1. Introduction:
origins, acknowledgements and aims
1. The recent scandals in the
sports world have stained the image of international sport. Not
only do we hear almost daily about criminal activities such as doping,
manipulation of sports results, corruption, financial malpractices,
cases of tax evasion, illegal betting, violence and racist speech,
questionable connections between sport and the top levels of politics,
etc. alleged or discovered in different organisations, but there
is also a growing awareness that the failures of international sports
governance are long lasting and systemic, and that it is strategically
urgent to modernise the way that sports organisations are governed.
2. In October 2015, Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports
Studies issued a Sports Governance Observer (“SGO 2015 report”)
on the legitimacy crisis in international sports governance,
which triggered the current report.
I was intrigued by why and how – after so many years of talk about
good governance in sport, including within the Council of Europe
–
the sports world was still run on archaic management models that lack
elementary democratic structures, accountability and transparency
in decision-making, and which still feed the ground for impunity
for corrupt practices.
3. From the outset of my mandate as rapporteur in March 2016,
I had the opportunity to participate in the meetings of the Task
Force on Good Governance in Sport preparing the Council of Europe
14th Conference of Ministers responsible for Sport, held on 29 November
2016 in Budapest, which helped me to get an immediate insight into
the enormous challenges sports governance faces today, and the practical
steps that both the sports movement and governments should take
to find solutions.
4. At the committee level, in the course of the preparation of
this report, we have held five major hearings with representatives
of almost all stakeholder groups playing a pivotal role today in
advancing sports governance reforms. I wish to thank each and every
person for his or her personal contribution; their ideas and suggestions
are well reflected in this report. In particular, my gratitude goes
to Mr Andreas Selliaas, whose first expert analysis created a sound
basis for my report; and to Mr Antonio de Marco, who stepped in
at the final stage by carrying out for the purposes of this report
a comparative study of 15 major international or national codes,
standards or basic principles with the aim of streamlining the main
criteria of good governance in sport.
5. Furthermore, a special mention also goes to Play the Game
and its energetic International Director Mr Jens Sejer Andersen,
with whom the Sub-Committee on Education, Youth and Sport organised
a joint public hearing entitled “Hands on, hands off? The role of
politicians in reforming sports governance” on 3 April 2017 in Aarhus,
Denmark; and to the Council of Europe Enlarged Partial Agreement
on Sport (EPAS), without whose support and regular co-operation
this report would not have been the same.
6. In the course of preparations, the title of the current report
has evolved from the initial “Legitimacy crisis of international
sports governance”, echoing the SGO 2015 report, to an interim working
title “The need for better international sports governance”, which
the committee agreed to change for the current “Working towards
a framework for modern sports governance” at its very last meeting.
The latter indicates my aim to focus predominantly on seeking solutions
for improving the governance of international sports organisations and
on the crucial role national governments can play when introducing
similar standards and requirements at national level. I am convinced
that the solutions presented in this report constitute a winning
way forward for introducing a progressive and innovative setup for
sports governance.
2. The changing landscape of the playing
field
7. Sport is changing at a very
fast pace. It is no longer solely seen as a simple leisure activity,
contributing to the personal well-being of individuals, but a multi-billion
economic sector of significant importance, generating jobs and providing
ever more products and services.
8. At the same time, the sports industry is going through more
disruption than ever.
The two industries influencing it
the most – technology and media – are evolving at a record-high
speed. Broadcast media is becoming wider than ever, yet linear TV
is experiencing decreasing ratings and revenues. Global tech giants are
slowly but surely entering the rights market. Brands now have more
channels through which to engage with consumers, diminishing their
dependence on sponsorship. Competition for capturing new audiences
is intensive and is continuing to increase.
9. The globalisation of media is perpetuating the dominance of
a handful of elite sports, while there is a proliferation of sports
events around the globe. The latter create a market and important
commercial opportunities. All the same, the increasing costs of
staging major sporting events are diminishing the interest among
host cities, whose populations increasingly speak out against spending
public money without long-term sustainability gains.
10. New technologies are transforming the fan experience and how
they interact with sports. The fast development of social media
is widely contributing to the “democratisation” of the traditional
ways sport is channelled and commercialised, giving everybody a
voice. Today sports fans can immediately connect with their favourite
players or athletes and also the sports governing bodies through
Twitter or Facebook. They can instantly engage with them on a personal
basis. A two-way relationship is emerging through the social media, allowing
the general public to give immediate feedback but also to demand
more from the governing bodies and from their idols.
11. Sport is thus more than ever under public scrutiny, and there
is increasingly more grass-roots pressure for sports to become transparent
and accountable. Notably the millennials and younger generations
active on social media are vocal in appealing to the governing bodies
for sports governance reforms, with integrity concerns, etc. They
want to see that sport echoes the values they associate themselves
with. This new group is emerging strongly as a new key stakeholder
in the field of sports governance and integrity.
12. This latter group is also politically active and reactive
to the numerous scandals and reported misdoings in the sports world
unfolding almost daily. Within minutes, any news can be shared between
the 1.86 billion active users of Facebook, 1.2 billion users of
WhatsApp and Messenger, 1 billion users of YouTube or the 328 million
users of Twitter around the world.
Everybody has the ability to post
their thoughts and their ideas. When no action is taken, the public
can also see it immediately.
13. I would like to believe that the leaders of sports governing
bodies have understood that the old habits of taking decisions behind
closed doors or buying votes for positions or venues and other type
of favours has come to an end. If sport wishes to regain public
trust, to reach out to new audiences and to ensure revenue streams,
it has to adapt to the new realities which impose strong public
scrutiny on the one hand, and the demand for openness, transparency,
accountability, good governance and integrity on the other. In trying
to reform itself, it would make sense for sports bodies to look
to other sectors, such as business and non-profit- making organisations,
for governance lessons.
3. What
is at stake?
3.1. Die-hard
specificities of the sports world
14. For decades, sports organisations
have enjoyed almost full autonomy in their functioning. This autonomy is
unquestionably important for the good functioning of sport in terms
of setting sports agendas, deciding on internal rules, etc. However,
it is clear that this autonomy has also been misused and abused,
which has led to the situation of lack of trust and credibility
in which sport finds itself today.
15. It is also clear that sports organisations are very different
in terms of size, resources and specific challenges across sports
and countries, and they evolve in a highly complex environment.
International federations are in fact hybrid structures, on the
one hand based on voluntarism and professionalism, and on the other
hand established to support not-for-profit missions through commercial
activities.
16. Arguing on the grounds of autonomy and the non-governmental
associative legal status of most international federations, international
sports leadership has created for itself a position of “untouchable”, making
it almost impossible for them to be prosecuted for acts of bribery,
embezzlement of funds, abuse of power, match fixing, etc. In most
countries, national legislation for prosecuting private corruption
does not extend to the sports world, which adds to the complexity
of fighting fraudulent practices in sport.
17. Although the revenues associated with international sports
organisations are not comparable to the biggest businesses in the
global economy, sport can be considered big business nonetheless.
In particular, mega-events (Olympic Games, FIFA World Cup) result
in the mobilisation of tens of billions of dollars in State-sponsored
infrastructure expenses. Because of their unique governance structures,
however, such bodies are not easily held accountable to standards
of good governance. For instance, companies and other organisations typically
have formal accountability to stakeholders (shareholders, for example,
in the case of public companies) and are often overseen by independent
directors. International sports bodies have more diffuse and complex
stakeholder relationships, and very few have any external directors
(the World Anti-Doping Agency is an exception).
18. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) co-ordinates the
activities of national Olympic bodies and collaborates with international
sports federations (including 35 federations of Olympic sports,
36 affiliated to the Association of IOC Recognised International
Sports Federations (ARISF) and 5 regional associations). It may seem
like an international body, but it is actually a not-for-profit
organisation incorporated under the provisions of Swiss law, which
– along with several other global sports bodies – receives special
treatment under Swiss law, including tax and property privileges.
19. Apart from the IOC, about 60 international sports organisations
have their headquarters in Switzerland. They have
de facto international status. But,
de jure, they are not incorporated
as international governmental organisations (IGOs) or international
quasi-governmental organisations (IQGOs). They are associations subject
to national private law whose terms of constitution and organisation
are formalised in the Swiss Civil Code. The legal framework provided
by the Code allows a large freedom of arrangement, but also imposes certain
conditions.
20. Until 2000, corruption of foreign public agents was not prosecuted
in Switzerland. Offering bribes was a common way of doing business
and they were deductible from corporate tax. But since then, international pressure
has continued to increase from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) with the Anti-Bribery Convention (2000),
the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS
No. 173) (2006), the United Nations Convention against Corruption
(2009), and the critical third evaluation on Switzerland (2011)
by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommending that private
corruption no longer be prosecuted upon complaints, but
ex officio, and that the offence
of private sector bribery be extended to sports associations.
21. In reaction to the above and to numerous scandals, the Swiss
Government passed a law in December 2014 that would classify the
leaders of sports organisations as “politically exposed persons”,
thus allowing investigators to examine their financial holdings
and transactions.
22. However, many loopholes remain in international sports governance.
For instance, leadership compensation disclosure is one of the many
areas in which private, non-profit sports organisations differ from governments.
23. Transparency International and several other international
bodies regularly recall that sports governing bodies have to start
operating as big businesses, using best business practices. This
would also imply adopting accountability rules that are not mandatory
in the current context.
24. The final resolution adopted at the Budapest Ministerial Conference
also recommended the introduction of the appropriate level of transparency
on financial accounts and political decision-making processes in
order for sports organisations to comply with requirements applicable
to same size business companies, for example the International Financial
Reporting Standards.
25. In today’s world, unfortunately most international sports
governing bodies would still rather appeal to their autonomy and
the complexity of the international sports system, referring to
varied legal statuses of sports organisations (non-profit associations,
limited companies, charities, special purpose vehicles for hosting events,
etc.), dependency on national legislations, having to comply with
multiple forms of compliance systems and regulatory environments,
etc. than manifest willingness to change without outside pressure.
3.2. The
need for restoring public trust
26. Both external and internal
to studies of international federations
indicate
that 50% to 75% of the international Olympic federations comply
with less than 50% of the indicators used for these studies. The
deficit is essentially a problem of flawed institutional design,
but also the lack of mechanisms that would encourage accountability
and transparency in these institutions and allow monitoring and
sanctioning of decision-body members. It is not to be expected that
the currently existing sports governance structures, which have
for decades closed their eyes to corrupt and fraudulent practices
within the sports movement, would make a quantum leap forward in
introducing modern institutional design or bold reforms without
strong pressure from external stakeholders.
27. And yet there is a strong need for restoring public trust
in clean sports and sports leadership that would be capable of governing
the sports movement according to contemporary best practices and
governance standards. This requires real will and major efforts
from international umbrella organisations like the IOC, ASOIF and
AIOWF and international and national federations alike.
28. It would be unfair not to recognise the efforts that have
been made towards mitigating corruption risks, either by the IOC
through its Agenda 2020, the ASOIF through the assessment of its
member federations’ compliance with good governance standards, or
by various international federations. Increasingly more leaders,
organisations and stakeholders are acknowledging a range of governance
issues to be addressed in making sure that sports organisations
remain fit for purpose. More solutions are also being developed
and implemented across sports, countries or regions.
29. In this context, I must recognise the reforms undertaken by
several international sports federations. The steps taken by FIFA
and UEFA are analysed in depth in the report of Ms Anne Brasseur
on “Good football governance”.
30. The International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF)
has been the most recent international federation to follow FIFA’s
lead in subjecting itself to comprehensive governance modernisation.
It has set up a new independent Athletics Integrity Unit to manage
integrity matters, including assuming responsibility for education
and testing and for investigation and prosecution of breaches of
IAAF’s Integrity Code of Conduct. It also takes over responsibility
for investigating and prosecuting anti-doping rule violations of
all international level athletes, which used to be carried out at
a national level. To ensure the independence of the Athletics Integrity
Unit, it has its own board and staff. The Unit is housed and operates
separately from IAAF. A new Disciplinary Tribunal and a so-called
Vetting Panel, comprised of three independent persons, appointed
by the IAAF Congress on the recommendation of the IAAF Council,
have also been created, the decisions of both of which can be appealed
to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).
31. At national level, many recent solutions in the form of governance
reforms of sports organisations have been initiated as a response
to a governance-related crisis and on the basis of a governance
review. In an increasing number of countries, either the national
Olympic committee and/or the government have also been developing
national frameworks and tools for good governance in sport. In some
cases, compliance with minimum governance criteria has also become
a prerequisite for national sports organisations to remain eligible
for full public funding.
All
in all, according to Play the Game, the EU Erasmus+ project “National Sports
Governance Observer”, currently being carried out with a view to
creating a benchmarking tool that assesses the level of good governance
in national sports federations, shows that the national sports federations
are in better shape and more “co-operative, curious and ready to
change”.
32. Most of these steps have, however, been taken in reaction
to major scandals. Over three years ago, upon the adoption of its
Agenda 2020 reform package, the IOC President sent out a warning
signal: “Change or be changed”. Three years on, there is still strong
resistance within the sports movement to any change at all. The
IOC itself has been under fire over its own slow pace of reforms
as well as over several corruption cases concerning its members,
the latest scandal having erupted just before the IOC session in
Lima, Peru (13-15 September 2017), surrounding Rio 2016 President
Carlos Nuzman who has been accused of involvement in bribing for
the votes of African IOC members in return for supporting Rio 2016.
This followed previous accusations against IOC Executive Board member
and Senior Vice-President of the Association of National Olympic
Committees (ANOC) Patrick Hickey who is facing charges of theft,
tax evasion and money laundering in a ticketing fraud at the Rio
2016 Games. Some claim that the decision-making system within the IOC
is more secretive than ever and that the few members who still try
to get the IOC to reach independent decisions have lost virtually
all their influence.
33. And yet it is clear that implementing good governance and
undertaking targeted action would be energy effective and would
lead the sports movement towards enhancing trust and legitimacy.
It would allow the mitigation of corruption risks and enhance resistance
to unethical practices, considering the high-risk environment that
international sports organisations are operating in. Eventually
good governance would also increase their autonomy by building trust
with governments and various stakeholder groups.
34. The Olympic Agenda 2020, adopted just before the revelations
of systemic malfunctions within the international sports governing
bodies, was adapted to an earlier era when all was “pretty much
rosy in the IOC rose garden”. I agree with those who say that it
has proved inadequate to reassure inhabitants of prospective bidding
cities, or to counter the torrent of criticism directed at the body
during the last two or three years. It did serve the useful subsidiary
function of securing unanimous buy-in from IOC members for a package
of reforms in some cases so vague as to cover almost anything.
35. Sports governance is in serious leadership crisis today. I
share the concern expressed by many of the speakers at the Play
the Game 2017 Conference, which is taking place in parallel with
the completion of this report, that not only are the reforms going
at snail’s pace, but the leadership of the Olympic movement is silent on
questions of tolerance, respect, fair-play and human rights issues.
36. In order for the IOC leadership to demonstrate that it is
ready to adapt and to embark on serious governance reforms, it would
need to define a proper strategic vision and priorities that take
into consideration changing realities and generate a new era of
sports governance culture. This strategic vision should encompass,
inter alia:
- a proper strategy on mitigating corruption risks;
- building democratic structures and procedures that promote
transparency and accountability and secure a strict separation of
powers and functions;
- ending impunity within sports organisations through thorough
investigation and indictment of all those involved in corruptive
activities;
- introducing a functioning system of sticks and carrots
to sports governance, including through proper monitoring, assessment
and coaching of sports organisations; and revision of the system
of sanctions and rewards.
37. Furthermore, I believe that as much as every individual initiative
to improve governance practices is to be welcomed, sports governance
is complex and needs a “big picture” framework vision. In the following chapters,
I offer my humble vision and call on all those involved to debate
openly these issues.
4. Towards
a sports governance framework
38. The existing positive examples
reveal a correlation between the definition and implementation of strategic
objectives, enacting of regulations and codes, introduction and
abidance by relevant legislation, and monitoring in matters of good
governance and improvement of the said governance, and tying subsidies, administrative
approval of sports associations and eventual privileged tax status
to compliance with good governance standards.
39. The introduction of a broad-based governance framework would
need to be built on three pillars:
- introduction of the basic regulatory framework and culture
that supports it, which applies first and foremost to individual
sports organisations and how they are managed at different levels;
- adoption of common tools, including a harmonised legislative
framework and procedures of fair trial, independent arbitration
and collaboration with law-enforcement and investigative bodies;
but also harmonised standards and compliance with them;
- inclusive action and cultivating governance culture through
knowledge-sharing, involvement in policy making and communication
of a broad range of stakeholders and diverse societal groups, and
co-operation with multi-stakeholder platforms.
4.1. Pillar
1: The basics of good governance in sport
40. In order to put in place a
functioning system of good governance in sport, it is first and
foremost important to look at what good governance means in society
today and how sports organisations should approach it.
41. Good governance is a complex concept. However, it is clear
from studying corporate, public, non-profit and the sports sector,
that good governance principles are very similar across all of these
sectors. Despite this, it appears that the governance reform process
in sport is particularly challenging thanks to a number of complicating
factors inherent to the sector.
42. There is no single clear definition of good governance. Governance
is usually understood as the action or manner of governing a State
or organisation. Existing literature also defines it as the process
of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented
(or not implemented)”. Good governance also means different things
in different contexts. In the widest sense, the term is used to
describe how institutions and organisations conduct themselves and
make their most important decisions, how they determine who they involve
in the process and how they render account.
43. Unfortunately for sports governing bodies, national and international
sports federations do not neatly align with the governance models
of either traditional commercial or non-profit entities. Despite
this, there is no reason for other standards to be applied in terms
of good governance.
44. When looking at what constitutes good governance, there is
the organisational structures element, which encompasses the separation
of powers, the existence of statutes and internal rules of procedure,
transparency and accountability, internal control measures, codes
of ethics and ethics commissions and appropriate judicial/disciplinary
and appeals procedures.
45. Another element is management practices, such as: election
of board members; encouragement of competitive elections; application
of term limit; separation of political and operational management
merit-based boardrooms; diversity and respect for gender equality;
clearly outlined responsibilities of board members; declaration
of conflict of interest of board members; merit-based hiring of
staff; recognition of rights and equitable treatment of members
and shareholders; involvement and managing diversity of stakeholders
and investors; proactive anti-corruption measures and financial
integrity.
46. More specifically, sport has also specific aspects that need
to be taken into consideration when developing proactive policies
against doping, match-fixing, illegal betting, intolerance and discrimination,
abuse of athletes or trafficking of athletes, or for the integrity
of sports events (including bidding processes and selection of event
hosts, ticket pricing and distribution, selection of sponsors, granting
media broadcasting rights, building event infrastructure for major
events, respect of the bidders for human rights, labour standards, environment
and anti-corruption, sustainability and legacy) or development funding
(clear rules for fair, equal and transparent allocation and use
of funding for sports development; reinvestment of benefits into
grass-roots activities; control mechanisms of use of development
funds) and an environment and social responsibility strategy/programme.
47. In summary, the key to good governance in sport is having
a robust regulatory system in place to which all sporting bodies
are accountable and the culture that supports that. The tone is
set from the top and that needs to be filtered all the way to the
bottom. The scandals that have hurt sport have in fact mostly been
in relation to leadership failures from the cultural perspective.
Therefore, there needs to be a robust system of following these
clear rules and regulations and that culture needs to filter through
sports organisation and through those who fund sport.
4.2. Pillar
2: Common tools for good governance
4.2.1. Ending
impunity for corruption
48. Restoring public trust begins
with ending impunity and bringing those responsible for crimes to
justice. First and foremost, it is the sports movement itself that
needs to demonstrate that it is able and willing to take proactive
measures to root out the culture of corruption and lawlessness within
its ranks, and to bring to justice those who commit crimes. Secondly,
national authorities have the obligation to bring appropriate legislation
up-to-date. Thirdly, it is also for the national authorities to
introduce governance codes and monitor their compliance. Finally,
in this context, it is also important that whistle-blowers receive
appropriate protection.
49. The other side of the coin is also bringing culprits to justice
through the procedures of free trial, providing independent arbitration
and collaboration with law-enforcement and investigative bodies.
4.2.1.1. Need
for a proper legal framework
50. Governments and parliaments
can play a pivotal role and have a key responsibility in investigating, prosecuting
or sanctioning corruption, even when it takes place within the framework
of sport. By defining solid national frameworks of sports governance
and encouraging the change of culture, they may offer credible bottom-up
solutions for improving the functioning of international federations
as well.
51. Unfortunately, governments have often revealed inactive or
even complacent or permissive postures, which have enforced the
public feeling of authorities’ impotence in the face of inappropriate
behaviour in matters of good governance and integrity in sport.
There are many reasons for this situation.
As long
as governments are complacent or turning a blind eye to corruption
in sport and are not ready to actively promote good governance in
sport, the issue will not be addressed properly. It is therefore
strategically urgent to engage governments in understanding what
is at stake.
52. Governments and public authorities can also adopt other concrete
measures within their respective jurisdiction,
inter alia by:
- evaluating whether national
legislation is appropriate to allow for investigation, prosecution
and mutual legal assistance with police and judicial co-operation
in cases of corrupt behaviour in sport;
- adopting and effectively enforcing clear criminal provisions
to crackdown on private corruption, which would automatically allow
corruption in sport to be prosecuted;
- applying appropriate measures as regards the fight against
money laundering and corruption in the field of sport, for example
for financial institutions to consider some leaders of sports organisations
as “politically exposed persons”.
53. Most of these measures have been endorsed in the final resolution
of the Budapest Ministerial Conference and will hopefully be included
among the recommendations to member States on the implementation
of good governance.
54. Furthermore, governments could also consider tax deductions
for sponsors that promote clean sport and good governance, consider
requesting legal status change for professional elite sports federations
on their territory, and consider promoting international co-operation.
4.2.1.2. Whistle-blower
protection
55. While the intrinsic value of
whistle-blowers in sport is today generally recognised, it goes
without saying that policies and procedures must be in place to
regulate the use of whistle-blower information and protect whistle-blowers
from retaliation.
56. Whistle-blower hotlines, policies and procedures are increasingly
being implemented in various sports organisations and other authorities
in the area of anti-doping, match-fixing and harassment of athletes.
57. Yet the protection of whistle-blowers in sport is by and large
vested in the hands of private sports organisations and/or public
or semi-public authorities. They may have all the best intentions
to support and protect any forthcoming whistle-blower, but they
are unlikely to have enough strength in cases where the lives and
livelihoods of whistle-blowers are threatened.
58. Legal assistance and media guidance may be provided by sports
organisations or via independent initiatives like Fair Sport, but
the powers and means necessary to provide long-term financial support
and physical security are only available to governments and their
law-enforcement entities. For now, they only act to a very limited
extent and only in very rare cases.
59. Sports organisations and anti-doping agencies cannot develop
effective whistle-blowing programmes in isolation. Law-enforcement
agencies should be involved and there should be a united approach
to manage endangered whistle-blowers. Governments need to play a
much more active role. Collaboration with sports organisations and
anti-doping and integrity agencies is a fundamental necessity if
protection of whistle-blowers is to be credible and effective.
60. Governments should take measures to guarantee that whistle-blowers
do not need to flee or in worst cases to change their identities
in return for telling the truth and take measures to provide financial
support at least temporarily until they are able to support themselves
again. That is the least we can do if we want whistle-blowers to
do the right thing.
61. Whistle-blowers considering speaking up must be professionally
advised to make informed decisions: Will it be worth it? What are
the risks? How will life look on the other side? This is also a
responsibility that should rest with law enforcement and where sports
and anti-doping organisations must realise they need a helping hand.
62. Naturally, this will only work in situations where governments
can be trusted. Often, they cannot. Or they lack the will to protect
people giving compromising information. Still, closer co-operation
between sport and the world’s governments seems more relevant than
ever. We are a long way from convincing solutions, but there are
signs that interest is growing. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)
has implemented a programme to protect informants, called ‘Speak
Up’. The IOC says it has established a whistle-blower programme
a few years ago, but no information on its policies, protection
measures and results are shared with the public.
63. Governments have taken a first look at how to better protect
whistle-blowers as this was one of the recommendations in the “Kazan
Action Plan” endorsed by UNESCO in July 2017. It remains to be seen
how many countries will follow the recommendations to the necessary
degree.
4.2.2. Harmonising
governance standards
64. The topic of good governance
of sport has actually been on the political agenda since the beginning
of the nineties. The Council of Europe pioneered the first set of
principles of good governance in sport with the adoption in 2005
of Committee of Ministers Recommendation Rec(2005)8. Since then
about 50 sets of good governance principles and codes have been
forged at international and national levels, including by the IOC (Basic
Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports
Movement (2008) and IOC Olympic Agenda 2020), the European Team
Sports Association (2008), UEFA (2009), UNESCO (2010), the Parliamentary
Assembly (
Resolution
1875 (2012)), the European Union (2013), the Australian Sports Commission
(2015), the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations
(ASOIF)(2016) and UK Sport (2016), FIFA (2016), IAAF (2017), etc.
In addition, tools such as sets of indicators have been developed by
academics, civil society and sports organisations, the very latest
by the Sport Integrity Global Alliance (SIGA) in September 2016.
All these good initiatives have some common points but many different
approaches and variables for benchmarking.
65. While largely consistent with one another, they all remain
individual sets of standards, which do not provide a commonly agreed
standard or benchmark upon which to build effective international
compliance assessment and co-operation.
4.2.2.1. Revision
of the standards of the Olympic movement
66. The IOC Basic Universal Principles
of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement (BUP) is the
only binding international document, which could in theory give
rise to sanctions. However, the governance criteria are vaguely
formulated, which makes any sanctioning difficult. The BUP do not
offer either a significant coherent policy for capacity building,
advising or giving financial support.
67. In 2016, the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations
(ASOIF) introduced its Key Governance Principles and Basic Indicators
(KGP) for its 28 summer Olympic sports federations, based on five dimensions,
each
of which is measured by 10 indicators. The ASOIF Governance Task
Force committed itself to carrying out an initial assessment of
the implementation of these indicators by all international federations
during 2016-2017. After the first round of self-evaluation, I understand
that the IOC is tending to agree that the ASOIF KGP should be extended
to all international Olympic federations. At a recent meeting in June
2017, the General Association of International Sports Federations
(GAISF) indicated that if the ASOIF good governance self-evaluation
proved successful, it might consider using the same ASOIF methodology,
so that non-Olympic sports organisations could also be covered.
This
indicates that GAISF, which is a body bringing together about a
hundred sports organisations, is willing to propose to their organisations
to adopt the ASOIF KGP as a benchmark. This in itself is a welcome
development, for the ASOIF KGP is one of the most comprehensive
set of governance principles and indicators, elaborated on the basis
of the Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport
(BIBGIS), developed by the Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration
at the University of Lausanne. However, on substantial grounds,
the ASOIF KGP does not provide for imposing sanctions or financial
repercussions for non-compliance.
68. With its Agenda 2020, the IOC took the commitment to periodically
update its Basic Universal Principles. I hear the arguments expressed
within the sports movement that opening up a debate on the BUP may
create difficult discussions, but these discussions should not be
feared: in nearly a decade, standards have evolved as is clearly
evidenced by the comparative study undertaken by the Assembly team.
In the first place, the IOC could be encouraged to align its BUP
and the indicators at least to those of the ASOIF Key Governance Principles
and Basic Indicators, so that at least the Olympic family would
speak with the same voice.
69. However, on substantial grounds, the ASOIF KBP does not provide
for imposing sanctions or financial repercussions for non-compliance,
although it could use naming and shaming if it so wished. However,
to this day, ASOIF has not shown any willingness to publish any
of the results of their first self-evaluation, and I do not see
any reason why this should voluntarily change in the future. Therefore,
in the absence of credible sanctions or monitoring implementation,
it is unlikely that international federations will be sufficiently
motivated to comply with the ASOIF KBP beyond the self-evaluation
exercises.
70. With these constraints in mind, yet considering the arguments
of almost all our key partners in this exercise for the need of
a common benchmark applicable to sports organisations of various
sizes and origins, I commissioned a study last summer to compare
15 major sets of standards, key principles and codes introduced
by the sports movement (IOC, ASOIF, FIFA, UEFA, IAAF), international
organisations (Council of Europe, European Union, UNESCO), national
and regional governments (United Kingdom, Australia, Flanders),
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Play the Game, SIGA), academic
research institutions (BIBGIS, AGGIS). However, my first-sight conclusion
is that these standards and codes are very much complementary. They
have evolved with time (2005-2017), with every new code trying to
build on the best practices of the previous ones. There are certainly
some differences in the criteria and the way to measure them, but
all in all it is possible to deduct basic common criteria or benchmarks.
71. I would therefore encourage the IOC and all relevant stakeholders
to use our comparative study and open up a debate between all these
different partners on the basis of what genuinely constitutes the
best practices of good governance, which could also evolve over
time.
72. Based on these common criteria, I could envisage four different
evolution scenarios:
- bringing
the IOC Basic Universal Principles up-to-date with modern sports
governance standards;
- at European level, elaborating a new Council of Europe
convention on good governance in sport;
- introducing a professional ISO certification of the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) on governance of sports organisations;
- preparing guidelines for the national governments to introduce
their modern codes.
73. These four options can be complementary, for each has its
own remit: the revised IOC Basic Universal Principles would service
the Olympic movement and other sports organisations which would
volunteer to subscribe to them; a new Council of Europe convention
would commit European governments and other interested parties to
respect and monitor good governance practices in their area; the
ISO certification would encourage sports organisations worldwide
to adopt certain policies and procedures that governments may request
in exchange for public funding. Finally, agreeing on a common benchmark
would give an incentive and facilitate the adoption of clear and
harmonised national codes all around the world.
74. It appears to me common sense that a harmonised set of agreed
criteria or benchmarks could further create synergies and further
enable creating proper foundations for compliance assessment and
monitoring.
4.2.2.2. A
new Council of Europe convention on good governance in sport?
75. The Council of Europe has been
the pioneer in good governance issues since the adoption of Committee of
Ministers Recommendation Rec(2005)8 in 2005. Following the Budapest
Ministerial Conference in November 2016, a new recommendation by
the Committee of Ministers to the member States on the promotion of
good governance in sport is in preparation. EPAS is already engaged
in gathering a collection of good practices on governance and preparing
a handbook of good practices in sports governance.
76. Introducing a Council of Europe convention on good governance
in sport would complement the existing conventional basis of the
Organisation covering doping, match-fixing and spectator violence,
bind its member States by the observance of the same harmonised
standards and enable efficient monitoring of their implementation.
77. As a first step towards a Convention-based monitoring of sports
governance, the Council of Europe could already introduce a systematic
review system of the national policies of good governance in sport
and their implementation and produce a dashboard of the available
monitoring results seeking their critical analysis.
4.2.2.3. Introducing
an ISO certification standard on good governance in sport
78. From the outset of launching
this report and in my quest to find pragmatic solutions, I was intrigued
why the sports world should not borrow ideas from other sectors
of business where certain procedures have contributed to improving
the situation. I immediately thought that if there was a problem
with harmonising standards, ISO should be able to offer a solution.
79. ISO declares its goals as “bringing together experts to share
knowledge and develop voluntary, consensus-based, market-relevant
International Standards that support innovation and provide solutions
to global challenges”.
80. ISO standards are subjected to four basic principles:
- they respond to the needs of
organisations: ISO does not decide when to develop a new standard
but responds to a request from industry or other stakeholders;
- they are based on global expert opinions: they are developed
by groups of experts from all over the world, which are part of
larger groups called technical committees. These experts negotiate
all aspects of the standard, including its scope, key definitions
and content;
- they are developed through a multi-stakeholder process;
- they are based on a consensus.
81. Today there are two ISO certification standards that could
be applied to the sports world:
- ISO
37001 (2016) – Anti-Bribery Management Systems;
- ISO 20121 (2012) – Event Sustainability Management Systems.
82. Sports organisations should be encouraged to subscribe to
both of them. Notably ISO 37001 (2016) is a step forward in sports
governance, which could be imposed, for example, on those organising
major sports events or who receive public subsidies of over a certain
sum.
83. The ISO Technical Committee CT309, led by the British Standards
Institution (BSI), with whom our committee had the opportunity to
exchange views on 26 April 2017 in Strasbourg, is currently drawing
up guideline standards on Governance of Organisations and on Whistle-blowers.
84. Under the same Technical Committee, there would be a possibility
to develop a new ISO certification standard on governance of sports
organisations. An international standard would be optimal and can
be facilitated by a national standards body such as BSI proposing
a new work item to ISO. This usually takes around three years to
publication.
85. Given the urgency, it could be useful to develop a seed document
for use prior to it being developed into a full ISO standard. This
seed document can be developed through a publicly available specification
(PAS), which is a sponsored standard and offers the fastest solution
(6-8 months). The PAS, which has gone through initial testing/pilot
project, can then later on be developed into a full-fledged ISO
certification standard.
86. The great advantage of introducing an ISO certification standard
is its legitimacy: ISO standards are truly universal and their content
is not contested. They are voluntary and support, but are separate
from, legislation. The voluntary nature means that standards are
ideal for establishing a means of cross-border compliance. They
often encourage but do not require changing national legislation,
which is usually a major obstacle to get an agreement or convention
adopted. It is an existing structure, which requires no additional
development costs. ISO certification is a plus for international
federations that wish to show themselves as clean of corruption;
it requires them to develop a series of concrete measures that are
not currently a must under the IOC BUP or ASOIF KGP.
4.2.3. Monitoring
and compliance assessment
87. The global harmonisation of
standards goes hand in hand with the introduction of a proper monitoring and
compliance assessment system of the implementation of these standards.
Up until 2015, the sports movement at large was not subjected to
any scrutiny or assessment as regards the implementation of any
of the codes or standards or principles.
88. Since then, a number of tools have been developed to measure
good governance. Most notably these include the Sports Governance
Observer tool (SG0 2015) and the National Sports Governance Observer
2017, developed by Play the Game, and the BIBGIS indicators developed
at the University of Lausanne. These tools consist of checklists
whereby sports organisations can measure their level of compliance
with certain good governance principles identified by the tool.
89. Whereas the adoption of harmonised standards and the monitoring
and assessment of their implementation are fundamental elements
of ensuring good governance, they cannot on their own instigate
the change needed for successful governance reform in sport, nor
help sports organisations looking to overcome some of the major
issues they are currently facing, including damage to their reputation,
mistrust from key stakeholders, mitigation of risks, etc.
90. The “ticking the boxes” and completing checklists through
same weight non-motivated indicators are relevant for noting tendencies
and major failures in the system; this has made possible – figuratively
speaking – a “scanner photo” for “diagnosing the gravity of the
illness that the patient has identified himself by ticking the boxes
of a list of symptoms”. However, this method would allow identification
neither of the source nor the course of the illness, nor its development
over time. Without a proper follow-up, counselling and assistance, this
method of compliance assessment would not offer a magic wand for
sports organisations looking to solve their underlying organisational
and cultural issues or get sports organisations out of the current
governance crisis.
4.2.3.1. Self-assessment
91. In February 2016, ASOIF, while
introducing its Key Governance Principles and Basic Indicators (KGP) for
its 28 Summer Olympic Sports Federations, committed itself to carrying
out an initial assessment of the implementation of these indicators
by all international federations during the year. The results were
reviewed by an external expert and announced at the ASOIF General
Assembly on 4 April 2017.
92. The progress achieved by the setting up of the process in
such a short time is impressive and to be welcomed. Many experts
and stakeholders agree that the ASOIF self-evaluation is a welcome
step in the right direction. It is the first time international
federations have agreed to enter into a compliance process on good governance.
On the other hand, it remains a self-regulation tool, which does
not provide the necessary independence of the process that would
produce reliable assessment, even if they have hired an external expert
of undoubted integrity to verify and validate the results. Furthermore,
the fact that the individual scores of international federations
are not published but only released in the form of anonymous and
aggregated results is not convincing or conducive to inspiring transparency
or trust.
93. As regards the methodology used, besides the application of
same weight non-motivated indicators that are not compared to actual
practices, the First Review of IF Governance
itself pointed out the following limitations:
the desk analysis of documents, procedures and structures does not
take account of the actual behaviour and organisational culture;
the questionnaire did not address some important and high profile
topics such as gender equality, evidence of criminal activity or
welfare issues; most of the scoring definitions describe a predominantly
“quantitative” rather than “qualitative” view; the thematic division
between sections in the questionnaire was pragmatic but is not claimed
to be scientific; and there is a degree of subjectivity in the scoring,
which explains the need to accept a margin of error.
94. ASOIF itself concluded that the system used for this first
exercise needed serious revision and possibly a different methodology
altogether for assessment in the future.
95. As regards further steps, I have been informed that between
April and September, an ASOIF representative and the contracted
external expert have been meeting almost all of the international
federations separately to go through their individual results. Since
April, the external expert has also been conducting a similar project
with the Association of Winter International Federations (AIOWF),
which is nearing completion. As announced in April, it is foreseen
that the assessment exercise will be repeated starting again in
November 2017 with an updated version of the questionnaire. It is
not yet known whether the results will be public or not or whether
there might be any sanctions imposed on those who don’t make any
progress.
96. I can accept that this first exercise remained confidential
if this was the means to get all 28 ASOIF international federations
on board; however, in order to enjoy credibility, the ASOIF leadership
will have to publish the detailed data on the assessment of all
its indicators and the results of any next round so as to compare
them with an independent external assessment carried out by the
Sports Governance Observer or other non-governmental bodies.
97. As regards the efficiency of the methodology, I must nevertheless
underscore the weaknesses of self-assessment: it lacks objectivity
and in-built mechanisms of control; the desk analysis of documents,
procedures and structures does not take account of the actual behaviour
and organisational culture; usually most of the scoring definitions
are predominantly “quantitative” than “qualitative” (e.g. the existence
of rules for an internal appeals process rather than how effectively
the rules work); and the scores are not weighted.
98. Self-regulation only works when there is sufficient external
pressure by stakeholders, by governments, by public actors or by
international organisations. Today the external stakeholder pressure
is unfortunately not strong enough. Creating change via motivation
may work better.
99. There is also the crucial question of the independence of
assessment. The ASOIF first exercise was made mandatory to all member
organisations and carried out by the ASOIF Governance Task Force,
the results of which were then verified
by external experts from “I Trust Sport” (a UK-based sports consultancy company).
The criteria were based on a system developed by Jean-Loup Chappelet,
a Professor at the University of Lausanne who sits on the Task Force
together with the IOC Compliance Officer and five other members.
The results have not been published, or even sent to individual
international federations. As a next step, the ASOIF Task Force
proposes consulting/advising its members. The entire process, starting
from the development of the criteria, the assessment and the counselling
thereafter all by the same group of stakeholders, clearly lacks
transparency and independence, and thereby also the necessary credibility,
or the interest for this method to be extended to other organisations
outside the ASOIF system.
100. The above scenario is a good example of what needs to be avoided
and the Olympic movement still needs to work out the conflict of
interest in this system as well as in its other recent attempts
to create “independent” agencies, such as the Independent Testing
Agency (ITA). Any compliance assessment should be done in respect
of the separation of powers: those who develop concepts and monitor/advise/counsel/coach should
never be involved in the control functions. In order to be credible,
the assessment should be done by third-party professional agencies
of impeccable international reputation, similar to existing financial
or ESG rating agencies.
4.2.3.2. Towards
a model of Sports Ethics Rating
101. Introducing an international
rating system for sports governance offers a solution that is similar
to the ISO standardisation scheme in terms of being solicited (voluntary),
elaborated through the involvement of key stakeholders, assessed
by fully independent private service providers and results of the
assessment would belong entirely to the organisation/federation
assessed. In addition, it presents the bonus of being more dynamic
and encouraging positive competition within sports organisations.
The rating can fluctuate with time, giving the organisations a possibility
to improve, but also to lose their credit points when corruption
cases emerge. It thereby contains a competitive element against
desired target goals, which can give sports organisations incentives
to improve their governance performance over time.
102. Similarly to ISO certification, both international and national
federations and clubs of different sizes and legal statutes could
benefit from the independent evaluation that is voluntary and professional.
The rating system has proved reliable in the economic world touching
companies and countries. Professional agencies base their evaluation
on scientific modules and algorithms as opposed to sources of academic
research; they have solid and credible methodology, which could
be adapted to the specificities and existing codes and principles
in the sports environment.
103. The rating process is generally an annual cycle during which
the organisation is being rated based on a scientific algorithm
using weighted indicators. Rating criteria are regularly reviewed
and reactive to changes (fluctuations modify the algorithm). Besides,
all professional rating agencies share the following “golden rules” upon
which they:
- guarantee full
independence from entities under rating and governing bodies;
- do no consultancy in order to avoid cases of conflict
of interest;
- have in-built separation of powers and control mechanisms;
- have internal independent controlling bodies (Compliance
Officer, Rating Committee).
104. As was explained by the experts at our hearing on 26 April
2017, the sustainability rating system proposed by Standard Ethics
is capable of assessing what the models used by ASOIF, the Sports
Governance Observer, the most recent SIGA Universal Standards on
Good Governance or ISO fail to assess: the change in the organisational
culture over time. Rating is “a living tool” as its algorithm is
capable of taking into account every new reference or change in
the standards. The advantage of the Standard Ethics rating is also
that it offers both solicited rating (whereby the results will be
owned by the federation or club that has solicited the rating) and
unsolicited rating (which can be done upon a request by an umbrella
sport governing body or a government.
105. If the system proves adaptable and applicable to a critical
mass of sports organisations, it could be used in the future as
leverage for allocating public funding or when deciding on venues
for major sports events. The advantage is also in the comparatively
short time needed for its elaboration.
106. As mentioned before, the self-evaluation round completed by
ASOIF Governance Task Force offers a good opportunity for identifying
the strengths and pitfalls of its international federations as compared
to its five Key Governance Principles of transparency, integrity,
democracy, sports development and solidarity and control mechanisms.
The performance of the same international federations has also been
assessed by the Sports Governance Observer in 2015 along with their
established indicators. Whereas the former lacks the necessary independence
for being considered fully credible by all stakeholders, the latter
has the disadvantage of having been carried out mostly on an unsolicited
basis, thereby missing much of the valuable information from “inside”.
Both have the same limitations. A sports governance rating could
fill that gap and offer a more reliable solution for ASOIF’s next
assessment procedures. It also presents the supplementary advantage
of professional non-advocate, non-stakeholder neutrality while working
on a solicited (voluntary) basis.
107. Professionalising good governance evaluation through an independent
rating system would be well in line with the ASOIF GTF vision on
the future steps to be taken in encouraging federations to perform.
The federations which are able and willing to commit resources and
staff for implementing more advanced indicators might be willing
to receive a bonus mark for their efforts through a proper governance
rating system. Furthermore, the GTF sees as its third step the establishment
of a management system to ensure proper support for international
federations in the implementation of all principles and indicators.
The establishment of a proper management system should be accompanied
by a fully independent professional system rather than on stakeholder
evaluation. That system would also have the flexibility to incorporate
and absorb any new evolving governance principles and benchmarks.
4.2.4. Who
should be responsible for harmonising standards and introducing
monitoring and assessment?
108. There is a lack of strong leadership
in the sports movement today for taking the sports governance and integrity
matters in hand. At the same time, there is a clear move towards
involving new stakeholders in sports policy making, and notably
the new multi-stakeholder platforms and alliances that are looking
to take the lead in seeking global solutions.
109. In 2016, two parallel initiatives emerged: the Sports Integrity
Global Alliance (SIGA), led by the ICSS, and the International Sports
Integrity Partnership (ISIP, later renamed International Partnership
against Corruption in Sport – IPACS) led by the IOC, the ASOIF,
the Council of Europe, the OECD and the UNODC. IPACS has embarked
on bringing together the sports movement, national governments and
international organisations to look into harmonising procedures
and the understanding of governance criteria; SIGA has clearly defined
its priorities in sports governance, financial integrity and betting
integrity, worked out its own universal standards and declared its
readiness to focus on assessment and rating.
110. All of these are highly positive tendencies. I should nevertheless
call on the new multi-stakeholder platforms that any monitoring,
assisting and consulting must be strictly kept apart from compliance
control, which for the sake of guaranteeing full independence, must
be carried out by an external professional fit-for- purpose agency.
Advisors should not be judges!
111. Furthermore, I hope that these new multi-stakeholder initiatives
can build on their synergies and experiences and co-operate well
in their respective domains.
4.2.5. The
role and independence of ethics committees
112. Since the launch of this report,
I have been pleased to observe the ever-growing number of emerging codes
of ethics or conduct and the setting up of an increasing number
of ethics and disciplinary committees within international sports
governing bodies. Independence is key to the functioning of any
such body. I therefore urge sports organisations in which such committees
have been created, to grant these bodies full structural, budgetary
and operational independence. Members of these committees must be
free from any undisclosed, actual or potential conflict of interest.
113. In July 2017, the Lausanne-based International Management
School released a Governance Review, commissioned by the IOC, which
made several policy recommendations as regards the strengthening
of the IOC Code of Ethics and the functioning of the IOC Ethics
Commission, including introducing a standard and codified procedure
for reminding IOC members of their obligation to respect the Code
of Ethics; and calling on the IOC to grant its Ethics Commission
more independence to investigate cases of ethical misconduct, provide it
with an independent secretariat and budget, and strengthen its sanctioning
powers and sanctions for non-compliance in cases of conflict of
interest. Several of these recommendations were implemented between
July and December 2017.
114. I welcome the recent appointment of Mr Ban Ki-moon, former
United Nations Secretary General, as Chairperson of the IOC Ethics
Commission and count on him to make it an exemplary body showing
firmness and independence.
4.3. Pillar
3: Inclusive action and knowledge-sharing
4.3.1. New
multi-stakeholder partnerships
115. As already mentioned above,
at an international multi-stakeholder level, the emergence of two partnerships
is particularly noteworthy: the Global Sports Integrity Alliance
(SIGA) an independent initiative, and the International Partnership
against Corruption in Sport (IPACS), a tripartite forum involving
selected sports governance organisations, governments and intergovernmental
organisations.
4.3.1.1. The
Sports Integrity Global Alliance (SIGA)
116. SIGA was set up in January
2017 with a declared goal of working towards a vision of sport played
and governed under the highest integrity standards, free from any
form of unethical, illicit and criminal activity, to safeguard sports
values and ensure its positive impact and benefits to all citizens.
The declared mission of SIGA is to provide global leadership, promote
good governance and safeguard the integrity of sport through a set
of universal standards operated by an independent, neutral and global
body.
117. A year after its launch, SIGA stands out by being independent
and multi-stakeholder in nature. Founding members and founding supporters
include stakeholders such as national, regional and international
sports organisations as well as governments, inter-governmental
bodies, sponsors, sports business, media, financial institutions,
NGOs, academics and professional services. The Alliance also stands
out by offering a mix of universal standards on good governance
in sports, financial integrity and betting integrity, and a comprehensive
implementation network which takes into account the fact that sports
organisations are very different in size, resources and specific
governance challenges.
118. Looking at the mandate that SIGA has taken upon itself, while
understanding its eagerness to find quick-fix solutions for a better
management of the sports world, I would advise them against trying
to assume all roles at the same time. It should clearly define its
remits, set a strategy for the years ahead and communicate it clearly.
4.3.1.2. International
Partnership Against Corruption in Sport (IPACS)
119. IPACS (originally launched
as the International Sports Integrity Partnership (ISIP)) was announced
on the occasion of the 2nd International Forum of Sports Integrity
(IFSI), which was convoked by the International Olympic Committee
in February 2017 in Lausanne. According to the IFSI declaration,
it aims to be a multi-stakeholder platform that brings together
governments, sports organisations and international organisations
to promote transparency, integrity and good governance.
120. It is premature to speculate on the success of this process,
but it is positive that key international sports organisations have
agreed to establish an informal but structured and regular dialogue
with governments and a small selected group of international organisations
on the fight against corruption and the promotion of good governance.
121. Little has been publicly unveiled regarding the new platform’s
concrete objectives, nature and operations. On 21 June, a selected
group of organisations and government representatives calling itself
the Informal Working Group, met in the Council of Europe’s Paris
office.
The meeting agreed to rename
the partnership “Partnership against Corruption in Sport” (IPACS)
and defined its mission statement as follows: “To bring together
international sports organisations, governments, inter-governmental
organisations, and other relevant stakeholders to strengthen and
support efforts to eliminate corruption and promote a culture of
good governance in and around sport.
”
122. The Informal Working Group expressed strong support for working
on three key aspects:
- reducing
the risk of corruption in public procurement in the context of sports
events;
- ensuring transparency and integrity in the context of
venues for sports events;
- compliance with good governance principles in the context
of sports settings, focusing on the aspects of term limits, financial
transparency and conflict of interest.
123. The meeting also discussed what the next steps should be and
the idea of gathering the partnership in a broader plenary setting
and having high-level meetings at ministerial level to generate
political will for the partnership to generate further momentum
between working group meetings. It was agreed to meet again in December
2017 in Paris (hosted by the OECD).
124. I commend the pragmatic approach adopted by this Informal
Working Group. Some questions however remain, notably as to whether
IPACS could grow from this elite group of the selected few into
a credible and inclusive international multi-stakeholder partnership
gathering on the one hand not only the key Olympic family members
but also representatives of diverse sports movements and athletes,
and on the other hand a wider group of stakeholders such as relevant
civil society organisations and representatives of academia, press
or sponsors.
125. I hope that IPACS will soon meet in a plenary sitting open
to all interested States and allowing a broader involvement of other
stakeholders, including the sports industry, media, sponsors, NGOs,
researchers, etc. This plenary setting should also decide on the
composition of the working groups.
126. Transparent organisations set a tone of openness, accessibility
and accountability for others to follow, building confidence among
stakeholders and the public. Therefore, international partnerships
like the IPACS and SIGA are key to moving beyond words into action,
and both are valuable.
127. What I consider very important in these international partnerships
– and what I am currently missing in the IPACS – is that they must
apply themselves the principles of good governance, transparency
and reciprocity. They should themselves be on top of the game in
terms of applying the principles they preach.
4.3.2. Inclusion
of other stakeholders
128. Sports organisations and elite
athletes depend on the commercialisation of their rights to generate income,
while sponsors and broadcasters need sport to reach wider audiences.
Recently, several high-profile sponsorship deals with sports bodies
and athletes ended prematurely or were not renewed, for strictly reputational
reasons.
129. However, recent studies indicate that the various scandals
have had little impact on two major stakeholders – sponsors and
the public. Sponsors have shown minimal interest in holding sports
bodies accountable when allegations of corruption have surfaced.
Sport is continuing to grow in popularity, and there is scant evidence
to suggest that its popularity is threatened by alleged or actual
corrupt practices among governance bodies. Doping or match-fixing
has proved to be a greater threat to the integrity of sport than shortfalls
in governance.
130. Nevertheless, with the issues of corruption, doping or match-fixing
becoming more public, sponsors and brands will have to take a stand
on them. As discussed at our hearing with sponsors on 22 September,
it is the emotion around sport that leads sponsors to transform
or to convey an image of their products. Through sponsoring they
acquire visibility and a positive image. Conversely, a company that
sponsors sport can also be tarnished by the negative consequences.
The Swiss Ski Federation was one of the first to include in their contracts
a clause stipulating that such a contract can immediately be cancelled
upon non-compliance with doping regulations. Including good governance
clauses in contracts and promoting good governance principles among
sponsors and brands is what the European Sponsorship Association
said it is ready to support. However, they need to be guided, educated
and supported in promoting change.
131. Awareness, inclusion and education are the key components
for bringing on board a wide range of stakeholders in reforming
sport and changing the governance culture, of which I highlight
three: athletes; young people and millennials, and women. Not only
do the millennials and women represent respectively a purchasing
power of US$ 2.5 trillion and US$ 30 trillion,
but all these three groups are motivated
and need to be empowered through education and should be included
in formal decision-making bodies.
5. Concluding
remarks
132. International sports governance
is at a crossroads today. Never before have sports faced such unprecedented
loss of trust vis-à-vis its various stakeholders, but never before
have the different stakeholders had as much say in sports governance
and integrity matters. The sports movement, from the top to the
bottom, will have to get its house in order and reform its functioning
in terms of checks and balances, transparency of procedures or accountability.
However, the stakeholders – be it governments, public actors, international organisations
or sponsors – should also assert more external pressure and demand
bolder reforms.
133. There is a lack of strong leadership in the sports movement
today for taking the sports governance and integrity matters truly
in hand. The IOC definitively has to make more headway and not only
proactively respond to recent corruption problems concerning bidding
processes or doping scandals, but also show its commitment and sense
of initiative when it comes to reviewing its Basic Universal Principles,
its host city selection processes, or removing any conflict of interest
in the composition of its Ethics Commission.
134. Overall, the sports world must make a quantum leap forward
in introducing a modern governance culture. In order to achieve
this, it needs first and foremost to restore public trust in clean
sports and sports leadership that is capable of governing the sports
movement according to contemporary best practices of governance
standards. This requires a real will and major efforts from international
umbrella organisations (IOC, ASOIF, AIOWF) and international and
national federations alike.
135. There is also a dire need for:
- ending impunity for corruption in the sports world, through
improved international and national legislation and engagement of
law-enforcement agencies;
- introducing functioning sticks and carrots to sports governance,
including through proper monitoring, assessment and coaching of
sports organisations;
- developing inclusive multi-stakeholder platforms for sharing
information and practice.
136. The current void of strong leadership could possibly be filled
by a new more inclusive and democratically run international multi-stakeholder
platform or alliance that would dare to set the targets high and
be bold enough to live up to the declared ambitions. This body could
take the lead in:
- bringing
all stakeholder groups on board in defining the common governance
standards/benchmarks in sports governance. In order to facilitate
the universal acceptance of this set of standards/benchmarks, they
could be drawn up through the system of a globally recognised and
indisputable standardisation body, e.g. through creating an ISO
certification standard on good governance in sport;
- offering monitoring, consultancy and coaching to sports
organisations of various sizes in order to help them through institutional
reforms;
- setting up an independent professional compliance assessment
of the implementation of the accepted basic standards as a prerequisite
for getting truthful, objective and credible results of the evaluation.
137. Any compliance assessment should be done in respect of the
separation of powers: those who develop concepts and monitor/advise/counsel/coach
should never be involved in the control functions. In order to be credible,
the assessment should be done by third-party professional agencies
of impeccable international reputation similar to existing financial
or ESG rating agencies.
138. I believe that both the ISO standards and a sports ethics
rating could offer viable alternatives, and they are far from being
mutually exclusive. Rating actually takes over where ISO certification
stops.
139. An effective assessment and rating system cannot function
independently: it requires a more global and holistic approach by
creating inter-linkages between the development, assessment, monitoring,
reviewing, consultancy and training, capacity building and the participation
of the principal actors, namely sports organisations at all levels.
140. It goes without saying that various stakeholders, including
the sports movement, relevant international bodies, government and
civil society experts should be involved in the conceptualisation
of the basis for working out benchmarks and criteria for ISO and
rating algorithms. This could even provide an additional incentive
for a faster conclusion of the common governance benchmarks within
the same process.
141. Governments as stakeholders should be interested in both the
subscription to ISO standards and in the independent international
rating system. Although first and foremost meant for international
sports federations, it does not mean that national federations or
clubs should not be encouraged to participate in the same schemes.
Obtaining an ISO certification or positive rating results could
well become linked to public funding and subsidies.
142. In the long-term vision, the ideal solution would be to create
a global sports governance foundation which would have its own multi-stakeholder
board of advisors, a proper board of directors and independent funding. This
foundation could work globally for all: on the one hand finance
the creation and evolution of a rating model and then either outsource
the rating to “Standard Ethics” or create a specialised rating structure
of its own. At the same time, the foundation could offer grants
to sports organisations that are willing to voluntarily solicit
their rating (which would remove the argument that smaller organisations
could not afford it) and to governments or sports governing bodies
who commission unsolicited rating.
143. Finally, in all the work I have carried out in the last two
years, I observe that whereas there is an ever stronger input of
national governments into the debate of sports governance and integrity,
there is no co-ordinated parliamentary action or international parliamentary
partnership that would allow MPs to have a credible stakeholder
voice in the current debate outside the scope of individual reports.
To this end, I propose setting up a parliamentary alliance for good
governance and integrity in sport with the aim of bringing together national
parliaments and international parliamentary bodies around a meaningful
discussion on sports governance and integrity issues. This alliance
could have as a first task to contribute to the preparations of
the 15th Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for
Sport in October 2018 in Tbilisi and to hold a parliamentary conference
on the margins of this event.