In this respect, it is clear that Russia
bears full responsibility for the protection of civilians in the
territories that are under its effective control and therefore for
the crimes and human rights violations committed against them. The
use of indiscriminate force and weapons by both Georgian and Russian
troops in civilian areas can be considered war crimes that need
to be fully investigated.
30. While it is beyond the scope of this memorandum to discuss
the possible action the Assembly should take, it is clear that it
cannot be business as usual. At the same time, there is a need to
maintain the dialogue with, and between, both countries in the conflict.
31. It is my firm conviction that the Assembly has an important
role to play in resolving the current situation. Following the debate
in the Assembly, the Bureau might consider sending a follow-up mission
to the region, possibly with a different format and composition,
in the not too distant future.