1. Introduction
1.1. Reminder
of the procedural context
1. Montenegro became a member
of the Council of Europe in 2007. It was subject to the full monitoring procedure
until 2015. In June 2012, in
Resolution
1890 (2012), the Parliamentary Assembly identified five “key issues”,
on which Montenegro was encouraged to make progress, namely the
independence of the judiciary, the situation of the media, the fight
against corruption and organised crime, the rights of minorities
and the fight against discrimination, as well as the situation of
refugees and internally displaced persons.
2. In light of the progress made on these issues, the Assembly
decided in
Resolution
2030 (2015) on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Montenegro
to close the monitoring procedure and to engage in a post-monitoring
dialogue. It stated that this dialogue could be concluded by the
end of 2017 if Montenegro was to fulfil four requirements, three
of them already mentioned in 2012: the independence of the judiciary,
trust in the electoral process, the situation of the media and the
fight against corruption. The resolution highlighted the importance
of “trust in the electoral process” which was seen as “even more
necessary to ensure political stability and fair elections […] further
to the disputed 2012 parliamentary elections and 2013 presidential election”.
Moreover, as regards the
rights of minorities and the fight against discrimination, as well
as the situation of refugees and internally displaced persons,
Resolution 2030 (2015) indicated that the Assembly would “closely follow how
authorities enforce and implement the adopted legislation”.
Finally, the Assembly concluded
that “should the Montenegrin authorities fail to meet the above-mentioned
commitments by the end of 2017, the Assembly expects its Monitoring
Committee to consider whether Montenegro should be returned to the
full monitoring procedure”.
3. Since 2015, two fact-finding missions have been conducted
in Podgorica: in 2017 and 2019. The first one was followed by the
presentation to the committee of a written information report.
4. The current report was prepared under the rapporteurships
of Mr Anne Mulder and Mr Emanuelis Zingeris.
It was drafted before the Covid-19
pandemia erupted. If new developments related to the obligations and
commitments of Montenegro were to happen, they would be subject
to an addendum.
5. The parliamentary elections of 2016 and the presidential election
of 2018 were observed by the Assembly. The respective reports prepared
by the ad hoc committees of the Bureau were submitted to and debated
in the Assembly.
1.2. Our
perspective as co-rapporteurs
6. As co-rapporteurs, we are perfectly
aware that the Montenegrin authorities could legitimately expect
a decision to be made on the future of the post-monitoring procedure
at the end of 2017. However, this was not possible. The holding
of the 2016 parliamentary elections and the changes of co-rapporteurs
(in 2015, then in 2017) have indeed delayed the possibility of a
visit, as well as the drafting of a report. Regrettable as it may have
been, we believe that the submission of a report to the Assembly
in 2017 would not have been most opportune, given the political
situation resulting from the 2016 elections which had been characterised
by the boycott of the parliament by the opposition. Between September
2017 and September 2019, most of the opposition returned to parliament,
which sought an agreement between the majority and the opposition
on the establishment of the necessary legal framework prior to the
holding of the 2020 parliamentary elections. The time was then right
for us to submit a preliminary draft report to the Monitoring Committee
in the months following the visit to Podgorica, in order to have
a report ready to be debated by the Assembly in April 2020, before
the Plenary part-session was cancelled.
7. Concerning the future of the post-monitoring dialogue with
Montenegro, the combined reading of paragraph 13 of
Resolution 2030 (2015) and paragraph 13 of the terms of reference of the Assembly Committee
on Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of
the Council of Europe stipulates three options: to end the post-monitoring
dialogue, to have Montenegro returned to the full monitoring procedure
or to set concrete deadlines for the fulfilment of outstanding commitments.
8. The proposal we chose to make in the conclusions was exclusively
based on the progress made by Montenegro in the four key issues
identified by the
Resolution
2030 (2015), and on the follow up of those issues related to the
fight against discrimination and the situation of refugees. No supplementary
concerns of utmost importance were drawn to our attention. Last
but not least, we fully share the views of the Assembly that “Montenegro
has continued to play a positive role in the stabilisation of the
region and to be a reliable and constructive partner, involved in
several regional and multilateral initiatives” and that “there has
been excellent co-operation between the Montenegrin authorities
and the Council of Europe”. These quotes from 2015 are still valid
today. One just needs to take a look at the important number of
opinions requested by the Montenegrin authorities from the Venice
Commission or from Council of Europe’s experts on draft legislation.
Montenegro’s positive attitude is further reflected in the way it
took these opinions into consideration, or the way it executes judgments
from the European Court of Human Rights. It is also to be noted,
that the quality of the comments by the Montenegrin delegation to
the preliminary draft report further demonstrated this very constructive attitude.
9. That being said, our findings in the four key areas are rather
mixed. In most of them contradictory trends are at work. Our conviction
is that, where political will is unquestionable, results are noticeable.
When political will is apparently lacking, little progress is made,
and sometimes setbacks can be observed. Moreover, it appeared that
in some fields, the issue is less about legal reform than changing
the practice, that is implementing another way of doing things.
2. Political developments since the last
visit of the co-rapporteurs to Montenegro in 2017
10. Since the last visit by the
rapporteurs in October 2017, Montenegrin political life has been
dominated by the following events: the presidential election that
took place in April 2018 and which saw the victory of President
Đjukanović; the partial boycott of the parliament by the opposition
that blocked the electoral reform; the transformation of a judicial
case on corruption called ‘the Envelope affair’ into a political
scandal; the introduction of a draft law on Freedom of Religion;
and the critical annual assessment of the implementation of reforms
in Montenegro, published in May 2019, by the European Commission
and its aftermath.
2.1. Presidential
election
11. On 15 April 2018, Mr Milo Đjukanović
won the presidential election with 53.90% of the votes. Mr Đjukanović
had held the post of Prime Minister for some 17 years and that of
President of Montenegro for almost five years from January 1998
to November 2002 (making him one of the longest serving leaders
in Europe since the collapse of communism). His main opponent, Mr Malden
Bojanić won 33,40% of the votes.
12. The ad hoc Committee of the Bureau of the Assembly that was
invited to observe the election concluded that the election “respected
fundamental freedoms […] and that voters made their choice among
a wide range of candidates, even though the candidate and leader
of the ruling party [Mr Đjukanović] enjoyed institutional advantages
consolidated over the 27 years in power of his party”.
13. It pointed out, however, several flaws within the electoral
framework that need to be addressed. It noted that the election
campaign was peaceful and that the fundamental freedoms of assembly,
movement and association were respected. It is worth noting that,
the debate on NATO membership, to which Montenegro acceded on 5
June 2017, alongside the debate on the international alignment of
the country, which had polarised the political scene in mid-2017,
continued during these elections but did not derail into violent incidents.
The ad hoc Committee nevertheless mentioned that “credible allegations
of vote buying, hiring of public employees during the election period
and pressure on voters, which is regrettably a recurrent feature
of elections in Montenegro, undermined voters’ confidence in the
electoral process”.
14. With a turn-out of 63,92% and a victory in the first round,
Mr Đjukanović’s legitimacy was not questioned by the opposition,
who now prepares for the general elections due to take place in
2020.
2.2. A
fragmented and polarised political scene
15. Since 2016, the Democratic
Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS) is in a coalition with ethnic minorities
parties (the Bosniak Party, Forca – an Albanian political organisation
- and the Croatian Civic Initiative), the Liberal Party (LP) and
the Social Democrats (SD). They have 42 seats among 81. The Democratic
Front (DF) is the biggest opposition party with 17 seats, followed
by Democratic Montenegro (DCG) with 8 seats, For the Benefit of
All (DSI) with 7 seats, the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro
(SDP) with 4 seats, Democratic Alliance (Demos) with 2 seats and
United Reform Action (URA) with 1 seat.
16. The general elections of October 2016 resulted in a landslide
victory for the DPS. It was followed by the refusal of the entire
opposition bloc to take part in the work of the parliament. This
stalemate seemed to have been overcome in May 2018 when most of
the opposition parties resumed their participation in the parliament. But
the boycott was not without legislative cost.
17. After October 2016, the opposition denounced alleged electoral
fraud, claimed that the elections were not free and fair and demanded
an immediate and thorough investigation of alleged abuses as well
as of the so-called attempted coup d’état that took place on the
election day.
The
government urged the opposition to come back to the parliament.
Both the European Union and the Council of Europe have consistently
stressed the importance for the opposition to have its voice heard
in parliament and in the legislative processes, not only because
the parliament is the arena where politics is debated, but also
because the absence of the opposition hindered the continuation
of reforms. Several pieces of legislation were passed in a rush
and, according to civil society, were not subjected to a public
debate, which was a serious breach to transparency and inclusiveness. The
NGOs referred notably to the amendments to the Law on Free Access
to Information in 2017 that limited the right of access to public
records. The Montenegrin authorities hinted that the public debate
on the draft law lasted 40 days. The boycott also affected the appointments
of several high-ranking officials, such as members of the Judicial
Council or the Supreme State Prosecutor, for whom a qualified majority
is required. It led the authorities to put in place anti-deadlock
mechanisms that allowed the institutions to function. One of the
most acute consequences of the boycott was the blocking of the electoral
reform, for which opposition votes were and are still needed in
order to pass it into law.
18. Between December 2017 and May 2018, almost all opposition
parties returned to the parliament, with only two of them, Democratic
Montenegro (DCG – 8 seats in parliament) and United Reform Action
(URA – 1 seat), carrying on the boycott. On 30 October 2018, this
enabled the parliament to formally establish a committee under the
name of “Interim Committee for Further Reform of Electoral and Other
Legislation” (“Electoral Committee”), with a year-long mandate.
All political forces were represented in the Committee, apart from
the DCG and the URA.
19. This positive trend was immediately reversed after the major
opposition party, the DF, retreated from the parliament in December
2018 following the arrest of two of its prominent leaders and members
of parliament, Mr Nebošja Medojević and Mr Milan Knežević. The arrest
by police forces and the detention of Mr Medojević took place without
his immunity being lifted beforehand.
20. The return of the DF to the parliament was quite uncertain
after the judgment on 9 May 2019 on the so-called coup d’état of
2016. The Montenegrin High Court in Podgorica found all 14 defendants
guilty of plotting against the State. Political leaders from the
DF, Mr Mandic Andrija and Mr Milan Knežević, were sentenced to five
years of imprisonment.
However,
the DF resumed its participation in parliamentary activities. After
deep consultation with the Head of the European Union Delegation
to Montenegro, Ambassador Aivo Orav, the second largest opposition
group in the parliament, Democratic Montenegro (DCG), accepted to
join the Electoral Committee. Its participation in other parliamentary
activities remained uncertain, as DCG claimed it continued its boycott.
21. During our meetings with the parliamentary factions, we reminded
all political groups that the parliament was the arena where political
competition should take place and that boycotting its work was not
the European way to compete.
22. So far, the fragmentation of the political landscape – partly
due to a systemic tendency of political organisations to split –
and the divisions within the opposition made it impossible for the
Montenegrin electoral system to experience alternating political
power at the national level. The situation differs at the local
level, where competition for municipalities is very lively and resulted
in changes of power. For instance, majorities shifted in the municipalities
of Budva, Kotor, Herceg Novi and Tuzi in 2016, 2017 and 2019 respectively.
23. Apart from these developments, the ‘Envelope affair’ had significant
effects on the political scene.
2.3. The
‘Envelope affair’
24. In January 2019, Mr Duško Knežević,
owner of the Atlas Bank group, a company that was investigated for
money-laundering, started to reveal details about possible shady
businesses involving the ruling party’s high officials, President
Đjukanović being among them.
The most prominent revelation, supported
by a video material dating back from 2016, showed Mr Duško Knežević
appearing to hand the then mayor of Podgorica, Mr Slavoljub Stijepović,
an envelope containing what Mr Knežević later said was 97 000 US
dollars, to fund a DPS election campaign. This donation did not
appear in the party’s financial records.
25. These revelations unleashed protests (some of which turned
out to be massive) on 17 February 2019 in several cities throughout
Montenegro, including Podgorica, Budva and Herceg-Novi. The protests
lasted until June 2019. The protesters used the slogan “97 000 Resist”
referring to the money allegedly given to the DPS. The protests
were led by civic activists with no political affiliation, who requested
a thorough follow-up and investigation into the ‘Envelope affair’,
as well as the dismissal of President Đjukanović and other officials (Prime
Minister, Supreme State Prosecutor and Special Public Prosecutor).
26. Protests’ organisers initiated a dialogue with opposition
leaders that resulted in the “Agreement for the future”, a political
platform which was signed by all the 39 MPs from the opposition
in April 2019. Among the priorities listed, there was a demand for
a government of civic unity and the boycott of all elections until
the requests detailed in the Agreement were satisfied. This political
platform has until now not lead to a cooperation agreement with
the aim of winning the next general elections. The programme has
been presented by the movement to diplomatic representatives. But
divisions between civic activists and the opposition factions, and between
the opposition parties – especially after the change of alliances
between parties of the opposition in the town of Kotor – seemed
to have slowed the process.
27. This affair may have contributed to the loss of the town of
Tuzi by the DPS, where a new coalition was formed by the Albanian
parties after a local election in March 2019.
28. No inquiry committee was created in the parliament to investigate
the ‘Envelope affair’. The Special Public Prosecutor’s Office is
now investigating the former mayor of Podgorica. The Agency for
the Prevention of Corruption (APC) asked the DPS to return 47 500
euros to the State budget and pay 20 000 euros for violating the
law on financing political entities during the 2016 campaign. President
Đjukanović took Mr Knežević to court for the false claims against
him and asked 500 000 euros for defamation. The case is still pending.
2.4. The
Law on Freedom of Religion
29. In May 2019, the Montenegrin
authorities requested an opinion from the Venice Commission on the
draft law on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Legal Status
of Religious Communities. The authorities had already made a similar
request in 2015 but abandoned the legislative process after the
Venice Commission was highly critical of the draft sent. The Venice
Commission published its opinion on the new draft law on 24 June
2019.
It welcomed several improvements
compared to the legal framework dating back to 1977 but remained
cautious on the controversial provisions relating to properties
of religious communities.
30. These provisions would require the Serbian Orthodox Church,
which accounts for 70 % of the Orthodox population according to
the local media,
to present evidence of
ownership of all buildings and lands that were built or obtained
from public revenues of the State or that were owned by the State
until 1 December 1918 (this date corresponding to the creation of
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the end of the Kingdom of Montenegro). These
provisions would only apply to culture heritage property, according
to the Montenegrin authorities, who assured the Venice Commission
that the transfer of property will not affect in principle the use
that is made by religious community of the property in question.
31. The Serbian Orthodox Church claimed that these provisions
may be dedicated to strengthening the Montenegrin Orthodox Church
through a transfer of propriety. The Montenegrin Orthodox Church
has been registered as an NGO since 2001 and is not canonically
recognised by other Eastern orthodox churches. It is indeed highly
possible that the provisions were introduced with a view to developing
a national and autocephalous church, which would be distinct from
the Serbian Orthodox Church, the latter one being seen by the Montenegrin
Government as close to Serbian authorities.
This would therefore follow a similar
pattern to what happened recently in Ukraine. An interview by President
Đjukanović to AFP news agency on 10 February 2020 gave grounds to
the claims of the Serbian Orthodox Church, for President Đjukanović
stated that Montenegrins “are driven by the indisputable need to
improve spiritual, social and state infrastructure in order to strengthen
citizens' awareness of their identity” and that there should be
an autonomous Orthodox Church in Montenegro that would bring together
all Orthodox believers, “the members of the Serbian, together with
the members of the Montenegrin nationality”.
32. In September 2019, the Montenegrin authorities started consultations
on the draft law with all religious communities. On 27 December
2019, the parliament passed the Law on Freedom of Religion with
votes from the majority and from the Social Democratic Party, which
belongs to the opposition. MPs voted in a climate of violence within
the parliament, that led to the intervention of police forces and
the arrest of several MPs from the Democratic Front, who were all
quickly released. Signed on 28 December 2019, the law came into
force on 8 January 2020.
33. The passing of the law created strong tensions within Montenegro
and in the region.
34. In Montenegro, the law faced strong opposition from the Metropolitanate
of Montenegro and the Coastlands and the head of the Serbian Orthodox
Church in Montenegro, Radović Amfilohije. Following its passing,
the Orthodox clergy organised protest marches in several cities
that were still taking place twice a week at the time when this
report was drafted. Protest marches seemed to have been of a significant
scale in a country of less than 630 000 people. For instance, before
the passing of the law, the Serbian Orthodox Church was able to
hold a protest of 6 000 people in the town of Nikšić on 21 December
2019, according to the police, and an independent media stated that
tens of thousands rallied in Podgorica and other towns on 12 January
2020.
The Democratic Front called its
supporters to take part in these marches. Occasional clashes with
law enforcement agencies have been reported just after the passing
of the law. Since the Orthodox Christmas (7 January in Montenegro),
demonstrations seemed peaceful. However an escalation in the tone
was also observed.
35. Calling for the withdrawal of the law, Metropolitanate Amfilohije
incited people not to vote for politicians who supported it.
President Đjukanović warned members
of his party, DPS, of a possible exclusion if they were to take
part in these marches, while the Montenegro Army Chief, General
Dragutin Dakić, said that military personnel risked being forced
out, if they were to do the same.
A
documentary from the national public broadcasting, the RTCG, on
Metropolitanate Amfilohije was heavily criticised by the Serbian
Orthodox Church and the DF for presenting him as “an envoy of a
foreign church” and “a fanatical follower of the Great Serbian project”
and they accused the RTCG of being politically motivated.
36. Given the level of tension in Montenegro, the authorities
deemed it fit to use a provision from the Criminal Code, article
398, that punishes all those who convey “false news or allegations”
and by doing so cause “panic or seriously disrupt public law and
order”. On the basis of this article, three journalists were arrested
and detained for several hours. One of them, an editor-in-chief
of a local news website, FOS, published an article which alleged
that the Montenegrin government was considering requesting security
assistance from Kosovo
to help quell
protests on Christmas Day. The government denied the information
and FOS retracted the article, published an apology, and dismissed
its editor-in-chief for a “serious professional error”, according
to the media.
37. In the region, the law caused tensions between Montenegro
and Serb leaders from Serbia and Republika Srpska, one of the two
entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serb leaders mainly focused
their criticisms of the law on two arguments: first, the law would
be directed only against Serbs, who they claim account for 28% of
the Montenegrin population, and would thus be discriminatory.
This discrimination would be the
latest of many inflicted on Serbs, not only in Montenegro, but also
in other neighbouring countries.
Second, by attacking the Serbian
Orthodox Church, the Montenegrin authorities would be attacking
one of the “basic values of the identity of the Serb people”, the
other values being the letter and the language.
38. Montenegrin authorities emphasised that the law was in line
with the opinion of the Venice Commission, that it was passed by
the parliament in a democratic way, with a large consultation prior
to its adoption, and that it would be a violation of the democratic
process to withdraw it. They pointed out the fact that the protests were
directed not against the law, but against the Montenegrin State
and its institutions.
They also denounced the influence
of Serbia in Montenegro through the Serbian Orthodox Church
and the disinformation
campaign that would come from “the neighbourhood”.
An on-line petition, signed by 120 officials,
academics and prominent cultural figures in the Balkans, named
Appeal against Belgrade’s threats to peace
in Montenegro and the region, underlined that Montenegro
was a target of attempted destabilisation by violent means and that
peace was threatened, not only in Montenegro but also in the entire
region.
39. In a statement published on 19 December 2019, the European
Union spokesperson declared that regulating religious communities
is a national competence, but that it should be done in an inclusive
way and in line with relevant international and European standards,
in particular with all the recommendations of the Venice Commission.
While in Podgorica on 7 February 2020, European Commissioner for
Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Mr Olivér Várhelyi, also called on
everyone in Montenegro to engage in a dialogue on the Law on Freedom
of Religion and to find a solution that would be acceptable to everyone.
40. At the time of drafting, Prime Minister Marković, who had
stated that the law could always be amended in following due parliamentarian
process, and could also be challenged in the Constitutional Court,
met on 14 February 2020 with Metropolitanate Amfilohije, who seemed
to have proposed several amendments to it.
41. Assembly Resolution
2030 (2015) mentioned in its paragraph 10.2. that it expects “the
adoption of the Law on Religious Communities.” The Assembly further
stated that it would closely monitor how the authorities enforce
and implement the adopted legislation. We therefore discussed this
issue in depth during our fact-finding mission, three months before
the passing of the law and the aforementioned developments.
42. If we did not get a clear explanation on the concept of “cultural
heritage” used by the Montenegrin authorities to justify the possible
“taking back” of properties from the Serbian Orthodox Church during
our mission, the Montenegrin authorities provided us later with
the following information: according to the Ministry for Human and
Minority Rights, sacred properties built before 1918 are, in most
cases, part of Montenegro’s cultural heritage. The scope of the
concept is therefore rather broad. The Ministry also stated that
State ownership allows for better protection of these cultural monuments,
as some of them would have been “devastated while being in religious
communities’ ownership”.
43. During our mission, an interesting point of view was shared
with us: as most of the provisions of the then draft law were seen
as very positive by the Venice Commission, if those related to the
properties of religious communities would continue to be viewed
as controversial, a solution would be to divide the draft law into
two separate texts, in order not to delay the upholding of the provisions
focused on the status of religious communities.
44. As co-rapporteurs, we must reiterate that regulating religious
communities is a matter of national sovereignty, that should be
exercised without any foreign interference. However, we do understand
the fears that the provisions related to the property rights created
and the feeling of members of the Serbian Orthodox Church that they
have become targets. We deeply regretted that this law, which seems,
for the biggest part, a genuine progress compared to previous legislation,
deepened the polarisation within Montenegrin society. Splitting
this text in two parts, adopting most of it and continuing the discussion
on the issue of property may have limited the tensions created.
45. On 5 January 2020, the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr Ivica Dačić, singled out Serbian citizens of Montenegrin descent.
He emphasised their moral duty not to remain silent on the issue
of the Law on Freedom of Religion, and for those who were supporting
the Montenegrin authorities, he wondered whether they should be
deprived of their citizenship.
He clarified later his position,
explaining that he was not referring to “ordinary citizens or those
who have been in Serbia for generations” but to those who have “business empires”
and “work for Montenegrin agents”.
We strongly condemn
the language used to single out Serbian citizens of Montenegrin
descent. Not only could it be seen as discriminatory, but it also
reminds us of a nationalistic rhetoric that dates back to the 90s,
with reference to an alleged ‘enemy from within’. In that sense, we
also deeply regret the statement by Serbian Minister of Health,
Mr Zlatibor Lončar, saying that he was not allowing Montenegrins
in his administration if they did not speak Serbian, when asked
to comment on the developments around the Law on Freedom of Religion
in Montenegro. We regretted it, because, as the Serbian Commissioner
for Equality, Ms Brankica Janković, already said,
this declaration was discriminatory
and offensive, and because it was a reminiscent of the past, when
the issue of language was misused in a divisive way.
46. We noted, and welcome, the fact that despite the tension,
the dialogue between Prime Minister Marković and Metropolitanate
Amfilohije was never interrupted. We urged them to find a solution,
that respects democracy and the rule of law, which means respecting
the legislative process and using proper Courts, even the European
Court of Human Rights, if need be, to defend one’s legal rights.
We also expect that the sense of political responsibility of leaders
from Montenegro and abroad will prevent themselves from using the
debate on this law either to distract the public attention from
other issues or to create a nationalistic atmosphere of rallying
around the flag.
47. As co-rapporteurs, we will closely monitor whether the implementation
of the law on Freedom of Religion will be in line with the European
standards, and notably article 1 of the Protocol to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS
No. 9) (protection of property), as well as the recommendations
of the Venice Commission, especially when it comes to the standard
of proof that may be used to prove the property rights. We will
also monitor whether the transfer of property will not affect the
use made by the religious community of the property in question,
as assured by the Montenegrin authorities to the Venice Commission.
If need be, we will request the opinion of the Venice Commission
on the implementation of this law.
2.5. The
annual assessment of the European Union
48. Montenegro was granted the
official status of candidate country to the European Union in December 2010
and accession negotiations were opened in June 2012. The European’s
Commission Strategy for
'A credible
enlargement perspective for an enhanced EU engagement with the Western
Balkans’ adopted in February 2018,
set out a perspective of accession
to the European Union in 2025, if a series of key steps were taken
and conditions were met. In March 2019, 32 negotiating chapters
have been opened – four more compared to the time of the last visit
of the co-rapporteurs in 2017 – of which three have been provisionally closed
– which means no change in comparison to 2017. Chapters 23 (Judiciary
and fundamental rights) and 24 (Justice, freedom and security),
that are of particular interest for the Council of Europe given
their content, are still being negotiated.
49. The Communication on EU Enlargement Policy by the European
Commission issued in May 2019
and the conclusions on enlargement
and stabilisation and association process adopted by the Council
in June 2019,
which were also endorsed
by the European Council, were less positive and more urging than
those from previous years. The Commission, as well as the Council,
made it clear that it was now the time for the entire rule of law
sector to deliver more tangible results and that Montenegro should
be more proactive in reforming the following fields: media freedom,
the fight against corruption and trafficking in human beings. The Commission
further noted that Montenegro should demonstrate clear political
will in the fight against corruption and organised crime. It also
underlined that the electoral reform remained vital for re-establishing
electoral trust. In other words, the concerns of the European Union
seem to match, with the exception of the issue of human trafficking,
the four key issues selected by the Assembly to be discussed in
the post-monitoring dialogue.
50. Reception of the EU annual assessment differed: the opposition
and some civic activists denounced the absence of progress when
it comes to democracy, the rule of law and human rights; the majority
considered that it was normal for the European Union to be tougher
on Montenegro, since the country was moving closer to the accession.
51. In November 2019, the European Commission issued its non-paper
on the state of play regarding chapters 23 and 24 for Montenegro,
that the government made public.
This document covered the first
half of 2019. It did not show significant changes compared to the
situation described in the Communication from May 2019. However,
it emphasised the importance for Montenegro not to reverse earlier
achievements on judicial reform, to continue further building track
records on the fight against corruption, to ensure genuine independence
to the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (APC) and to respond
to the recent allegations of corruption and illegal political party
financing. It also underlined the successful operations against Montenegrin
crime groups thanks to the increased participation in international
police co-operation, although the criminal justice system remains
hampered by systemic deficiencies.
52. In February 2020, the government initiated a comprehensive
dialogue called “Alliance for Europe” on issues that would help
to overcome divisions and contribute to the advancement of the country’s
EU integration process and the process of comprehensive reform,
including the electoral one. Political parties from the opposition,
prominent NGOs, representatives of the media, and academics were
invited to meet the Prime Minister, and consultations started mid-February
2020.
3. The
independence of the judiciary
3.1. Resolution 2030 (2015) requirements and relevant developments in this field
53. Resolution 2030 (2015) listed three requirements as regards the independence
of the judiciary: to fully implement the constitutional amendments
related to the judiciary, to provide ongoing training to the prosecution,
the police and the judiciary, and to strengthen the position and
the means of the Supreme State Prosecutor.
“13.1.1 fully implement
the constitutional amendments related to the judiciary adopted in
July 2013 and adopt the laws on the courts, the rights and duties
of judges, the Judicial Council, the Constitutional Court and the
State Prosecution Office, in full compliance with the relevant recommendations
of the Venice Commission adopted in December 2014”
54. The legislative process that followed the amendments to the
Constitution in 2013 continued. The various laws that regulate the
courts, the prosecution authorities, their internal organisation
or the training of the judiciary were adopted in 2014 and 2015.
Some of them have been amended since then, such as the Law on the
Judicial Council and Judges in 2018. The Law on Courts introduced,
among other things, the misdemeanour courts. The Law on the Judicial
Council and Judges established a new system of elections, promotions,
work appraisal, mobility and disciplinary liability for the judges.
The Law on the State Prosecution Office did the same for the prosecutors.
The Law on the Special Public Prosecutor’s Office gave the prosecutor a
defined mandate on specific criminal offences: organised crime,
high level corruption, money laundering, terrorism and war crimes.
The Law on the Constitutional Court of Montenegro and the Law on
the Centre for Training in Judiciary and State Prosecution Service
entered also in force in 2015.
55. On all these laws, apart from the Law on the Centre for Training
in Judiciary and the State Prosecution Service, the Montenegrin
authorities asked for the opinion of the Venice Commission, whose recommendations
were generally implemented. Since the last report of the co-rapporteurs,
the legal framework has been set and is now functionable.
56. Despite positive trends, in terms of training or efficiency,
the judiciary in Montenegro is still seen as vulnerable to political
influence. According to the European Commission, the progress in
terms of transparency, accountability and respect of ethics seemed
rather slow.
57. It is worthy to note that most of the recommendations made
by the co-rapporteurs in their 2015 report and their information
note of 2017 were in line with the diagnosis presented by the European
Commission in its 2019 report, which would indicate that few changes
took place in-between. The European Commission assessment was rather
severe, as it noted that the Montenegrin judicial system was only
“moderately prepared for the accession”.
58. One of the key reforms of the judicial system initiated in
2014-2015 was the reshaping of what was to become the Judicial Council
and the Prosecutorial Council, two bodies that contain most of the
powers in terms of organising the courts and the prosecutor offices.
We then focused our attention on them.
59. Concerning the Judicial Council, the Group of States against
corruption of the Council of Europe (GRECO), stated that its recommendation
v. for abolishing the ex-officio participation of the Minister of
Justice in the Council and the establishment of objective and measurable
selection criteria for non-judicial members of the Council
which
endorse their professional qualities and impartiality had not been
implemented.
During our frank and open meetings
with the President of the Judicial Council and with a representative
of the Ministry of Justice, we were told that this recommendation
came after the Venice Commission gave its opinion on the composition
of the Judicial Council, without criticising the participation of
the Minister of Justice. Moreover, they brought to our attention
that the Venice Commission and GRECO had contradictory opinions
on the Presidency of the Judicial Council, the Venice Commission
being in favour of a President who does not perform judicial functions,
the GRECO pleading for the opposite.
60. On the issue of the participation of the Minister of Justice
in the Judicial Council, as co-rapporteurs, we do recognise that
the standards of the GRECO seem to be stricter than those of the
Venice Commission. We are also fully aware of the difficulty to
change the composition of the Judicial Council, which is determined
by the Constitution, if the parliamentary opposition refuses to
take part in the amendment process of the Constitution, which was
the case in the past. Finally, we also know that, according to the
Constitution, the Minister of Justice cannot be elected as President
of the Judicial Council, which is, in a way a safeguard, since the
President of the Judicial Council has the final say in case of an
equal vote. However, when the judiciary is perceived as vulnerable
to political influence, as the European Commission stated, it may
be wise not to include the Minister of Justice into the composition
of the Judicial Council. However, we do not consider this issue
to be the most serious one when it comes to the independence of
the judiciary.
61. On the issue of the Presidency of the Judicial Council, we
are of the opinion that the recommendation of GRECO should not be
taken separately from other recommendations concerning the Judicial
Council. Indeed, when GRECO called the Montenegrin authorities to
take “additional measures to strengthen the Judicial Council’s independence
– both real and perceived – against undue political influence,”
it recommended three types of action. Two of them are worth mentioning:
the establishment of objective and measurable selection criteria
for non-judicial members; and the setting up of operational arrangements
to avoid an over-concentration of powers in the same hands concerning
the different functions to be performed by members of the Judicial
Council.
It
is our opinion that if these two types of action had been implemented,
the issue of the Presidency of the Judicial Council could have been
of less importance for GRECO. This, however, was not the case, even
though the President of the Judicial Council recognised that conditions
to be elected as lay member should be clarified and strengthened.
This matter could be dealt with by a simple law and we would welcome such
a move.
62. In an extensive report on the appointment and promotion of
judges and prosecutors in Montenegro (2016-2019),
the NGO Human Rights Action (HRA)
called for applying to all candidates to the Judicial Council or
the Prosecutorial Council the same criteria as those for the Council
members of the APC, the RTCG or the AEM. It did not see any reason
why the prevention against possible conflicts of interest would
be lower for a judge or a prosecutor. We raised this issue and were
told that the law that regulates the conflict of interest was the
same for everyone considered to be a public agent, but that by-laws
related to the aforementioned bodies may be stricter.
63. Concerning the Prosecutorial Council, the Venice Commission,
in its final opinion of 2015 on the revised draft law on the public
prosecution office of Montenegro, stated that a number of matters
raised by the Commission had not been addressed. These included
concerns relating to: the procedures for elections to the Prosecutorial
Council; the need to ensure the fair and proportional representation
of the basic State Prosecutor’s Offices in the Council; the fact
that the decision on the dismissal of a member should be taken only
by the other members of the Council, without involving external
bodies; and the need for increased clarity for certain criteria
related to the appointment as public prosecutor.
64. Concerning the independence of the judiciary, we were told
by magistrates belonging to the Podgorica Basic Court (Court of
first instance) and by the President of the Judicial Council, that
the judicial information system, PRIS, was very effective. This
system was designed especially to randomly allocate cases, in order
to prevent an allocation based on motives other than the good administration
of justice. It had been criticised by the judges, before it was
completely effective, according to the 2015 report of the co-rapporteurs.
The European Commission regretted in its 2019 annual report that,
in the absence of clear criteria, the practice of reallocating large
numbers of cases between courts to reduce backlogs puts at risk
the principle of random allocation of cases.
65. The issue of transparency of the Judicial and Prosecutorial
Councils as well as with regard to appointments of judges and promotion
of magistrates, is a long-standing concern for the co-rapporteurs.
The European Commission confirmed that the transparency of the two
Councils’ work needed to improve tangibly, especially by publishing
fully reasoned decisions on promotions and appointments, and on
disciplinary proceedings. The above-mentioned analysis of HRA was
very critical about the Judicial Council’s disregard for the judicial
vacancy plans in its policy of appointing judges. It was further
critical of a decision taken in June 2018 to appoint 10 judges to
the Basic Courts. This decision was challenged in front of an administrative
court based on serious allegations regarding the actions of the
Judicial Council members with regard to the testing and the interviews.
In October 2019, the administrative court dismissed the lawsuit
filed by the applicant. Following this rejection, NGO HRA expressed
its doubts about the impartiality of the procedure. The case was dealt
with by an administrative court in the first instance and will be
judged by the Supreme Court in the second instance. It means that
both courts would have taken part in the impugned decision to appoint
the Basic Court judges. Consequently, HRA pleaded for the possibility
to appeal to the Constitutional Court instead of the Supreme Court.
As co-rapporteurs, we are willing to consider this proposal, depending
on the ruling of the Supreme Court to come. Three NGOs (HRA, MANS
and Institute Alternative) also pressed criminal charges against
the members of the Judicial Council for allegedly grossly violating
regulations in the process of selecting the 10 candidates, referring
to the criminal offences of misuse of office, malpractice in office,
trading in influence, counterfeiting documents and violation of
equality. These charges were rejected by the Special Public Prosecutor
on 15 October 2019.
66. The President of the Judicial Council rejected all allegations
made by these NGOs during our meeting. However, the Judicial Council
seemed to have partially learnt from this experience, since it was
commended later by NGO HRA for the way it interviewed candidates
for the appointment to the Presidency of another Basic Court, on
7 February 2020. The interviews were fully in line with the rules
according to HRA. Unfortunately, the outcome of the selection confirmed
our concerns, presented hereafter.
67. In its report, HRA also emphasised that the decisions of the
Prosecutorial Council on the appointments of prosecutors were insufficiently
reasoned.
68. Developments in 2019 and 2020 showed how sensitive the question
of appointment of some judges is in Montenegro. In May 2019, the
Judicial Council re-appointed Ms Vesna Medenica as President of
the Supreme Court for another term.
The
Judicial Council also validated applications by five incumbent Basic Court
Presidents to serve as president again despite the fact that they
had already occupied this function for two terms or more. Under
the amendment to Article 124 of the Constitution of Montenegro,
which came into effect on 31 July 2013, “the same person may be
elected president of the Supreme Court no more than two times.”
The amended Act on the Judicial Council and Judges that came into
force on 1 January 2016 states that “no-one may be elected president
of the same court more than twice.” On 31 May 2019, 11 NGOs appealed
to the Judicial Council in order to contest the nomination and the
decision on the applications, on the grounds they violated the Constitution.
The Judicial Council argued that the principle of non-retroactivity
of the law, enshrined in the Constitution, led it to make these
decisions.
69. As co-rapporteurs, we regret the way these re-appointments
took place, for they were a sign, that despite genuine progress
in the judicial reform and the putting in place of safe-guards,
practices that are contradictory to the spirit of the reform still
endure. The President of the Judicial Council explained to us the
procedure that was followed concerning Ms Medenica. A body of the
Supreme Court composed of 18 of its members presented only her candidacy
to the Judicial Council, which decided to appoint her, even though
its President would have preferred it if the Judicial Council had
been able to decide between several candidates. The limit of two-terms
introduced in the Constitution in 2013 could not apply to Ms Medenica,
since the constitutional amendment did not incorporate any provision
clarifying how this limit would be applied for the Presidents of Courts
already in office. On the same issue, Serbia and Croatia have decided,
according to the President of the Judicial Council, to implement
transitory provisions, which was not the case in Montenegro. Consequently, the
two-terms limit could not apply to Ms Medenica or the five Presidents
of Basic Courts, whatever the number of terms they already served
as Presidents prior to the 2013 constitutional reform.
70. We do not dispute the legal aspect of the position of the
Judicial Council and its interpretation of the non-retroactivity
process. However, we noted that, in the case of Ms Medenica, the
Judicial Council could have suspended its decision to appoint her
and asked the 18 judges of the Supreme Court to present several candidacies
to it, which it did not. But more fundamentally, we observe that
the purpose of the 2013 constitutional reform was precisely to avoid
having Presidents of Courts, including the Supreme Court, continuing
to occupy their positions after two-terms. This is exactly what
happened. The signal would have been much more positive if the Judicial
Council would have been able to make appointments according to the spirit
of the constitutional change of 2013.
71. As we did with the President of the Judicial Council, both
the European Commission and GRECO expressed their clear dissatisfactions
and their deep concerns with these re-appointments.
On 7 February, the Judicial
Council re-appointed the new President of the Basic Court in Žabljak
for a fifth term, disregarding all the warnings previously addressed.
72. As co-rapporteurs, we see in that pattern a systemic flaw
within the judiciary when it comes to strengthening its own independence
and respecting the rule of law.
In that
context, we can only be very concerned by the protest initiated
in February 2020 by six NGOs against the appointment of the ‘Presiding Judge’
of the Constitutional Court, who had already served as President
of the Constitutional Court.
73. In 2019, the European Commission made the same assessment
on the accountability of the judiciary as the co-rapporteurs did
in 2015 and 2017: “track records of the enforcement of the code
of ethics and disciplinary accountability for judges and prosecutors
remain very limited”. One of HRA’s recommendations would be to amend
the law and the Regulations on Appraisals of Judges and Court Presidents
to ensure that all identified violations of the Code of Ethics are
taken into account during reviews of their promotion applications
and that these violations are assessed according to their gravity.
As co-rapporteurs, we all the more endorse this proposal, as GRECO,
in its Second Compliance report for the Fourth Evaluation Round, deplored
the fact that no progress had been made in reviewing the disciplinary
framework for the judges.
“13.1.2. provide ongoing professional training
to, and enhance the co-ordination between, the prosecution, the
police and the judiciary, so as to ensure effective and professionally administered
justice”
74. Concerning the training for judicial professions, our impression
is that genuine progress has been made. The aim of the Law on the
Centre for Training in the Judiciary (CTJ) and State Prosecution
was to transform the former Centre for Training of Judges into an
autonomous and self-sustainable legal entity, with the scope of
its activities being extended so as to include the training of State
prosecutors, deputies and advisers at the prosecution offices. Although
independent, the CTJ is an organisational unit of the Supreme Court.
In 2019, its budget slightly decreased to 619 000 euros, compared
to 624 240 in 2018. 14 of the 20 envisaged positions are filled.
75. During our discussion with magistrates and the director of
the CTJ, it appeared that the reservations expressed by the European
Commission in its 2019 annual assessment on the need for more proactive behaviour
from the CTJ when it came to training, promoting training and to
strengthening the co-operation with the Judicial and Prosecutorial
Councils, were being addressed. The CTJ built a very wide network
of international co-operation that goes beyond the numerous programmes
of the European Union or of the Council of Europe. We were informed
that focus had been placed on several areas of case-law relating
to the European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, these
areas included: article 3 (prohibition of torture), article 5 (right
to liberty), article 6 (right to a fair trial), article 10 (freedom
of expression) and article 13 (right to an effective remedy). These
claims were substantiated by the 2018 annual report of the CTJ.
We were also told that trainees were more and more interested in
the issues of ethics, appraisals and appointments for judges and
prosecutors. That could be interpreted as if the young magistrates
were more willing to know their own rights and ethical limitations,
which is a good thing for the future. According to the 2018 annual
report of the CTJ, the participation of judges and State prosecutors
to the trainings is very high.
76. During our meeting with the Director of the CTJ, we asked
if the training on humanitarian law would be strengthened. In its
2019 annual report, the European Commission noted that, concerning
crimes committed during the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the
judicial decisions reached in the past contained legal mistakes and
shortcomings in the application of international humanitarian law.
We were told that the CTJ was aware of this statement and was considering
it.
77. According to some judges we met, as a result of the efforts
made to improve the training of magistrates, the level of professionalism
of the new judges and prosecutors is much higher today than it was
10 years ago. Moreover, it is worth noticing that, when it comes
to the execution of the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights, none of the Montenegrin cases have been placed under enhanced
surveillance.
78. Concerning the efficiency of the justice system, in 2018 the
case backlog decreased by 4,5% to 38 970, while the number of cases
pending for more than three years fell by 4% to 3 081. This is a
continuous trend that is to be welcomed. The fall in disposition
time (average time from filing to decision) should also be welcomed:
178 days for first-instance proceedings in civil cases in 2018,
compared to 295 days in 2017.
79. We discussed the issue of the bailiff system that was recently
introduced in Montenegro, since the European Union underlined that
the enforcement of court decisions remains problematic. The Montenegrin authorities
are well aware of the flaws of the current system but stressed that
they had to build it almost from scratch. They are now working on
the accountability of this profession in co-operation with the European
Union. The non-paper of the European Commission from November 2019
welcomed the joint inspections of bailiffs’ offices, which produced
good results.
“13.1.3. strengthen the position and the
means of the newly elected Supreme State Prosecutor, who must be
held accountable for bringing to court cases motivated by sound
and reasoned indictments”
80. We unfortunately did not meet the Supreme State Prosecutor.
No information led us to believe that his position and its means
had not been strengthened, as paragraph 13.1.3. of
Resolution 2030 (2015) required. However, it was brought to our attention that
the ‘Envelope Affaire’ had repercussion on the Supreme State Prosecutor’s
office (SSPO): on 8 October 2019, the Prosecutorial Council decided
to provisionally maintain Mr Ivica Stanković beyond his term as
acting Supreme State Prosecutor until his successor was elected.
One member of the Prosecutorial Council also announced an investigation
into the allegations of Mr Duško Knežević for paying bribes to the
SSPO in order to stop an investigation into foreign clients of Atlas
Bank, which he owned.
81. On another issue related to the transmission of documents
by the SSPO to the Commission for monitoring actions of the competent
authorities in the investigation of cases of threats and violence
against journalists, murders of journalists and attacks on media
property, we were told that the SSPO waited for nine months before
answering repeated requests of the Commission in the case of the
journalist Olivera Lakić, which was a regrettable precedent.
3.2. Position
of the co-rapporteurs and concluding remarks on the independence
of the judiciary
82. Our general assessment is that
Montenegro made genuine progress in laying the grounds for the future. Its
magistrates are better trained, and the legal framework put in place
with the co-operation of the Venice Commission, after the adoption
of constitutional amendments in 2013, seems rather in line with
European standards. However, there remains some room for improvements,
so that the recommendations
of the Venice Commission can be taken into account. The Montenegrin
authorities have themselves recognised it. The rules regarding the
“lay members” of the Judicial Council could, in particular, be improved.
83. In certain fields of litigation, the rule of law prevailed.
This seemed to be the case in December 2018, for instance, when
the Constitutional Court annulled arrest warrants issued against
two MPs, Mr Medojević and Mr Knežević, who had been arrested without
their immunity having been lifted, even though it finally did not decide
on the issue of the parliamentarian immunity itself. The rule of
law also seemed to be demonstrated in 2018, when different Basic
Courts and the High Court in Podgorica dared to annul very sensitive
decisions taken by the parliament to dismiss members of the Council
of the RTCG and its former president, even though their judgments
were overruled by the Supreme Court in June 2019. The same could
also be said when in October 2019 the Appeal court of Podgorica
quashed the judgement of first instance condemning an investigative
journalist working on arms trafficking, Mr Jovo Martinović, who
had been previously sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment for drug
trafficking and criminal association.
84. However, wrong signals with regard to the transparency of
judges’ selection and appointments were recently sent in a society
where the judiciary is perceived as being vulnerable to political
influence and where the small size of the judicial professions’
world may be seen as facilitating the closing of ranks mentality.
85. As the European Commission underlined it in its annual report
of 2019, the number of judges (51) and prosecutors (17) per 100 000
inhabitants in Montenegro is far above the European average of 21
judges and 11 prosecutors. Montenegro is not lacking magistrates.
Hence, the focus should be on a change of culture through new procedures
and on willing efforts to support the reform process, especially
by:
- implementing the spirit
of the constitutional changes regarding the limitation of two-terms
for Presidents of Courts,
- increasing the transparency in the selection of magistrates
and in their appointments,
- enhancing the enforcement of the code of ethics and disciplinary
accountability for magistrates.
4. Trust
in the electoral process
86. Considering the current political
tensions in Montenegro and the way in which the latest general elections took
place, with a so-called coup d’état on polling day, it is of utmost
importance that the next general elections scheduled for 2020 be
seen as free and fair and that their results be considered unquestionable
by most, if not, all the political stakeholders. Therefore, the
manner in which it will be administered is probably as important
as the content of the electoral reform itself.
87. The Council of Europe, including the Assembly’s co-rapporteurs,
as well as the European Union, kept on pleading for a review of
the electoral legal framework in a comprehensive and inclusive manner
well in advance of the next election. Unfortunately, the boycott
of the parliament by some parties in the opposition made it difficult
to improve legislation in this field at the level required.
4.1. Resolution 2030 (2015) requirements
and relevant developments in this field
88. Resolution 2030 (2015) listed five requirements as regards trust in the electoral
process. These related to the financing and the use of administrative
resources in the electoral campaigns, the electronic voter list,
the electoral process at local level, the recognition of Montenegrin
citizenship and the recommendations from the OSCE’s Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Venice Commission.
“13.2.1.
implement the Law on Financing Political Entities and Election Campaigns,
including regulations on the use of administrative resources during
electoral campaigns”
89. As the ‘Envelope affair’ demonstrated, the Law on Financing
Political Entities and Election Campaigns that was deeply modified
in 2014 and last amended in 2017 had a limited effect on the prevention
and the sanction of illegal donations. The role and the powers of
the APC created in 2016, and which is in charge of controlling the
funds and the expenditures of all parties, were questioned by the
ad hoc Committee of the Bureau of the Assembly for the observation
of the parliamentary elections in 2016, for “it did not manage to guarantee
adequate transparency of pre-electoral activities and expenditure
of the parties”.
These doubts were reiterated
by the ad hoc Committee of the Bureau for the observation of the
presidential election in 2018: “The system of funding for political
parties and presidential candidates seems very generous compared
with the salaries and pensions funded from the national budget of
Montenegro. As in the previous elections, candidates generally failed
to report in kind donations and this non-compliance has not been
properly and efficiently addressed by the APC. Many ad hoc committee
interlocutors questioned the impartiality and voiced criticisms
regarding the functioning and transparency of the Agency, as well
as its reluctance to co-operate with civil society organisations
by publishing or providing them with any information”.
90. The lack of effectiveness of the legal framework governing
funding appears to be all the more damaging, since candidates not
belonging to the ruling party seemed to have limited resources during
the 2018 presidential campaign.
Moreover, it does not
offset the highly possible abuse of administrative resources by the
ruling party that has been governing for 20 years. In its report
on the 2018 presidential election, the ad hoc Committee noted that
“credible allegations of vote buying, hiring public employees during
the election period and pressure on voters, which is regrettably
a recurrent feature of elections in Montenegro, undermined voters’ confidence
in the electoral process”.
In 2016, the Venice Commission
and the OSCE ODIHR published Joint Guidelines for preventing and
responding to the misuse of administrative resources during electoral
processes that could be of help for the Montenegrin authorities.
“13.2.2.
finalise the establishment, and ensure the correct use of, electronic
voter lists in future elections”
91. The establishment of the electronic voters’ register was achieved
and is kept up to date by the Ministry of the Interior. In 2015,
the co-rapporteurs hinted that 25 000 citizens were lacking a Biometric
ID, although it was necessary to be able to vote.
This issue seems to have
been solved.
92. In 2016, the ad hoc Committee of the Bureau was impressed
by the effectiveness of the new electronic voter identification
system (Automated Fingerprint Identification System – AFSIS), which
it recommended for adoption by other member States. However, some
minor adjustments proposed by NGOs, the Centre for Monitoring and
Research (Cemi) and the Centre for Democratic Elections (CDT), could
be made.
93. The voters’ register remains a source of concern for several
NGOs and opposition parties. In 2016, the then Minister of the Interior,
who belonged to the opposition, refused to sign the voters’ register,
as he deemed it to be inaccurate. In 2016 and 2018, the ad hoc Committees
of the Bureau and the OSCE/ODIHR mentioned the allegations of NGOs
and the opposition that the voter list contains deceased voters
and those who live abroad. The ad hoc Committee of the Bureau reported
in 2018 that the electoral body represents over 80 % of the population,
which is a relatively high figure.
In its final report on
the observation of the presidential election of 2018, the OSCE/ODIHR
noted that despite efforts by the Ministry of the Interior to increase
the transparency of the voter list by conducting cross checks, publishing
data on-line and issuing messages to the public with information
about the voter list verification and location of polling stations,
the accuracy of the voter list was questioned by NGOs and the opposition.
However, no evidence was produced to the ODIHR and no complaints
were filed.
94. We raised the issue with representatives of civil society
who confirmed that the voters’ register had been genuinely improved
and was updated by the Ministry of the Interior in a professional
manner. They underlined, however, that this register was established
on the basis of other registers, one of them being the register
of residence, which has caused the most concerns.
In 2014, the NGO Center for
Democratic Transition proposed to check this register. This proposal
was rejected by the opposition party Democratic Front and by the
DPS.
95. As co-rapporteurs, we believe that this checking could only
help rebuild trust in the electoral process and complete the unquestionable
progress that was made in this field.
“13.2.3. take measures
to fully involve local authorities and local political leaders in
building trust in the electoral process at local level”
96. In Montenegro, local elections are not organised so as to
take place within a single day, but instead take place on a rolling
basis. In 2018, local elections took place in 13 municipalities.
We believe that two measures could be taken in order to fulfil Montenegro’s
obligations in that area.
97. First, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the
Council of Europe has never been invited to observe any local election
in Montenegro. It could certainly be invited to do so.
98. Second, the electoral reform should include local elections,
in line with the Congress’ recommendations. In a similar case in
Armenia, the Congress stated, in its observation reports, that the
scattered nature of local elections is impractical, decreases the
attention paid to the respective elections, is confusing for the
voter and lowers public attention to elections at the grassroots’
level in general. It suggested that local elections be held on a
single day and that they take place at least six months from parliamentary
elections in order to raise public awareness on issues of local
significance.
99. We strongly believe that local elections could contribute
towards restoring trust in the electoral process, for, as we already
said, there is a genuine political competition at this level. Moreover,
parties belonging to the opposition in the parliament rule some
important cities and are engaged in local coalition. The local level
shall therefore not be forgotten.
“13.2.4. adopt legislation that facilitates
the recognition of Montenegrin citizenship according to Assembly
Resolution 1989 (2014) on access to nationality and the effective
implementation of the European Convention on Nationality”
100. This requirement was not in the draft resolution presented
to the Assembly in 2015 but added through an amendment that was
subsequently sub-amended in the chamber. The Monitoring committee
was in favour of it. Initially, the amendment was not designed to
be part of the Montenegrin road map, but it found its way there
as the result of this sub-amendment.
101. The link of this paragraph to the trust in elections is, however,
not completely obvious and more indirect than others. Montenegro
is one of the few member States to have signed and ratified the
European Convention on Nationality (
ETS
No.166) in 2010. It did so with one reservation on article
16 – Conservation of previous nationality – that says that “a State
party shall not make the renunciation or loss of another nationality
a condition for the acquisition or retention of its nationality
where such renunciation or loss is not possible or cannot reasonably
be required”. It is true that paragraph 7 of the
Resolution 1989 (2014) states that “(…) the renunciation of the nationality
of origin should not be a necessary precondition for the acquisition
of the nationality of the host country.”
102. We raised the issue with the Chair of the Standing Committee
for Human Rights in the parliament and asked, pointing out the weak
impact on voting, on whether Montenegro was considering withdrawing
its reservation on article 16. The Chair answered that he was not
informed of any move from the government in this direction.
“13.2.5.
address the remaining issues highlighted in the recommendations
from the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
and the Venice Commission, such as reducing the constitutional two-year
residency requirement to six months, the same as for local elections,
before citizens can obtain the right to vote”
103. Hereafter are the four most recurrent and priority recommendations
developed in OSCE/ODIHR
and ad hoc Committee of the Bureau
reports.
Two years of residency condition not in line with
European standards
104. According to ODIHR, the Montenegrin
Constitution guarantees citizens the right to vote if they have resided
in the country for two years prior to the election day. The election
law further restricts the right to vote only to those who were residents
for the last two years immediately before election day and does
not allow for out of country voting. The same residence requirement
has to be met in order to be registered as a candidate. This condition
has been constantly criticised by the OSCE/ODIHR, the ad hoc Committees
of the Bureau of the Assembly and the Venice Commission. In particular,
it goes against the principles set forth in the Venice Commission
Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, which states that a
length of residence requirement may be imposed on nationals solely
for local or regional elections.
Absence of a clear day when the electoral campaign
starts
105. The law does not determine
when the electoral campaign officially begins. It only states that
the right to free airtime on the public broadcaster starts on the
day when the candidate list is registered by the State Election
Commission (SEC). This lack of definition causes confusion as to
when campaign regulations apply and blurs the timeframe for the
oversight of campaign finance, for imposing restrictions on public
officials for campaigning, or for granting equal access of candidates
to purchase advertisements on private media. Furthermore, according
to ODIHR, it allows for early campaigning, in the absence of a sanctioning
mechanism.
Impartiality and accountability of the SEC should
be enhanced
106. This should be done primarily
by allowing the media to have access to SEC meetings, which is not
the case. It would also be worth obliging the SEC to publish all
relevant documents in a timely manner, including its decisions,
especially when it fulfils the gap of electoral regulations.
Fostering of the independence of the RTCG and the
AEM
107. The public broadcaster, RTCG,
funded from the State budget, runs three television channels and
two radio stations. Despite legal guarantees of independence, the
public broadcaster is not exempt from political influence, according
to ODIHR. At the end of 2017, in controversial decisions, the parliament
replaced several members of the RTCG Council and one member of the
media regulator, the AEM, due to conflicts of interest spotted by
the APC. On 20 March 2018, that is before the Presidential election
of April, the new RTCG Council replaced its President. The ODHIR
saw these early dismissals as directly challenging the autonomy
and independence of the RCTG and of the AEM. The electoral reform
should then take into account ways to protect the council’s members
of these bodies from undue influence from politics, and early dismissals
should be permitted only in limited circumstances.
4.2. How
to deliver the electoral reform – the issue of the ad hoc parliamentary
committee
108. On 30 October 2018, the Interim
Committee for Further Reform of Electoral and Other Legislation
was created within the parliament. The second largest group from
the parliamentary opposition, the DCG, only started to take part
in its work in September 2019 during our fact-finding mission, although
other groups from the opposition participated in it previously.
In July 2019, the parliament decided to widen the mandate of this Committee
and renamed it the ‘Committee on Comprehensive Reform of Electoral
and Other Legislation’ (‘Comprehensive Committee’). Its seven working
groups were tasked with almost all of the key issues – apart from
the fight against corruption – discussed in this report. For instance,
working group No. 1 was in charge of local elections, No. 2 of the
voters’ register, No. 4 on the Law on media and the Law on the RTCG,
No. 5 of the legislation on financing political entities and electoral
campaigns. The aim was to allow the Comprehensive Committee to propose
draft laws that ought to be passed before the general elections
in 2020. Its mandate was prolonged until 18 December 2019.
109. As a supplementary guarantee of the inclusiveness of the process,
DPS agreed on 29 July 2019 that the amendments proposed by the Comprehensive
Committee would require a four-fifths majority instead of the previous
two-thirds majority. This commitment and the intervention of the
European Ambassador facilitated the participation of the DCG that
had been boycotting the parliament since October 2016.
110. Unfortunately, on 10 December 2019, the DCG left the Comprehensive
Committee and asked the government to withdraw the then draft Law
on Freedom of Religion. Without the DCG, the quorum failed and the
Comprehensive Committee was not able to achieve its task at the
end of its mandate on 18 December. However, the parliament passed
amendments that did not require a two-thirds majority on four laws:
the Law on Financing of Political Entities and Election Campaigns,
the Law on the Criminal Code, the Law on Territorial Organisation
and the Law on Voters List. On 9 January 2020, DPS called on the
opposition to re-start the dialogue on the electoral reform, but
the opposition factions, DF, DCG and SDP, replied that the amendments were
passed after they decided to leave the Comprehensive Committee.
The amendments to the four laws were not formally assessed, neither
by the Council of Europe, nor by the OSCE at the time of drafting.
111. On the other hand, DPS repeated that a technical government
was not an option. This statement is of importance, since it was
the way chosen to organise previous general elections in 2016. In
April 2016, the political parties represented in the parliament
signed an Agreement for Creating Conditions for Free and Fair Elections,
that was implemented as a law, and allowed the formation of a transition
government tasked with preparing the elections. The agreement also
called for the resignation of the director and editors of the public broadcaster
and the entrance of opposition members into the government with
ministerial posts, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the
Ministry of Finance. This commanding effort to ease direct confrontation
between the ruling majority and the opposition and strengthen the
confidence in the electoral results was ruined by the allegations
of electoral fraud made by the opposition, the refusal of the opposition
to recognise the results of the election, and the so-called coup
d’état that took place on the election day.
112. During our visit, representatives from the majority reiterated
their opposition to a technical government prior the general elections,
arguing that they already agreed to it in 2016 and that it did not
prevent the entire opposition from refusing the results of the election
and boycotting the parliament. Representatives of the opposition
all assured us that a technical government was a pre-requisite to
their taking part to the next general elections.
113. Montenegro already experienced attempts to revise its electoral
framework in 2014 and 2017, in line with OSCE/ODIHR recommendations.
Each time, an ad hoc parliamentary Committee was created and the presence
of the opposition was demanded. Each time not all – and sometimes
none of – the proposals established could be discussed or passed,
because of the lack of the required majority when the opposition was
boycotting the parliament. For the 2020 general elections, there
is also a risk that the legal framework may not be revised. In that
context, the first victim would be the trust of the citizens in
the electoral system. On the contrary, the majority and the opposition
could choose to preserve the actual and very perfectible framework, the
former claiming that the reform was blocked by the opposition, the
latter complaining about the impossibility to have free and fair
elections.
114. This is exactly what should be avoided and why we wrote in
our statement following our mission that “for the Council of Europe
and the international community, this process [of electoral reform]
will also indicate the level of maturity of the political dialogue
in Montenegro. The ruling coalition and the entire opposition have
the opportunity to demonstrate that they are able to negotiate within
the parliamentary framework, which is the right platform for political
dialogue irrespective of serious differences between the stakeholders.”
4.3. Position
of the co-rapporteurs and concluding remarks on the trust in the
electoral process
115. Apart from the voters’ register,
no progress has been made in the implementation of the requirements set
by
Resolution 2030 (2015), since 2015. In the absence of a proper assessment of
the amendments to the four laws and given the likelihood that the
Comprehensive Committee will not re-start its work in March 2020, it
is clear to us, that the way the next general elections will develop
will be a key element in determining the future of the post-monitoring
dialogue with Montenegro.
5. Fight
against corruption
116. In
Resolution 2030 (2015), the Assembly noted that, despite the many policies
launched to root out corruption, it remained widespread and should
be further tackled. In their information note of 2017, the rapporteurs
pointed out the weak track-record of investigations, prosecutions
and final convictions in the area of fighting corruption. In its
2019 annual assessment, the European Commission stated that, overall,
corruption was prevalent in many areas, remained an issue of concern
and that there was a need for strong political will to effectively
address corruption issues, as well as a robust criminal justice
response to high-level corruption.
5.1. Resolution 2030 (2015) requirements
and relevant developments in this field
117. Resolution 2030 (2015) listed four requirements related to the legal framework
on the prevention of corruption, the Special Prosecutor on Corruption
(or ‘Special Public Prosecutor’), the establishment of a record of
high-level cases and the recommendations of the GRECO.
“13.3.1.
implement the Law on Prevention of Corruption and the Law on Prevention
of Conflict of Interests; entrust to the future Agency for the Prevention
of Corruption the implementation of efficient preventive policies
and give it all necessary means to properly control the funding
of political parties and electoral campaigns”
118. Since 2016, the APC has been in charge of the identification
and prevention of conflicts of interest in the exercise of public
functions, whistle-blowers’ protection, control of the financing
of political entities and election campaigns and regulating lobbying.
It has 45 employees.
119. Apart from the criticisms by several NGO’s against the way
the APC reacted during the ‘Envelope affair,’ the APC has had no
cases related to abuse of public resources for parties and electoral
campaigns in three years of intense voting periods (general election,
presidential election and several local elections). It seemed to
have a limited record in almost all the fields of its activities,
except when it comes to incompatibility of functions and conflicts
of interests.
120. But it is also when dealing with conflicts of interests, that
the APC was highly criticised for making it possible for the parliament
to vote on the dismissal of members of the RTCG in 2017. In June
2018, the Agency was further criticised for proposing that the parliament
be seized of allegations of conflict of interest involving one of
the members of its board belonging to civil society, Ms Vanja Ćalović
Marković, executive director of MANS.
121. Although 95% of public officials submitted income and asset
declarations for the period 2017-2018 in due time, only 10 members
of the government gave their optional consent to the APC for access
to their bank account for the purpose of verifying the data submitted
in the income and asset declaration.
122. In 2018, the APC opened 30 cases of inexplicable wealth, but
found no irregularities in 28 of them.
123. A serious matter concerning access to information arose in
2018: public entities, including the APC, increasingly declare requested
documents classified in order to restrict access to information.
This is particularly damaging in areas prone to corruption and in
sectors dealing with the allocation of large portions of State budget
or property. This tendency to restrict access to public documents
can also be found in the electoral campaigns: MANS criticised the
APC for having declared contracts, invoices, bank statements submitted
to it by political entities after the elections as business secrets
and alleged that the APC would have even declared secret its own
decision determining that DPS had violated the law with regard to
the ‘Envelope affair’.
It
also criticised the Agency for Personal Data Protection and Free
Access to Information for its April 2018 decision, during the presidential
campaign, that political parties are not obliged to act on requests
for free access to information, thereby limiting the scope for public
scrutiny of campaign financing.
124. We discussed these issues with representatives of the APC.
It was brought to our attention that it was not a repressive but
a preventive body. This is in line with the choice made by the legislator
in 2016, which could have very well been different. According to
them, the statistics show that public officials still need to be aware
of the legislation related to conflict of interest. Concerning the
‘Envelope affair”, we were told that the APC had already proposed
amendments to the Law on Financing Public Entities (42 recommendations),
and that a significant number of these recommendations were incorporated
into the Draft Law on Financing of Political Entities and Election
Campaigns, prepared by the Committee on Comprehensive Electoral
Reform and Other Legislation. The representatives of the APC stressed
that the sanction it applied to the DPS – to return 47 500 euros
to the State budget and pay a 20 000 euros fine – was the highest
the law permitted and if documents were not made public, it was
because this case was part of a criminal procedure and, as a consequence
thereof, was covered by the confidentiality rules governing this
kind of procedure.
125. Last but not least, the APC made it clear that in the case
of the RTCG, the procedure was initiated by the parliament, that
the APC conducted its investigation in relation to all members of
the RTCG Council, and established a violation of the regulation
related to conflict of interests for seven out of nine members.
It also indicated that when the APC establishes such violation,
it is up to the parliament and not to the APC to decide to use administrative
sanctions and if it does, which ones.
126. A development, which the European Commission highlighted in
its November 2019 non-paper, occurred in July 2019. The parliament
appointed the new Council of the APC, composed of five members,
two being from civil society. The interpretation of the eligibility
criteria for Council members would have led to “excluding some competent
civil society organisations’ candidates”.
“13.3.2. adopt the Law
on the Special Prosecutor on Corruption and Organised Crime, provide this
office with the necessary human and financial resources and ensure
co-ordination with the other bodies active in the field of corruption,
so as to duly and diligently prosecute cases of corruption as soon
as possible”
127. Compared to 2015 and to the last visit of the rapporteurs
in 2017, the means of the Special Public Prosecutor’s Office (SPPO)
and of the Special Police Unit (SPU) have been increased. The number
of prosecutors allocated to the SPPO is now 12 and two additional
prosecutors have been temporarily seconded to the SPPO. Of the planned
37 positions, 34 have been filled. As regards the SPU, 32 positions
were filled (20 in 2017); in 2017 the Special State Prosecutor told
the co-rapporteurs that there would need to be 50 police officers
in order to cover the whole territory.
128. In 2017, the Special Public Prosecutor complained about the
excessive broadness of his mandate, arguing that he was in charge
of the prosecution of perpetrators of organised crime, high-level
corruption, money laundering, terrorism and war crimes. In the end,
his competencies were, as he expected, expanded so as to include
offenses related to the 2016 ‘attempted coup’, which has been investigated
as a terrorist attack. He told us that he still was in favour of
narrowing the definition of ‘high-level corruption’ in order to
concentrate the SPPO resources to fight the corruption related to
high public officials.
129. Concerning the co-ordination with other bodies in the field
of corruption, the European Commission hinted that, following the
trend of previous years, the police and other State institutions
continue to submit only a small number of cases to the prosecution
service, while hardly any originate from official inspections or auditing
bodies. The SPPO seems to remain the key actor in the fight against
corruption.
130. In 2015, in its final opinion on the revised draft law on
Special Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Venice Commission regretted
that the relationship between the Special Public Prosecutor and
the police (SPU) did not take into account its previous conclusions
regarding the draft law.
Notably, the fact that
disciplinary proceedings, in cases involving failure to execute
the order given by the special prosecutor, remained in the hands
of the police chief rather than the prosecutor “leaves a question
mark over the effectiveness of these procedures”.
In its interim opinion,
the Venice Commission recommended that police officers from the
SPU be seconded to the SPPO, and in this framework, that they carry
out their activities, as judicial police, under the exclusive authority
of the Special Public Prosecutor.
We had the
confirmation that there were no plans for a secondment of SPU officers,
but the Special Public Prosecutor assured us that SPU officers were
actually conducting their activities under his close supervision.
In its non-paper from November 2019, the European Commission hinted
that, following an important reorganisation of the Police Directorate,
the Special Public Prosecutor kept the right to appoint the Head
of the SPU, but did not appoint his superior. It concluded that “this
new hierarchical layer between SPO [SPPO] and SPU introduces a risk
of
de facto stronger control
of the executive power in investigations into organised crime cases.”
131. Although the SPPO was provided with increased human resources,
the European Commission underlined in its non-paper that the low
salary conditions of the experts supporting Prosecutors have not
been addressed and the condition of the SPPO premises remains poor.
“13.3.3.
establish a record of high-level cases, ensure the full implementation
of the law and enable courts to reach final decisions”
132. In 2019, the European Commission stated that an initial track
record of investigation, prosecution and final convictions in corruption
cases has been established, but sustained efforts were needed to
consolidate results. NGOs were more critical. In a study on corruption
cases tried from 2013 to 2018, MANS criticised official statistics
on anti-corruption as unreliable, reported that only two final verdicts
for corruption were adopted by the autumn of 2018, that there were
very few cases against State officials, and that the number of cases
against such State officials was by far the lowest among all those
charged with corruption.
133. The Special Public Prosecutor and the representative of the
Ministry of Justice disagreed with the assessment made by the European
Union. The Special Public Prosecutor presented us a complete report
on his activities and emphasised that he had to deal with international
criminals. The representative of the Ministry of Justice also regretted
that the fallout from the ‘Šarić brothers’ case’
has
taken attention away from the ‘initial track record’ of the SPPO.
This case is repeatedly referred to by several NGOs as the embodiment
of the failed fight against corruption. According to the Montenegrin
authorities, as of 2015, the records of corruption cases fall under
the jurisdiction of the High Court in Podgorica. At the end of 2017,
the court rendered 40 judgements in case of high-level corruption,
31 of which were final. In 2018, 20 criminal cases of high-level corruption
were resolved, of which 8 judgments were passed and 4 became final.
Among these 4 judgements, the court rendered three acquittals and
one conviction was reached through a plea-bargain agreement.
134. It is the opinion of the co-rapporteurs that the assessment
of the requirement set by paragraph 13.3.3. of
Resolution 2030 (2015) is rather complex in comparison to the other requirements.
Whereas recommendations by MONEYVAL or by GRECO consist mostly of
passing laws or regulations and monitoring the implementation, which
is rather feasible to check, assessing the establishment of a record
of high profile cases is more difficult. It implies selecting and
setting up relevant criteria (number of cases, number of convictions,
type of convictions, volume of frozen assets…), and being able to
check the official record presented by the national authorities,
which are often related to complicated cases. The co-rapporteurs
are not sufficiently equipped for that. However, we noted that the
SPPO started to function only two years ago. We are well aware of
the results in certain cases such as the ‘Šarić brothers’, the ‘Limenka
affair’
or the
‘Carine case’,
but we noted that several new cases
had been opened since 2018, such as those related to the privatisation
of Hotels Avala, in Budva, and Bianka, in Kolasin.
135. In its November 2019 non-paper, the European Commission emphasised
that Montenegro’s continuing involvement in international police
co-operation led to a number of successful operations. However,
it stated that “the criminal justice system appears generally lenient,
with sentences, fines and asset recoveries disproportionately low
compared with the gravity of the crime.”
136. In its 2019 report, the European Commission took into account
the recurrent criticisms by NGOs concerning the high number of cases
ending with plea bargains and lenient sentences. In May 2019, the Special
Public Prosecutor announced that plea agreements would no longer
be concluded. In the case of the Budva criminal group, that was
mentioned by the rapporteurs in 2015,
MANS recalled that the
SPPO “most often agreed to impose a six months prison sentence for
criminal offenses, for which a sentence ranging from two to ten
years in prison is prescribed and which resulted in multi-million
dollars gain.”
Representatives
from civil society explained to us that the very frequent use of
plea-bargaining by the SPPO came from the fact that it permitted
a quick seizure of criminal goods and was sometimes the best way
to overcome difficulties in applying legislation against money-laundering,
that was hard to prove.
137. The Montenegrin authorities informed us that they were well
aware of the flaws in their asset-freezing system and that a German
expert was currently assessing it, with the possibility of proposing
reforms.
“13.3.4. further implement the recommendations
made by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) related to
the third and fourth evaluation rounds focusing on incrimination,
funding of political parties, parliamentarians and the judiciary”
138. Concerning the third evaluation round focusing on incrimination
and transparency of party funding, GRECO concluded in its Second
Compliance report published on 19 January 2015
that out of 14 recommendations,
12 had been satisfactorily implemented or dealt with in a satisfactory
manner. The two remaining recommendations have been partly implemented.
The first one (recommendation iv.) aimed at introducing clear rules
and guidance concerning the use of public resources for party activity
and election campaigns. GRECO highlighted that the rules had not
been sufficiently coupled with clear mechanisms for their enforcement,
both in terms of the responsible authorities and the available sanctions.
The second one (recommendation vi.) called for an institution to
be given appropriate independent authority and resources to monitor
the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns. GRECO
considered that, given the abuse of administrative resources that
came to light in the 2013 presidential election and in the municipal
elections of 2014, it could only be cautious as to the effectiveness
of the oversight mechanisms for political financing. Although the
legislative framework was improved since this evaluation, the tune
of the assessment is the same as the more recent ones of the co-rapporteurs,
the ad hoc Committees of the Bureau of the Assembly and the European
Union. The APC developed Guidelines for the use of public resources
in election campaigns and considers the two remaining recommendations
of GRECO as fully implemented.
139. Concerning the fourth evaluation round on Corruption prevention
in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors, GRECO
concluded in its Second Compliance report published on 6 February
2020
that out of 11 recommendations,
8 were considered to be fully implemented, and 1 partially implemented,
while 2 recommendations have not yet been implemented.
140. Recommendation i. (partly implemented) aimed at ensuring that
there is a mechanism within the Montenegrin Parliament both to promote
the Code of Ethics for parliamentarians and raise their awareness
as regards the standards expected from them and at enforcing such
standards where necessary. GRECO concluded that it had not been
able to assess the effectiveness of the mechanism for enforcing
the ethical standards applicable to the parliamentarians.
141. Recommendation v. (not implemented) that dealt with the strengthening
of the Judicial Council’s independence was already largely described
in part 3.1.
142. Recommendation vii. (not implemented) aimed at strengthening
the disciplinary framework for judges and increasing transparency
in the disciplinary procedure. GRECO was informed that a working
group composed of judges of the Supreme Court was tasked with proposing
amendments to the Law on the Judicial Council and judges, inter
alia on disciplinary liability of judges. Concerning transparency,
GRECO considered that the publishing of decisions concerning the
Code of Ethics of judges needed to be complemented.
143. Although the Second Compliance report terminates the Fourth
Round Compliance procedure in respect of Montenegro, GRECO stated
in paragraph 43 of the report that it was “alarming that no progress
has been demonstrated as regards the composition and independence
of the Judicial Council, nor in reviewing the disciplinary framework
for judges.”
5.2. Position of the co-rapporteurs and
concluding remarks on the fight against corruption
144. It is clear to us that the
rather severe criticisms made by the NGOs or the European Union
against the APC or the record on high-level corruption do not target
a lack of means or a non-functionable legal framework. Once again,
although progress can be made on the legislation related to money-laundering
or the freezing of assets and properties, pre-requisite seem to
be in place for an efficient fight against corruption. In a country where
“corruption is prevalent in many areas and remains an issue of concern”,
according to the European Commission 2019 assessment, addressing
corruption issues requires a strong and enduring political will.
In our opinion, this is what the Montenegrin authorities should
demonstrate.
6. The situation of the media
145. The situation of the media
is an ancient concern of the different co-rapporteurs on Montenegro.
Upon their recommendation, in 2015, the Assembly chose to keep it
as a key issue of the post-monitoring dialogue, because it needed
to be strongly improved.
146. In 2017, the co-rapporteurs reminded the Montenegrin authorities
that “the state of freedom of expression and freedom of the media
in the country [had] seen little progress since the last co-rapporteurs’
visit [in 2015]”.
This conclusion was echoed
by the European Parliament in 2018, which stated: “[it was] increasingly
concerned about the state of freedom of expression and media freedom,
in which three successive Commission reports have noted ‘no progress’”.
The European Commission
reiterated in its 2019 report that “no progress was made in the
reporting period and previous recommendations are yet to be addressed”.
147. The two indexes usually used by NGOs to evaluate the overall
situation of the media in a country, place Montenegro in a middle
position. The Montenegro media situation is considered as “partly
free” by Freedom House in 2017, with a score of 44/100, 0 being
the freest, 100 being the least free. According to the World Press Freedom
Index of Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF) – Reporters Without Borders
– Montenegro ranks 104 out of 180 countries in 2019.
148. The media landscape is heavily polarised along political lines.
Media outlets are subject to political and economic pressure.
6.1. Resolution
2030 (2015) requirements and relevant developments in
this field
“13.4.1.
refrain from condoning any abuse of freedom of the media and of
expression, adopt legislation to punish attacks on human dignity
in the media, and ensure that court decisions are duly enforced”
149. This requirement was directly
related to the smear campaign led by the daily newspaper
Informer against Ms Vanja Ćalović
Marković, executive director of MANS, after MANS monitored 13 local
elections on 25 May 2014, reported hundreds of irregularities and
announced that it would submit more than 130 criminal complaints
for offences against voting rights. Despite a court ruling which
banned the further publication of the offensive material, the
Informer continued to try discrediting
Ms Ćalović’s personal and professional integrity.
150. No similar case has been reported to us since then, and nor
have the ad hoc Committees of the Bureau of the Assembly or ODIHR
mentioned such concerns during the 2016 general election or the
2018 presidential election. However, this requirement will remain
valid if such an event is repeated during the next general election
in 2020 or the local elections, as we fully share the statement
made by the co-rapporteurs in 2015 that “this […] happened in a
context that […] made life difficult for NGOs who perform oversight
of public action and publish critical reports”.
151. It is also clear to us that this requirement completes one
of the priority recommendations ODIHR made in its report on the
presidential election, according to which, during the electoral
process, the “authorities should firmly condemn any attacks against
journalists and foster measures to protect journalists and prevent
impunity (…)”.
“13.4.2.
ensure that the Commission for Monitoring the Actions of the Competent
Authorities in the Investigation of Cases of Threats and Violence
Against Journalists, Assassinations of Journalists and Attacks on
Media Property has full access to data and that all public bodies
reply at the earliest opportunity to all information requests made
by the commission in order to solve the 10 remaining cases of attacks,
threats and murders of journalists that it is dealing with”
The Commission
152. Violence and threats against
journalists have been a long-lasting concern in Montenegro. Another concern
is the fact that they developed in a context that could be qualified
as impunity. The Commission for monitoring the actions of the competent
authorities in the investigation of cases of threats and violence
against journalists, murders of journalists and attacks on media
property was created in 2013 and designed to strongly incite public
authorities to properly investigate through access to their data
and the publication of an annual report.
153. This Commission is administratively linked to the Ministry
of the Interior. It is currently composed of nine members representing
civil society, the Prosecutorial Council, the Trade Union of Media,
the police, the National security agency, the Media Self-Regulation
service, two newspapers usually perceived as very critical towards
the government and a journalist expert. It is chaired by Mr Nikola
Marković, assistant editor-in-chief of the daily Dan. Its last report was published
in February 2019.
154. We welcome the work of this very original body, which is helping
to ease relationships between all the stakeholders, is dedicated
to its mission and produces relevant information. In particular,
we commend the public support that the government gave to the Commission
while it was confronted with the refusal of the Supreme State Prosecutor
to deliver documents to it on the Olivera Lakić case,
which
it finally did nine months after it was requested to do so. We call
on the government to continue supporting the Commission by delivering
comprehensive feed-backs on the recommendations made by the latter,
for they are, according to the Commission, more than limited today.
We welcome the decision of the government to set a monthly fee for the
work of the Commission, which it has been paying since January 2018.
We further urge the government to provide the Commission with the
resources it needs to fulfil its mission. If the Commission decides
to recruit an international expert for some of its cases, as it
did in October 2018, it is our opinion that it should be able to
do so. It seems that the Prime Minister shares our views, since,
according to the Montenegrin delegation, he agreed with Mr Marković
during a meeting they had on 4 March 2020 that the Commission should
be supported by international experts.
155. A possible efficient means to incite public administration
to respond to the Commission’s requests could be to organise an
annual public debate within the parliament on the report of the
Commission. We discussed this issue with the Commission and with
the chair of the parliamentary Standing Committee for Human Rights and
they seemed to support this proposal. Following an exchange of views,
the Monitoring Committee of the Assembly, during its Paris meeting
in December 2019, in the presence of Mr Marković, and thanks to
the intervention of the chairperson of the Montenegrin delegation,
Mr Predrag Sekulić, the Committee for Security and Defence and the
Committee on Human Rights and Freedoms from the Parliament of Montenegro
decided to hold a joint hearing with Mr Marković on 6 March 2020.
We welcome this initiative and hope that it will be the first step
of a regular public hearing on the reports of the Montenegrin Commission
for Monitoring.
Attacks on journalists
156. Apart from the requirement
set by paragraph 13.4.2. of
Resolution
2030 (2015), we deeply regret that the safety of journalists has
not improved in recent years. We are well aware of the fact that
Montenegrin authorities actively co-operate with the Council of
Europe platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety
of journalists, and that their actions led the partners of this
platform to declare two cases (Vladimir Ostašević and Sead Sadiković)
‘resolved’. We have also noted the opinion expressed in the Montenegro
Media Sector Inquiry, financed by the European Union and implemented
by the Council of Europe, that: “it is obvious that there are visible
efforts by the Prosecution office of Montenegro to address the attacks
against journalists”
if
one looks at the convictions in the cases dealt with in relation
to attacks on journalists between 2004 and 2017.” We are also aware
of the judicial positive developments related to the Tufik Softić
case: in November 2017, the Constitutional Court found that Tufik
Softić’s right to life had been violated due to the ineffective
investigation since 2017 into the attempted murder of which he was
victim.
157. If we commend efforts by police forces to arrest the perpetrators
and suspects of attacks on journalists,
we
regret that those behind the attacks are not always identified,
as in the emblematic case of Duško Jovanović, editor-in-chief of
the Montenegrin opposition daily newspaper
Dan,
shot dead in 2004.
We also regret that investigative
journalists may still be subjected to intimidation attempts, as
in the case of Gojko Raičević, editor-in-chief of the news portal
www.in4s.net, who was physically attacked then threatened by the police
while covering protests of opposition parties in 2015. He was also
interrogated in 2019 by police officers regarding articles put on
the
IN4S portal related to
several conversations of former Montenegrin Ambassador in Moscow.
158. Whilst we warmly welcome the decision of the Appeal Court
of Podgorica that quashed the judgement of first instance condemning
the investigative journalist Jovo Martinović in October 2019, we
also strongly condemn the four years it took for the judicial system
of Montenegro to issue this judgment after Jovo Martinović’s arrest
in 2015 and the 15 months he spent in pre-trial detention.
Both could
be perceived as a way to pressure journalists through judicial procedures
and detention.
“13.4.3. promote the effective work of the
media’s self-regulatory bodies and actively encourage ethical journalism
and better professional standards”
159. As the report on the Montenegro Media Sector Inquiry stated,
self-regulation is an important tool to safeguard editorial freedom,
promote quality and ensure credibility of media outlets and reputation
of journalists. It is also a vital mechanism for reducing the influence
of the State on media to a minimum.
160. In 2017, the co-rapporteurs welcomed the adoption of a revised
Code of Ethics for Journalists. Unfortunately, the mechanisms that
should enforce it are not unified and reflect the overall polarisation
of the media scene along political lines. Montenegro had two self-regulatory
bodies: the Media Council for Self-Regulation and the Self-Regulatory
Council for Local Press (which deals only with local print media). Furthermore,
three print media outlets (Dan, Monitor and Vijesti)
that hold an important market share, have not joined the aforementioned
self-regulatory bodies, but instead have recently established their
own internal ombudsperson (one for the daily Dan and
a joint one for the daily Vijesti and
the weekly Monitor).
161. The Self-Regulatory Council for Local Press was never actually
active, as they did not have complaints to decide on, and the Media
Council for Self-Regulation suspended all its activities in September
2018, due to the difficult financial situation. They explained that
their appeals and requests for assistance to international organisations
and the Government of Montenegro have not yielded results.
162. The last attempt led by the European Union Delegation to create
a unique self-regulatory body was in November 2018 and ended without
success. Given the polarisation of the media scene, this goal seems unachievable
and the remedy probably lies in increasing the level of professionalism
of journalists. This requires better training and a serious improvement
in the economic status of journalists. According to a Freedom House
report of 2016, the monthly average income of journalists is 400
euros, that is to say lower than the average national income of
480 euros.
6.2. Other developments
Political interferences on RTCG
and AEM
163. Very regrettable and reprehensible
developments occurred at the end of 2017 and in mid-2018, which demonstrated
how vulnerable the RTCG and the AEM, that regulates the on-line
newspapers sector, are to political interferences. As result of
the Agreement for Creating Conditions for Free and Fair Elections
signed in April 2016 by parties from the majority and the opposition,
there were changes in the managing structure of the RTCG and more
leeway to appoint Council members not closely aligned with the dominant
party. The composition of the Council therefore changed and it appointed
a new Director general, Ms Andrijana Kadija, who, according to the
Montenegro Media Inquiry, had filled many important positions with
individuals with different political pedigrees. In 2017, the parliament
initiated a procedure requesting the APC to investigate possible
conflicts of interest of the members of the Councils of the RTCG
and the AEM. In October 2017, the Agency made a decision that three
members of the RTCG Council and a member of the AEM Council violated the
provisions of the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest and
that four other members violated the provisions of the Law on Prevention
of Corruption. In December, the parliament dismissed another member, Mr Goran
Djurović, for whom there was no case of conflict of interest. Reshaped
with a new majority, the RTCG Council dismissed its director general
in June 2018.
164. Mr Djurović challenged his dismissal before the courts. In
February 2019, the decision by the parliament to dismiss him was
overturned in first instance as illegal. But this ruling was annulled
by the High Court of Podgorica in July 2019 and the Basic Court
of Podgorica that held the re-trial of the case declared itself
as incompetent in November 2019, as the Administrative Court previously
did in January 2018. Mr Djurović filed an application with the European
Court of Human Rights, claiming violation of his right to a fair
trial, freedom of expression, effective remedy and prohibition of
discrimination. His application seemed to have been rejected on
the grounds that all remedies had not been exhausted yet.
165. As co-rapporteurs, we strongly regret that, two years after
its dismissal, no Montenegrin jurisdiction seems to be competent
to examine the case of Mr Djurović.
166. In a broader perspective, we have deep concerns about the
issue of jurisdictional competence with regard to decisions taken
by the parliament to sanction, including dismiss, members of organisations
supposed to be independent, be it the councils of the APC, the AEM,
the RTCG or even the Central Bank of Montenegro.
The questionable draft amendments
to the Law on Classified information and to the Law on Free Access
to Information
167. We already pointed out a worrying
tendency of public entities to restrict access to public documents
in part 5. This trend was also witnessed in draft amendments to
two laws that would severely hamper transparency and the possibility
for journalists to expose corruption if they were adopted in their
current form.
168. In March 2018, the Ministry of Defence withdrew his first
draft amendments to the Law on Classified information, after 25
Montenegrin NGOs spoke against it and highlighted the manner in
which these amendments violated the Constitution. The amendments
would have enabled government bodies to withhold information if
they decide that releasing it would impede their ability to “perform
their activities”. Critics say the wording of the amendment could
be interpreted far too broadly, allowing the government to classify
information that is in the public interest, including State spending.
169. In September 2019, the Ministry of Public Administration presented
its draft amendments to the Law on Free Access to Information (FAI).
The draft amendments were heavily criticised by five NGOs (MANS,
Institute Alternative, Human Rights Watch, Center for Monitoring
and Research and Center for Civil Liberties) amongst others for
creating the vague notion of “abuse of right” to access information
and narrowing the definition of “information.” The law was further
criticised for allowing an unlimited number of types of information
to be declared as classified, or for freeing political parties from
the obligation to disclose information about their financing. On
27 September 2019, 44 NGOs asked the Prime Minister to withdraw
the amendments in an open letter. In September 2019, the EU Delegation
Ambassador to Montenegro, Mr Aivo Orav, made it clear that the EU
experts stressed the importance of not introducing the concept of
“abuse” of right to access information in the law on FAI.
170. We are fully aware of the need to amend the law on FAI, as
some NGOs like MANS already called for it in 2017. However, we urge
the Montenegrin authorities not to destroy the progress they started
to make in the field of transparency and to proceed in this field
as they did for the amended legislation on RTCG and media, that
is in close co-operation with international organisations and in
line with European standards. At the time of writing, the amendments
to the Law on FAI were said by the Montenegrin authorities to have
incorporated the inputs received during the previous phase of consultation
and were sent for reviewing by the European Commission.
A revised legal framework on media
in the making
171. Based on the Montenegro Media
Sector Inquiry of December 2017, a thorough and comprehensive study
of the media situation and its challenges in view of an harmonisation
with the Council of Europe and European Union standards, a package
of three draft laws are being drafted in co-operation with the Council
of Europe: the draft law on RTCG, the draft Media law, and the draft
law on Audio-visual media services. All of them went through an
inclusive process, that ended mid-2019.
172. The draft law on RTCG was criticised by NGOs during our mission
for containing some provisions that were a step backward or for
maintaining the possibility for the government to approve the budget
of RTCG. We were informed that the Montenegrin authorities modified
this draft law during consultations with the Council of Europe and
that the final version presented to the latter was compliant with
Council of Europe standards.
173. The draft Media law was adopted by the government in December
2019, without the Council of Europe being submitted the final draft.
The draft law on Audio-visual services is still to be analysed by
the Council of Europe.
6.3. Position of the co-rapporteurs and
concluding remarks on the situation of media
174. In a country where “corruption
is prevalent in many areas and remains an issue of concern”, as
the European Commission stated, and where the judiciary is seen
as being vulnerable to political influence, freedom of media is
essential for promoting transparency. Therefore, the limited progress
observed in the investigation of the attacks against journalists,
or the support of the government to the Commission for Monitoring
the attacks against them do not counterbalance the very negative
trends that are still at work when it comes to the safety of journalists,
the independence of the RTCG and the AEM or the threats towards
access to information. These three issues are of paramount importance
if the Montenegrin authorities want to improve the level of compliance
with their obligations and commitments to the Council of Europe.
7. Situation with regard to other human
rights issues
175. As already stated in part 1
of this report,
Resolution
2030 (2015) outlined some topics that are not listed amongst the
four key issues, but that had to be followed, according to paragraph
12 of the Resolution. These are the rights of the minorities and
the fight against discrimination (paragraph 10) and the situation
of refugees and internally displaced persons (paragraph 11).
176. On these issues, we did not receive any information that could
lead us to think that the situation has deteriorated, or that would
justify making one or several of these concerns supplementary key
issues.
177. The Protector of Human Rights and Freedoms (Ombudsman), who
has been acting as the mechanism for the prevention of torture and
the mechanism for the protection against discrimination, under both
United Nations conventions since 2014, saw his competencies clarified
in 2017. Concerning the antidiscrimination mechanism, he is now
covering both the private and public sectors. He told us that these
mechanisms were fully functionable.
178. The Law on Minority Rights and Freedoms, the “speedy adoption”
of which was referred to by
Resolution 2030
(2015), was adopted on 27 April 2017. The opinion of the Venice
Commission was required and the final draft law followed four out
of five key recommendations that it made, the secretariat of the
Venice Commission pointing out that the functions, institutional
position and supervision of the Centre for Minority Culture Preservation
and Development had not been clarified.
On 7 March 2019, the Advisory Committee
on the Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities
from the Council of Europe (Advisory Committee) issued its third
opinion on Montenegro. It was in general very positive, even though
it called for “urgent efforts […] to be focused on ensuring that
Roma and Egyptian communities as a whole, both Montenegrin Roma
and Egyptians and displaced persons, have effective access to adequate
housing, health care, social protection, high quality education
and sustainable employment, and can effectively participate in economic
and public life, and ensuring that those persons whose status remains
unclear have it regularised”. This call should be taken into consideration
by the Montenegrin authorities in their Strategy for the Social Inclusion
of Roma and Egyptians in Montenegro 2016-2020.
179. As presented in part 2 of this report, the Law on Religious
Communities referred to by
Resolution
2030 (2015) is being prepared and a draft was sent to the Venice
Commission that gave its opinion.
180. Concerning LGBTI persons’ rights, the Montenegrin authorities
implemented the Strategy for Improving the Quality of Life of LGBTI
persons in Montenegro 2013-2018 and adopted a new one in March 2019
that covers the period 2019-2023. From 2014 to 2018, four Pride
parades were successfully held, with no incident and a reduced number
of police officers protecting these public gatherings. On 29 October
2018, in a landmark decision, the Constitutional Court found that,
by upholding the ban on the gay pride march in Nikšić, the second largest
city in Montenegro, the Montenegrin Supreme Court violated freedom
of peaceful assembly, as guaranteed by the Constitution of Montenegro,
the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.
As co-rapporteurs, we share the diagnosis
of the European Commission, which stated in 2018 that Montenegro
was setting a good example for the whole region when it came to
the level of protection provided to LGBTI persons, even if the parliament
failed to adopt a law on same-sex union in July 2019. All ethnic
minority parties belonging to the majority voted indeed against
the government’s bill.
181. Concerning the situation of refugees and internally displaced
persons, the Advisory Committee welcomed in its third opinion on
Montenegro the progress that “has been made on resolving the issue
of displaced persons, mostly Roma and Egyptian refugees who arrived
in Montenegro from Kosovo in the late 1990s. The regularisation
of the legal status of these persons is almost complete, and the
housing situation for many of them has improved substantially.”
The Montenegrin authorities informed us that, in the period from
7 November 2009 until 1 July 2019, displaced persons and internally
displaced persons submitted a total of 15 214 applications for the
approval of permanent residence and temporary stay up to three years.
Out of this number, 12 334 persons had their request accepted. We
were also informed that from the date of enforcement of the Law
on Montenegrin Citizenship on 1 January 2008 until 1 July 2019,
a total of 1 067 displaced persons from the territory of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia received Montenegrin citizenship.
8. Conclusions
182. “When I look at my country
today and how it was ten years ago, I am rather satisfied”, said
one high-ranking official whom we met during our fact-finding mission.
As co-rapporteurs, we measured the distance travelled since Montenegro
became a member State of the Council of Europe. We also recognise
the substantial progress made since the adoption of the last report
on the post-monitoring dialogue in 2015. Montenegro has introduced
legislation which complies with Council of Europe standards and
has addressed several concerns formulated by the Assembly and other
Council of Europe monitoring mechanisms.
183. In the fields where Montenegro is usually seen as a co-operative
partner or a good example for the region, namely the execution of
the European Court of Human Rights or the areas listed in part 7
(minority rights, LGBTI persons’ rights …), the situation continued
to improve.
184. However, as the draft report demonstrates, limited progress
was achieved in the four key areas identified by
Resolution 2030 (2015). Even where improvements could be noted, such as in
the independence of the judiciary or in the situation of media for
instance, they were counterbalanced by opposing negative trends
185. In the four key areas, Montenegro seems to have reached a
glass ceiling. In each of them, a lot of effort was made to establish
a legal framework that, despite some further possible improvements,
should be completely workable, but which, in reality, turned out
not to be. In our opinion, time has come for Montenegro to demonstrate
that there is the political will to break through this glass ceiling.
The very broad mandate of the parliamentary Committee on Comprehensive
Reform of Electoral and Other Legislation indicates that the Montenegrin
authorities are aware of the scope that has not been achieved so
far.
186. However, Montenegrin authorities are not the only ones able
to break through this glass ceiling. The opposition has all the
more a duty to play its role within the parliament, that the Montenegrin
legislative process often requires a qualified majority. It is therefore
very regrettable that, on the issue of the electoral reform, which is
of major importance, some factions belonging to the opposition decided
in the end to revert back to a boycotting attitude. This is not
the way to strengthen the parliament and this is not the sign of
maturity we expected.
187. Our assessment, detailed in this report and in the concluding
remarks we wrote on each of the four key areas, leads us to recommend
not to end the post-monitoring dialogue. However, by the same token,
we would not recommend the reopening of the full monitoring procedure,
given the contradictory trends we mentioned and the general elections
to come. In the absence of a revised electoral framework, the way
these elections will be held will constitute a test for Montenegro.
188. There is a clear need for Montenegrin politicians to demonstrate
their political will to break through the glass ceiling. We then
expect the parliament to fully play its oversight role and stimulate
the government to make progress in the four key areas, as well as
we expect the Executive branch, whose head has been in power for
30 years now, to continue the process of reform.
189. We therefore propose that the post-monitoring dialogue be
continued and that we re-evaluate the situation after the general
election of 2020. At that time, we will make a final decision on
the future of the post-monitoring dialogue with Montenegro.