1. Introduction
1. The last report prepared by
the Monitoring Committee on the situation in Ukraine was debated
under urgent procedure in the Parliamentary Assembly on 9 April
2014, and led to the adoption of
Resolution 1988 (2014) “Recent developments in Ukraine: threats to the functioning
of democratic institutions”.
2. Since the adoption of that report, the developments in Ukraine
have been dominated by the military aggression by the Russian Federation
in eastern Ukraine and the efforts in the framework of the Minsk Agreements
to bring that conflict to a peaceful resolution. However, while
often overshadowed by the events in eastern Ukraine, a major reform
process is being implemented in Ukraine to address the demands made
by the Ukrainian population during the Euromaidan protests that
led to the fall of the Yanukovich regime.
3. On 12 October 2016, following a joint debate on the report
of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy by our colleague
Kristýna Zelienková on the “Political consequences of the conflict
in Ukraine”
and the report of the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights by our colleague Ms Marieluise
Beck on “Legal remedies for human rights violations on the Ukrainian
territories outside the control of the Ukrainian authorities”,
the Assembly adopted
Resolution 2132 (2016) on the political consequences of the Russian aggression
in Ukraine and
Resolution
2133 (2016) on legal remedies for human rights violations on the Ukrainian
territories outside the control of the Ukrainian authorities.
4. The developments with regard to the Russian aggression in
Ukraine and the worrisome human rights situation in the Ukrainian
territories not under the control of the Ukrainian authorities are
succinctly outlined in these two excellent reports. There is therefore
at this moment no need for us to repeat what has been said by the
Assembly on these issues and we will not touch upon these two areas
in the present report. However, in order to complete the picture
provided by these two reports we feel that it is important to complement
these two reports with a report about the ongoing domestic reforms
and related political developments in Ukraine. On our proposal,
the Monitoring Committee therefore agreed at its meeting on 9 November
2016 in Paris to ask the Bureau of the Assembly to hold a debate
on “The functioning of democratic institutions in Ukraine” during the
January 2017 part-session.
5. We realise that it would be impossible in such a short time
span to cover in detail in this report all the reforms that are
taking place at this moment in Ukraine. We will therefore limit
ourselves to some of the main reforms that are taking place, and
in particular the constitutional reform process. We intend to provide
a detailed and in-depth assessment of the total reform package in
the next report on the honouring of obligations and commitments
by Ukraine.
2. Domestic political developments
6. On 25 May 2014, an early presidential
election took place in Ukraine. The prominent businessman and backer
of the Euromaidan movement, Mr Petro Poroshenko, was elected President
of Ukraine with 54.7% of the vote.
The turnout for these
elections, in which nine candidates competed, was 60.3%. The elections
were observed by an International Election Observation Mission (IEOM)
of which the Assembly was part. According to the IEOM: “The early
presidential election in Ukraine was characterized by high voter
turnout and the clear resolve of the authorities to hold what was
a genuine election largely in line with international commitments
and with a respect for fundamental freedoms in the vast majority
of the country”. Regrettably, no elections could take place in some
areas in the east of the country due to the deteriorating security
situation as a result of the pro-Russian insurgency, or in Crimea
that had been illegally annexed by the Russian Federation. The high percentage
of votes received in a democratic and genuinely competitive elections,
with a high voter turnout, gave President Poroshenko the clear democratic
legitimacy to lead the country and to implement the ambitious reform
agenda that was being drawn up to address the popular demands made
during the Euromaidan protests.
7. In order to ensure maximum legitimacy of the Verkhovna Rada
and its decisions following the Euromaidan events, and taking into
account the rapidly deteriorating security situation, early parliamentary elections
were organised on 26 October 2014. These elections were observed
by the Parliamentary Assembly in the framework of the International
Election Observation Mission.
The elections
took place in a challenging security situation as a result of the
military conflict in eastern Ukraine. As a result, elections did
not take place in the parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts not
under the control of the Ukrainian authorities, as well as in Crimea.
According to the IEOM, the “early parliamentary elections marked
an important step in Ukraine’s aspirations to consolidate democratic
elections in line with its international commitments”.
8. The elections took place in a mixed majoritarian–proportional
election system. In the proportional part of the race, the People’s
Front obtained 22.14% of the votes; the Petro Poroshenko Bloc 21.81%;
Samopomich (“Self Reliance”) 10.97%; the Opposition Bloc 9.43%;
the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko 7.44%; and Batkivshchyna (“Fatherland”)
of Yulia Timoshenko 5.68%. Together with the majoritarian mandates
obtained this resulted in the Petro Poroshenko Bloc obtaining 132
seats; the People’s Front 82 seats; Samopomich 33 seats; the Opposition
Bloc 29 seats; the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko 22 seats; Batkivshchyna
19 seats; and Svoboda 6 seats. Strong Ukraine, the Volia party,
Zastup and the Right sector each won one seat in the new parliament.
In addition, 94 independents candidates were elected to the parliament.
The turnout was 52.4%. This outcome showed clear support for the
pro-Maidan parties and the reform programme that had been initiated
immediately after the events of February 2014.
9. Following the early parliamentary elections, a ruling coalition
was formed that encompassed most of the parliament with the exception
of the MPs linked to the Opposition Bloc.
The
members of the ruling coalition at the time of its formation were:
Petro Poroshenko Bloc, Peoples Front of Prime Minister Yatsenyuk,
the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, Samopomich and Batkivshchyna.
This was a very heterogeneous coalition with the partners holding
differing opinions on a number of policy areas including on the
reform of the Constitution and the fight against corruption. On
1 September 2015, the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko left the ruling
coalition as it opposed the support of the government for the decentralisation
chapter of the constitutional reform (see below).
10. In this context it should be stressed that in Ukrainian politics
mere party affiliation is not always a guarantee of support for
a certain position or policy. Beyond party factions also informal
internal and cross-party factions and groups exist, often based
on a single issue or other interests, including economic and oligarchic
interests. This was especially clear with regard to the constitutional
reform, where a number of provisions on both decentralisation and
judicial chapters proved to be controversial across party lines.
11. With the ongoing security challenges in eastern Ukraine and
the slow pace of reform, including with regard to the fight against
corruption, public support started waning for a number of parties,
or party officials, that were perceived as part of a self-serving
political establishment. In this context, the position of then Prime Minister
Yatsenyuk, who was widely unpopular among the Ukrainian public,
who saw him as ineffective in implementing reforms and fighting
the rampant corruption in Ukraine, became an issue of political
contention, with his party’s support sinking into low single digits.
12. On 25 October 2015, local elections took place in Ukraine.
These elections confirmed a change in the support for the different
political factions. The People’s Front of Mr Yatsenyuk did not participate
in the local elections as its public support had sunk below 2%.
Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc maintained the support it had obtained at
the parliamentary elections, mostly as a result of a number of coalitions
it entered into at the local level with several other parties and
groups. The winners within the governing coalition were Batkivshchyna
and to a lesser extent Samopomich. Two new parties, Vidrodzhennia,
of Kharkiv Mayor Gennady Kernes, and UKROP, of former Deputy Governor
of Dnipropetrovs’k Hennadiy Korban, established themselves as political forces
with a national dimension in these local elections. It should be
noted that, while Mr Poroshenko’s party did well percentage-wise,
six of the seven main regional capitals were won by members of other
parties.
13. On 16 February 2016, President Poroshenko asked Prime Minister
Yatsenyuk to resign. However, on the same day the government of
Mr Yatsenyuk survived a vote of no-confidence in the Verkhovna Rada, reportedly
with the help of a number of MPs of the Poroshenko Bloc. Subsequently,
on 17 February 2016, Batkivshchyna and, on 18 February 2016, Samopomich
announced that they were leaving the ruling coalition. With those
two parties leaving the ruling coalition, the government had lost
its ruling majority and had 30 days to form a new majority if it
wished to avoid pre-term elections. Following several weeks of political
negotiations between all parties, who were generally eager to avoid
the prospect of early elections, Mr Yatsenyuk formally resigned
on 12 April 2016. He was replaced by the then Speaker of the Verkhovna
Rada, Volodymyr Groysman. Mr Groysman, who is well respected by
the international community, is a close ally of President Poroshenko.
Other ministers from Yatsenyuk’s People’s Front maintained their
positions in the government, underscoring the continuing political
influence of the People’s Front. The new government was supported
by the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, the People’s Front and Samopomich
as well as the Revival and People’s Will Party. Batkivshchyna officially
declared itself in opposition to the new government.
14. On 30 May 2015, President Poroshenko appointed controversial
former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili as Governor of Odessa,
citing both the latter’s reformist and anti-Kremlin credentials.
However, soon the relations between Mr Saakashvili and the government
in Kyiv, including with President Poroshenko, soured – reportedly
over Mr Saakashvili’s brazen political style, as well as his continued
involvement in Georgian domestic politics, which led to tensions
in the relations between Georgia and Ukraine. For his part, Mr Saakashvili
increasingly expressed frustration with the slow pace of reforms
and limited results in the fight against corruption. On 7 November
2016, Mr Saakashvili, who had become increasingly isolated, resigned from
his post of Governor of Odessa, citing corruption in government
circles and the unwillingness to push through reforms as the main
reasons for his resignation. On 7 November 2016, he announced that
he was establishing a new political party in Ukraine.
15. On 17 December 2015, the Kyiv District Court disbanded the
Communist Party of Ukraine on the basis of the law on the condemnation
of Communist and Nazi regimes and symbols. This decision raised
a number of questions with regard to freedom of expression and association
in Ukraine. At the request of the Monitoring Committee, the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) adopted
an opinion on the law on condemnation of Communist and Nazi regimes
and symbols in December 2015.
In
this opinion, the Venice Commission concluded that it “recognize[s]
the right of Ukraine to ban or even criminalise the use of certain
symbols of and propaganda for totalitarian regimes. While States
are free to enact legislation that bans or even criminalises the
use of symbols and propaganda of certain totalitarian regimes, such
laws must comply with the requirements set by the [European Convention
on Human Rights] and other regional or international human rights
instruments ...” and that “While Law No. 317-VIII may be considered
as pursuing legitimate aims, it is not precise enough to enable
individuals to regulate their conduct according to the law and to
prevent arbitrary interference by public authorities”.
With
regard to the banning of parties, the opinion concluded that “the
Law should clarify that banning any association is a measure of
last resort in exceptional cases, proportionate to the offence.
This is particularly the case for political parties in the light
of their important function in a democratic society”.
The
Communist Party of Ukraine had become politically irrelevant following its
overt public support for the illegal annexation of Crimea by the
Russian Federation. As a result of this falling support it had all
but disappeared and had no MPs in the Verkhovna Rada. However, we
wish to reiterate that, in our view, it is up to the voters to condemn
the party to irrelevancy over its policies, and not to the courts.
16. The intertwinement of political and economic interests continues
to be a point of serious concern in Ukraine. Mr Poroshenko was a
prominent businessman before being elected President and has appointed
a number of former associates in his administration. Moreover, all
parties, without exception, have a number of wealthy businessmen
within their ranks. Oligarchic interests therefore continue to be
an important political factor in Ukraine and this has not diminished
since the Euromaidan events. A point in case has been the breakdown
in relations between President Poroshenko and Ihor Kolomoiskiy.
Mr Kolomoiskiy, a wealthy businessman like Mr Poroshenko, was appointed
by President Poroshenko as Governor of Dnipropetrovs’k. He is widely
credited as having used his influence to avoid the insurgency that
was instigated in Luhansk and Donetsk from spreading to Dnipropetrovs’k
and Kharkiv. In addition, he financed a number of the voluntary battalions
fighting in eastern Ukraine alongside the Ukrainian army, when the
army’s capacities were stressed to their limits. Following a standoff
over the leadership of Ukraine’s main energy company, President Poroshenko
fired Mr Kolomoiskiy from his position as Governor of Dnipropetrovs’k.
The controversial arrest of Hennadiy Korban, former Deputy Governor
of Dnipropetrovs’k and one of the leaders of UKROP – a party considered
close to Mr Kolomoiskiy that has been in active opposition to Mr Poroshenko
and his policies – was decried as politically motivated by Mr Korban’s
supporters. This intertwinement of oligarchic and political interest
has contributed to the public perception of the high level of corruption
and a political class in which at least a part puts its own interests
before that of the voters or Ukraine as a nation.
17. The ongoing intervention by Russia in eastern Ukraine is hardening
the media environment in Ukraine. Journalists who have sought accreditation
from the
de facto authorities
of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) and “Luhansk
People’s Republic” (“LPR”), or journalists who are openly critical
of the policy with regard to the areas not under the control of
the central government, are often harassed and threatened or even
attacked.
While most of these threats and
attacks are made by civilians, they are not seen as being investigated
properly, giving rise to a sense of impunity for those attacks that
undermines the freedom of the media. This was compounded by the
publication of information obtained from hacked e-mail accounts
of “DPR” officials, which included the names and contact details
of journalists having asked for accreditation in the “DPR”.
The publication
of this information was publicly condemned by President Poroshenko
but reportedly welcomed by other government officials, including
the Minister of the Interior. On 3 August 2016, the Deputy Minister
for Information Policy, Ms Tetyana Popova, resigned from her position
citing the authorities’ lack of will to investigate harassment and
threats to journalists. On 20 July 2016, journalist Pavel Sheremet
was killed in Kyiv by a car bomb. His murder was strongly condemned
by the authorities, which indicated that the possible involvement
of the Russian secret services in his murder was being investigated.
However, to date no-one has been arrested or charged with his murder.
At the beginning of September 2016, protesters blocked and tried to
set fire to the building of the Ukrainian Television Station Inter,
a popular television station co-owned
by Serhiy Lyovochkin, former Chief of Staff of ousted President
Yanukovich
and
oligarch Dmytro Firtash, for allegedly being pro-Russian. This arson
attack was condemned by,
inter alia,
the representative for freedom of the media of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Ms Dunja Mijatovic.
In the context of the ongoing information war with Russia, President
Poroshenko signed, on 27 May 2016, a decree banning 17 Russian journalists
and media representatives from entering Ukraine on the grounds that
they would be a threat to national security and the constitutional
order. This follows a similar decree on 16 September 2015 that was
widely criticised by the international community. While the concerns
by the Ukrainian authorities about Russia’s propaganda and information
war are legitimate and understandable, banning journalists from
entering Ukraine and ultimately limiting media freedom seems to
be an inappropriate response to this threat.
18. The Opposition Bloc has made several allegations of harassment
and intimidation of opposition supporters, which are denied by the
authorities. We intend to continue to follow these allegations closely
and call on all political forces to overcome divisions and animosity.
19. In the context of the stability of the country, it is also
important to stress the continuation of an inclusive policy towards
minority languages. The alleged abolishment
of
the law on State languages was instrumentalised to instigate the
illegal annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the east. However,
as outlined in the above-mentioned 2014 report on “Recent Developments
in Ukraine: threats to the functioning of democratic institutions”,
this law was never abrogated and remained continuously in force.
While reportedly the authorities are not planning to abrogate this
law, 57 individual members of the Verkhovna Rada have appealed this
law to Constitutional Court, claiming the unconstitutionality of
some of its provisions as well as the manner in which it was adopted.
The protection of minorities and the use of their languages are
guaranteed in the Constitution, as well as by the law on the ratification
of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ETS
No. 148). The law on State languages lowers the threshold for the
use of minority languages in public affairs and education to 10%.
While we cannot comment on the ongoing appeal to the Constitutional Court,
we urge the authorities to continue to promote an inclusive minority
language policy and to ensure, in the event the law on State Languages
is repealed by the Court, that the 10% threshold for the use of
minority languages is maintained.
20. On 17 November 2016, the Verkhovna Rada postponed the ratification
of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (CETS No. 210, “Istanbul
Convention”), reportedly over concerns about the references to sexual
orientation in the convention. We hope that the Verkhovna Rada will
soon overcome its hesitance and urge it to promptly ratify this
important convention.
21. On 15 November 2016, protests took place in Kyiv over rising
prices and poor economic performance, as well as over the failure
of some banks. Radio Free Europe reported that a number of people
told their reporters that they had been paid to participate in the
protests.
The authorities had virtually locked
down the centre of Kyiv over these protests as they feared that
they could be the start of a campaign orchestrated by Russia to
destabilise Ukraine, the plans of which had been obtained in the
hacking of the e-mail account of President Putin’s advisor, Vladislav
Sukov.
22. Visa liberalisation with the European Union has been one of
the key priorities for the Ukrainian authorities. On 20 April 2016,
the European Commission proposed to the European Council and European Parliament
to lift visa requirements for short-stay travel of Ukrainian citizens
to the Schengen area. On 17 November 2016, the European Council
agreed on its negotiating position on visa liberalisation for Ukraine. The
Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament
called for the visa liberalisation process to be finalised soon.
3. Constitutional reform
23. Following the change in power
that resulted from the Euromaidan events, and in line with the 21 February
2014 agreement brokered by the European Union, the Verkhovna Rada
reinstated the 2004 amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution with
a view to providing a more inclusive and democratic division of power
with proper democratic safeguards. It should be recalled that the
Assembly and the Venice Commission had previously criticised the
2004 amendments as containing important deficiencies and shortcomings
that could hinder the comprehensive reforms that were needed for
the country.
Noting that there
was a unique window for constitutional reform following the Euromaidan
events, the Assembly therefore urged the Verkhovna Rada to implement
a comprehensive reform of the Constitution with a view to bringing
it fully into line with European standards and norms.
The need to reform the Constitution
was also agreed upon in the European Union-brokered agreement on
21 February 2014.
24. The constitutional reform process soon got caught up in the
implementation of the Minsk Protocol that had been agreed upon in
an attempt to resolve the military conflict in eastern Ukraine.
The original Minsk Protocol, signed on 5 September 2014, called
for decentralisation of power.
The “Package of Measures for the Implementation
of the Minsk Agreements”, that was signed on 12 February 2015 in
an attempt to resolve the breakdown of the ceasefire agreement and
escalation of hostilities between the Ukrainian and the Russian- backed
forces, linked the principle of decentralisation with the explicit
need for constitutional reform.
25. Given the extent of the constitutional reform that was needed,
as well as the tight deadlines imposed by the “Package of Measures
for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements”, it was agreed that,
as a first step, the constitutional reform would focus on the decentralisation
and justice system chapters of the Constitution. While we understand
and agree with the need to focus in first instance on efforts to
reform the judicial and decentralisation chapters of the Constitution,
we, and the previous monitoring co-rapporteurs on Ukraine, have consistently
expressed our concern that a phased implementation of constitutional
reform could result in only a partial reform. Constitutional reform
is a complicated process under any circumstances and it may be difficult to
find successive constitutional majorities for repeated constitutional
reforms, especially in the context of the increasing heterogeneity
of the Verkhovna Rada. We would like to emphasise that the constitutional
reform process should go beyond the judicial and decentralisation
chapters. Reform is also needed with regard to other chapters, and
in particular with regard to the division of powers between the
President, the government and the Verkhovna Rada, with a view to
addressing the deficiencies noted by the Assembly in this regard
in its previous monitoring reports on Ukraine.
26. A Constitutional Commission, tasked with drafting the constitutional
amendments, was set up by President Poroshenko on 3 March 2015.
This commission is chaired by the Speaker of the Parliament. Its composition
was agreed upon on 31 March 2015 and includes 12 members from the
international community. The Council of Europe is represented by
three members: the Special Representative of the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
and the Venice Commission. Following its establishment, three working
groups were set up, reflecting the priorities of the commission:
on judicial reform; on decentralisation; and on human rights and
fundamental freedoms. However, the work of the third working group
did not result, to our knowledge, in proposals for amendments to
the Constitution. We welcome the close co-operation between this
commission and the Council of Europe, as exemplified by the three
members of our organisation in this commission.
3.1. Decentralisation
27. The constitutional reform with
regard to decentralisation concerns two separate but interlinked
issues:
- the constitutional
provisions needed to allow the decentralisation of the powers and
establishing the principles of local and regional self-government;
- the constitutional provisions that would allow for the
establishment of a special status for certain areas of the Donetsk
and Luhansk Oblasts.
28. The constitutional provisions on decentralisation were developed
in close co-operation with the Venice Commission and the Congress
of Local and Regional Authorities. In its opinion on the initial
draft for the decentralisation chapter, the Venice Commission concluded
that these chapters formed a good basis for the reforms which are
“largely compatible with the European Charter of Local Self-Government”.
It
made a number of recommendations to bring this chapter fully into
line with the Charter. In a memorandum prepared by the Secretariat,
the
Venice Commission subsequently welcomed that most of its recommendations
– including all substantial ones – had been introduced by the authorities
in the constitutional amendments that were adopted in first reading
by the Verkhovna Rada.
29. The decentralisation chapter foresees the establishment of
“prefects”, or representatives of the President, at the regional
level. Their main function is the supervision and co-ordination
of services provided by the central government. However, a number
of parties in the governing coalition have expressed concern that
the prefects have extensive powers that would allow the President
to impose his political preferences and policies on local self-government
and to block decisions of local governments that he deems undesirable
from a political point of view.
Both the
Congress and the Venice Commission have emphasised that the function of
prefect, as foreseen in the constitutional amendments, does not
contradict European standards.
30. The constitutional provision that allows for the establishment
of a special status for certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk
Oblasts is the most controversial and contentious. In order to adhere
to its obligations under the “Package of Measures to Implement the
Minsk Agreements”,
the
Verkhovna Rada adopted, on 31 August 2016, in first reading, Article
18 of the transitional provisions which reads: “Specific arrangements for
self-government of some parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts shall
be set forth in a separate law.” The fact that this article was
included in the transitional provisions raised some questions about
its temporal validity. In its opinion
on
this issue, prepared at the request of the Normandy Format countries,
the Venice Commission concluded that, as Article 18 had been adopted
according to the same procedure and with the same majority as the
rest of the Constitution, it carries the same weight and has the
same effect as the rest of the Constitution and therefore can by
no means be considered to be of a temporary character. As is the
case for the rest of the Constitution, this article remains valid
until it is repealed by the Verkhovna Rada.
31. It should be noted that, in compliance with the Minsk Agreements,
the
Ukrainian Parliament had already adopted the law on the special
status of the Donbas on 17 March 2015. In the trilateral contact
group, representatives of the separatist forces have stated that
they wish to maintain full control over the judiciary, prosecution
and police forces, which was rejected by the authorities in Kyiv
as this would be contrary to the principle of a unitary nation.
In that respect, it is to be regretted that in the course of an
interview, the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that the Donbas
special status should be permanent and that this status should include
“the right to speak the Russian language on the territory of Donbas,
the right for special economic ties with Russia, the right to take
part in appointing prosecutors, judges, have their own law-enforcement
agencies, including people’s militia, and many more things”,
which is not what was agreed in
the “Package of Measures to Implement the Minsk Agreements” or the
Minsk Agreements themselves.
32. The constitutional amendments on decentralisation, including
the controversial Article 18 of the transitional provisions, were
adopted in first reading on 31 August 2016. As already mentioned
in Ms Zelienkova’s report, as a result of the continuing violations
of the ceasefire agreement and absence of progress with the implementation
of the other provisions of the Minsk Agreements with regard to the
security situation by the Russian Federation, there is a general
feeling among the Ukrainian public that only Ukraine is implementing
the Minsk Agreements, while the Russian Federation and its proxies
in Luhansk and Donetsk have not honoured their obligations under
these agreements. Realising that it is unlikely that in such a context sufficient
support could be found to adopt in final reading the constitutional
amendments on decentralisation – which includes Article 18 of the
transitional provisions – the vote in final reading has been provisionally postponed
until significant progress has been made with the implementation
of the Minsk Agreements by the Russian Federation and their proxies
in Donetsk and Luhansk.
33. While we do understand the difficulties and delays in the
adoption of the decentralisation paragraphs due to their close link
with the (absence of) developments with regard to the implementation
of the Minsk Agreements, we wish to emphasise that, in our view,
the absence of progress in the implementation of the Minsk Agreements
should not be used as an excuse for not implementing the other reforms
that are essential for the democratic consolidation of the country.
In that context, we welcome that, despite the fact that the constitutional
amendments with regard to decentralisation have not yet been adopted,
the authorities continue with their efforts to decentralise power
and strengthen local government in Ukraine. A law on the merger
of local communities was adopted on 25 December 2015. As a result,
847 villages voluntarily merged into 172 new communities, which
were given increased competencies and resources. It is hoped that
this will lead to more mergers, which in turn will strengthen local
government in Ukraine and provide a sound basis for future decentralisation
reforms.
3.2. Judiciary and justice system
34. The Assembly has repeatedly
stressed that the adoption of constitutional amendments ensuring
the independence of the judiciary is a crucial precondition for
the reform, in line with European standards, of the justice system
as a whole. Therefore, the considerable progress that has been achieved
with regard to the constitutional reform in relation to the justice
system and the judiciary should be welcomed.
35. Following lengthy negotiations, on 2 June 2016, the constitutional
amendments with regard to the judiciary and justice system were
adopted in final reading by the Verkhovna Rada. The constitutional amendments
with regard to the justice system were drafted in close consultation
with the Venice Commission. In its final opinion
on
the draft amendments, the Venice Commission welcomed that many of
its recommendations – given in a preliminary opinion – had been
taken up by the authorities.
36. The draft constitutional amendments removed the role of the
Verkhovna Rada and President in the appointment of judges and abolished
the right of the President to dismiss judges, which were widely
seen as a threat to the independence of the judiciary. The President
now formally appoints judges strictly on the basis of a binding
proposal by the High Qualifications Commission, which is an independent
part of High Council of Justice, which is also the sole organisation
that can dismiss judges. The Venice Commission had recommended that
the promotion and transfer of judges should be the sole prerogative
of the High Council of Justice, although it would be admissible
in the current situation in Ukraine that the President maintains
these powers during a clearly delimited transitional period. The
constitutional amendments also change the composition of the High
Council of Justice in order to ensure that the majority of its members
are judges and to remove the possibility for the President or the
Verkhovna Rada to dominate and unduly influence its work and decisions.
Following the adoption of the constitutional amendments, a draft
law on the High Council of Justice was submitted to the Verkhovna
Rada by President Poroshenko on 26 September 2016. The Council of
Europe, jointly with the Judicial Reform Council, had provided an
expertise on the draft law and reportedly most of the recommendations
were incorporated in the draft that was submitted to the parliament.
According to the draft law, the High Council of Justice will be
composed of 21 members. Ten will be elected by the Congress of Judges,
two will be appointed by the President and two by the Verkhovna
Rada. In addition, two members will be elected by the Congress of
Lawyers of Ukraine, two by the Ukrainian Congress of Prosecutors and
two by academic institutions. The Chairperson of the Supreme Court
of Ukraine is an ex officio a
member of the High Council of Justice.
37. In a welcome development, the constitutional amendments have
removed the general oversight function from the Prosecutor General.
This general oversight function was contrary to European standards
and norms. Ukraine has thus honoured one of its remaining accession
commitments to the Council of Europe.
38. The constitutional amendments create a three-level court system
and a unified Supreme Court, which have been long-standing recommendations
of the Venice Commission. A new law on the Supreme Court, that would
establish the Supreme Court in its new format and allow for the
appointment of its members (a so-called reset of the Supreme Court)
was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada but was sent, on 3 October 2016,
to the Constitutional Court by an unanimous decision of the current
(old) Supreme Court. We hope this will not result in lengthy delays
for the establishment of the new Supreme Court, given its importance
for the efficient functioning of the justice system.
39. An important question that was raised during the adoption
of the constitutional amendments on the judiciary is the manner
in which it can be ensured that sitting judges have both the required
professional capacity and integrity for their work. A large number
of political forces, and indeed Ukrainian society, favoured the
mass dismissal of all sitting judges and having them reapply for
their positions. The Venice Commission strongly opposed this idea
as it would violate European standards with regard to the independence
of the judiciary and the rule of law. For that reason, this proposal
was also opposed by the authorities. As a compromise, it was agreed
that all sitting judges would be subjected to an evaluation process
before being appointed for an indefinite term, which was introduced
by the constitutional amendments. This would not violate European
norms. A special High Qualification Commission was set up for this
purpose, under, but independent from, the High Council of Justice.
In the period February-June 2016, a total of 300 judges were evaluated.
We were informed that 20% of the judges resigned or refused to participate
in the evaluation process, 5% of the judges were send to the National
School of Judges for further training and in 15% of the cases, the
decision of the Qualification Commission is still pending based
on “further reviews”. The other 60% of judges evaluated have been
given permanent positions. This process has not been without controversy,
especially from among the judges themselves. Supreme Court judges
and specialised court judges have not yet undergone evaluation by
the High Qualifications Commission.
40. As part of the vetting of the sitting judges, a Public Integrity
Council – that would have civil society representatives among its
members – is foreseen to assist the High Qualifications Council
in assessing candidates for judicial positions. While the High Qualifications
Council can ignore the advice of the Public Integrity Council, the
notion of the involvement of what seems to be a non-judicial body
in the appointment process of judges potentially raises some questions
about possible infringements of the principle of the independence
of justice. At the very least, the exact powers and appointment
process for this body should be clearly circumscribed by law.
41. Part of the legal reforms the authorities have prepared, on
the basis of the constitutional amendments on the judiciary, is
a new law on the Constitutional Court. On 7 October 2016, the President
of Ukraine requested the opinion of the Venice Commission on this
law. In its draft opinion,
the
Venice Commission welcomed the new law as a clear step forward,
in line with European standards, concerning constitutional justice.
A key aspect of this law is a new appointment procedure for judges
of the Constitutional Court. One third of the judges are appointed
by the President of Ukraine, one third by the Verkhovna Rada and
one third by the Congress of Judges, on the basis of a competitive
selection process by specific screening commissions. This competitive
selection process was welcomed by the Venice Commission. However,
it recommended that the outcome of the selection process in the
screening commissions should be binding on the appointing bodies, while
the majority for the Rada to appoint should be raised to a two-thirds
majority, as this would better assure the independence of the Constitutional
Court. The introduction of a strict time limit for the appointment
of new judges was also welcomed in the light of the constitutional
crisis in 2005, where the failure to appoint new judges at that
time resulted in the court losing its quorum to take decisions.
Ukraine allows for individual normative complaints to the Constitutional
Court. In its draft opinion, the Venice Commission recommended that
the law on the Constitutional Court allow for full individual complaints
(laws and acts) to ensure that “individuals have the possibility
to protect their fundamental rights effectively on the national
level before Ukrainian courts without having to resort to the European
Court of Human Rights”.
While welcoming the improvements
contained in this draft law, we call on the authorities to address
all the recommendations of the opinion by the Venice Commission,
including with regard to individual complaints.
42. The adoption of a number of important laws to implement the
constitutional changes with regard to the judiciary are now necessary,
as are amendments to a number of already existing laws. While we
are aware of the workload this implies, we urge the authorities
to promptly adopt the required legislation with a view to ensuring
both a genuinely independent judiciary and an effective justice
system. This in turn is an essential prerequisite for the successful
fight against the endemic corruption in the country, which we will
discuss in the next section.
43. An issue that has raised considerable controversy in Ukraine
has been the lustration of public officials. A lustration law was
adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 16 September 2014 and signed into
force on 9 October 2014. The law came into effect on 16 October.
According to this law, persons that, inter
alia, helped the previous authorities to usurp power,
took action or inaction that undermined the foundations of the national security
of Ukraine, served in leading positions in the Soviet Union, or
ordered or abetted the police action against Euromaidan protesters,
are excluded from serving in government positions or holding high-level
civil service positions. Elected persons are expressly excluded
from lustration as are persons who have since served in anti-terrorist
operations (both in the regular army and in volunteer battalions)
in eastern Ukraine. A number of human rights questions were raised
and the Monitoring Committee therefore requested an opinion of the
Venice Commission on this law.
44. The Venice Commission issued an interim opinion on 12 December
2014
and
adopted a final opinion at its plenary meeting on 19 and 20 June
2015.
According
to the Venice Commission, lustration in itself does not constitute
a violation of human rights, nor is it in contravention of European
standards. However, in order to be acceptable in the context of
European standards, the lustration process needs to fulfil a number
of criteria: guilt must be proven in each individual case; due process
before the courts must be guaranteed; lustration needs to have strict
time limits, both in the period of its enforcement as well as the
period to be covered; and it should not be intended as a substitute
for criminal law, i.e. be intended as a punishment for people who
have violated the law. In this context, the Venice Commission, in
its interim opinion, noted a number of concerns with regard to the
period covered by the lustration law, the broad range of positions
to be screened, and insufficient safeguards to ensure that individual
guilt is established. The Ukrainian authorities acknowledged that
the law contained shortcomings and established a constructive dialogue
with
the Venice Commission on possible improvements to this law. A number
of issues were addressed or clarified in separate decrees and, in
April 2015, the authorities prepared a set of amendments to the
lustration law, which, according to the Venice Commission, addresses
many, albeit not all, of the shortcomings in this law. However,
to our great regret, at the moment of writing, these amendments
had not yet been adopted by the Verkhovna Rada. As a result, a number
of human rights concerns remain with regard to this law and the
lustration process. We urge the Verkhovna Rada to promptly adopt
these amendments and to address the remaining concerns of the Venice Commission
that were not covered by these amendments.
45. The first phase of the lustration process, the lustration
of government ministries and security services, was implemented
immediately after the law was signed into force. On 28 October 2014,
the Justice Ministry published on its website a list of 179 government
officials who had been dismissed as a result of the lustration process.
On 5 November 2014, then Prime Minster Yatsenyuk announced the start
of the second phase of the lustration process that would involve
all State agencies, including law-enforcement agencies.
4. The fight against corruption
46. The endemic corruption in Ukraine
continues to be a main point of concern. The prolonged absence of marked
and concrete progress in this area, including in prosecutions and
convictions, could potentially diminish the effects of the ambitious
reform agenda of the authorities and undermine the trust in the
political system by the Ukrainian public, who would consider it
as a betrayal of the principles of the “Revolution of Dignity”.
All Ukrainian stakeholders are therefore encouraged to step up their
efforts, at all levels, to fight corruption in the country.
47. On 16 November 2016, Transparency International published
its report “People and Corruption: Europe and Central Asia 2016”.
According to the surveys in this report, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Serbia
and Ukraine are seen as having the most severe corruption problems.
In Transparency International’s Global Corruption Perceptions Index
of 2015, Ukraine was ranked 130th out of 168 with a score of 27,
slightly up from its previous score.
48. Most of the reforms in the fight against corruption have focused
on the establishment of a new institutional framework. This institutional
framework to implement the anti-corruption strategy consists of
a three-tier set of institutions: the National Anti-Corruption Bureau
(NABU); the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutors Office (SAPO);
and the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC).
A number of political forces have questioned whether the current
court system, given the endemic corruption among the judiciary,
would be capable, or indeed willing, to effectively deal with corruption
cases. They have therefore called for the establishment of a special
anti-corruption court to complement the above-mentioned institutions.
49. The Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office was the
first to be established. It is functionally independent of the Prosecutor
General’s Office, which has no right to interfere in the cases that
are dealt with by the Special Prosecutor. However, before the establishment
of NABU, the Specialist Prosecutor was dependent on the investigation
services of the normal prosecution service. This reportedly led
to tensions between the two services that hindered the effective
investigation into alleged corruption cases.
50. The tensions between the two institutions were especially
clear during the term of Viktor Shokin, who was appointed Prosecutor
General on 10 February 2015 and who was generally perceived as being
unwilling to tackle the endemic corruption in the government or
to reform the prosecution service. However, despite the strong domestic
and international criticism, he remained in office until 29 March
2016. When the well-respected Head of the Security Service of Ukraine,
Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, publicly questioned why the Prosecutor General
had not followed up on a number of high-level corruption cases brought
to his attention by the Security Service of Ukraine, he was relieved
of his function by President Poroshenko. Only when, on 15 February
2016, Deputy Prosecutor General Kasko, a reformer with considerable
support in the international community, resigned, citing “patronising
corruption, lack of reform and lack of progress on important investigations”,
did President Poroshenko ask Prosecutor General Shokin to resign.
On 22 February 2016, President Poroshenko officially submitted to
the Verkhovna Rada a request for the dismissal of Prosecutor General
Shokin, who was dismissed on 29 March 2016.
51. On 12 May 2016, the Verkhovna Rada appointed Mr Yuriy Lutsenko,
then faction leader of the PPB and a close ally of President Poroshenko,
as Prosecutor General. Mr Lutsenko was Minister of the Interior
in the government of Yulia Timoshenko and was imprisoned on politically
motivated charges by former President Yanokovich. He has been an
outspoken critic of the endemic corruption in the country and widely
seen as someone who would give new impetus to the fight against
corruption.
52. Since the summer of 2016, both the NABU and the NAPC became
operational, finalising the establishment of the institutional framework
to implement the anti-corruption strategy.
53. NABU has 284 staff, of which 200 are investigators. Since
its establishment, investigations have reportedly been started in
187 cases of which 19 have already been sent to the courts. NABU
has started investigating a number of deputy prosecutors for alleged
corruption, which has led to tense relations between the Prosecutors
Office and NABU. Prosecutor General Lutsenko has questioned on a
number occasions the exclusive prerogative of NABU to investigate
corruption cases, especially given its (still) relatively small
size and limited geographical presence.
54. A key activity of the newly established NAPC is the electronic
asset declaration system for public officials, the so-called e-declaration
system. This system, developed with the assistance of the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), was adopted by the NAPC members
on 10 June 2016 and became functional on 15 August 2016. There was
some controversy surrounding the certification of the system, as
well as with regard to data protection. More than 50 000 top-level
public officials, including the President, government ministers
and members of the Verkhovna Rada had to declare their assets, as
well as those of their closest family members, by 30 October 2016.
As from January 2017, all other public officials covered by the
law on asset declaration will also have to file their e-declarations,
reportedly bringing the total number of persons to be scrutinised
to over 100 000. A group of 45 MPs, mostly from the Opposition Bloc,
have questioned the constitutionality of the law on asset declaration
and have sent the law to the Constitutional Court for review.
55. The e-declarations, which are publicly accessible, can be
a highly effective tool in the fight against corruption and allow
the Ukrainian public to scrutinise the assets of their elected officials,
as well as civil servants, judges and government officials. Reportedly,
more than 200 judges have resigned from their functions in order
to avoid the obligatory declaration of their assets, underscoring
the potential of the system.
56. The publication, in line with the law, of the asset declarations
of government officials and members of the Verkhovna Rada stirred
quite some controversy when it appeared that a number of them had
quite considerable assets, including large quantities of cash.
While
this may also indicate a lack of trust in the Ukrainian banking
system, and while this cash is not necessarily illicitly obtained,
it does underscore the gap between those officials and the average
Ukrainian citizen, whose average income and assets are a far cry
from these amounts. The public discontent about the revelation of
the assets of government officials and members of parliament has
led to calls to expand the powers of the NABU and to accelerate
the establishment of a special anti-corruption court. It also added
to the public perception that the authorities do too little to fight corruption.
It is important that the authorities are seen as giving priority
to the fight against corruption, and that they start to achieve
concrete results – for the moment the results are too limited in
comparison to the extent of the problem. At the same time, the public
outcry following the publication of the e-declarations should also be
seen as a sign of its effectiveness, or at least of its potential.
For that reason, the first results were widely welcomed by the international
community.
57. In order to maintain public trust in the political system,
in the light of these declarations, it is now important that they
are transparently audited and that any suspicious declarations,
or evident discrepancies between assets owned and the salary of
the person in question, are fully investigated, and if justified
by the evidence, criminal charges filed. According to the law on
asset declaration, the NAPC will now audit the declarations and
check their correctness. In case of suspected intentional errors
or omissions in the declarations, or evident discrepancies between
income and assets, the NAPC will transfer the file to the NABU for
investigation, which can then transfer the file to the SAPO for
prosecution if criminal wrongdoings are uncovered. It is not clear
how the NAPC, with its current resources, will be able to audit
the more than 100 000 expected e-declarations within a reasonable
period of time. Given the potential of the e-declaration system
as a tool to fight corruption, it is important that the NAPC be
provided with the required resources to do its work. At the same,
the public nature of the e-declarations cannot be underestimated,
as this allows the public to scrutinise the declarations and flag
any suspicion of illicit enrichment.
58. In the context of the fight against corruption, the reform
of the civil service in Ukraine is also of importance. A new civil
service law came into force on 1 May 2016 and a strategy for civil
service reform was adopted by the government on 24 June 2016. The
civil service law will, inter alia,
govern the hiring process of civil servants and establish rules
on ethics and conflict of interest. However, a number of implementing
laws still need to be adopted and other laws amended in order to
implement the law on the civil service.
5. Electoral reform
59. The reform of the electoral
system and the adoption of a unified Election Code that would bring coherence
to the legal provisions that govern the different elections in Ukraine,
has been a long-standing recommendation of the Assembly. This recommendation
has gained even more importance as a result of the Package of Measures
for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, signed on 12 February
2015, which reiterates that local elections should be organised
in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk on the basis of Ukrainian
law.
60. As mentioned in previous reports, for the parliamentary elections
both the Venice Commission and the Assembly have repeatedly recommended
that such a new unified Election Code should introduce a variant
of the regional proportional election system, in order to address
the systemic problems that have plagued the division of powers and
functioning of political parties and the Verkhovna Rada.
61. In
Resolution 1988
(2014), adopted on 9 April 2014, the Assembly therefore called
on the authorities to organise the next parliamentary elections
on “the basis of a new unified Election Code and a regional proportional
election system”
the adoption
of which should be an “immediate priority for the Ukrainian authorities”.
However,
as mentioned in the report of the ad hoc committee that observed
the early parliamentary elections on 26 October 2014,
these elections
took place before many of the electoral reforms could be implemented
and therefore took place under the (amended) 2012 electoral legislation.
Regrettably, as is often seen to be the case, following the elections
the political interest in electoral reform waned and was overtaken
by other developments and priorities.
62. A number of drafts for a unified Election Code are formally
on the agenda of the Verkhovna Rada.
Some of these proposals have been developed
with the assistance of the Venice Commission and address shortcomings
noted by the Assembly and the Venice Commission; others contain
provisions that have been flagged as problematic under international
standards. A working group has been established consisting of experts
and stakeholders, that works closely with the Venice Commission
and is tasked with drafting a unified Election Code on the basis
of,
inter alia, these proposals.
There are no indications of preference for any of the draft laws
that are circulating. Regrettably, according to several interlocutors,
there seems to be a lack of commensurate political will to push
forward with the drafting of a unified Election Code, especially
now that the prospect of new elections has receded.
63. It is important that the drafting of a new unified Election
Code, that takes fully into account the recommendations made by
the Venice Commission, is given the priority it deserves and put
on the agenda of the Verkhovna Rada well before the next parliamentary
elections take place.
64. On 16 February 2016, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a series of
amendments to the law on the Election of People’s Deputies. These
amendments would make it possible for parties to change the order
of the candidates, and to effectively exclude them from the list,
after the election has taken place but before they are sworn into
parliament. The validity of this law was limited to the electoral
lists for the 2016 early elections and seems to have been aimed
at giving the political parties control over who would enter parliament
to fill vacant seats as a result of the foreseen government reshuffle.
Indeed,
immediately following its adoption several political parties asked
the Central Election Commission to remove one or more candidates
from their lists.
65. Irrespective of the temporal limitation of these amendments,
they raise a number of issues with regard to international standards,
specifically with regard to the principle of direct suffrage and
the right of the voters to have full knowledge of the consequences
of their vote, i.e. the representatives they elect. The Monitoring Committee
therefore requested, on 9 March 2016, an opinion by the Venice Commission
on these amendments. In its opinion, which it adopted at its plenary
meeting on 9 and 10 June 2016, the Venice Commission
concluded
that “the empowerment of political parties ex post facto to deny
the electorate its choice and choose who to place on its party list
in a position to be elected”
and thus the “power of political parties
to remove from their lists, after an election has taken place, candidates
who at the time were ‘deemed unelected’ but retain a potential to
be elected”
is
contrary to international standards. Like the Venice Commission,
we therefore urge that these provisions, even if only valid for
the election lists for one particular election, be removed from
the law.
66. In the context of this opinion, the Venice Commission noted
that Article 81 of the Ukrainian Constitution allows the removal
of the mandate of an MP who has switched to another political party
or grouping other than that for which he or she was elected, on
the basis of a request by the party on whose list that person was elected.
The Venice Commission reiterated its concerns about this possibility
that enables elected MPs to be dismissed, in violation of European
standards. We strongly recommend that this possibility be removed
from the Constitution in the context of the ongoing constitutional
reform.
6. Concluding
remarks
67. Following the Euromaidan events,
the Ukrainian authorities embarked on an ambitious and far-reaching reform
programme. The authorities should be commended for their commitment
to the reforms which are taking place in the context of a challenging
political and economic environment as a result of the effects of
the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea.
However, it should be underscored that, while the reform process
is overshadowed, and in several areas interlinked with the developments
in eastern Ukraine, absence of progress in the implementation of
the Minsk Agreements should not be used as an excuse to slacken
the pace of, or commitment to, the overall reform process, which
is essential for the democratic consolidation of the country as
a whole. Much progress has been achieved with the reform of the
legal framework and adoption of new laws. However, it is now important
that these legislative changes are implemented and result in the
intended changes in behaviour and practice. This is especially true
for the fight against the endemic corruption in the country.
68. The reform of the Constitution, which has been a long-standing
recommendation of the Assembly, should be welcomed. Until now, the
constitutional reform process has focused on the chapters on decentralisation
and on the judiciary and the justice system. However, constitutional
reform should not be limited to these areas, and continues to be
needed in other areas, in particular the division of powers between the
President, the government and the Verkhovna Rada, with a view to
addressing the systemic deficiencies noted by the Assembly in this
regard. In this context, we also reiterate the recommendation of
the Assembly to adopt a new, unified, Election Code, well before
the next elections.
69. The adoption of the constitutional amendments with regard
to the judiciary, which will address many shortcomings with regard
to the justice system and independence of the judiciary, is to be
warmly welcomed, especially the abolition of the general oversight
functions of the Prosecutor General, which was an accession commitment
by Ukraine to the Council of Europe. It is now important that all
the necessary implementing legislation is adopted and, where needed,
existing legislation amended, to allow for the prompt implementation of
the constitutional amendments.
70. While welcoming the fact that the institutional framework
to combat the endemic corruption in the country is now in place,
we are concerned that the pace of the fight against corruption is
too slow, and that concrete results are still too few. We therefore
urge the authorities to step up the fight against corruption and
to ensure that the new institutional framework will now lead to
marked and tangible results. In that context, the authorities should
consider accelerating the establishment of a special anti-corruption
court.