1. Introduction
1.1. The monitoring procedure
1.1.1. History of monitoring Georgia's
obligations and commitments to the Council of Europe
1. Georgia became member of the Council of Europe in
1999 and the monitoring procedure was opened immediately thereafter.
A first report on the progress of reform in Georgia was issued two
years after accession, laying out the persistent deficits and the
gap between the legislation and its implementation
.
2. In November 2003, the co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee
were in Georgia when massive but peaceful protests following the
fraudulent parliamentary elections led to the Rose Revolution and
the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze. A few weeks later,
in early January 2004, the co-rapporteurs were back in Georgia on
the occasion of the presidential election which led to the victory
of Mikhail Saakashvili.
3. In
Resolution 1363
(2004) and
Recommendation
1643 (2004) on the functioning of democratic institutions in Georgia,
adopted in January 2004
, the Assembly acknowledged that
the newly elected leadership could not be held responsible for the
failure of the former regime to fulfil the country's obligations and
commitments to the Council of Europe. As a sign of support to the
new authorities and due to the extraordinary character of the transition
that had taken place in Georgia, the Assembly agreed to reconsider deadlines
for Georgia's commitments to the Council of Europe.
4. The new timeframe was set one year later, in
Resolution 1415 (2005), adopted in January 2005. One year after the Rose Revolution,
the Assembly made it clear that the post-revolutionary situation
should not become an alibi for hasty decisions and neglect for democratic
and human rights standards.
5. Two years after the Rose Revolution, in January 2006, the
Assembly debated the latest comprehensive report on the honouring
of obligations and commitments by Georgia
and adopted
Resolution 1477 (2006).
6. The Assembly concluded that Georgia's progress could be regarded
as generally encouraging but was still only a first step towards
meeting its obligations and commitments. It thus recommended a number
of important measures which the authorities should take to achieve
this goal.
7. Aware that full normalisation of the situation in Georgia
was impossible without reaching a peaceful and democratic settlement
of the conflicts in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the Assembly commended President Saakashvili's efforts
to propose solutions but at the same time was extremely worried that
no real progress had been achieved on the ground and in the on-going
negotiations. It called all interested parties and in particular
the Russian Federation to demonstrate their commitment, in principle
and in practice, to a peaceful and democratic solution with full
respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia.
8. The Assembly resolved to pursue its monitoring until it received
evidence of substantial progress, particularly with regard to the
issues mentioned in
Resolution
1477 (2006).
9. The serious sanctions that the Russian authorities imposed
against Georgia and its citizens residing in Russia in autumn 2006
and the subsequent worsening of the long-lasting tensions between
the two countries caused considerable concern to the Council of
Europe
and the Assembly in
particular.
10. The Monitoring Committee commissioned one of its co-rapporteurs
on Georgia, Mr Eörsi, and one of its co-rapporteurs on Russia, Mr
van den Brande, to visit both countries and report back to the committee. Following
a discussion on the information note prepared by Mr Eörsi and Mr
van den Brande after their visits in November 2006 the committee
at its meeting on 13 December 2006 decided to ask for an urgent
procedure debate during the January 2007 part-session. Considering
the closing of the remaining Russian bases in Tbilisi ahead of time
and the return of the Ambassador of Russia to Tbilisi as first steps
in the right direction, however, the Assembly decided not to hold
the debate. On 23 January 2007, the Monitoring Committee adopted
a declaration on the issue and declassified the information note
on its rapporteurs' fact finding visits (AS/Mon (2006)40 rev), including
a list of immediate steps the Georgian and Russian authorities should
take.
1.1.2. Background of the current report
11. The present document is based on the information
gathered during a series of visits undertaken in recent months.
From 10 to 16 September 2007 we visited Tbilisi, Batumi, Abkhazia
and South Ossetia with a view to assessing the situation in the
country. We paid particular attention to the issues of the functioning
of democratic institutions, progress in reforms, the protection
of human rights, the fight against corruption and the persisting tensions
with the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This visit
led to the preparation of a first draft of this report, which the
Monitoring Committee considered at its meeting in Berlin on 6 November
2007. The extensive analysis of the situation in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia presented in Chapter 6 provided background information
for a public hearing on the frozen conflicts that the Monitoring
Committee organised in the German Bundestag on 5 and 6 November
2007.
12. Following the dispersal of anti-governmental demonstrations
on 7 November by riot police, after which a state of emergency was
introduced and the Imedi TV and Kavkazia channels were shut off,
we immediately decided to undertake a snap visit to Tbilisi on 9
and 10 November.
13. After the resignation of President Saakashvili on 25 November
and the proclamation of the pre-term presidential elections for
5 January 2008, we visited Tbilisi again in the context of a pre-electoral
mission from 5 to 7 December. A 30-member ad hoc committee of the
Bureau of the Assembly observed the election on 5 January 2008.
14. On all the above occasions, we held very open and frank discussions
with the highest state authorities, relevant ministers, leaders
(and candidates) of the opposition parties and local authorities.
In addition to the official programme organised by the Georgian
parliamentary delegation, we also met with local think-tanks, NGO
and media representatives, foreign Ambassadors residing in Tbilisi
and representatives of international partner organisations on each
of these occasions.
15. In Sukhumi and Tskhinvali in September, we met with the Speakers
of the de facto Abkhazian
and South-Ossetian Parliaments, Mr Nugzar Ashuba and Mr Znaur Gassiev;
Mr Ivo Petrov, Deputy SRSG of UNOMIG in Sukhumi, representatives
of the UNHCR in Gali and the OSCE Mission in Tskhinvali. We also
paid a visit to a returnee community in Tsikiri village in the Gali
district. We regret not having had the occasion to meet with the de facto government leaders in Sukhumi
and Tskhinvali, which would have offered us a better understanding
of possible avenues for conflict resolution in the two separatist
regions. On separate occasions, we also met with Mr Malkhaz Akishbaia,
Head of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia in the
Upper Abkhazia in Zugdidi, and Mr Dimitri Sanakoev, leader of the
Temporary Administrative Unit for the Tskhinvali Region, South Ossetia,
in Kurta.
16. We wish to thank the Georgian authorities for their full co-operation
and hospitality throughout our visits. We are grateful to the Georgian
Parliament and the Georgian national delegation for the excellent
organisation of our visits, one of which at extremely short notice.
We extend our gratitude also to UNOMIG and OSCE, whose Missions
facilitated our visits to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Finally, our
full recognition goes to Mr Igor Gaon, Special Representative of
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in Georgia, and Ms
Tamara Katzitadze from the Council of Europe office in Tbilisi for
their active assistance in making our visits a success.
17. During our first visit in September, we praised the Georgian
authorities for their substantial efforts in pushing for simultaneous
reforms at various levels, though we also noted various areas where
further improvement was necessary. Meanwhile, the country has been
upset by the events which have cast a shadow on Georgia's reputation
as champion of democratic reforms in the region. Notwithstanding
the very short time lapse between the pre-term election and the
fact that the final results of the presidential elections of 5 January 2008
are not announced at the moment of finalising this report, we deemed
it appropriate to pursue the initial schedule of holding a debate
at the January 2008 part-session of the Assembly in order not to
lose sight of the progress made in the last two years and to help
Georgia identify new challenges and ways to go ahead.
18. Finally, the present document takes account of the information
gathered during all these recent visits as well as on the data provided
in various recent reports of other international governmental and
non-governmental organisations. We have no intention of closing
our eyes to various other challenges facing the Georgian society
today, notably concerning such issues as protection of national
minorities or education, which relate to the core values of the
Council of Europe. Nonetheless, in order to be consistent with other
similar monitoring exercises and to avoid opening new debates, we
will limit our assessment only to the issues mentioned in
Resolution 1477 (2006).
1.2.1. Political events
19. In November 2003, the new government inherited a
deeply insecure and corrupt state with no control over large parts
of its territory and declining international support. Since then,
Georgia has shaken off the legacy of political bankruptcy and poor
national reputation and laid the foundations of a functioning democracy and
free market economy.
20. Up until September 2007, Georgia enjoyed political stability,
which allowed the government to swiftly pursue complex reforms in
most spheres of public life. The legislative framework and action
plans for major reforms were adopted; the government reformed the
education system, law enforcement bodies and the Army, considerably
reduced and rejuvenated state bureaucracy and increased the salaries
of officials, cracked seriously down on corrupt practices and took
measures to strengthen the independence and professionalism of the
judges. Signs of restored social infrastructure and reconstruction
of tourism infrastructure are visible everywhere. Georgia deserves
by all means praise for that.
21. Nevertheless, some reforms have been carried out very rapidly,
causing a genuine shock to the Georgian society. The state has slimmed
down; many people have lost their jobs. The social situation has
in many cases been exacerbated by the Russian economic blockade.
Although poverty rates have grossly dropped in figures, concerns
of social injustices have been insufficiently addressed. The government
has faltered in managing overly ambitious post-revolution expectations
and failed to adequately communicate the stakes of the reforms.
Impatient to deliver, the young government has too often disregarded
the demands of the opposition and public discontent, and bulldozed
its way through perceived obstacles. All these factors plus a popular
perception of lack of transparency, accountability and credible
investigations into disturbing cases of abuse of office led the
internationally much-praised reformist government to face a major
internal political crisis in October-November 2007.
22. At the beginning of October, Arkadi (Badri) Patarkatsishvili,
Georgia’s richest man and owner of the oppositional Imedi TV channel,
announced that he would take lead of anti-government campaign and
became the principal financier of opposition demonstrations throughout
the country. He later made a series of statements pointing to financing
the regime change in Georgia. On 2 November massive demonstrations
broke out at the call of a newly-formed bloc of nine opposition
parties demanding the rescheduling of parliamentary elections from
autumn to spring 2008, the transformation of Georgia into a parliamentary
republic, and the resignation of the then President Mikheil Saakashvili.
Patarkatsishvili further announced that he would finance not only
the opposition rallies, but also the political parties that constituted
the opposition alliance.
23. On 7 November 2007, the political disturbances culminated
in a violent dispersal of protesters by the riot police. Special
Forces raided and shut down the Imedi TV station, which the authorities
claimed was airing calls to stage a Russia-orchestrated coup d’etat.
A few hours later, triggered by Patarkatshishvili’s communiqué vowing
to "… put all my efforts, all my resources,
my financial resources, including the last tetri, for liberating Georgia
from this Fascist regime" and further calls for civil
disobedience channelled through the same tycoon owned Imedi TV and
radio stations, the government imposed a state of emergency. Several
opposition leaders were charged with conspiracy and subversive activities.
24. On the following day, President Mikheil Saakashvili, in an
attempt to diffuse the extremely tense political situation, declared
that he would step down for a snap presidential elections, while
putting the date of parliamentary elections up to plebiscite. The
state of emergency was lifted nine days later on 16 November. On
the same date, he dismissed Prime Minister Nogaideli and appointed
Vladimer Gurgenidze to lead the new government. Upon his own resignation
on 25 November, President Saakashvili also signed a decree for holding
another plebiscite on NATO accession. Imedi TV and radio subsequently
reopened on 8 December; however, a fortnight later, in the midst
of the campaign, the authorities produced evidence implicating Badri Patarkatshishvili
in renewed plotting to overthrow the government in the days following
the elections. A number of journalists quit the channel and its
management decided to take it off the air once again. The station remained
closed beyond the presidential election.
25. The actions taken on 7 November seriously tarnished the credibility
of the government’s willingness to build up a state founded on the
rules of democracy and law. On the other hand, we welcome the decision
of the Georgian leadership to solve this crisis through early presidential
elections and also by asking the opinion of the people about the
timing of the parliamentary elections. This democratic and constitutional
decision helped halt the escalation of violence and brought the
opposition from the streets to some form of dialogue and focus on
the election.
1.2.1.1. Pre-term presidential elections
of 5 January 2008
26. Twenty-two candidates initially expressed their desire
to contest the presidential poll. Seven candidates were finally
registered. These included:
- Levan
Gachechiladze, nominated by the nine-party opposition coalition;
- Davit Gamkrelidze, leader of the New Rights Party;
- Badri Patarkatsishvili, a business and media tycoon;
- Shalva Natelashvili, leader of the Labor Party;
- Mikheil Saakashvili, the ex-president and the leader of
the ruling National Movement party;
- Gia Maisashvili, leader of the Party of Future.
- Irina Sarishvili, leader of the Hope Party;
27. Parallel to the presidential election, voters were also called
on to cast ballots in a plebiscite to decide on the date of upcoming
parliamentary elections and whether they support NATO accession.
The constitution currently provides for elections in November 2008;
the opposition, however, demanded elections in April 2008. The plebiscite
aimed at resolving this disagreement by putting the choice directly
in front of Georgia's citizens.
28. From the outset, the election campaign was conducted in a
highly-polarised political environment. The government declared
it their main goal to conduct free, transparent and fair elections.
To this end they welcomed great numbers of international observers
and encouraged exit polls to be conducted. More than 1000 international
and 2000 domestic observers participated in the observation of this
election on 5 January 2008.
29. However, a number of opposition forces put the whole process
in question before the latter had even started. Although this election
presented the first genuine chance for Georgian political leaders
to truly compete, this opportunity was not seized by most candidates.
The campaign by the opposition concentrated not on developing programmes
but mostly on anti-Saakashvili rhetoric. At the same time, the opposition
failed to come up with their own common counterweight candidate.
Throughout the electoral process most opposition candidates were
clearly not campaigning to win the elections but threatened with
post-election protests to contest the results, should Mikheil Saakashvili
win. On 24-25 December secretly taped recordings were released by
the government showing Badri Patarkatsishvili attempting to bribe
the Head of the Special Operations Department of the Ministry of
Interior to orchestrate an overthrow of the government and to resort to
violent means, including elimination of the Minister of Interior.
30. The legislative framework for these elections underwent a
number of important changes. The short period of time between the
date of the changes and the date of the election raised concerns
among various stakeholders. However, the fact of the parliament
having already prepared new draft amendments to the Electoral Code
in view of the elections to be held in autumn 2008, which incorporated
many previous recommendations of ODIHR and the Venice Commission,
helped the ruling majority and the opposition to reach a compromise
agreement on these amendments rather quickly. On 22 November the
Parliament amended the Law on Referendum and the Unified Electoral
Code. Further technical amendments were effected on 7 December.
During our pre-electoral visit we observed that, albeit perfectible,
the Electoral Code constituted an adequate basis for holding democratic
elections, if implemented in good faith.
31. The amended Electoral Code introduced changes ensuring the
participation of opposition parties’ representatives in the electoral
process on the central as well as local levels. The requirement
to designate 6 members from opposition parties and the principle
of 2/3 majority decision-making added a safeguard against impropriety.
The new CEC acted competently during the electoral process, despite
some unconstructive actions and voting along party political lines
noted by long-term election observers.
32. The accuracy of voters’ list has been a long-standing problem
in Georgian elections. In order to combat the perceived and real
inaccuracies, the CEC carried out a door-to-door voter list verification
in the run-up to the election, which resulted in a substantial number
of revisions. A public awareness campaign was carried out aimed
at exhorting voters to check their data on the lists. Voters could
check their data on Internet, through a CEC hotline, or in person
in PECs and DECs. This additional campaign resulted in a total of
2,123 corrections made to the database. Throughout the campaign,
the opposition claimed that hundreds of thousands of “dead souls”
were on the list, without making any official complaint though to
the CEC to this avail within the deadlines required by the law.
According to the CEC, altogether 31,000 dead persons were removed
from the list during the door-to-door verification and later. The
Ministry of Interior provided the CEC with information on the deceased
persons registered in the Civil Registry Agency until 22 December
2007 and the population was called upon to notify the CEC of any
dead relative who might still have figured on the list. Despite
all these efforts, international observers noted several cases of
inaccuracies on the polling day. We acknowledge, however, a considerable
improvement in the quality of this list in comparison to previous
elections, and encourage the CEC to continue to improve these lists
on the basis of additional data collected on the Election Day.
33. Voter registration on the Election Day was a predictable source
of procedural difficulties. Bearing in mind the past negative experiences
of Georgia whereby additional voter lists were used for fraud, most
domestic and international election observer organizations as well
as the opposition contested the use of them. Although the election
law provided for various safeguards against fraudulent activities
such as inking, use of video cameras, immediate display of protocols,
immediate transfer of information by fax and a wide-scale public awareness
campaign, the procedures laid down by the amended Election Code
remained complicated and vague on some points. With the overall
voters’ list substantially and continuously improved after this
election, we strongly feel that the use of additional lists should
be abolished in the future.
34. We welcome the fact that the authorities responded to our
pre-electoral recommendations on the security of votes and covered
the polling booths with a light material so as to remove any doubt
as to the confidentiality of votes in polling stations where ceiling-attached
video cameras were used.
35. During our pre-electoral mission we were confronted by the
opposition and NGOs with numerous allegations of the use of state
funds and administrative resources for the campaign of former-President
Mikheil Saakashvili. In a country that has never experienced a genuinely
competitive election before, it is understandable that the population
is generally not familiar with the give-and-take of democratic policies
and has difficulties understanding where the barriers between acceptable
and unacceptable electioneering lies. We observed that the notion
of what is considered as "fair" and permissible was largely misunderstood
by all parties concerned. For instance, the OSCE/ODIHR long-term
observers reported evidence of misuse of state budget in the case
of distribution of vouchers for utilities and medical supplies to
vulnerable groups for campaign purposes of one candidate
.
The government and United National Movement (UNM) officials asserted
that there had been no legal abuse of administrative resources and
backed it up by providing evidence that most of the social initiatives
had been launched well before the election was announced. They also confirmed
that the party had paid for all services their candidate had availed
himself of in the course of the campaign. Nevertheless, in the absence
of visibility of other candidates’ campaign, the grossly over-visualised campaign
of the former President appeared out of proportion and contributed
to the public perception of state resources being used.
36. We drew the attention of the authorities and UNM representatives
that the state’s role in a democratic election process was to be
a neutral, mature and competent actor. We believe that our advice
was taken on board and that the boundaries and separate competences
between the government institutions, the CEC and the UNM candidate
became clearer in the course of the electoral process. To this end
we welcome the establishment of the Inter-Agency Task Force for
Free and Fair Elections (IATF) by the Acting President, under the
chairmanship of the Minister of Justice, in order to immediately
respond to complaints regarding the election. Also the CEC assumed
its role as the sole key actor administering this election and the
visible involvement of security and law-enforcement bodies was removed.
37. Throughout the campaign, however, concerns were raised about
the involvement of central and local state officials at all levels
in the former President’s campaign. We are aware that there are
no common "European standards" as regards the limits of use of administrative
resources and that the former President's campaign may well have
abided by the Georgian law (Article 73 of the Election Code). However,
it is the responsibility of the governmental authorities to ensure
that the public perceives the campaign environment as fair between
the candidates. In a political system of overwhelming concentration
of power in the hands of the governing majority, it would benefit
the fairness of the process if some restrictions applied – formally
or informally – on the campaigning of political officials and public
servants. It is noteworthy that the Acting President on 22 December
endorsed Election Guidelines for Civil Servants, elaborated by the
CEC and supported by the IATF, which established concrete rules
to be maintained by every civil servant during the election campaign
by clearly describing prohibited activities and sanctions envisaged.
We expect these guidelines to be more widely endorsed before the
upcoming parliamentary elections.
38. The campaign was also overshadowed by widespread allegations
of intimidation, pressure by local officials and even kidnapping,
especially in the regions. Even if only a small proportion of these
allegations were true, they are still far too many to be comfortable.
Although presumably not orchestrated by the government in Tbilisi
or the close election team around the former President, the government
and UNM contributed to an atmosphere of permissiveness and impunity
which allowed the intimidation to take place.
39. We underline that any form of intimidation or pressure is
unlawful and hampers free choice of voters. The government’s response
to allegations was generally swift but at times overly defensive,
finding legalistic counter-arguments instead of tackling the root
causes of the problem. Government officials – but most of all the
former President himself - failed to send strong messages to lower
levels of governance that no form of intimidation, pressure or harassment
was to be tolerated. We call upon the relevant state authorities
to now seriously investigate all reported cases of intimidation,
harassment and violence and prosecute violations.
40. Equal and unbiased access to media for all candidates is essential
for democratic elections. The campaign began under emergency rule,
which imposed restrictions on the broadcasting of information programmes
and newscasts by electronic media across the country – with the
exception of the Public Broadcaster. The restrictions were lifted
nine days later, although Imedi TV remained off the air for most
of the campaign period
. Self-regulatory safeguards for audiovisual
media were elaborated. A number of public bodies (Media Council,
CEC, etc), private broadcasters and NGOs launched their media monitoring programmes.
Changes to the Election Code provided for equal allocation of free
airtime to all qualifying political parties. Additionally, the Georgian
Public Broadcaster (GPB) was required to provide additional airtime
to non-qualified candidates. Towards the end of the campaign period,
the GPB reduced the fees paid for political advertisements.
41. During the pre-electoral visit, our delegation called on the
media authorities to ensure balanced and unbiased coverage of all
candidates, without any censorship or impeded access to media. We
also appealed to both the media and the candidates to organize and
participate in regular topical televised debates, enabling voters
to make well-informed choices on Election Day. The media landscape
was assessed by the International Election Observer Mission (IEOM)
as having been competitive, with a wide range of views available
through talk shows, televised debates and free airtime for the voters
to make an informed choice. Towards the end of the campaign the
airtime share became increasingly more balanced but prime time news
coverage remained imbalanced towards the former President. No debate
between contestants took place, which denied voters an opportunity
to see the candidates exchange policy views in an interactive format.
42. In their preliminary statement on the election on 6 January
2008, the IEOM welcomed the calm and peaceful atmosphere on the
Election Day. With very few incidents, unrest or violence the Georgian
people were able to freely express themselves at the ballot box.
The conduct of the elections was judged in essence consistent with
most OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards for democratic
elections; however, significant challenges were revealed which need
to be addressed urgently. The IEOM further noted that “this election
was the first genuinely competitive presidential election, which
enabled the Georgian people to express their political choice”
.
43. The majority of other international missions of observers
(including a mission from the CIS) also assessed the presidential
election as open and democratic. Nevertheless, they have also drawn
attention to "certain organizational flaws" and "unfortunate factors
which cast a shadow over the democratic nature of the process".
At the time of completing this report, the final conclusions and
recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission as
well as those of the ad hoc Committee of the Bureau of the Assembly to
Observe the Pre-term Presidential Elections of 5 January are yet
to be released.
44. Despite record snowfall and low temperatures, the absolute
turnout of voters, 1,9 million, was the record number in Georgian
history, although it represented only 56% of the total number of
registered voters.
45. The official results have not yet been announced. However,
the preliminary official results that have been released indicate
that Mikheil Saakashvili is set to narrowly win his re-election
as president of Georgia with 53,38% of the votes ahead of his rival
Levan Gachechiladze with 25,66%. The opposition, however, refuses
to recognise Saakashvili’s victory, claiming that a run-off is needed.
To that end, the opposition is rejecting the international observers’
validation of the electoral process, and is calling for the recount
of votes and ultimate cancellation of election results. Protest
demonstrations are planned for the week of 13 – 18 January 2007.
46. We urge all political forces to respect the legitimacy of
the democratically conducted presidential election process and accept
the officially announced results. Any allegation of fraud or vote
rigging should be contested through the legal avenues prescribed
by the Constitution of Georgia and its related legislation. The
“geopolitics of Rustaveli avenue” whereby access to power and the
alteration of political power has been dictated from the streets
rather than through the ballot box has simply no place anymore in
a mature democratic society that aspires to accede to European and
Euro-Atlantic structures. Nor are the language of hatred and politics
of brinkmanship conducive to stability and national consensus. Accepting
defeat with dignity, even at narrow margins, is a fundamental principle
of democratic leadership.
1.2.1.2. Political challenges ahead
47. The new old authorities – and the Georgian society
on the whole – will have to face a number of huge challenges in
the future months:
48. First, the presidential election has not produced an environment
conducive to defusing tensions in Georgian society. The country
faces a turbulent time ahead of the early parliamentary election
likely to be held in Spring 2008. This forthcoming election will
be a true test for the future of pluralist democracy in Georgia.
49. The authorities will need to show their resolve to organise
genuinely democratic, free, honest, fair, competitive and peaceful
elections, and demonstrate their ability to achieve this aim. They
must resolutely leave behind any bad practices and temptation for
fraud or for inequitable play witnessed in the previous elections.
The recent presidential election showed that there is still much
room for improvement for the future election to culminate in the
free and democratic expression of the will of the Georgian people.
To this end we expect from the Georgian political leadership an
unfailing commitment, working alongside the international community,
to address the roots of the previously noted shortcomings and not
only their symptoms.
50. In concrete terms, the authorities will have to demonstrate
a new level of political maturity to create a competitive and balanced
election campaign environment that is free of intimidation and pressure
and is perceived as such by the population. Government structures
should further be detached from electoral administration and the
electoral administration should be fully empowered to act independently.
The recently adopted amendments to the Electoral Code which lowered
the electoral threshold from 7% to 5% and transformed the current
majoritarian election system into a proportional one still need
to be written into the Constitution and the remaining inconsistencies
need be removed from the electoral legislation. The voters’ list will
need to undergo final updating on the basis of the information gathered
at the presidential election, so as to cancel election-day registration
for future elections. It is of utmost importance that all these
issues be tackled immediately and not shortly before the next elections.
Moreover, in order to give credibility and public trust to all these
processes, the alleged wrongdoings of the presidential elections
need to be investigated vigorously and those responsible need to
be brought to justice.
51. Secondly, the management and governance style of the country’s
top leadership will need to open up and give way to far more inclusive
decision and policy-making processes. Democracy can be effectively sustained
only through public participation and a wide range of institutions
in society through which the individual can interact with the state.
This is the only way by which a democratic government can achieve
the necessary level of consensus to ensure the irreversibility of
reforms. Inclusion cannot occur without participation and participation
cannot occur without the array of institutions in the State, market
and civil society to mediate the communication. In this context,
the building up of strong institutions and empowering the human potential
at all levels of state administration that would be able to cultivate
a political culture of independence, respect and plurality of views
should become a top priority for the political leadership.
52. Thirdly, a state genuinely governed by the pre-eminence of
law and justice needs to be built. As long as impunity reigns and
laws are stretched to accommodate whatever purpose or justice is
perceived as partial, no public trust can emerge towards the state
and its rulers.
53. Restoring confidence in democratic processes in the upcoming
early parliamentary election is a joint responsibility of all political
forces in Georgia. The state authorities should respect a plurality
of views; but the opposition also has its share of responsibility
in ensuring stability and national unity and participating in the reforms
underway. A new vibrant opposition has recently emerged from the
anti-government demonstrations, which could become a positive sign
of burgeoning pluralist society. However, they too should seek to
engage in a constructive dialogue with the ruling party on major
policy issues. In order to maintain long-term support at grassroots
level, the opposition should stop focusing on short-sighted criticism
of government’s actions and politics of brinkmanship and begin offering
issue-based, constructive alternatives to the population. Their leaders
should harness their energy on contributing to a genuinely competitive
and meaningful campaign for the forthcoming parliamentary elections.
54. The governing party’s majority in the next parliament will
most certainly be reduced. This provides a chance to strengthen
the democratisation process by building into the political process
the dialogue that has been notably lacking. Georgia’s leaders on
both sides of the divide would have an opportunity to learn from their
mistakes and realise the need for constructive policy debate in
order to gain legitimacy and support for the public. A more diversified
composition in Parliament would increase the capability of Georgian
society to address societal problems and political divisions through
the Parliamentary process, rather than from the street. Representation
of a larger proportion of the opposition in parliament could help
these parties develop into mature, responsible and constructive
political actors, able to form credible alternatives in Georgian
politics. However, this prospect poses challenges as it will require
all sides to step up their democratic commitments.
1.2.2. Economic growth
55. Georgia merits praise for its economic growth and
dynamism. Immediately after the Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili
promised to redirect the government action and the economy towards
privatisation, free market, reduced regulation and control of corruption.
56. The government has made strides in fulfilling these aims.
In January 2007, the 2007 Index of Economic Freedom of The Wall
Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation ranked Georgia as the
world's 35th freest economy (out of 157
countries surveyed).The 2007 World Bank Doing Business survey considers
Georgia to be the 18th easiest country in the world for doing business,
a great step ahead compared to its 37th position last year and 112th
in 2005.
57. Economic growth has remained strong, from 9.3% in 2005 to
12% in 2007. The GDP per capita has gone up from 700 USD in 2003
to 2,300 USD in 2007. Inflation has remained around 11%. And this
regardless of the massive pressure imposed by Russia in 2006 in
terms of sealing its borders to Georgian exports, which brought
to collapse Georgia’s major traditional export market and deprived
a proportion of the population of their livelihoods, and rocketing
Russian gas-import prices as of January 2007.
58. Improved collection and administration of taxes have greatly
increased revenues for the government. The government has been able
to pay off wage and pension arrears and increase spending on desperately needed
infrastructures such as roads and electricity energy supply systems.
The government expects to have privatised virtually the entire commercial
property of the state (with the exception of the railroads) by the
end of 2008, thus increasing revenues and removing a major temptation
toward corruption from the control of state bureaucrats.
59. Restructuring along liberal lines has required streamlining
and this in turn has both eliminated jobs and created new ones.
Such draconian strategies have, however, borne major political risks.
The failure to adequately communicate these necessary reforms to
the society, largely characterised by a high level of poverty (23%,
down from 54,5% in 2003) and unemployment (13-20% according to different
sources), limited access to basic social services, low income and
unequal distribution of that income, became part of social discontent
that led to the political crisis in November 2007. On 28 December,
the Parliament reviewed the 2008 budget in order to make it more
socially oriented. The man spending priority in 2008 will be the
social sector, reflecting the government’s promises to tackle social
problems in the country in a more coherent manner. With this objective
in mind, the economic growth rate is today forecast at 6%; GDP is
expected to reach 12 billion of USD and the inflation is forecast
at 8% next year.
60. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the most important source
of capital for Georgia and the Government is making huge efforts
to attract foreign investors. Foreign investors are beginning to
take notice of the changes in Georgia. While initially the inflows
were driven by privatisation, they now increasingly reflect investor willingness
to establish their own presence in Georgia. FDI reached 1 billion
USD in 2006, and has exceeded 1.5 billion USD in 2007. The largest
investors last year were Turkey, the United States and Kazakhstan.
61. Turkey has replaced Russia as Georgia's leading trade partner,
and a free trade agreement with that country has been concluded.
Turkish investors have embarked on several major infrastructure
investments including the airport in Tbilisi and a second one in
Batumi, which now serve both Georgian and Turkish citizens living
in the region. A deal has been struck with Azerbaijan to build a
railroad link to Turkey which will ultimately be a link between
Beijing and London.
62. Finally, the Georgian leadership feels that successful liberal
economic reforms are providing a model for the rest of the region
and helping to open trade relations with neighbouring states. These
ties are vital and have important implications, not only for the
economy, but also for energy security – and possibly in the long
run for conflict resolution in its own territory.
1.2.3. International relations
63. Georgia's geo-political location, situated between
the Black Sea, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, gives it
strategic importance far beyond its small size. It is developing
as the gateway from the Black Sea to the Caucasus and the larger
Caspian region.
64. In summer 2005 the Georgian government adopted the National
Security Concept, which outlined the main priorities of the Country's
foreign and security policy. It described Georgia as "an integral
part of the European political, economic and cultural area", and
asserted that the revival of the country's "European tradition"
will be achieved through "full-fledged integration into the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union" and by contributing
"to the security of the Black Sea region as a constituent part of
the Euro-Atlantic security system"
.
65. In 2006-2007, Georgia has continued to steer its foreign policy
wheel towards NATO and EU integration. It is also currently seeking
to orient itself within a new identity paradigm, that of a wider
Black Sea region. No longer willing to be labelled merely as a post-Soviet
state nor wishing to be identified with the volatile and fragmented
Caucasus region, Georgia sees its ties with the Black Sea community
as a way to become affiliated with the rest of Europe. As such,
Georgia is following its fellow Western-leaning post-communist states
on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration through NATO.
66. Georgia's speedy political and economic reforms have boosted
international confidence in Georgia as a key regional player. Russia's
increasing use of energy leverages in pursuing its political aims
have also focused more international interest in Georgia as part
of an alternative energy route towards Western Europe. Georgia has
also offered reliable partnership in controlling illegal immigration,
combating smuggling and fighting terrorism. On the other hand, the
government’s recent temporary clamping down on the freedom of media
and the imposing of the state of emergency on 7 November 2007 have
tarnished Georgia’s international reputation of champion of democratic
reforms in the outer borders of the European Union.
1.2.3.1. Relations with NATO
67. Integration into the NATO is the government's and
the public's highest foreign policy priority. The recent plebiscite
of 5 January on NATO membership indicated that 72,5% of the public
supports integration with NATO. This high support helps explain
why the Georgian government has all along been so focused on the issue.
NATO membership was high on the agenda of all but one opposition
candidates in the recent presidential run.
68. Having completed the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP)
in 2006, Georgia is now engaged in Intensified Dialogue on Membership
Aspirations (ID). Georgian officials vie for a Membership Action
Plan (MAP) which could put Georgia on the road towards NATO accession
as soon as possible. Georgia's NATO aspirations have internal implications;
they have helped consolidate the reform process and encouraged political
forces to deal with internal disputes in ways designed to avoid
the use of force. The government also feels that Georgia has no
positive and viable alternatives to Euro-Atlantic integration and
that its candidacy for NATO will have an impact in other countries
in the region. It could be a factor, for example, in Ukraine's approach
to NATO.
69. For their part, NATO officials keep stressing that membership
of NATO is performance based and that the determination of NATO
members to extend a MAP to Georgia will be based on a collective
judgment that Georgia has made sufficient progress in a broad range
of reforms.
70. Although NATO does not intervene directly in the issue of
frozen conflicts and openly claims that countries outside the Alliance
have no veto over NATO enlargement, Georgia's gradual integration
is raising concerns in the breakaway regions and splitting opinion
in the capitals of NATO member states. One view is that the NATO
membership would provide a positive framework in which the disputes
can be settled peacefully. Others fear it having a negative impact
on the conflict resolution: since the two separatist regions are
heavily oriented towards Russia, they would want still less to be
re-integrated into Georgia, which is becoming part of NATO. Should
Georgia join the Alliance before the two conflicts find a settlement,
this may give the Russian peacekeepers the pretext to "protect"
the Russian passport-holders in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the other
hand, discouraging Georgia from joining NATO would certainly be
perceived in the country as giving a
de
facto veto to Russia
.
1.2.3.2. Relations with EU
71. EU integration is a top priority in the Georgian
government's foreign policy agenda. Although it has long-term aspirations
to join the European Union, it recognises that the prospects are
more distant. Nevertheless the Georgian government is anxious to
exploit existing instruments to associate the country as closely
as possible with the EU and move it towards eventual membership.
72. Georgia's relationship with the EU is structured under the
European Neighbourhood Action Plan, which was endorsed on 14 November
2006. It has adopted a pragmatic approach toward making full use
of the ENP AP in order to achieve greater economic and regulatory
integration and further enhance its bilateral trade and economic
relations with the EU. The Georgian Parliament is working to introduce
European legal standards into the corpus of Georgian law where this
is possible. It hopes to gain greater access to the EU's internal market
and is keen on the establishment of free trade agreements with the
EU, particularly in light of the recent Russian embargo
.
73. As regards the long term perspectives for bilateral relations,
the EN AP provides that when the EU-Georgia Partnership and Co-operation
Agreement (PCA) reaches the end of its initial ten-year term in
2009, consideration may be given to a new enhanced agreement reflecting
the overall evolution of bilateral relations as a result of ENP
AP implementation
.
74. EU is paying close attention to the security challenges in
Georgia and in the South Caucasus region in general. Georgia has
long requested greater participation in the peacekeeping structures
in the conflict zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There is currently
an effort underway to give greater prominence to conflict resolution
issues within the EU's Neighbourhood Policy. The EU, however, has
yet to develop a strategic approach towards these conflicts and
a coherent policy towards Georgia. At the same time it has assumed
a more prominent role in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by becoming
the largest single donor to these regions. It supports economic
development and infrastructure rehabilitation, including water supply
and electricity networks, educational support and capacity building
projects with local NGOs.
75. Georgia is very concerned about the EU-Russian visa facilitation
agreement that implicitly recognises passports that Russia has issued
in the breakaway regions of Georgia. Today, people from these regions
can travel more easily to the Schengen countries than Georgians,
which is viewed as a rather unfortunate support to separatism on
behalf of the European Union. The European Commission and the European
Council should thus be encouraged to take steps in the near future
to launch negotiations on similar visa-facilitation agreement between
the EU and Georgia.
76. Another issue that would give a quicker boost to Georgia's
relations with the EU and to its economy is the free trade agreement
between the EU and Georgia in order to give access of Georgian exports
to the EU.
77. A new centre of gravity has lately evolved within the EU/NATO
regarding policies of Europe's eastern neighbourhood, including
Georgia. A group of eight EU member states – the three Baltic States,
Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Sweden – was lately
formed, identifying itself as the New Friends of Georgia, who have
agreed to work jointly as well as in their national capacities to
promote Georgia's Euro-Atlantic goals. The New Friends are stepping
into a role vacated by the old group of "Friends of Georgia", which was
formed a decade ago by the US, Germany, Britain and France; however,
it lost its effectiveness by admitting Russia into its ranks and
reinventing itself as the United Nations Secretary General's Friends
of Georgia. Meeting on 13-14 September in Vilnius, the New Friends
supported Georgia's goal to advance to the NATO MAP in spring 2008,
called for adjusting the ENP more closely to Georgia's internal
reform performance and to the EU's own interests in the region,
notably in terms of facilitation of travel and trade agreements,
and underscored common interests in resolving frozen conflicts.
Together with the US, the New Friends can form a critical mass for
shaping strategy and policy towards Georgia.
1.2.3.3. Relations with the US
78. Georgia considers the United States as its most important
ally. The US became involved in Georgia in the 1990s because of
its regional energy interests. After the events of 11 September
2001 and the war in Iraq, Georgia's geopolitical location became
an additional interest. Georgia is one of the biggest per capita
providers of allied troops for the Iraqi war.
79. The US has made available substantial military aid and advice
to the Georgian government and given solid political backing for
Georgia's territorial integrity and NATO aspirations.
80. The US has targeted extensive support to Georgia's democratic,
economic, and security reform programmes, with an emphasis on institution
building and implementing lasting reforms. The United States has provided
Georgia with approximately $1.7 billion in assistance since 1991.
Georgia has also met the stringent standards for US assistance under
the Millennium Challenge project. On 12 September 2005, Georgia
signed a contract with the Millennium Challenge Corporation for
a five-year $295.3 million assistance package. It seeks to galvanise
economic development by underwriting regional infrastructure, enterprise
development and anti-poverty initiatives. The programme also supports
Georgia's democratic transition and facilitates the implementation
of economic and social reforms.
80.1.
80.1.1.
80.1.1.1. Relations with Russia
81. Tensions with Russia are a long-lasting political problem
for Georgia. It reflects the wide gap that has developed over the
last years in the two countries' political and economic aspirations,
understanding of mutual interdependence and ways of solving frozen
conflicts.
82. For years, the Russian support for the secessionist republics
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been the primary irritant in Russian-Georgian
relations, even more so because Georgia understands that regaining control
over the breakaway regions effectively requires Russian consent.
Russia's intransigence with regard to the breakaway regions, in
particular issuing Russian passports to citizens of Georgia living
in those regions, and links made by Russia between Kosovo final
status and secessionist aspirations in the two breakaway regions
have also contributed to increased tensions between Tbilisi and
Moscow.
83. Georgia's unconditional aspiration of NATO membership is a
key irritant for Russia who misses no opportunity to condemn Georgia's
foreign policy orientation and reiterate that its accession to NATO membership
would have negative long-term consequences
. Georgia
sees the reluctance by the Russian political leadership to accept
Georgia's foreign policy change from East to West and notably its
closer integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures as
a threat to its independence and sovereign decision on who they
wish to build their future with. They fear that through actions
to destabilise Georgia's still fragile economy and by telling its
European and American partners that the small country is preparing
to solve its frozen conflicts through military means, Russian authorities
will succeed in undermining Georgia's credibility as a trustworthy
and reliable partner and thus enforce the understanding that Georgia
is a "tame and weak satellite"
.
84. Indeed, various punitive measures and economic sanctions undertaken
unilaterally by the Russian Federation against Georgia in 2006-2007
have confirmed those fears. Since December 2005, the Russian authorities
have imposed a series of embargoes on Georgian fruits and vegetables,
wines, brandy and even mineral water produced in Georgia, justifying
it by the non-compliance of products with sanitary norms applied in
Russia. The political nature of those bans is further demonstrated
by the adoption by the Duma of a resolution on 21 March 2006, which
abolished such restrictions for the Abkhazian segment of the Georgian-Russian
state border
.
85. Following the expulsion of five Russian military intelligence
officers in September 2006 and the subsequent breakdown of diplomatic
relations and the closure of the border in October 2006, Russia
stopped all air, automobile, sea and railway communication, postal
traffic and money transfer with Georgia and launched a major campaign
against Georgian nationals living in Russia, expelling them massively
from the country. Due to the diplomatic intervention of several
international organisations, a further escalation of the situation
could be prevented and in January 2007, the Russian ambassador returned
to Tbilisi. Yet, economic sanctions persist and the border is largely
closed
.
After the partial resumption of visa issue for Georgians with Russian
relatives in May, the government further relaxed the visa policy
in July in order to stabilise the bilateral relations. Still, the
largest Georgian group seeking visas – tourists – are still excluded
from the arrangements
.
86. On 26 March, Georgia lodged an interstate application to the
European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) against the Russian Federation
based on reported violation of rights of ethnic Georgians who were
deported from Russia in 2006
.
87. Russia's reluctance to see Georgia as an alternative energy
route towards Western Europe is undoubtedly another major cause
of current and possibly increasingly future conflict between the
two states. Moscow's tactics of energy cuts, disrupting Georgia's
economy through economic blockade or gas price hikes have not made
Tbilisi cede their ownership on the North-South gas pipeline to
Gazprom (contrary to neighbouring Armenia). The recent decision
by Russia to double the price of the gas it delivers to Georgia
has rather required Georgia to quickly reorganise its energy markets
and modernise its own energy transit potential
.
Russia runs a different energy policy towards the secessionist regions
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In December 2006, Gazprom began construction
of a pipeline in North Ossetia, prompting protests from Tbilisi.
Reportedly worth 15 billion Rubles (over USD 580 million), the pipeline
between Dzuarikau in North Ossetia to the breakaway South Ossetian
capital of Tskhinvali, with a total length of 163 km, will have
the capacity to deliver 252.5 million cubic meters of gas per year
.
88. On a positive note, Russia has to a great extent honoured
its long overdue commitment to the Council of Europe and pulled
out its garrison in Tbilisi and the bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi
– even ahead of the deadlines stipulated in a Joint Statement of
30 May 2005. In accordance with the 1999 CFE Treaty's Final Act of
the Istanbul Summit, the Gudauta military base (near Sukhumi) had
to be closed by 1 July 2001. However, the issue still remains open
and the base is used without legal basis by CIS peacekeepers.
1.2.3.4. Relations with regional organisations
89. Recently, relations with the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) have become increasingly strained. For more than a
year now, Georgia has positioned itself critical towards the organisation.
According to several government officials, the CIS has lost its
meaning and purpose and hardly represents a community of values
to which Georgia would want to adhere. It has repeatedly announced
its intentions to quit the CIS
; on the other hand, as the organisation's
summits offer a platform for contact and exchange with neighbouring states,
and notably with Russia, it seems unlikely that Georgia will initiate
its secession from the CIS in the nearest future.
90. At the same time, for Georgia, the GUAM
is a replacement more appropriate to Georgian
foreign policy aspirations, preserving relations and fostering integration
with a few more like-minded CIS states. In May 2006 the heads of
GUAM member states announced that the group would collectively seek
closer integration with the West. In December 2006, Ukraine's military
officials reportedly announced that a GUAM peacekeeping force would
be formed in early 2007 to serve in UN peacekeeping operations.
On the same occasion, GUAM foreign ministers also issued a joint
declaration calling on Russia to refrain from unilateral actions
against Georgia and supported the introduction of international
forces in the breakaway regions.
1.2.4. Statehood and security
91. Sustainable democracy cannot be built in the absence
of basic security. Georgia contends that it has pursued a broadly
democratic agenda in the face of an overtly hostile Russian government,
which has sealed its borders with the country and intimidated it
at every turn with such tactics as missile attacks. Russia’s challenging
of Georgia’s statehood has generated a constant state of crisis
and siege mentality in the country. Building solid democracy in
these conditions is naturally difficult.
92. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Georgia’s
volatile democracy has made mistakes. Although the "Russia factor"
was most probably grossly exaggerated at the outbreak of the crisis
in November 2007, the constant tug-of-war with Russia and the present
tensions on the international political arena contribute to increased
instability inside Georgia.
93. Yet western and in particular European reactions to various
acts of aggression have been weak or almost non-existent. Western
governments need to acknowledge that their refusal to engage with
Georgia on a serious basis in security issues impedes the country’s
development and thereby also important European interests in the
stability of its Eastern neighbourhood, now also an important conduit
for Caspian energy. In this context, building a stable and democratic
Georgia will only be possible if Europe is prepared to invest more substantially
in Georgia’s security and stability. This implies continued support
for Georgia’s domestic reform, more attention to the resolution
of its secessionist conflicts, and facilitating its integration
into Euro-Atlantic structures
.
2. Adherence to Council
of Europe standards and instruments
2.1. Signature and ratification
of Council of Europe conventions
94. Since the adoption of
Resolution 1477 (2006) in January 2006, the Georgian authorities have made significant
efforts to honour Georgia's obligations and commitments to the Council
of Europe. To this end, they have ratified the Framework Convention
on National Minorities (ETS No. 157 – entered into force on 1 April 2006
) and the European Outline Convention
on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or
Authorities (ETS No. 106 – entered into force as of 25 October 2006).
95. In formal terms, the last remaining accession commitment of
Georgia is the signature and ratification of the European Charter
for Regional or Minority Languages, the deadline for which – as
outlined in
Resolution 1415
(2004) – expired in September 2005. Despite the promising announcement
by the Government in January 2007 that it expected the Charter to
be signed and subsequently ratified by the Parliament in spring 2007
, no
substantial effort seems to have been undertaken in that direction
since then. Mr Nikoloz Vashakidze, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
told us that the delays were due to the elaboration of a national concept
of minorities.
96. We remain convinced that the ratification and subsequent compliance
with the Charter for Regional and Minority Languages can in no way
present a threat to the territorial integrity in Georgia as is sometimes
alleged by the national leaders. On the contrary, a failure to properly
address these issues and protect the rights, including language
rights of national minorities can exacerbate tensions between minorities
and the majority, and therefore create a risk for the stability
in the country. To this end, we recommend
the Georgian parliament step up the ratification process of the
Charter. We also remind the authorities in Georgia that contrary
to many of the 25 member states of the Council of Europe who have
to this day not ratified the Charter, Georgia undertook voluntarily
to sign and ratify it upon accession in 1999.
97. We also encourage the Georgian
authorities to speed up the ratification of Council of Europe instruments
in general.In eight years of membership, Georgia has
ratified only 52 out of the body of 200 Council of Europe treaties.
During the period covered in this report, only three additional
ratifications
have taken place and no treaty
has been signed. Eight conventions remain signed but not ratified.
2.2. Legal co-operation with the
Council of Europe
98. Georgia enjoys good working relations with different
bodies and directorates of the Council of Europe. It has largely
benefited from Council of Europe assistance programmes, especially
those that aim at bringing the legislation of the country in line
with European standards. The Action Plan on Georgia, adopted in
2005, is currently being implemented.
99. During this evaluation period, effective co-operation has
contributed to the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Strategy and
Action Plan, the Law on Repatriation of Persons Forcefully Sent
into Exile from Georgia by the Former USSR in the 1940s of the 20th Century
(repatriation of the Meskhetian population), the Law on Property
Restitution and Compensation on the Territory of Georgia for the
Victims of Conflict in the Former South Ossetia District; the new
Law on Legal Aid and the Law on Local Self-Government, and the law prohibiting
ex-parte communication.
100. A number of Codes of Ethics, such as those for the Police,
prosecutors, advocates or broadcasters have been elaborated in co-operation
with the Council of Europe.
101. The Directorate of Democratic Institutions of the Council
of Europe has been actively supporting the process of local government
reform in Georgia through providing legal expertise on several pieces
of newly drafted and amended Georgian legislation. These include:
the draft Law on Municipal Property; the draft Law on the Budget
of Local Self-government Units; the Concept Paper on the Administrative
and Territorial Reform, the Law on Making Amendments and Additions
to the Law of Georgia on the Capital of Georgia – Tbilisi; the draft
Law on the Supervision over the Activities of Local Self-Government
Bodies, the revised Organic Law on Local Self-Government, etc. Relevant
amendments to bring the Organic Law on Local Self-Government in compliance
with the Council of Europe recommendations are being currently drafted.
In addition, the Council of Europe has recently completed the appraisal
of the draft law on Regional Development and the Concept Paper on
Regional Development Planning and Implementation Process in Georgia,
requested by the Security Council of Georgia.
102. The Venice Commission has offered its invaluable expertise
on a number of draft laws, including the draft Law on Property Restitution
and Compensation on the Territory of Georgia for the Victims of
Conflict in the Former South Ossetia District
, the amendments to the Election
Code
(joint opinions with
OSCE/ODIHR), the draft Constitutional Law on Amendments to the Constitution
and the Law on Disciplinary responsibility
and disciplinary prosecution of judges of common courts
. It is currently advising
Georgian lawmakers on further amendments to the Electoral Code.
103. In recent years the Georgian Parliament went through a marathon
of adopting legislation to fulfil the calendar of legislative reforms.
We have full comprehension that much of the legislation has been
adopted under extremely tight time frames, which has not favoured
thorough reflection and extensive parliamentary or public debate.
On the other hand, we must reiterate that reforms continue to be
carried out by a very narrow circle of likeminded leading politicians
rather than by a broad configuration of people reflecting all the
rich potential of the country. This has not encouraged a feeling
of responsibility and ownership by the parliamentarians towards
the legislation it passes.
104. A frequent source of frustration for Council of Europe experts
willing to assist Georgia is that the authorities often submit legislation
for expertise after its adoption, thus necessitating endless new
amendments in order to bring it closer to European standards. Several
important recent pieces of legislation have been sent to the Council
of Europe bodies such as the Venice Commission after the first reading
of the texts, yet these texts are adopted a few days before or after
the adoption of the legal opinions have been issued, without paying heed
to the latter. In this regard, we
would like to to encourage the authorities to send all the laws
within the competence of the Council of Europe immediately to the
organisation for expert appraisal. It would also be highly recommendable
that Council of Europe experts are involved already at the stage
of drafting of the laws, as this would ensure from the outset the
high quality of the legislative process and save precious time.
105. Experience of other member states having passed through the
Assembly's monitoring procedure has demonstrated the paramount importance
of the Council of Europe's legal expertise for the smooth adaptation of
the legislation of these countries to the European standards, including
those relating to the European Union's acquis
communautaire.
3. Democratic institutions
3.1. Constitutional changes
106. Constitutional changes in Georgia have long been
an issue of serious discussion. Successive presidents have introduced
new constitutions "for generations to enjoy" only to see the reality
prove otherwise.
107. Immediately after the Presidential elections in February 2004,
constitutional amendments were enacted, which provided for the restoration
of the post of Prime Minister. According to this Constitution, the
President appoints the Prime Minister who appoints the Ministers
of Interior and Defence. He also has the right to appoint a Cabinet
of Ministers if the latter fails to obtain parliamentary support
three times. He can even dissolve Parliament in case the latter
rejects the proposals for the State Budget. The President has unlimited
power to dissolve the Government. The 2004 amendments also provided
that the President chairs the Supreme Council of Justice of Georgia
and gave him/her the right to appoint and dismiss judges "according
to the constitution and organic law". The Venice Commission, which
examined these amendments before their adoption, concluded that
the amendments did not fully correspond to a "semi-presidential
model" as they retained strong powers for the President
. Its recommendations were not
followed.
108. In February 2005, further constitutional amendments were introduced
regarding the reduction of the total number of seats in the unicameral
parliament from 235 to 150. According to this amendment, 100 MPs
will be elected through a proportional, party-list system, while
50 MPs will be elected in first-past-the-post constituencies. The
amendment will apply to the next Parliament, to be elected in 2008.
Again, although the Venice Commission was invited by the Ministry
of Justice of Georgia to comment on the draft law on Changes and
Amendments to the Constitution of Georgia, which it delivered in
a form of a joint opinion with OSCE/ODIHR in December 2004, the
Venice Commission's advice was not taken into consideration.
109. In January 2006, the Assembly called upon the Georgian authorities
to "review the constitutional changes of February 2004, by taking
into account the opinion of the European Commission for Democracy through
Law (Venice Commission), especially with regard to the strong powers
of the President".
110. On 27 December 2006, several new amendments to the current
Constitution were passed, which the President enacted on 10 January
2007. According to these amendments, the President no longer chairs
the High Council of Justice (the Chairman of the Supreme Court will
instead serve as chair of the High Council of Justice) or have the
right to appoint or dismiss judges. Furthermore, while the Constitution
so far enabled the President to dismiss the Parliament on multiple
occasions, the new amendment enables him to dismiss Parliament only
twice. This has certainly been a welcome step in the desired direction.
111. In addition, an amendment introduced simultaneous parliamentary
and presidential elections to be held sometime between October and
December 2008. This amendment prolonged the sitting Parliament's
mandate (at least of those lawmakers who were elected through the
party list system) by at least six months and has also cut the President's
current term in office by between three to six months
. Lawmakers of the governing party argued
that simultaneous elections were necessary for foreign policy reasons,
as the upcoming polls will be seen as an approval referendum for
the current authorities' action against the background of Russia's mounting
pressure on Georgia
.
112. The opposition parties objected to the rushed adoption of
the amendments and in particular the provision for holding simultaneous
parliamentary and presidential elections, claiming that regardless
of its single-record nature, an extension of the current Parliament's
term in office would be a negative precedent. In October-November,
the opposition parties reinforced their push for parliamentary elections
to be held in April 2008 instead of late 2008. On 8 November, the
President announced early elections and a plebiscite on this question.
More than 67% of the voters gave their consent to hold the elections
in Spring 2008.
113. On 22 November the Parliament adopted amendments to the Electoral
Code, reflecting the agreement reached between the majority and
opposition to lower the electoral threshold currently set at 7%
to 5% and to change the current majoritarian system for a proportional
system. Thus further constitutional amendments are expected with
regard to lowering the electoral threshold. We note that the election
barrier was raised from 5% to 7% under President Shevardnadze in
1999. For the last eight years, this high threshold has hampered
the development of opposition parties and has not encouraged them
to unite and form a stronger political platform.
114. On 28 December, the parliament introduced a draft constitutional
amendment that would make the plebiscite results on the timing of
parliamentary elections binding.
115. We strongly advise the Georgian authorities to involve the
Venice Commission as the n°1 competent European body in constitutional
matters in the drafting process of any constitutional amendments
or new constitution from the very outset and not only in the final
stages of adoption.
3.2. Creation of a second parliamentary
chamber
116. Despite being commonly accepted as a possibility
for further developing the system of checks and balances, the issue
is put on hold as long as there is no progress in the resolution
of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
117. We received assurances from the President and the State Minister
of Conflict Resolution Issues of the readiness of the Georgian authorities
to offer the widest possible autonomy, including the creation of
a second parliamentary chamber. Also the Speaker of the de facto Parliament in Tskhinvali
recognised the readiness on the Georgian side to offer them what
was requested in the early 1990s; however, we believe that in realistic terms
not much progress is to be expected in the near future.
3.3. Electoral reform
118. The conduct of elections since the Rose Revolution
has been considered generally free and, apart from minor irregularities,
in compliance with internationally accepted standards. Overcoming
widespread fraud, hitherto endemic, constitutes a major achievement
in Georgia as regards its democratic standards. On the other hand,
the election legislation is still perfectible and the level of political
competition remains low, regardless of the competitive environment
in the recent presidential elections.
119. During past years, serious debate has been held among Georgian
political opposition and authorities on the necessity to improve
the principles and procedures embodied in the Election Code of Georgia,
notably issues related to the principles of representation and transparency.
The Government initiated discussions on those issues. In October
2005, the Parliament of Georgia requested that the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) provide an opinion
on the Georgian Election Code. On 19December,2006, the Venice Commission
and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
issued a Joint Opinion on the Election Code of Georgia as amended
through 24 July, 2006.
120. The process of negotiations was very active throughout 2006-2007
and legislative amendments were supposed to be passed long before
the parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2008, as prescribed
by the Georgian Constitution. The Venice Commission's Code of Good
Practice in Electoral Matters underscores that substantial changes
to election legislation should be made no later than one year before
the elections. Bearing this in mind, we urged the Georgian parliament
in the first draft of this report to amend the Election Code of Georgia
before the end of the year, in particular as regards the lowering
of the electoral threshold, the introduction of guarantees for the
independence of the election administration and the improvement
of the complaints and appeals system. Meanwhile, early presidential
elections were announced for 5 January. The political upheavals
in early November however pushed once again for major changes to
be introduced in the electoral system a month before the elections.
121. On 22 November, the Parliament voted and adopted in third
reading changes and amendments to the Electoral Code. This included
the composition of the electoral administration and division of
authorities, legal regulation of the first and second rounds of
the presidential elections, the number of signatures to nominate
a candidate, the rule of creation and the size of the electoral
precincts, supplementary voters' lists, the distribution of air
time among the electoral subjects and other technical issues.
122. Based on a serious of discussions with opposition parties,
the Government agreed to opposition demands to transform the current
majoritarian election system for Parliament into a system based
on proportional representation. Some MPs will be elected through
a nation-wide party list system, while other part will be elected
through regional party lists. This effectively eliminates the previous
much-criticised system whereby one-third of the Parliament was to
be elected through a "first past the post" system.
123. On 15 November, the Parliament gave preliminary endorsement
to constitutional amendments that will decrease the election threshold
for Parliament from 7% to 5%. These amendments have been subjected
to a one-month period of public discussion; they are expected to
be adopted without delay. We welcome the authorities for partly
fulfilling this long-standing demand of the Assembly.
124. With a view to the forthcoming parliamentary elections, the
date of which has been set to Spring 2008, we expect these changes
to be passed into law as soon as possible.
3.4. Local self-government reform
3.4.1. Legislative package
125. Georgia is party to the European Charter on Local
Self-Government since 1 April 2005. Towards the end of the same
year, Georgia launched a comprehensive government decentralisation
programme. At the time of adoption of the previous report in January
2006, the State Commission on Decentralisation
and the Parliament
were in the process of drafting or amending several laws, including
the organic Law on local self-government, which, together with the
Electoral Code, constitute the core legislation on local self-government. The
legislative package also includes the draft on the supervision over
local government activities and on citizen participation in the
activities of local authorities. The Council of Europe has been
actively involved in drafting these laws.
126. At that time, the Georgian Parliament, together with Council
of Europe experts, proposed a timetable according to which most
of these laws were to be adopted by the end of June 2006. The authorities
estimated that it would take about 5 years for the decentralisation
strategy to be fully implemented. The local elections of October
2006 were to be the first real test for local democracy.
127. However, the "decentralisation package" is still under consideration
in Parliament. The Law on Local Self-Government and the draft Law
on Budget of Local Self-Governing Units have been passed but the
draft Law on Citizen Participation in Local Self-Government Activities
is still pending
.
128. The Law on State Property Transfer to Local Self-Governing
Units was passed in March 2005. It transferred important assets
from the central government to local governments. According to USAID,
which assisted with the implementation, effective management of
local assets and government transparency have increased as a result
of this initiative
.
With more resources under their control, local governments will
be able to develop income-generating programmes on the district
level.
129. According to a recent report of the CLRAE
, a number of positive developments relating
to local democracy have been taking place in Georgia since the ratification
of the European Convention on Local Self-Government. Yet, significant
steps are needed to ensure full compliance with the Charter and
other Council of Europe standards.
130. One of the principal challenges facing local government reform
in Georgia is the weak financial base of many local and district
governments. With the new Law on Local Self-Government coming into
effect now, some of these problems should be eliminated, and local
governments should achieve financial sustainability. A special formula
has been designed for distribution of finances between local governments.
Municipal budgets are based on per capita revenues of each municipality
and then adjusted through equalizing transfers from the central
budget. A municipality that has revenues above national per capita
average is not eligible for equalizing transfers. In those municipalities
that have lower per capita revenue than the national average, the
number of residents is multiplied by a number indicating difference
between national average and municipal per capita revenues; and
this figure is also adjusted through a special corrective coefficient
for mountainous regions or for low-density populated areas. This
kind of municipalities are entitled to central budget subsidies
that should be no less than 70% of number, calculated though the
above mentioned formula. Finally, local
infrastructure must be developed in order to give local governments
the opportunity to control their municipalities effectively.
131. At local level, significant control by the central government
is still very much apparent. According to Georgian government officials,
this is partly due to the low professional status, qualification
and technical ability of the local authorities; the management capacities
of these units are still poorly developed. They consider these conditions
as the seedbed for corruption, which is apparently still a serious
issue at local level.
3.4.2. Implementation of the reform
132. The 2005 monitoring report welcomed the Georgian
authorities' wish to speed up the local government reform. It pointed
to a number of positive elements underlined by Council of Europe
experts, such as the reduction of number of municipalities, the
simple and objective approach to implementation, the transparency of
assignment of powers and functions, etc. However, we warned against
excessively rushed passing of new legislation and implementation
of the reform while its concept still needed to be revised according
to the recommendations of the Council of Europe. We cautioned the
Georgian government not to determine the timeframe for the preparation
of the territorial reform only on the basis of the next local election
date; the risk was too high that the reform would be disruptive
and ineffective, despite the good intentions inspiring it
. We also
called upon the authorities to give more space to consultation with
the existing local authorities and the population at large, and
to settle beforehand the essential issues of the scope of powers
and functions to be "delegated" or "transferred" to local governments.
133. According to the recent Freedom House Freedomin the World 2007: Nations in Transit report,
the creation of new local government institutions began after the
local elections of October 2006. These have been established at
the district level, plus Georgia's six largest towns and the capital,
Tbilisi, which is now governed by locally elected councils with
their own budgets and property. Municipalities have been given all
sufficient powers and resources for implementing their competences,
in accordance with European charter on local self governments and
best international practice
3.4.3. State Commission on Decentralisation
134. In our 2006 report we regretted that the State Commission
on Decentralisation had been bypassed when key topics such as the
revision of the Law on Tbilisi and the Election Code of Georgia
were submitted to Parliament. We urged the authorities to recognise
– not only on paper but also in practice – the co-ordination function
of the State Commission and its role as a platform for institutional
dialogue. We also requested that the State Commission be given real
authority and the necessary means to lead the preparation and implementation
of the decentralisation strategy. We
note with satisfaction that this request was taken into consideration
and the role of this commission has been significantly increased
since 2006.
135. In April 2006, an effective State Commission Secretariat
was set
up with the financial help of UNDP and Urban Institute. Its aim
is to secure long-term sustainability of reform. It has its own
headquarters, a full time Executive Director and a team of full
time experts and administrative assistants. The Council of Europe
is assisting in the drafting and implementation of its Action Plan.
3.4.4. Election of the Mayor of Tbilisi
136. Before the adoption of the Law on Local Self-Government
in 2005, the Mayors of Tbilisi, Poti and Batumi were appointed directly
by the President while in the rest of the country, mayors were elected
directly. The Mayor of Tbilisi did not have the status of elected
representative. Such appointment procedure infringed Article 3.2
of the European Charter of Local Self-Government. On 16 February
2005, the Georgian Constitutional Court ruled that it also violated
constitutional principles.
137. On 1 July 2005, the Parliament approved in its third and final
reading the government-backed proposal of the Law on the election
of the Mayor of Tbilisi. The new rule envisages the election of
25 members of the Sakrebulo (City Council) through a majority system,
while the remaining 12 seats would be distributed through the so-called
"compensatory list" among the parties which received 4% of the votes
in all 10 constituencies of the capital city. The 37-member City
Council would then elect the Tbilisi Mayor from among its members
with at least 2/3 of votes for a four-year term. Contrary to what
happens in other municipalities, the voter has only one vote (and
not two separate votes for the plurality and the proportional parts
of the election).
138. The first election according to the new system took place
in October 2006. The incumbent Mayor Mr Giorgi Ugulava (appointed
by the President in July 2005) was elected to this position.
4. Rule of law
4.1. Reform of the judiciary
139. Since July 2005 when the Concept of the Judiciary
was approved by a Presidential Decree, Georgia has made strides
in moving from a corrupt judicial bureaucracy to a modern European
judiciary system. In many ways we believe that the reform of the
judiciary in Georgia – although still in the initial stage of implementation -
has advanced at a quicker pace and with clearer objectives than
in many other transformation societies of Central and Eastern Europe,
some of whom are members of the European Union today.
140. According to the Concept and the subsequent Action Plan of
the Government of Georgia, the main goal of the comprehensive reform
is to establish a strong, independent and effective judiciary instead
of the heavily corrupt, biased and extremely badly managed judicial
system that existed before. The reform will encompass the organisation
of the court system, strengthen the role of the High Council of
Justice and reinforce the capacities of the High School of Justice.
Since 2005 the Government has committed over 560 million USD to modernising
the Georgian judicial system and to placing the country within the
established parameters of law in compliance with European democratic
standards.
141. The Assembly's
Resolution
1477 (2006) adopted in January 2006 called upon the Georgian authorities to
complete the reform of the judicial system, to ensure constitutional
and legislative guarantees for the independence of the members of
the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, to guarantee a fully transparent
and democratic system of replacement of judges in a dignified manner,
to ensure that the next generation of magistrates is independent
and highly professional, and to provide for the successful start
and functioning of the High School of Justice
.
4.1.1. Reform of the courts
142. The systemic reorganisation of the judicial system
is currently under way, with its first fundamental phase – the introduction
of a well-defined sequential order of court instances – having been
completed already. The first instance courtshas been separated from
the appellate and cassation courts, which is fully in line with
the classical systemic layout of judicial systems of European countries.
143. Two appeal courts have been established. The Supreme Court
now only acts as a court of cassation, providing a uniform interpretation
of the law that will strengthen legal security (so-called doctrinal
court).
144. With a view to focusing resources and increasing the efficiency
of the court process, district (city) court structures are being
enlarged and new judges and court personnel have been recruited
to allow for speedier trials that better protect the rights of the
accused.
145. After the expected completion of the reform in 2009, there
will be 18 enlarged district (city) courts established in all the
regions instead of the current 70 small first instance district
courts. Five enlarged district courts in Tbilisi, Mtskheta, Khashuri,
Akhalkalaki and Sachkhere have already been created, based on the principle
of specialisation of judges. The district (city) courts shall be
the first instance courts in criminal, civil and administrative
cases. The newly established magistrate courts will become part
of the lower unit of the common courts in the territorial unit where
the enlarged district (city) court is not present.
146. Magistrates appointed in specific areas of the administrative-territorial
unit under the jurisdiction of the district court will ensure that
people in areas remote from the district court have speedy access
to justice locally. At the same time by freeing district (city)
courts from small claims cases in civil and administrative cases
they contribute to the decrease of backlog of cases in district
(city) courts.
147. The power of constitutional review is vested solely in the
constitutional court. It arbitrates disputes between branches of
government and rules on individual human rights violation claims.
The court interprets its function in human rights cases narrowly,
agreeing to rule only on cases in which human rights were violated as
a result of specific articles of law.
148. Dramatic increases have been earmarked for the financial and
material support to the courts. In the past two years, 20 court
buildings have been totally renovated and equipped; the reconstruction
of the remaining 7 courts is under way. The process of reconstruction
is funded entirely from the state budget. This year, for instance,
more than 5,850,000 GEL were allocated from the state budget for
the above purposes.
149. The budget of the judiciary has tripled in the course of the
last three years, reaching over 20 million USD. We were told that
the salaries and pensions of judges have increased to an equivalent
of 800 USD for first instance judges, 1200-1300 USD for second instance
judges and 1700 USD for the Supreme Court judges. This has served
to substantially improve the working conditions of judges. Today
all judges have basic research tools such as Internet access and
special digital networks to track cases and legal decisions.
150. Special database management systems have been developed for
improved management of cases and the judiciary at large, which will
contribute to the increased transparency and efficiency of the judicial
system.
4.1.2. Independence of the judiciary
151. A major focus of reform is aimed at strengthening
the independence of the judiciary. Previously we had expressed our
concerns over the constitutional amendments introduced in early
2004, which increased the Georgian President's authority to dismiss
and appoint judges. The government then started to address corruption
in the judiciary, but the procedures for removing allegedly corrupt
judges lacked transparency and due process. In 2005 the authorities
told a number of judges that they should either resign or face disciplinary proceedings;
21 of 37 Supreme Court judges resigned under this pressure. Nine
refused to resign but were then subjected to disciplinary proceedings
in December 2005, found guilty, and were dismissed from office. The
proceedings addressed matters related to the judges' interpretation
of law rather than issues of ethics or conduct subject to disciplinary
evaluation.
152. Since then, important legislative amendments, including constitutional
ones, have been implemented with a view to further reinforcing the
independence of the courts. Following the most recent constitutional changes
in January 2007, the High Council of Justice has ceased to be an
advisory body of the President of Georgia. Not only does the President
no longer chair the High Council, but he is no longer a member.
The High Council is chaired by the President of the Supreme Court.
The procedure of staffing of the High Council of Justice ensures
majority membership of judges (10 out of 18), which gives them a
decisive role in the decision making process. The Minister of Justice
no longer sits on the High Council of Judges and the Parliament
no longer appoints the permanent members of the Council. Other executive
and legislative branch appointees, however, remain on the High Council
.
153. Members of the High Council of Justice exercise disciplinary
powers through a panel of 6 of its members: 3 judges and 3 non-judge
members.
154. On 10 August 2006, the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme
Court upheld the decision against the judges convicted in late 2005
on grounds that the latter had, among other allegations grossly
violated the law when deciding on a case; No allegation of fraud
or misconduct was made against these judges. NGOs and legal experts
widely criticised the action as infringing on the core responsibility
of judges to interpret and apply the law according to their knowledge
and experience. The justices were dismissed from the court. This
decision had a chilling effect on independent decision-making by
judges.
155. On 25 October 2006, the Monitoring Committee decided to request
the Venice Commission to provide an opinion on (1) the Law on "Disciplinary
responsibility and disciplinary prosecution of judges of common courts"
of Georgia, in particular with regard to the principle of the independence
of the judiciary and (2) the scope and application of Article 2.2.a
of that Law, which was the basis for disciplinary proceedings brought against
a number of judges, including judges of the Supreme Court who were
dismissed by decision of the disciplinary board dated 26 December
2005 (decision confirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia on 10 August
2006). The Venice Commission delivered the requested opinion at
its 70th Plenary Session on 16-17 March
2007
. It concluded that although
the Law of Georgia on disciplinary responsibility and disciplinary prosecution
of judges of common courts was founded on the good intention of
providing a legal basis for sanctions against judges who fail to
carry out their responsibilities and thereby,
inter
alia, fight against corruption of the judiciary, "
its vaguely worded provisions pose a real threat
to the independence of the judiciary and ultimately to the rule
of law. This Law should therefore be revised and its provisions
redrafted in a clearer and more precise manner in order to bring
it into line with European standards". The law on disciplinary responsibility
and disciplinary prosecution of judges has since been amended along
the lines of the recommendations of the Venice Commission. A decision
of the Disciplinary Panel of the High Council of Justice may now
be appealed to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court of
Georgia on both the factual and legal basis. This also means that
any final decision with respect to disciplinary proceedings is made
only by judges. Furthermore, only a judge can become a Chairperson
of the Disciplinary Panel of the High Council of Justice: this gives
the right of decisive vote to judge-members of the Panel. Judge-members
of the Disciplinary Panel of the High Council of Justice are elected
by the Conference of Judges from members of the Council itself.
156. According to government sources, amendments to the Law of
Georgia on the Disciplinary Administration of Justice and Disciplinary
Responsibilities of Judges of General Courts of Georgia were adopted
by the Parliament in July 2007. These amendments aim at providing
more clearly defined and exhaustive grounds for the disciplinary
responsibility of judges and offer a more detailed definition of
the term "gross violation of law" in order to protect judges from
being prosecuted for their decisions. It is now imperatively stated
that any wrongful interpretation of the law that was based on the
intimate convictions of the judge cannot form the basis for disciplinary
prosecution.
157. The recent adoption of the law on ex
parte communicationhas been another significant step
further for strengthening the independence of the judiciary. It
protects judges from attempts by outside actors to influence them.
It also obliges judges to report immediately to the High Council
of Justice any attempt to influence the court regardless of whether
it is done by a State official, a member of the Executive branch,
a lawyer or a common citizen. This law also explicitly forbids contacting
a judge regarding any specific claim under his or her review.
158. The Code of Judicial Ethics has been substantially revised.
Draft rules of judicial ethics which are in full compliance with
the European standards of judges' ethical behaviour were recently
presented to the Association of Judges of Georgia.
159. Despite all these positive initiatives, the popular perception
of the judiciary is that it continues to suffer from corruption
and pressure by the executive branch. We heard from several NGOs
that the executive and the "powerful" allegedly continue to exert
pressure on judicial authorities. Many NGOs complained that judges continue
to simply "rubber stamp" prosecutors' decisions, that "telephone
justice" was still commonplace and that the executive branch exerted
undue influence. The recent political manifestations were also sparked
by the perception of selective application of justice.
160. We have no reason to doubt that the Georgian Government sincerely
strives to create an exemplary judicial system in their country.
However, deep-rooted traditions of corrupt and biased practices
will take long to eradicate. In their endeavours to clean the judiciary
from corruption, the Georgian authorities have dared what most other
countries in transition have not: to clean the old guard of corrupt
judges and replace them with a new – hopefully better-qualified
– judicial corps. The process has been painful and many mistakes
have been made along the way. We do not doubt it was a necessary
step, which should however remain an exceptional one.
161. The dilemma facing the current authorities now is how to avoid
new loyalties being formed. We believe that the key to continued
progress lies first and foremost in the political will of the government
officials to abide by the rule of law and separation of powers,
and in full transparency of procedures, vigorous oversight by a democratically
elected parliament, but also on the continued recruitment and promotion
of well educated and qualified persons able to make independent
rulings and willing to deliver justice in the country through open and
transparent procedures.
162. Despite the many positive measures introduced to enhance the
independence of the judiciary, there is still some reason to be
concerned about the influence of the political elite over the functioning
of justice. Although in other European countries the top of the
judicial power is often also nominated and/or elected by the executive
and legislative branches, the present composition and functioning
of the High Council of Justice still allow for a direct interference
by the executive or political nominees in the every-day administration
of justice. We therefore urge the
Georgian authorities and lawmakers to further revise the legislation
in line with the European Charter on the Status of Judges with a
view to limiting the influence of political personnel over the recruitment
of judges and disciplinary proceedings against them.
4.1.3. Appointment and training of
judges and magistrates
163. According to the information given to us by the President
of the Supreme Court of Georgia, since 2005, 140 new judges have
been recruited. However approximately 120 of the 400 posts of judges
in the Georgian court system still remain vacant. The country is
in dire need of at least another 30-40 new judges. It is still proving
extremely difficult to find decent, educated, qualified personalities.
Only 8 percent of those having sat the examination passed it.
164. The lack of qualified personnel gravely affects the system's
ability to try cases effectively. To facilitate the filling of vacancies
with appropriate candidates, recent constitutional amendments decreased
the age requirement for judges to 28 years of age.
165. The NGOs we spoke to expressed concerns that recent judicial
appointees (mostly very young) lack experience and training to act
independently. In addition, the high number of vacancies at the
first instance court level has resulted in long delays in scheduling
of trials, which in turn requires pre-trial detainees to be kept in
severely overcrowded detention facilities for extended periods.
166. The Georgian authorities assert that the situation is significantly
improved. Speedy trial rules have been mandated by new legislation.
The appointment of new judges contributed to decrease the caseload
per judge and simplification of certain procedures enabled quicker
completion of average cases.
167. A few months ago, a new system for the selection and appointment
of judges was introduced. The newly established High School of Justice
will be the cornerstone of this new model. The standards of higher
legal education will be in accordance to the Bologna Process. Graduates
in three categories of legal professions – judges, lawyers and prosecutors
– will have to pass, upon completion of academic studies in the
graduate school, a Unified Certification Exam. When a candidate
passes the selection process, he or she will not be directly appointed
as a judge, but will be enrolled in the High School of Justice to
complete comprehensive judicial training. Afterwards, candidates
will have the requisite training and will be nominated by the High Council
of Justice for appointment to a vacant post without any selection
process. A well-regulated career development system is also being
developed. The Council of Europe has been asked to give an expert
opinion on the selection, appointment procedure and the Statute
of the school and to advise the Georgian authorities on the curricula
development.
168. The first class started with an intensified 18-month course
in legal processes and procedures in October 2007. Their new curriculum
has been prepared with the assistance of experts of the Council
of Europe and similar schools of the European Union member countries.
169. We heard many critical remarks by the NGOs as regards the
transparency of the appointment process, mainly on the account of
oral interviews of appointees being held behind closed doors with
no written or testimonial record. We
wish to receive more information from the judicial authorities on
that account.
170. We are nevertheless convinced that, at least in principle,
the newly established system is on the right track. The new model
has only been introduced and will require some more time to take
root. All in all, the various positive steps taken to reform the
judiciary need to be more widely communicated to the public in order to
promote effective implementation and increased confidence of the
public at large.
4.1.4. The Bar Association
171. In January 2006 we reported that two entrance exams
sessions had been organised, in 2003 and 2004, by the High Council
of Justice. 1200 lawyers successfully passed the examination and
took an oath as members of the Bar. The founding Assembly of the
Bar Association was held in March 2005. It adopted a Charter and
elected a Chair, but at the time of writing it had not started functioning
yet because of legal disputes surrounding the entry examinations.
These were later resolved with an out-of-court settlement.
172. According to information received from the Council of Europe
Directorate of Political Affairs, the Bar has been functioning now
for a year. At present, the main focus of the Bar Association is
on elaborating the Code of Ethics and Disciplinary Procedures. The
Council of Europe has offered to provide its support and expertise
4.1.5. Legal aid system
173. On 2 July 2007, the Law on Legal Aid entered into
force. It introduced a full-fledged model of public defenders as
legal aid providers, and a quasi-independent executive agency (outside
the Ministry of Justice) to administer the system.
174. The law radically changes the former system of publicly-funded
legal services, which was rooted in the Soviet legacy. It seeks
to address the former shortcomings by devising clear procedures
to assess individual eligibility for free legal aid and for appointment
of legal aid lawyers; by introducing registration and reporting requirements
for private attorneys who wish to become legal aid providers. It
calls for a gradual implementation of the system over the next two
years. The Georgian government drastically increased the 2007 legal
aid budget to more than 800,000 USD (from about 30,000 USD in 2005)
to fund the ambitious reform plan
.
175. According to the law, the territorial bureaus of the Legal
Aid Service shall cover all levels of criminal proceedings and administrative
proceedings in the territory under their competence (they will cover
all administrative and civil proceedings from 2009). The bureaus
shall also provide free legal consultations and drafting of legal
documents. In 2007, the competence of the bureaus has been enlarged,
offices have been adequately equipped, and a number of new lawyers
have been recruited on the basis of competitions. Before the end
of the year, more territorial bureaus will be created and a Public
Attorneys Register will be established. From January 1 to September
20, 2007 the attorneys of the Tbilisi Bureau and Imereti Bureau
took 747 criminal and 11 administrative cases.
176. The establishment of a unified free legal aid system is a
laudable step ahead, even if it still needs to be made fully operational
on the ground in order to become a truly effective aid system. Several
human rights organisations we met voiced their concern about the
current functioning of free legal aid services in practice. They
pointed out that the quality of the work of ex
officio lawyers often left to be desired and that the
perception of their independence from law enforcement and prosecuting
authorities was questionable. Thus many defendants preferred not
to have a lawyer at all rather than to be represented by an ex officio one. Taking this into
consideration, we expect the new
system to be elaborated and implemented in close co-operation with
the Georgian Bar Association, in particular so as to improve the
professional quality and independence of the services offered.
4.2. Criminal justice reform
4.2.1. New Code of Criminal Procedure
177. In 2004, the Georgian government launched a comprehensive
strategy for the reform of the criminal justice system, which foresaw
the adoption of the new code of criminal procedure (CCP). In January
2005, the Assembly welcomed the assurances of the Georgian authorities
that the new Code was being elaborated. However, in February 2005
the Council of Europe experts expressed the opinion that while most
of the proposed amendments were compatible with European standards,
the new draft was considered to be largely unsatisfactory. The draft
was further elaborated in collaboration with the Council of Europe
and other international and national organisations and adopted in
the first reading in May 2006. It contains many steps forward such
as adversarial proceedings (in which the judge would play the role
of a real arbitrator not the inquisitor, prosecutor, investigator
and jury in one mantle), examining witnesses in front of the judge
only, trials by jury, limited time frames, simple but effective
investigation, etc. Since then, however, the adoption process has
stalled.
178. Instead, the Georgian authorities have introduced a number
of step-by-step amendments to the existing CCP, thus allowing those
involved to get used to the changes and possibly revise weak points.
These include:
- The placing
of the burden of proof for the necessity of pre-trial detention
on the prosecutor rather than on the defence;
- The abolition of out-of-court testimonies as an essential
component of criminal trials;
- The reduction of the maximum trial length of a person
under accusation from 24 to 9 months and the term of maximum pre-trial
detention length from 9 to 4 months;
- Introduction of release on bail and plea-bargaining systems.
179. The first stage of investigation, i.e. the inquiry by the
police, has become part of
the preliminary investigation. This has effectively helped streamline
the process of criminal investigation and reduced the bureaucracy
involved.
180. In order to ensure transparency and the protection of individual
rights, a defendant now has the right to invite two people to witness
any investigative actions or searches. In the past, law enforcement
agencies were obliged to select witnesses for investigative actions.
The result of this practice was that the same persons routinely
attended investigative searches as witnesses, a practice that lead
to unfairness and misinterpretation. The ability to choose the witness
for investigative purposes now lies in the hands of the defendant.
Furthermore the draft CCP, if adopted, will give the defendant the
right to conduct a private investigation and, in certain cases,
also to the plaintiff.
181. In reaction to the alarming increase of the number of inmates
and the resulting aggravated overcrowding in Georgia's detention
centres (see 5.2.) following the government's "zero tolerance on
crime" policy, the government has taken measures to limit the detention
of the accused. In order to detain an individual, the authorities
must now prove that there is a strong probability of absconding
justice, avoiding appearance in court, destroying evidence, threatening
parties involved in an impending legal battle, or committing a crime. According
to the Minister of Justice, the number of pre-trial detentions in
lower courts, and convictions in both appellate and cassation courts,
have decreased remarkably, with the use of bail during the pre-trial
period having increased up to 55,3% this year. Also the use of plea-bargaining
has increased.
182. In our previous reports we expressed certain doubts about
the application of the plea-bargaining system, which we believed
on the one hand to allow some alleged offenders to use the proceeds
of their crimes to buy their way out of prison and, on the other,
risk being applied arbitrarily, abusively and even for political
reasons. In the meantime the system of plea-bargaining has been
improved through the introduction of an appeal procedure. The plea
agreement can now only be accepted after the court has ascertained
that there has been no torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.
The accused has the right to request criminal proceedings against the
relevant person(s) in case of such treatment. Regardless of these improvements, we maintain
our earlier reservations as regards the possibilities of arbitrary
application of the plea-bargain system.
183. Although the step-by-step amendments have managed to considerably
bring the Georgian criminal justice system closer to the standards
of western liberal criminal justice, a new comprehensive CCP which incorporates
the best European practices is a must for the credibility and sustainability
of the Georgian justice system. Its adoption would also allow proceeding
faster with reforms of different branches of law enforcement.
184. A separate – and more contentious – issue in the criminal
justice reform is the recent amendment signed into law by the Georgian
President on 27 May 2007 lowering from 14 to 12 the minimum age
for criminal responsibility for specific crimes, including premeditated
murder, intentional bodily injury, and most types of robbery and
assault. The Council of Europe together with other international
and national human rights watchdogs have severely criticised these
amendments, pointing out that this was against acknowledged European
practice and that instead of solving the problem of juvenile delinquency,
lowering the age of criminal responsibility may exacerbate it instead.
185. We raised this issue with President Saakashvili and relevant
ministries, who explained that juvenile crime and particularly the
use of drugs and violence, including fatal violence, was becoming
a grave problem in the country, notably in certain wealthier neighbourhoods.
They explained that under-aged juvenile detainees would not be sent
to ordinary detention facilities but to special correctional semi-educational
establishments and that the law will only become applicable once
proper conditions for juvenile confinement will have been created.
186. Nevertheless, we see this step as a measure to treat symptoms
rather the causes of the high juvenile crime rate, which we consider
at least partly to be the consequence of fast socio-economic changes
in the country. In order to prevent
child criminals falling into a systemic circle of committing recurrent
crimes, juvenile confinement should be used as the last resort in
exceptional cases only. The protection of the rights of this particularly
vulnerable category of persons, their education and reintegration
into society should be tackled with utmost care.
4.2.2. Reform of the Prosecutor's
Office
187. The concept and strategy of the reform of the Public
Prosecutor's Office have been finalised and are currently in the
process of implementation
. This concept envisages,
inter alia, the establishment of
the Council of Prosecutor's office with a view to ensuring effective
management of the system, participating in the appointment procedures
and disciplinary proceedings. The adoption of the Law on the Public
Prosecutor's office, which would set forth the reform of the Prosecutor
General's Office, is stalled by the non-adoption of the new Code
of Criminal Procedure.
188. Meanwhile, a draft Code of Ethics for prosecutors was approved
by the Prosecutor General in June 2006: it provides rules aiming
at strengthening the sense of responsibility inherent to the position
of the Prosecutor, ensuring protection of human rights, contributing
to effective and impartial criminal prosecution and administration
of justice. Violation of the requirements of the Code of Ethics
leads to the imposition of disciplinary liability upon the employee
of the Prosecutor's Office. The General Inspection of the Office
of Prosecutor General is in charge of inquiring into such violations.
189. Also, the Prosecutor's Office now holds a larger supervisory
role over preliminary investigations. An investigator can only request
to change, extend, or discharge a criminal complaint with the consent
of the Prosecutor. This gives the Prosecutor's Office rather wide
discretionary powers of oversight. At the same time there is slow
process and lack of convincing results in major enquiries.
190. For reasons of conflict of interest, the Prosecutor's Office
no longer supervises the penitentiary system.
191. The prosecutor general's office is in charge of all criminal
investigations into allegations of torture and ill-treatment. Prosecutors
are required to investigate police use of force when a detainee
with injuries sustained during arrest was registered. The law requires
the office to open an investigation when it receives information about
a possible violation even coming from an anonymous source. If prosecutors
conclude after an investigation that charges are not warranted,
the decision can be appealed to a higher level of the office.
192. In 2006 investigations were initiated into 137 cases of torture
and ill-treatment. Criminal cases against 16 officials were submitted
to court for trial. Sentence was passed against 7 officials in 4
criminal cases. During the first 4 months of 2007 an investigation
was launched into 44 cases of alleged torture and ill-treatment.
2 cases together with the indictments against 6 officials have been
submitted to the court for trial. 11 officials have been convicted
in 3 cases
.
193. According to the US State Department
, NGOs report that the prosecutor
general's office opens investigations but often continues them indefinitely
without issuing any findings or, if concluded, usually substantiates
the reasonable use of force by police. In 2006 at least nine investigations
conducted by the office into allegations of torture or abuse and
inhumane treatment concluded that the police had not committed any violation.
The statistics show that after the rose revolution 68 police officers
and prosecutors were charged and convicted for human rights violations.
In addition, 27 officials of the prosecution service were dismissed
from their positions, 46 officials were reproached, 19 received
severe reproof and 99 were rebuked.
194. Unfortunately we did not have the possibility to discuss the
above issues with the Prosecutor General's Office.
4.3. Reform of the Police
195. The reform of Georgia's police, which has remarkably
reduced petty corruption, can be considered as a major achievement
of the current government in Georgia. Even though the new Law on
Police is not adopted yet pending the adoption of the Criminal Procedure
Code, major steps have been taken to reorganise the police force,
which has been divided into patrol police (public order police),
criminal police and border police. The government has completely
reorganised the traffic police, which was infamous for its corruption
prior to the Rose Revolution. They take pride in claiming that small
corruption and bribery have virtually been ousted from the police
force.
196. A Main Office for the Protection of Human Rights and Monitoring
has been established within the Ministry of Interior. It carries
out internal monitoring in the law-enforcement agencies and pre-trial
detention centres. The Unit co-operates closely with the Public
Defender and NGOs.
197. However, impunity remains a serious problem in the police
force, which was not denied by any of the authorities we met. Though
the crime rate has considerably decreased in the last year, members
of the police are still reported to be involved in a number of human
rights abuses, which mainly include disproportionate use of force,
in particular in police stations and during special police operations,
torturing of detainees and other forms of abuse. According to Minister
of Interior data, in 2006 alone, 612 officials of the Ministry were
subject to various penalties: 83 were rebuked, 220 were reproached,
121 received severe reproof, 11 were demoted, 166 dismissed, and
6 suspended from work. Furthermore, 32 officials were prosecuted
and two are currently wanted.
198. In June 2006 a new Code of Ethics came into force. The comments
and suggestions of the Council of Europe on the draft code of ethics
for the policemen were taken into account in the final version of
the document. The Code obliges police officers to uphold the human
rights of all persons and to use force only when strictly necessary
for the performance of their duty. However, there is no office of
professional responsibility within the police.
199. According to the authorities the problem of excessive violence
relates to the lack of professional training of the police forces.
The Ministry of Interior therefore attaches great importance to
the proper training of police. The Police Academy includes training
on human rights in the basic course for patrol police and conducts additional
specialised training on human rights in conjunction with international
partners, including the Council of Europe. However,
there is still a serious lack of adequate
initial and continuous training for police, including the criminal
police, which should be effectively addressed .
On many occasions, the Council of Europe has stated its readiness
to give substantial assistance to the Georgian authorities in this
field.
200. The Council of Europe could also offer its valuable know-how
and assistance for police decentralisation notably in setting up
a system of community policing in Georgia, which in many member
states has proved to be an effective and efficient measure to make
the police closely work together with the local population and thus
enhance its role and reputation in society.
4.4. Fight against corruption
201. From the outset, President Saakashvili and the new
Georgian administration declared the fight against corruption as
their top priority. The ambitious anti-corruption strategy and action
plan have already scored significant results, notably in the law
enforcement sector. Small-scale corruption, which used to cripple Georgian
society has been significantly reduced. According to the data received
from the Ministry of Interior, 211 police officers have been arrested
on corruption charges, mostly for taking bribes. Today, polls rate
only 2% of corruption in the police force. The anti-corruption strategy
is also being pursued through a drastic decrease in the government's
role in Georgian citizens' and business' lives. Independent observers
have noted strong ownership of anti-corruption efforts at the highest
level of government
. The EBRD-World
Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS
2005), showed Georgia as having achieved the largest reduction of
corruption in 2002-2005 among transition countries.
202. A more recent survey by Transparency International, which
was published on 26 September 2007, ranked Georgia 79th among
180 countries, giving it a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) rating
of 3.4 points (out of a total 10)
, a significant
improvement over the score in 2006 (2.8). Though this score "still
indicates that corruption is a significant problem in the public
sector"
, it nevertheless
means that Georgia has moved out of the countries considered to
have a rampant corruption problem (those under 3.0).
203. All in all the government's zeal in curbing corruption can
be felt in almost all spheres of public life. The vigorous anti-corruption
measures applied alongside the liberalisation of economy and cutting
state bureaucracy have indeed almost ousted petty corruption and
bribery in daily lives of Georgian citizens today. This has enabled
the government to tackle higher and more sophisticated levels of
corruption more aggressively. As a result, up to 400 officials had
been prosecuted for abuse of power by January 2007, including 11
former ministers, 9 deputy ministers, 2 MPs, the Head of the Audit
Chamber, 21 judges, 17 prosecutors, 6 mayors, and 96 heads of local
authorities
. This trend has continued, and even
tightened as investigation of corruption cases proceeds. President
Saakashvili has personally sent a strong message that no one would
be treated above the law.
204. To this end, and most particularly in reaction to the recent
accusations by the former Minister of Defense Irakli Okruashvili
of top political level corruption, President Saakashvili has announced
that a special anti-corruption commission directly subordinated
to him and the Speaker of Parliament would be set up
. According to the President, this
commission's major task will be to inspect and control the ministers
and their relatives. At this point of drafting it is not known what
the composition of this commission will be, when it will be created,
or how it will operate
. Following
democratic standards, in order for the commission to gain credibility,
our suggestion is that the head of this commission could be proposed
by the opposition. In a televised government sitting
on 4 October 2007, he underlined that this commission must enjoy
public confidence in terms of its composition, ability to communicate
with the public, and the transparency of its activities. In addition
to ensuring the effective work of the commission, the state must
put additional effort into strengthening the authority and independence
of those institutions that are responsible for preventing and eradicating
corruption, such as the Audit Chamber, the Inspectors General, the
State Procurement Agency, the judiciary, and the Ombudsman's Office.
It should also strengthen parliamentary oversight and increase the transparency
of the Prosecutor General's Office and the Ministry of Interior's
activities.
205. This is certainly a welcome initiative, which should be implemented
promptly in order to enhance public confidence. We nevertheless
see a number of risks and challenges in the current handling by
the President and government of the clamping down on high-level
corruption. We would like to emphasise that:
- for the sake of the long-term credibility of the government's
strategies, corruption should not be fought on an ad hoc basis but
through systematic and consistent scrutiny of all public officials'
assets, property and business affiliations;
- although no crime should ever go unpunished, we encourage
the Georgian authorities to focus on the roots of bribery and corruption
in the society in order to strike a proper balance by weighing the
causes and consequences of massive prosecution of corrupt officials
on society; in this context, they should review the existing policies
and oversight mechanisms of public procurement and focus on transparent, targeted
and priority-based public spending;
- whereas any high-level corruption case is linked to a
political context, the authorities need to be extra careful with
corruption accusations in order to avoid any connotation of selective
application of corruption charges against political opponents. To
this end, any accusation of corruption needs to be correctly investigated,
proven in a court of law with full respect for the presumption of
innocence and explained to the public through a well reasoned judicial
ruling;
- where release on bail is used, all relevant information
including who paid the money, how much and what for should be immediately
made open to the public; the sums imposed should be justified and
reasonable in quantum.
206. The Assembly's
Resolution
1477 (2006) recommended the Georgian authorities to
"pursue the fight against corruption,
implement all recommendations of the Group of States against Corruption
(GRECO) and ratify the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention
on Corruption (ETS No. 173);…" (paragraph 10.5.5.). In 2004, the
new Government inherited a GRECO first evaluation round compliance
procedure with only two recommendations fulfilled out of twenty-five.
This delay resulted in a non-compliance procedure being initiated. However,
according to GRECO's September 2006 Final Overall Assessment
, Georgia
has now totally or partially fulfilled the remaining recommendations.
GRECO consequently closed the non-compliance procedure, but it nevertheless
urged the Georgian authorities to pursue their anti-corruption efforts
vigorously. GRECO also stressed the need for the active involvement
of civil society in this process. Georgia has now begun the procedure
for drafting a second evaluation report.
207. Unfortunately Georgia is among the 11 member states that have
not ratified the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption.
We urge the authorities to ratify this significant international
instrument as soon as possible.
208. Resolution 1477
(2006) also urged the Georgian Government to step up work aimed
at building a culture and ethics of civil service (paragraph 10.5.5.).
Indeed, the public service has undergone major reorganisation as
a result of which the number of ministries and government agencies,
including the number of public servants, has been dramatically reduced
. According to government
sources, the salaries of civil servants have increased approximately
15-fold, which has attracted young motivated professionals to civil
service. The de-regularisation of economy, which has been carried
out along with the institutional changes, plus the optimisation
of human resources have considerably diminished or even eradicated
corruption in some predominantly corrupt services. In a number of
cases, but most remarkably in the Patrol Police and Product Safety
Agency, a complete renewal of the staff has been carried out. This
in turn has created much less tolerance of corruption in the general
public. A Code of Conduct for Public Service has been elaborated.
The Public Service Council, an advisory body of the President of
Georgia, is responsible for the implementation of the Code as well
as of the oversight of the Public Service Reform Strategy and its
Action Plan in general.
209. Despite the civil service having become more optimised and
effective, structural public sector reforms still remain to be finalised
or carried out in several areas. In a country of traditionally strong
vertical of power, the motivation and responsibility-empowerment
at middle management level still needs to be seriously worked on. A professional and responsible, non-corrupt
and non-politicised public administration that would be resilient
to any power alterations in the country's political spheres will
be a key to long-term sustainable reforms in the country. To this
end, particularly great importance should be attached to the improvement
of the selection and admission criteria and transparency for employment
in the civil service.
5. Human rights issues
5.1. Prevention of torture and inhuman
treatment, problem of impunity of crimes committed by law-enforcement
officials
210. The Assembly's
Resolution
1477 (2006) called upon the Georgian authorities to "build on first
steps taken to eliminate the "culture of violence" and torture in
prisons and pre-trial detention centres, urgently adopt further
necessary measures to meet this objective, with special attention
to the regions of Georgia outside the capital, in particular in
order to secure prompt, independent and thorough investigation of
all allegations of torture and ill-treatment and apply a policy
of zero tolerance to impunity (10.6.3.).
211. The Georgian Constitution and law provide important safeguards
for the protection of human rights. Considerable progress has been
made as regards preventing ill-treatment of persons in police custody. Whereas
Amnesty International, the US State Department, domestic NGOs, and
the Public Defender's office reported a large number of cases in
2006 in which a detainee reportedly sustained injuries resulting
from police mistreatment during arrest
, in the
current year the Ministry of Interior told us that the number has
so far been minimal.
Torture has practically
been eliminated. This presents a major positive change.
212. In 2006-2007, the government created better safeguards for
eradicating torture through amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CCP) and reforming the penitentiary system. For instance, upon
arrival, every new detainee undergoes a medical examination. In
cases where detainees are moved to another facility, a new examination
takes place. Every instance of interaction between enforcement agents
and inmates are documented. All court and prison employees are supposed
to wear identity badges, and masked enforcement agents within the
Department of Prisons have been assigned individual numbers kept
in a special log book which they must wear on duty
.
213. New amendments to the CCP adopted in 2006 exclude evidence
obtained in violation of the law and require that confessions given
by detainees during pre-trial detention be ratified in court before
being admitted as evidence. This is designed to prevent authorities
from pressuring alleged criminals to confess during preliminary
investigation. It should also be mentioned that a plea agreement
is null and void if it prevents the prosecution of law enforcement
officials for torture or ill-treatment.
214. In order to protect suspects from physical and psychological
pressure during interrogation, they also retain the right to record
the interrogation with their own recording equipment, should they
so desire.
215. The government has established departments of human rights
and monitoring within the Interior Ministry, the Office of the Prosecutor
General, and the Department of Prisons, thus strengthening internal oversight
of human rights practices within the law enforcement bodies. Since
March 2005, temporary detention isolators have been structurally
subordinated to the Main Unit for Human Rights Protection and Monitoring
set up at the Ministry of Interior. In September 2006, a new structural
entity within the Department of Prisons – the Office of Prisoners'
Rights Protection – was established in order to supervise and enforce
protection of prisoners within the penitentiary system. In addition
to reinforced internal control exercised by the Human Rights Protection
and Monitoring Unit, police establishments are regularly monitored
by the Office of the Public Defender and NGOs.
216. A new approach has also been adopted as regards the selection,
recruitment and training of the staff of the Ministry of Interior.
The adoption of a Code of Police Ethics in January 2006 is another
important step. In addition, considerable investment has been made
in the acquisition of modern technological means of inquiry and
laboratory equipment.
217. Regardless of the above efforts, impunity remains a serious
problem, particularly in the regions
. Effective investigations are rare.
According to government sources, between 2004 and 2006, 68 police
officers and prosecutors were charged and 33 convicted for human
rights violations. In addition, 27 officials of the prosecution
service were dismissed from their positions, 46 officials were reprimanded,
19 received severe warnings and 99 were rebuked. Of the 105 preliminary
inquiries investigated by the General Inspector's office of the
Ministry of Interior in 2006, 70 cases were referred to the Prosecutor
General's Office. In the same period, the Prosecutor General's Office
opened 46 cases against law enforcement officials; charges were
brought against 8 officers in 5 cases, and 4 cases against 6 officers
were sent to court. The courts issued 4 sentences for ill-treatment
in respect of 7 police officers in 2006.
218. NGOs claim that close ties between the Prosecutor General's
Office and the police hindered their ability to substantiate police
misconduct and believed the continuing lack of professionalism and
independence of the judiciary made it unresponsive to torture allegations
.
As a result, despite implementation of positive reforms, NGOs claim
that law enforcement officials can still resort to torture or mistreatment
with limited risk of exposure or punishment. They believe that a
lack of adequate training for law enforcement, as well as low public awareness
of protection afforded to citizens, impeded improvements. The authorities
maintain that the statistics show the opposite that police officers
receive punishment for any kind of misconduct
219. Human rights organisations have also voiced concerns about
the increased abuse of prisoners by prison staff and special police
forces since 2005 when the government stepped up its fight against
crime and sought to break the power of organised crime bosses (locally
known as "thieves-in-law"), including within the prison system,
which resulted in more frequent use of force to subdue or punish
detainees. Security forces repeatedly used force to suppress prison
disturbances.
220. There were allegations of a search by the special forces in
Rustavi prison N°1 on 30 January 2006, which had resulted in the
beating of a number of prisoners. However, according to HRW, no
one has had access to the prisoners to collect first-hand statements.
221. On 27 March 2006, Special Forces used automatic gunfire in
Tbilisi Prison No. 5 to suppress a disturbance, resulting in the
deaths of at least seven inmates. According to HRW, no one, including
lawyers and the members of the official Monitoring Council, was
allowed to enter the prison for two days. The government announced
that it had prevented a nation-wide prison riot plotted by criminals
and that extreme force was necessary to prevent further violence.
They presented video-taped evidence and taped telephone conversations
where prisoners were planning the disturbance. However, the opposition
and human rights activists have questioned the official version
and allege that the riot was a spontaneous act of prisoners to protest
against inhuman treatment by the prison officials against inmates
overnight on 26-27 March and that the force used by police was excessive.
222. We are not in the possession of any information as to where
the investigation of the above incidents stands.
223. In the current year, no major complaints against prison officials
have been launched. Closed-circuit surveillance TV cameras have
been installed in the corridors of a number of detention facilities,
which has certainly contributed to the improvement of treatment
of the inmates by prison officials. There has been no riots in the
prisons either.
224. We remind the Georgian authorities that all allegations of
ill-treatment or excessive use of force by the law-enforcement staff
should be properly investigated and where necessary, prosecuted.
We welcome the measures taken to limit excessive force and enhance
human rights awareness among the police force, but the authorities
must remain vigilant in this are.
5.2. Detention conditions
225. Overcrowding and poor conditions of detention, especially
in temporary detention isolators, continues to be the major human
rights concern in Georgia.
226. In 2006, the Ministry of Justice, which includes the Department
of Prisons, launched a comprehensive multi-year (2006 – 2010) action
plan for reforming all aspects of the penitentiary system. The latter
aims at establishing a humane penitentiary system based on human
rights and human dignity, solving the problem of overcrowded prisons
and improving the living conditions and reintegration into society
of prisoners. It also involves improvements in prison staff selection,
training and remuneration as means of fighting against prison staff
corruption. This action plan has been supported by a substantial
increase in the budgetary allocation (over 1 billion GEL over the
four-year period), notably for the refurbishment of existing and
construction of new prisons. In its first year, the government's
budgetary allowance for the Department of Prisons increased by 87% compared
to 2005. Further the budget more than doubled in 2007 compared to
2006. Since 2005, however, the inmate population has grown some
54% (from 8895 prisoners in 2005 to 19,441 prisoners on 30 September 2007
),
eroding some of the benefits that could have been realised by the
increased budgetary allowance. The Minister of Justice estimated
that the prison population will exceed 22,000 inmates by the end
of next year.
227. In response to the steep increase in prison population, the
Ministry of Justice has opened six new prison buildings that meet
international physical standards with a total capacity of 5178 in
Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Rustavi and Khoni since October 2005
. Another four new prisons
with a maximum capacity of 6300 are in construction in Rustavi (additions
to prisons Nos 2 and 6), Batumi and Zugdidi. Given that the pre-October
2005 capacity was about 12,200 places calculated on the basis of
2.5m² of living space per prisoner
(and
not on the basis of the CPT-recommended 4m² per prisoner), the new
additions will hardly be sufficient. It will be difficult for the country
to keep up its current prison-building marathon, for each new structure
implies not only construction and physical infrastructure, but also
recruitment and training of additional prison staff.
228. Furthermore, regardless of the official zeal and the policy
of "zero tolerance on crime" of the Georgian government, the country's
prosecutors and judiciary cannot go on forever sending an ever-increasing
number of its citizens behind prison bars. Instead, new legal avenues
that regard incarceration as the final resort and propose non-custodial
measures, wider uses of probation or early conditional release should
be more actively explored. In this respect, the last two years have
already seen notable progress. The ratio of sentenced prisoners
versus pre-trial prisoners has changed from 43,1: 56,9 in 2005 to
78,3:21,7 in September 2007
. The
use of probation has doubled within the last year. More attention
should be paid to measures which facilitate the reintegration into
society of persons who have been deprived of liberty.
229. Also, despite the opening of new and remodelled facilities
and the efforts made by the Ministry of Justice, conditions in prison
and pre-trial detention facilities have generally remained poor
and fail to comply with European standards. According to a recent
Human Rights Watch report, the majority of Georgia's prisoners live
in overcrowded, poorly ventilated, filthy cells. They receive inadequate
food and substandard medical care, have limited access to information
and family visits, and in 2006 some went for weeks or months without
an opportunity to leave their cells for exercise or fresh air. In
such cases the conditions of detention amount to degrading treatment.
230. Further issues raised during our mission by our NGO interlocutors
revealed the inadequacy of activities for inmates. Very few inmates
are entitled to work or professional training, most of them spend
23 hours in their cells without any mental or physical activity.
TV sets and radio are mostly not allowed, even if the latter is
not prohibited by law.
231. Another complaint of the human rights organisations, which
we also raised with the Public Defender, was the increased mortality
rate in the penitentiary system and the dubious fact that nearly
all deceased prisoners reportedly died of heart failure. The Justice
Ministry reported in 2006 that 92 inmates died in the prison system compared
with 46 deaths during 2005. In the first nine months of the current
year 79 inmates have died. Though generally deplorable, percentage-wise
the situation has been rather stable since 1999 (around 0.5%-0.6%). Besides,
31 (one-third) of the 92 deceased in 2006 died in the months of
July-August when inadequate conditions were exacerbated by very
high seasonal temperatures. The Justice Ministry made efforts to
improve conditions during that period by providing fans and removing
metal window shutters. Nevertheless, also in the current year the
outside climatic conditions in February and July affected prisoners'
health most. The Public Defender mentioned that his office frequently
petitioned prison officials to obtain necessary medical treatment for
inmates.
232. We visited Tbilisi Prison No 7, which is an establishment
traditionally used for the confinement of "high profile" prisoners,
including a number of criminal bosses (the so-called "thieves-in-law")
and prisoners serving a life sentence. We picked this particular
establishment on purpose because of our previously negative impressions
of the conditions of detention there. We were pleased to observe
a significant number of improvements in that establishment such
as the generally clean and refurbished cells including adequately secluded
sanitary conditions, space per inmate and luminosity in most cells,
the introduction of a prison shop with a very modern "credit card"
payment system and the installation of close-circuit surveillance
cameras
. We were told that for a year there
had been no complaints of torture or violence in that penitentiary establishment.
The inmates that we interviewed did not have any complaints in this
regard either.
233. At the moment of our visit, the prison was functioning below
its capacity (81 inmates for a total capacity of 108 places). Bearing
this in mind, we were surprised to see eight life-sentenced prisoners
crammed together is a cell of not more than 15-16 m². Their cell
(located on the 1st level of the building)
had almost no light, with the small window covered by dense wiring
which allowed hardly any natural light and fresh air to enter. We found
out that the detainees of this cell had been allowed no outdoor
exercise for more than two weeks. This is clearly unacceptable
. They also complained about
having been transferred from another prison for unexplained reasons.
None of them had been informed of the reasons for their transfer
to another establishment. They were generally well-aware of their
rights and found that the prison conditions were not adapted for
life-sentenced prisoners. The prison authorities appeared to be
aware of these complaints but seemed to ignore the issue. They explained
that those prisoners had been moved to their establishment from another
institution in Rustavi for the period of the latter's refurbishing.
None of the inmates was aware of the possibility of appealing against
the decision of their transfer.
234. None of the inmates that we talked to in Prison n° 7 could
engage in any professional or training activity. This should be
improved. No access to any outside information by radio, TV or newspapers
(other than those sent by relatives) was allowed even if permitted
by law. This should be immediately changed, especially given the
long-term sentences most of the prisoners in that establishment
are serving. One life-sentence prisoner was in solitary confinement
at the time of our visit. However, he did not complain and said
that he had some communication during the day with other prisoners.
235. Restrictions on visits and correspondence also appear to us
excessive, especially as regards prisoners on remand who require
prior authorisation by the competent investigation authority or
court to receive a visit, and which – even if authorised – can only
take place twice a month. The visit entitlement is even more restrictive
for life-sentence prisoners and especially those serving their sentences
under a cell-type regime. The latter are allowed only two visits
per year. The visiting facilities we observed in Prison n° 7 permitted
no physical contact between the prisoner and their visitor. Under
such conditions it is impossible for the long-term prisoners to
maintain adequate contact with their families.
236. In the light of the above, we can conclude that the detention
conditions have improved in general, even if overcrowding still
remains a grave problem for the foreseeable future. We hope that
the
new draft Code on Imprisonment , aimed at harmonising the Georgian penitentiary
system with international standards, will be adopted without delay.
We encourage the authorities to take into account the recent recommendations
and observations made by the CPT on their visit to Georgia in March
2007 during the consideration of the draft Code. We welcome the
initiative of the Georgian authorities to make the CPT report public
on 25 October 2007 .
237. We are pleased with the apparent effectiveness of the measures
taken to eradicate ill-treatment of the prison population, yet we
expect further safeguards to be introduced
with the adoption of the Code of Ethics of the Employees of the
Penitentiary System. We also count on the authorities to pay particular attention
to the detention conditions of juvenile prisoners.
238. We appreciate the fact that since 2006 the Georgian authorities
have made prisons accessible round the clock to various monitoring
bodies such as the Office of the Public Defender, the Ministry of
Justice's Inspection and Monitoring Department as well as local
monitoring commissions composed of NGO representatives and known
public figures. We trust that the
observations and recommendations of these monitoring bodies will
be duly taken into account when elaborating new legislation and
taking measures to improve conditions of detention.
239. Of the little we could observe ourselves during our visit
to Prison n° 7, we recommend that as long as this establishment
operates below its maximum capacity, its occupants should be dispersed
in cells so as to provide them with maximum possible space (even
if the recommended minimum of 4 m² cannot yet be fully respected).
We also urge the authorities to take further measures to provide
adequate lighting and outdoor exercise to all inmates irrespective
of their length of stay in the establishment. We further recommend
that the activities of inmates be substantially improved, including
their access to outside information through the installation of
TV sets and radios. Finally, we call upon the authorities to review
the current excessively strict regulations on visits and correspondence,
especially those regarding remand prisoners and prisoners serving under
the strict regime.
5.3. Repatriation of the Meskhetian
population
240. The repatriation of the Meskhetian population by
2011 to Georgia was one of Georgia's accession commitments in 1999.
However, it is only since the coming into power of the current government
that the issue has received more serious attention and reached a
stage of partial fulfilment.
241. In January 2006, the Assembly's
Resolution 1477 (2005)(2006) called upon the Georgian authorities to "pursue
the work of the State Commission on repatriation, seek actively
international assistance and speed up the adoption of relevant legislation
in order to create conditions for the repatriation process with
a view to its completion by 2011; implement fully the recommendations
set forth in Assembly
Resolution
1428 (2005) on the situation of the deported Meskhetian population
(paragraph 10.3.).
242. In March 2005, a state commission was set up which put forward
a new draft in collaboration with the Council of Europe and the
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) experts. At the same
time the relevant Parliamentary Committee started working on the
law on repatriation. The version of the draft law envisaged comprehensive
mechanisms for state support to repatriates and also mechanisms
for regulating the settlement process with regard to deciding on
locations for settlements and measures for integration of the repatriates. This
draft law passed through a series of consultations with legal experts
from the Council of Europe, Meskhetian representatives and other
civil society organisations
.
However, the process was again suspended in autumn 2006.
243. The government presented a much "shaved down" version of the
draft law to Parliament in June 2007, which encompassed only procedures
for application and provisions for granting of repatriate status
and citizenship. It was in this version that the draft law "On Repatriation
of Persons Forcefully Sent into Exile from Georgia by the Former
USSR in the 1940s of the 20th Century"
was finally adopted on 22 June 2007 at the first reading (by 134
to 14 votes).
244. Though this step has been criticised by many, we understand
that it may have been the only way for the Georgian lawmakers to
make at least the first step towards fulfilment of their commitment.
The President and the lawmakers of the country consider the repatriation
issue as their "moral obligation" and there is no reason to doubt
their sincerity. However, the government functions in the context
of very negative public opinion towards repatriation. A public opinion
poll carried out by the International Republican Institute (IRI)
in February this year indicated that 67% of the population was against
and only 16 in favour of opening Meskhetian repatriation. The opposition
was even higher than a 2006 poll when 53% were against repatriation.
The region from where the Meskhetians were deported, Samtskhe-Javakheti,
is populated by a large Armenian minority population. Both the Armenian
and Georgian local communities have issued strong statements against repatriation.
245. Similar resistance was also seen during the debate in the
parliament in June, some of the opposition parties making alarmingly
provocative statements. Even some less provocative parties suggested
that Georgia is not prepared to offer the Meshkhetians a proper
return and that their presence could cause more political instability
or threaten Georgia's territorial integrity.
246. Only one opposition force – the Republican Party – has supported
the draft. They were, however, critical of the authorities' failure
to provide a proper public awareness campaign, so as to bring the
population on board behind the proposal
.
247. The content of the draft law as adopted has been widely criticised.
Some have gone as far as to call it a "law on non-repatriation".
We agree that many provisions of the adopted law are vague and leave
too much space for interpretation by the state officials who will
be responsible for the processing of applications, thus bearing
a risk of applicants being turned down on technical grounds. In
addition, the law allows the receipt of applications only between
1 January 2008 and 1 January 2009. No applications will be allowed
after that deadline. According to the Chairman of the Georgian Delegation
to the PACE, Giga Bokeria, the one year period will enable the authorities
to determine exactly how many people are willing to return. This
would enable the government to plan – rationally and based on national
interests – the pace of the process
.
248. Another ambiguity in the law concerns the question of citizenship.
It determines that by 1 January 2010, a decree on simplified procedures
for repatriates should be issued. Hence it will remain unclear for
quite some time to come what repatriates can expect in terms of
citizenship
.
249. Furthermore, the law envisages the right to apply for the
repatriate status, but it fails to stipulate the right to repatriate.
It makes no mention of the order and procedures of resettlement
to Georgia and is unclear about how the issues concerning property,
taxation or social security are to be resolved upon the repatriates'
arrival in Georgia. Nor does the law define the rights and duties
of the repatriates coming to Georgia.
250. With many of the issues worded in an ambiguous way or not
touched upon at all, the adopted law will need to undergo further
revision in the future. Although Georgia has formally fulfilled
its commitment to adopt a law on repatriation of the Meskhetian
population, much needs to be done to keep to the deadline of 2011
for the completion of repatriation. We therefore call on the Georgian
authorities to:
- prepare a proper
national strategy for the resettlement and integration of the to-be-repatriated Meskhetians;
- envisage setting up a joint commission with the participation
of representatives of the government, international organisations
and relevant NGOs to work on the implementation of the law as well
as on further improvement of the existing legislation;
- consider providing financial and technical support to
the returning Meskhetians, regardless of the latter not having been
among Georgia's original 1999 accession commitments;
- explore all possible means for reversing the largely negative
public opinion towards Meskhetian repatriation. There is still not
enough recognition of the deportation in history schoolbooks and museums.
251. We hope that the government will tackle the issue with much
care and sensitivity in order to avoid any complication that it
becomes a major issue of the election campaign next year.
252. Finally, at the very moment of drafting this report, the Council
of Europe is organising a seminar in Tbilisi on the implementation
of the law. We encourage the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe to keep on providing substantial
support and assistance to the Georgian government to enable the country
to fully honour their accession commitment by 2011.
5.4. Media pluralism and freedom
of expression
253. Since the Rose Revolution, legislation relating to
freedom of speech and the media has fostered an open, lively, and
critical discourse in Georgian civil society. The Law on Freedom
of Speech and Expression, adopted in June 2004, is widely considered
as one of the most democratic and liberal of its kind in Europe.
It elaborates on the freedom of expression provisions that appear
in the Georgian constitution and in human rights treaties to which
Georgia is a party.
254. The Law prohibits censorship and protects journalists against
unwarranted pressure from owners and editors. It provides a course
of action by which individual journalists can take editors or owners
to civil court. This ensures that journalists have a legal remedy
not only in cases concerning the state, but also in cases when editors
and publishers violate the principles of journalistic independence.
Under the Law, journalists are guaranteed independence and freedom
of thought. This particular part of the legislation encourages journalists to
make editorial decisions based on their own professional judgment.
The Law also provides special protection for whistleblowers and
individuals who disclose confidential information in good faith
in order to prevent or expose wrongdoing.
255. The Law protects the absolute immunity of confidential journalistic
sources. It guarantees that a court cannot require a journalist
to disclose the source of confidential information during court
proceedings. Absolute protection is conferred upon the individual;
in other words, a journalist cannot be compelled to disclose a given source
no matter how important the countervailing interest might be. The
Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia contains additional guarantees
for journalistic activity.
256. There is no direct government pressure or influence from the
government on media, although according to the Freedom House 2008
report, after the Rose Revolution, part of the media proved vulnerable
to behind-the-scenes pressure from the government. NGOs and independent
media analysts sometimes accuse high-ranking government officials
of exercising undue influence over editorial and programming decisions
through their personal connections with news directors and media
executives
.
This has much to do with the fact that many of today's media owners
used to be formerly in opposition but with the change of government
have automatically become close to the government and other authorities.
This has contributed to a certain degree of self-censorship. Weak
editorial independence, using media outlets to promote the political
interests of owners, and low professional standards thus constitute
major concerns in the media field.
257. Both the government and civil society representatives criticise
the level of quality of broadcasting and press. A draft Code of
Ethics for broadcasters is currently being elaborated together with
the Council of Europe experts. It has triggered sharp criticism
from most journalists and has been denounced as an attempt by the government
to control broadcast media. Thus the National Commission on Communications
has postponed its adoption in order to allow for public comment.
258. The 2004 Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression took libel
off the criminal code and relieved journalists of legal criminal
responsibility for revealing state secrets. There have been no reported
cases of excessive fines in the last years. The new Law holds people
liable only for false statements that seriously damage a person
or his or her reputation, and not for a mere mistake. Thus, the
Law creates a favorable environment for free discussion and debate.
Moreover, the law distinguishes between public and private persons
in defamation proceedings. This distinction reflects the well-established
principle that public figures, because of their status in society,
must tolerate a far greater degree of criticism than ordinary persons.
The burden of proof was shifted from the defendant (i.e., the media)
to the plaintiff, thus making it harder to win cases against media
outlets. According to the Law, the court can hold only the owner
of a media outlet liable when a defamatory statement is aired or
published. A journalist or editor can never bear individual responsibility for
the publication of a defamatory statement. This provides important
legal protection to journalists. It eliminates the possibility that,
in the case of a libel accusation, a journalist would be forced
to personally hire expensive lawyers, or pay damages that he or
she may not be able to afford.
259. There are no strong formal associations of media, but in 2006
the Media Council made the first steps towards enforcing professional
standards to which most media have subscribed.
260. Although according to the General Administrative Code all
citizens have the right to require information through specially
designated persons in state bodies, problems nevertheless have been
reported about some institutions funded by the state budget which
systematically did not give out information or did not do so immediately,
as required by the law. According to law, if the information is
not readily available, it has to be provided within 10 days of the
request.
261. Media freedom has been recently in the focus of attention.
The media environment was affected by the recent state of emergency,
during which broadcast media faced restrictions in their reporting
and two TV channels were temporarily taken off the air. While all
broadcasters resumed normal operation after the state of emergency
was lifted nine days later, the opposition-backed Imedi TV, which
was raided by police on 7 November and had its license temporarily
suspended, was only able to resume broadcasting a month later. On 26
December, six leading journalists announced their decision to leave
Imedi TV in connection with the accusations against Imedi’s owner
Badri Patarkatsishvili. Imedi TV’s management consequently suspended broadcasts
to “distance themselves from dirty political games”, alleging pressure
from both their owner and the authorities.
262. A positive outcome of the otherwise deplorable reaction of
Georgia’s leadership on 7 November and its aftermath is the increased
awareness of professional and ethical standards of media in Georgia.
The closure of the Imedi station, although widely condemned, has
brought the quality of reporting into the focus of public debate.
It has also multiplied the broadcasting of differing views by private
broadcasters. Whereas up until 7 November Imedi was the only television
channel offering political debates, now other private channels have followed.
A major development has been the elaboration by the Media Council
of guidelines to encourage free and balanced media in the pre- and
post-election period, which have been subscribed to by most of Georgia's major
television stations. The Council of Europe media experts are currently
working on revising the draft Code of Ethics for Broadcasters.
5.5. Public Defender's (Ombudsman)
office
263. The Assembly's
Resolution
1477 (2005)(2006) invited the Georgian authorities to "grant the
necessary political and financial independence to the office of
the Public Defender (Ombudsman) and consider broadening its powers"
(paragraph 10.6.5.)
264. The Public Defender's Office (PDO) has been functioning for
more than a decade already, providing an effective leverage for
the protection of human rights in Georgia. It has sought to promptly
follow on all allegations of human rights violations. As a result,
the public trust and credit given to the PDO has increased considerably.
This has brought along a steady growth of complaints to the Public
Defender. According to the Public Defender, the biggest number of
applications concerned the socio-cultural sphere, including housing and
labour rights, but also criminal and civil proceedings. In recent
times, there have also been an increasing number of complaints on
the violation of the right to property, in particular concerning
the destruction of property by the state without fair compensation.
265. Citizens frequently address the PDO on the illegality of decisions
taken by courts. However, according to the Organic Law on Public
Defender, the PDO cannot interfere into judicial proceedings, summon
witnesses to court or take on the function of a counsel for prosecution.
The maximum right the Public Defender enjoys in relation to courts
is to make suggestions to the High Council of Justice concerning
the disciplinary responsibility of judges, where there is a breach
of law. The PD regrets, however, that his suggestions concerning disciplinary
penalties against judges have so far not been acted on.Mr Subari
also regretted the frequent reluctance by the Prosecutor General's
Office to open investigations concerning crimes committed by state agents,
such as torture and inhuman treatment, unlawful arrest, non-execution
of court orders, biased investigation, etc.
266. The PDO in Georgia enjoys a much broader monitoring right
than in most other European countries. Within the context of implementing
the Action Plan for criminal justice reform 2005-2009, the monitoring
of the prevention of torture and ill-treatment and other breaches
of human rights in closed institutions has become a key function
of the PDO. Since January 2005, the PDO has carried out more than
3000 visits to pre-trial detention facilities and police stations
and issued a number of recommendations. Monitoring of prisons, psychiatric
clinics, orphanages, military units and shelters of elderly people
also fall under the PDO's remit.
267. Several specialised centres of the PDO, such as the Tolerance
Centre, Patience Rights Centre or the Legal Centre, have been opened
with the help of UNDP and other donor organisations. The establishment
of these centres has helped improve the analysis of particular human
rights issues. For instance, the legal centre, established in 2006,
carries out the analysis of draft laws as well as of laws currently
in force. Since its establishment, the centre has prepared amendments
on 35 draft laws.
268. The PDO is actively involved in monitoring the situation of
ethnic and religious tolerance in the country. Some civil organisations'
representatives, however, pointed out that the PDG's office should
broaden its scope and deal also with other forms of discrimination,
including discrimination on the grounds of gender or sexual orientation.
Given the generally negative perception
of homosexuality in Georgia, which sometimes amounts to homophobia
and which finds support by the Georgian Orthodox Church, and the
fact that even the Council of Europe "All equal, all different"
campaign had to be cancelled earlier this year because of ferocious
media attacks labelling the event a gay pride , we recommend that attitudes to homosexuality
and LGBT rights be taken up by the PDO as an area of monitoring
and included as a component in its human rights trainings.
269. In the framework of the criminal justice reform, it is foreseen
to expand the authority of the PDO. In this regard, the office has
drafted amendments to the Organic Law on Public Defender regarding
the competences of the PDO.
270. The reform is also accompanied by the budgetary increase of
the PDO. According to the data available on the Ministry of Justice
official site, the total budget estimation for the Action Plan 2006-2009
as concerns the PDO is 2,050,000 GEL. According to the Public Defender,
the total budget for 2007 of his office is 1,340,000 GEL.
6. Regional conflicts over Abkhazia
(Georgia) and South Ossetia (Georgia)
6.1. Commitment of peaceful resolution
271. Upon accession to the Council of Europe, Georgia
(1999
) as well as Russia (1996
) voluntarily undertook the obligation
to settle all international as well as internal disputes by peaceful
means. Later Assembly resolutions recommended the Georgian authorities
to adopt a legal framework for the restitution of ownership and
tenancy rights or compensation for the property lost during its
internal conflicts and to ensure that internally displaced persons
would enjoy equal rights with the rest of the population
. In 2005 the Assembly
called twice upon the Russian Federation "to use its substantial
influence to back the efforts of the Georgian Government to resolve
the outstanding conflicts with South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a peaceful
and political manner; to create conditions to guarantee the broad
autonomy of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and to restore the territorial
integrity of Georgia
"; and to "constructively contribute
to the resolution of open issues and cease with activities, such
as the issuing of Russian passports to inhabitants of the Georgian
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which may – directly or indirectly
– undermine these countries' sovereignty and territorial integrity
". These obligations and recommendations
serve as mandates for the Council of Europe to monitor the progress
made in peace settlement and stabilisation in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
272. The Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly and
the Committee of Ministers have followed in parallel the developments
in the two breakaway regions over the years. The Council of Europe Commissioner
of Human Rights lately visited both regions and has issued an assessment
report on the human rights situation in these regions in September
2007
. At its April 2007
part-session, the Assembly adopted
Resolution 1553 (2007) on missing persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
from the conflicts over the Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia regions, prepared by our colleague Mr Platvoet (The Netherlands,
UEL), which also dealt with important human rights issues in the
two separatist regions. Our recent visit concentrated moreover on
the political considerations that impede the advancement of a positive settlement
of these conflicts today.
273. We observe that a major obstacle to conflict resolution today
is related to perceptions that prevent confidence-building. The
communities have lived isolated from one another for nearly fifteen
years now and have been subjected to heavy propaganda from all sides.
This has solidified the conflicting parties' distorted and negative
image of "the other" that do not quite fit the realities, but which
cannot be ignored if a solution is to be found one day. Also, it
is deplorable that the conflicting parties and the international
community have so far not managed to create minimum conditions for
the safe return of the internally displaced persons (IDP)s, which
we also address in this Chapter of the report.
274. In broad terms, the Georgian government has continued to respect
its international obligation as regards the peaceful settlement
of its internal conflicts. They insist that they do not seek military
solutions to the conflicts within Georgia's borders and we have
indeed no reason to doubt that the Georgian authorities who already work
hand in hand with NATO and EU structures with a goal of further
integration have any intention to solve these conflicts through
any other than peaceful means, even if the "rhetoric of frustration"
over the dead-locked situation may sometimes indicate otherwise
. There is no political
force in Georgia today willing to propagate military solutions.
The picture often presented by the Russian propaganda machine that
Georgia is an aggressive and armed-to-the-teeth country ready to
embark on a new military attack any moment is absurd. In recent
years, Georgia has proposed several peace plans, which have been
supported by the OSCE and the EU. These peace proposals have however
been discarded by other conflicting parties, the latter perceiving these
as directed primarily at proving good intentions to the international
community and thus allowing Georgia to pursue a solution on its
own terms
.
275. According to the State Minister of Conflict Regulation Issues,
Georgia is moving from daily operational issues, such as dealing
with individual border incidents, to focusing on wider strategic
conflict settlement issues such as economic reconstruction, the
return of the IDPs, restitution of their property, etc. This has,
however, not been facilitated by recurrent border provocations and
air raids, which flair up emotions every now and then, diverting
domestic and international attention from the issues of peace settlement
proper. Nonetheless, the government of Georgia seems to have greatly
matured in its reactions to such provocations over the last year. Its
response to the latest instance of military violation of its borders
was sober and
responsible, immediately mustering western diplomatic response to
the incident rather than taking unilateral action
.
276. It has long been said by all negotiating sides that a prerequisite
of peaceful resolution of these conflicts is that Georgia becomes
attractive to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Lately, Georgia has greatly
moderated its policies toward the breakaway regions and now privileges
the so-called "soft methods" of conflict resolution in a way that
appears to be creating new opportunities for dialogue. Their current
strategy favours linkage between conflict-resolution efforts and
its internal reforms. The measures taken include large-scale investment into
the infrastructures (reconstruction of roads and schools, hospitals,
public administration buildings) and generously distributing food
and medical supplies to the regions under their control with a view
to marking the growing contrast between the regions under their
control and the rest of Abkhazia or South Ossetia in terms of economic
development. It also involves engaging the new Temporary Administrative
Unit at national political level. For instance, a member of the
governing body of the Temporary Administrative Unit was recently appointed
Deputy Minister of Economy. This strategy is mostly applied to the
resolution of the conflict in South Ossetia, which has created new
tensions in that region but which could lead to a political breakthrough
if properly handled.
277. International observers note however that Georgia's new strategy
may backfire, and that frequent security incidents could degenerate,
unless it proceeds cautiously
. They
also warn Georgia against pushing too far too quickly, explaining
that impatience may lead to unnecessary escalation of tensions and
the situation getting altogether out of hand.
278. Following international advice, the Georgian government is
in fact currently pooling its efforts to engage in bilateral contacts
with the secessionist authorities. On 25 October, the State Minister
of Conflict Resolution met with the
de
facto Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia in Sukhumi;
which marked an end of a year-long pause in bilateral relations
between senior Georgian and Abkhaz officials
. Sukhumi had earlier linked the resumption
of dialogue to preconditions, such as the withdrawal of Georgian
forces and the Tbilisi-backed government from the Tbilisi-controlled
upper Kodori Gorge in the breakaway region. The dialogue appears
to be currently more difficult to establish with the Tskhinvali
authorities who do not wish to be part of a negotiated solution.
279. The Georgian government has recently taken the initiative
to launch a State Commission working on a future status of South
Ossetia within the Georgian State, which is meant to involve all
parties as well as Georgia's international partners in an inclusive
dialogue. The Georgian government has undertaken to request Council
of Europe's expertise on the draft to be elaborated.
280. The year 2008 will be an important test for the Georgian government:
Georgia attaches much importance to the April 2008 NATO summit in
Bucharest, as it could see Georgia joining NATO Membership Action
Plan (MAP). Georgia perceives its possible future membership as
an additional guarantee of security for its territorial integrity.
But for the time being, it is walking on a thin line between the
diplomatic behaviour that NATO and EU expect from potential members,
and safeguard measures of its own sovereignty, security and dignity
.
2008 will also see presidential and parliamentary elections in Georgia.
The restoration of territorial integrity is high on the political
agenda of both the National Movement and the newly united opposition.
Furthermore, the Georgians point out that the old models have failed
to solve the outstanding differences and insist that the time has
come to introduce new ones. The latter should however take account
of the current realities on the ground as well as the changed geo-strategic
situation in the wider Caucasus region.
6.2. Reasons for continued stalemate
281. The peace settlement over the political status of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia is at standstill; there are no effective
negotiations going on between the conflicting parties or attempts
to broker them at international level. From the discussions which
we held with different stakeholders of these conflicts, we distinguish
five fundamental causes or controversies that hamper finding a positive
settlement today.
282. First, the international community univocally recognises the
state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, thereby
granting legitimacy to Georgia's right to exert control over all
its territory. The "
de facto" inability
to regain full control of its territory is seen by Georgia as impeding
its state-building, national security and economic development.
Hundreds of thousands of individuals remain internally displaced
as a result of the ethnic cleansing that occurred in the early '90s
in Abkhazia, most of them living in harsh conditions in Georgia proper
but also in Russia. The continuing killing and kidnapping, lack
of law and order and lack of guarantees for the safe return of refugees
in the conflict zones make the Georgian government nervous and impatient. Occasionally
they resort to contumelious rhetorics, which is not appreciated
by other stakeholders in the peace settlement. The Georgians argue
that they cannot allow the "tactics of prolonging the situation,
prolonging injustice, prolonging persecution, with the final aim
of annexing those territories"
to continue.
283. They are also frustrated that every time they take an initiative
to reassert control over an unruly region (such as was the case
with the Upper Kodori Valley in July 2006), strive to build up a
military force that would put the country into a different negotiating
position, organise a youth patriot summer camp in Ganmukhuri that would
help bring the youth of different ethnic origins together, or request
a neutral, professional peacekeeping and police force under the
UN auspices to be set up, Georgia gets reproached by both its western
partners and Russia, and is reminded that it should stick to the
existing mechanisms of conflict resolution, in spite of their utter
failure
. This form of international
support to Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity is perceived by
Tbilisi as maintaining the status quo rather than leading to a fruitful
settlement.
284. Second, these conflicts
originally began as inter-communal conflicts, the regulation of
which then became "frozen" over different perceptions of the causes
and differing interpretations of international law. While Georgia
claimed the principle of its sovereignty and territorial integrity,
the Abkhaz and South Ossetians referred to the right of self-determination
as the basis of their own fight for independence. However, even
if these conflicts arose out of genuine grievances on the part of
minority populations and serious mistakes on the part of the Georgian
then leadership, Russia's influence over the secessionist regions
has grown so strong over the years that it
has
changed the nature of these conflicts. At the same time
Georgia has become more important for Europe and the United States
as a strategic partner. There is reason therefore to question whether
these conflicts are still essentially secessionist civil wars, or
whether they are best described as outright Russian-Georgian confrontations
by proxy
,
or even as part of Great Power rivalry between international actors,
who are themselves characterised by incompatible identities and
interests.
285. Indeed Russia has taken a different, more assertive position
in the two secessionist regions since 2004, refuting its earlier
stance of being a peace facilitator only. The Georgian side refers
to the Russian political, financial and military backing of the
de facto authorities in Sukhumi
and Tskhinvali as undermining Russia's role as an honest broker.
The Georgians claim that the vast majority of the population in
Abkhazia hold Russian passports that the currency used is the Russian
rouble and that a number of retired people receive Russian pensions.
Moscow has appointed Russian officers to the military and security
services of the
de facto governments
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Hence Abkhazia's Defence Minister
and the chief-of-staff are both former Russian officers. Likewise
two Russian officers serve as Defence Minister and Head of Security Service
in Tskhinvali. On 18 November 2006, the Moscow-backed
de facto South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoiti
stated that "South Ossetia will join North Ossetia and become a
part of the Russian Federation in the foreseeable future in any
case"
. All these measures
are not tolerated by Georgia who sees in them Russia's intention
to undermine Georgia's stability and thwart its prospects of regaining
territorial integrity.
286. The Russian side believes that the Abkhazian and South Ossetian
people do not want to live under Georgian rule and that they want
Russian peacekeepers deployed on their territory, at least until
Georgia convinces them that they will refrain from any military
solutions. This belief has further deepened after the Georgian special
operation in the upper Kodori Valley in July 2006, which was perceived
by the Russian side as employment of military force to solve the
conflict in Abkhazia. In the same month, the Russian Duma passed a
resolution authorising Russian troops to serve anywhere in defence
of Russian citizens – presumably including those who reside permanently
in Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Moreover the adoption by the Russian Duma
of two further resolutions on 6 December 2006, calling for the recognition
of Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's secession from Georgia and their
potential incorporation into Russia, blocked any hope of breakthrough
in the negotiations at the end of 2006.
287. As full-fledged parties to the two conflicts, Russia and Georgia
accuse each other of wanting to resolve the conflicts on their own
terms and according to their own picture of realities. Russia maintains
that it is interested in the regulation of the existing conflicts
as soon as possible and only through peaceful means, but it cannot
put up with Georgia not paying attention to the realities in the
two secessionist regions. Georgia's provocative acts humiliate Russian
peacekeepers and Russia in general
. In a rather father-to-son style, it demands
that the Georgian side should feel the responsibility of its actions.
Georgia in its turn asserts that it wishes to see Russia as part
of the solution and not as part of the problem. Georgia is not interested
in ousting Russia from the peace process, but in view of Russia's
partiality and vested interests in the conflict zones, the formats
for negotiations and peacekeeping should be altered so as to extend
the international participation in the negotiation process and bring
international police forces to the regions. This has been met by
opposition in Moscow and the two breakaway regions, and has not
been strongly backed by Georgia's Western partners, who do not wish
to further strain their own relations with Russia.
288. Georgia has pinned its hopes of recovering its lost territories
to its integration into the West, and notably to the prospect of
NATO membership. Its membership is strongly supported by the United
States. This is an irritant for Russia, who views its relations
with the United States in the region in zero-sum terms and has made it
very clear that Georgia's accession to NATO will "immensely complicate
and make very remote" the resolution of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz
conflicts. The successive border incidents and the recent violations
of Georgian air space may indicate that Russia is testing Georgia's
patience and international reactions, signalling to Georgia that
while the US and Europe may wish a close relationship in the sphere
of energy they might not be willing to take on any obligations in
the security sphere
.
289. Russia claims that it takes a long-term view of conflict settlement,
arguing that there should first be sufficient trust between the
sides before building a common state. However, it does not do much
to build this trust. Moscow's propaganda continues to depict Georgia
as guilty of aggression and ethnic cleansing against Abkhaz and
Ossetians. Russia is often using the UN Security Council's platform
and its resolutions to vindicate its own arguments, which deepen
the political deadlock
.
290. During the night of 11 March 2007, a major air attack on Georgia's
upper Kodori Valley was carried out by Russian helicopters
.
More recently, on 6 August, Russian SU-24 military aircraft(s) again
violated Georgian airspace, entering more than 75 kilometres into
sovereign Georgian territory and dropping a precision-guided air-to-surface
Raduga Kh-58 anti-radar tactical guided missile near the village
of Tsitelubani close to the Tskhinvali region, in South Ossetia
(some 60 kms from Tbilisi)
. The suspected
purpose of the latest incursion was to damage or destroy the Georgian
radar installation at Tsitelubani, but the rocket fired by the aircraft
missed its mark
.
Analysts of Georgian civilian and military radar data concluded
that the aircraft entered Georgia from the Russian Federation. An
onsite OSCE team, which included Russian representatives, confirmed
that the planes entered and left Georgia from the North-East.
291. As in the case of the 11 March bombing, Russia's initial reaction
was to claim that the Georgians had fired on themselves, which later
changed for the contradictory claim that the incident did not occur
at all. Georgia for its part reaffirmed its readiness to immediately
launch bilateral consultations with the Russian side in order to
prevent recurrence of such incidents in the future. Two consultation
meetings indeed took place on 17 August in Tbilisi and, at political
level, on 30 August in Moscow
. Following the
statement made by the Portuguese Presidency on behalf of the EU
on 10 August, underlining "the need for a rapid, thorough and independent
investigation in order to clarify and verify all the facts surrounding
this incident", the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia called
for an independent international investigation
of
the circumstances of the air incursion and missile drop. Two groups
of experts worked in Georgia
, both confirming
that the Georgian airspace had been violated three times on 6 August
from/by aircraft flying to/from Russian airspace and that Georgia
has no capacity for operating this type of missile
.
292. Although the UN Security Council in its
Resolution 1752 (2007) of 13 April 2007 condemned the attack on villages in
the Upper Kodori Valley as such, it avoided establishing any responsibility,
probably because of Russia's veto power. The OSCE reaction to the
August crisis was similar to the UN's reaction following the March
incident or the later incident in the Kodory Valley, proving as
incapable of addressing this event.
293. This leads to the
third underlying
reason for the current stalemate:
the
existing mechanisms of international response to incidents of this
sort are ineffective :
both the UN and the OSCE are ill-suited for deterring future incidents
of this type
mainly
because these multilateral international bodies are dependent on
Russian political or budgetary vetoes. Failing to respond convincingly
to provocations of this type sends the message to Russia that it
can intimidate its neighbours without being called to account for
it and deter Georgia from integrating Euro-Atlantic institutions
.
294. Fourth, there is a
general
absence of international consensus
on how the problem ought to be resolved. The international
multilateral organisations have no clear strategy or positive experience
of similar peaceful resolution of secessionist conflicts in Europe.
Mixed with prudence not to stretch the fragile ceasefire arrangements,
this absence of a coherent strategy has lead to an overall
defence of the status quo. Western policymakers
routinely urge "caution" advising the Georgian leaders to trust
the work of the "peace process" and international institutions under
the auspices of the UN and OSCE. Yet these "processes" are not only ineffective,
they are excuses for inaction
. Thus, for example,
all recent UN resolutions since October ask Georgia in strong terms
to comply with the terms of the 1994 Moscow agreement. Citing these
resolutions, Moscow and Sukhumi therefore demand the withdrawal
of Georgian police and civil authority from the upper Kodori Valley
as a precondition to their return to negotiations. Thus the western
diplomacy has given Moscow and Sukhumi an argument for blocking
the negotiations which the same western diplomats have been anxious to
see resumed
.
295. In his recent address to the UN General Assembly on 26 September
2007, the Georgian President observed that "fourteen years have
passed without a single in-depth analysis being conducted as to
why peace has not triumphed". He called for a "comprehensive review
of all aspects of the peace process" that should result in "fundamental
changes" to the existing "mediation" and "peacekeeping" formats.
He further called for the replacement of the "biased and unbalanced
actions by supposed peace keeping forces" with "competent and neutral
ones"
.
296. The European Union has not excluded that it may in principle
be prepared to participate in peacekeeping operations. This would,
however, require acceptance of joint operations by the other parties,
including Russia
.
297. Finally, the
status quo also serves as an alibi
for the western governments who support (albeit to varying degrees)
the
independence of Kosovo from
Serbia. However, this logic seems tacitly to accept Moscow's thesis
that the post-Soviet conflicts and Kosovo conflict are linked –
a thesis officially rejected both by the US and the European Union.
Any tacit or implicit acceptance of linkage could reward Moscow's
tactics of blocking the resolution of all five conflicts
.
298. The "Kosovo precedent" has infused new trends into the politics
of the secessionist regions. Kosovo's possible move towards independence,
albeit "conditional", has created a new
raison
d'être for the secessionist entities to resist any conflict
settlement in the hope that sooner or later they will follow Kosovo
. The Abkhaz
de facto President has openly stated
that "if Kosovo is recognised, Abkhazia will be recognised in the
course of three days."
6.3. Developments and perceptions
in the breakaway Regions
299. In his recent UN address, the Georgian President
spelled out Georgia's political offer to the South Ossetian and
Abkhaz communities: "Full self-governance based on the same principles
that have guided Europe," with special protection of language and
minority rights, under Georgian constitutional guarantees as well
as international guarantees to be negotiated. He also linked the
long-term preservation of ethnic identity with legal guarantees
of property rights
.
As it is to be expected, this proposal has been received with mixed feelings
within the conflict areas themselves.
6.3.1. South Ossetia
The open phase of the conflict in South Ossetia lasted between
1990 and 1992 and claimed approximately a thousand lives. The conflict
ended with a ceasefire agreement signed on 14 July 1992. As a result
of the ceasefire agreement, there is a trilateral peacekeeping operation
consisting of Russian, Georgian and de facto South Ossetian troops.
A Joint Control Commission (JCC) consisting of Russia, de facto
South Ossetia, North Ossetia (region of the Russian Federation)
and Georgia oversees the security situation and pursues negotiations
on conflict settlement. The OSCE supervises the situation. The Georgian
government has frequently complained that the current format for
talks puts them at a disadvantage, and would like greater participation
by the international community. The EU is an observer in the JCC
meetings on economic issues.
300. Following the election of President Mikheil Saakashvili
in January 2004, the Georgian government intensified efforts to
bring South Ossetia back under its control. Its South Ossetia strategy
combined anti-smuggling campaigns, aimed primarily at closing the
prosperous Ergneti market
with
a humanitarian aid campaign to undermine the leaders in South Ossetia.
These steps in fact increased support for the
de
facto regime, for many South Ossetians depended on illegal
trade for economic survival. As a by-product of the offensive anti-smuggling
policy, Georgian troop presence grew significantly, provoking harsh
reactions from the Ossetian side. In summer 2004, tensions escalated
and almost degenerated into another full-scale war. Within one month,
a ceasefire was agreed upon, which however has not prevented daily
shootings and criminal incidents from happening in the region.
301. As part of the Georgian government's new strategy of changing
the status quo peacefully, Tbilisi since November 2006 has supported
a South Ossetian administration led by Dmitri Sanakoev, a former
government official of the
de facto regime
in Tskhinvali. The latter has set up a government in Kurta, South
Ossetia, just 5 kilometres away from Tskhinvali. A situation of
dual power has thus developed in South Ossetia
. On 10
May 2007, Sanakoev was appointed by the Georgian government as head
of a new Temporary Administration Unit for the Tskhinvali region/South
Ossetia. So far, Sanakoev has secured support in Georgian-populated villages
, but it is uncertain whether he will
be able to gain significant influence over the Ossetian governed territory
– which will determine the future course of the conflict.
302. The Georgian government sees Sanakoev as a genuine Ossetian
interlocutor with whom it can negotiate a settlement which would
keep South Ossetia in the country
. They also see his
credibility in the fact that he is an ethnic Ossetian and a former
secessionist leader who fought against the Georgians in 1991-1992. President
Saakashvili and several government officials told us that they were
confident that Sanakoev would be able to win the support of the
majority of the population in the villages under the
de facto Tskhinvali rule. However,
they do not rule out radical provocations orchestrated from Moscow,
which may slow down the process.
303. Tbilisi is backing up its political support to Sanakoev by
the economic rehabilitation of the Georgian-administered areas,
supported by international donors, including the US. With government
encouragement, Georgian construction and other companies are building
roads, banks, cinemas, hotels, renovating schools, etc., which is
already making a visible difference compared to the areas administered
by the secessionist authorities. Economy is surely one area where
progress may be possible, but different economic realities are also
fuelling the conflict. Those benefiting from lucrative smuggling
and counterfeiting operations in South Ossetia will resist any reassertion
of state authority.
304. At our meeting with Dmitry Sanakoev, he stressed that Georgian
should become the state language on the territory of South Ossetia
while full autonomy should be guaranteed for the preservation of
Ossetian linguistic and cultural identity. Also, he pointed out
that the EU appeal could become a decisive factor in promoting confidence
between the Ossetians and Georgians. The EU would be the best placed
to broker a political dialogue and conflict resolution.
305. The Georgian government actively seeks international support
to the Sanakoev-led administrative unit. To this end, Sanakoev often
accompanies the President or government officials on their foreign
missions. Also, on 21 September 2007, Georgia organised an international
conference in Tamarasheni, South Ossetia, on the conflict. It was
the first event of this type ever held in any post-Soviet conflict
area, and was attended by ambassadors and staff from nearly all
EU and NATO member states as well as by the EU and OSCE missions in
Georgia
.
306. In spite of these positive developments, we tend to agree
with the International Crisis Group which points out that while
Tbilisi is approaching the conflict in an imaginative way, it would
also need to realise that this strategy cannot work overnight or
solely on the basis of economic incentives. The Ossetian aspirations
and fears must also be addressed. The Tskhinvali Ossetians doubt
that Sanakoev can represent their interests ahead of Tbilisi's.
Many in the Tskhinvali-backed villages consider him a traitor. To
this end, the ICG suggests that Tbilisi should resume substantive
dialogue with Tskhinvali, while Sanakoev tries to steadily build
credibility with the Ossetians
.
307. The Georgians argue that since March 2007 they accepted a
limited resumption of the JCC's work while emphasising that the
main focus is on the negotiations between Georgia and South Ossetia
bilaterally. However, they regret that Kokoiti's group mainly represented
Russian interests rather than local ones in the negotiations.
308. Despite the de facto authorities
in Tskhinvali being known as seeking European recognition as well, neither
Mr Kokoiti nor any government official responded to our meeting
request. The only meeting we held in Tskhinvali was with the Speaker
of the de facto Parliament.
He regretted that the proposal of President Saakashvili for full
autonomy within the territory of Georgia came 18 years after it
had been first requested by the South Ossetian parliament. He was
of the opinion that until South Ossetia has had its own Nuremberg
trial, the situation would not change. He also expected some guarantees
from the Georgian government that the atrocities would not happen
again. The Speaker, a local ethnic Ossetian himself, believed that
the conflict was entirely political and not ethnic.
309. A plenary session of the quadripartite Joint Control Commission
(JCC) on South Ossetia was to be held on 23-24 October 2007 in Tbilisi.
The Georgian side expected to push again for the demilitarisation
of the region and disarmament of illegal armed groups, as well as
to regain control over the Roki Tunnel that links breakaway South
Ossetia with the Russian Federation. Tbilisi also proposed that
Sanakoev's leadership be included in the existing negotiating formats
which deal with "on-the-ground" issues such as water supply, electricity,
roads, humanitarian projects and confidence-building, given that
the latter control about 50% of the territory. Meanwhile, the South
Ossetian side expected to push for an agreement on the non-use of
force, which, they hope, will be signed by South Ossetian secessionist
leader Eduard Kokoity and President Saakashvili. The two days of
talks, however, failed to yield any result, which the Georgian side
interpreted as demonstration of ineffectiveness of the existing
Russian-led format. The South Ossetian side saw Tbilisi's refusal
to sign the agreement on the non-use of force to have caused the
talks to fail
.
6.3.1.1. Restitution of property
310. Georgia promised to enact legislation on property
restitution for victims of the South-Ossetian conflict as a condition
of joining the Council of Europe in 1999. In 2004, the government
drafted a law on Restitution of Housing and Property to the Victims
of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, on which the Venice Commission
gave a rather critical opinion. In 2006, the draft law was revised
with advice from the Venice Commission. It passed the first reading
on 9 June 2006. The law – titled Law of Georgia on Property Restitution
and Compensation on the Territory of Georgia for the Victims of
Conflict in the Former South Ossetia District – finally came into force
on 1 January 2007. With this Georgia has fulfilled another of its
accession commitments.
311. The Law allows those who lost property during the conflict,
Ossetians and Georgians alike, to reclaim their houses if they can
prove legal ownership. If the property is damaged they are entitled
to adequate compensation or equivalent housing.
312. In its opinion on the revised draft, the Venice Commission
pointed out that while the draft law was clearer than the previous
versions and solved several problems, other issues remained open,
especially given that the law was also to function as a confidence
building measure. It also emphasised that an effective remedy for claims
of non-pecuniary damages for human rights violations that occurred
during the same conflict should be provided for. The legislative
package also needs to be accompanied by economic and social integration measures
and improvement of the infrastructure of the areas concerned. It
called upon the Georgian authorities to assess in depth the financial
burden of the law before its enactment. The financial implications
need to be assessed not only nationally but from an international
perspective
.
313. In theory, with the enactment of the law on 1 January 2008
Georgia is now ready to begin handling restitution claims. Currently
a tripartite Restitution Commission is being formed to involve representatives
of the Georgian government, the Tskhinvali authorities and international
organisations. Several international organisations such as the Council
of Europe, OSCE, UN, European Commission as well as the US Embassy are
working with the Georgian government on the organisational issues.
314. On the returnees' side, however, the strained relations between
Tbilisi and South Ossetia's unrecognised government in Tskhinvali
have more-or-less blocked the law's implementation. Besides the political
tensions, the reasons for reluctance to return are many: fear, lack
of trust in the law or Georgian authorities, integration in the
North Ossetian life today, etc. Some see the law itself as a possible
basis for encouraging tensions between old and new owners, which
could lead to ethnic hatred.
315. Also the Tskhinvali authorities are reluctant to take part
in a system run under the law of Georgia, the state from which they
claim to have seceded. They also feel the law places them at a disadvantage
because their side will make up only one-third of the tripartite
commission which is to decide on each claim, with Georgian officials
and international organisations making up the rest. Finally, they
fear claims against lost property from ethnic Georgians who fled
South Ossetia.
316. Reportedly North Ossetia, which has borne the burden of refugees
in its own republic of 700,000 people, is more favourable to the
return but argues that in the absence of agreement between Georgia
and Russia or Georgia and South Ossetia, the republic cannot take
part in the law.
6.3.2. Abkhazia
The conflict in Abkhazia
claimed more than 10,000 lives between 1992 and 1994. The most intense phase
of the conflict lasted from August 1992 to September 1993. A "Declaration
on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian
conflict" was signed in April 1994 in Moscow and an "Agreement on
a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces" (Moscow Agreement) was signed
in May 1994. There is a Russian-led peacekeeping operation under
a mandate of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and under
the supervision of the United Nations (UN Observer Mission to Georgia
– UNOMIG).
317. For Tbilisi, Abkhazia represents the big prize for
a number of reasons, including its strategic importance on the Black
Sea coast
,
the economic interest for the long-term sustainability of Georgia's
economy, the high numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs)
still affected by its non-settlement, the difficulty of resolving
this conflict, and the issues it raises in relations with Russia.
318. From an historical perspective, the conflict is driven by
competing narratives. According to the Abkhaz view, the indigenous
Abkhaz have been victims of mass displacement and colonisation during
the last centuries which explains the very low representation of
ethnic Abkhaz at the end of the Soviet era
. In contrast, Georgians
claim the civil war of 1992 – 1994 to have been a struggle for power
between different interest groups, one of which being the Abkhaz,
not peoples or nations. Both groups generally characterise what
happened to them as "ethnic cleansing"
. As the result of the war, the population
diminished from around 535,000 to 120,000 people.
319. The military confrontation between Abkhazian and Georgian
troops during 1992-1993 basically led to the full control of the
first over the territory of the former Soviet Abkhazia Autonomous
Republic. Despite the fact that both sides committed atrocities,
neither the Georgian nor the Abkhaz authorities so far have investigated
war crimes, declared amnesties or significantly sentenced perpetrators
of war crimes.
320. The Abkhaz seek full independence from Georgia, not incorporation
into Russia. They also stress that in the 2004
de facto presidential elections
the Moscow-backed candidate lost the elections. And yet, they have "outsourced"
some of the key "state" institutions to Russian state institutions.
Most of the population in these regions have Russian passports,
pensioners receive pensions from the Russian state, the Russian
rouble is the only valid local currency, etc. In addition, although
most of the legislation in force still dates from the Soviet times,
there is a process of legislative harmonisation between the legal
systems of Abkhazia and Russia
.
321. In May 1994, the Moscow Agreement established a ceasefire
separating the forces and installed a CIS peacekeeping force, which
is de facto entirely Russian.
Even today, these troops control the border district between Abkhazia
and the rest of Georgia, which is divided into an inner 'security
zone' and an outer 'restricted zone' in which no military presence
at all or no heavy weapons are permitted. The Moscow Agreement also provides
for a UN monitoring of the CIS peacekeeping forces, which became
the UN observer mission UNOMIG. It aims also to facilitate the return
of refugees and IDPs and its mandate is regularly extended.
322. Currently, the situation in Abkhazia is relatively stable
in terms of only occasional ceasefire violations and the return
of some 45,000 IDPs to the Gali district. Abkhaz and Georgians co-operate
in limited economic matters, such as the operation of the Inguri
power plant and the construction of a strategically important railway through
Abkhazia. However, negotiations at political level are deadlocked.
There was optimism in spring 2006 that discussions on increasing
co-operation and resolving disputes could begin: the sides resumed
talks within the UN-led Coordinating Council for the first time
since January 2001, and the Abkhaz presented a "Key to the Future"
document while Georgia issued a "Road Map". But nothing came of
it
. Following the anti-criminal operation
against armed rebels of Kvitsiani, which enabled reassertion of
Georgian Government control over the upper Kodori Valley area of
Abkhazia in July 2006 and made possible the resumption of UN monitoring
and introduction of additional transparency measures in that area
previously governed by warlords, all talks were stopped by the Abkhaz
side.
323. The Abkhaz side continues to link the resumption of such dialogue
to the return of the
status quo ante in
the upper Kodori Valley before the Georgian special operation there
in 2006, while the Georgian side insists that the present situation
there is not negotiable
.
For them, legitimacy rests with the Government of the Abkhazian
Autonomous Republic headed by Alkhaz Akishbaia, which had been long
"in exile" in Tbilisi and which took new temporary residence in
Chkalta, Upper Abkhazia, only in September 2006, weeks after the clearing
of the upper Kodori Valley. Following these events, the Georgian
local self-government elections were organised in the Upper Kodori
Valley in October 2006.
324. The Georgian side demands a "meaningful and implementable
plan for the return of the displaced", including creating a legal
framework, establishing a plan for the return, promoting economic
rehabilitation, guaranteeing their human rights, including their
property rights, and the resumption of direct dialogue between Georgian
and Abkhazian interlocutors without any preconditions
.
They also request fundamental changes in the negotiation and peacekeeping
format, which the Abkhazian side, supported by Russia, is not prepared to
underwrite.
325. According to international observers, the big problem is the
lack of minimum confidence between the Georgians and the Abkhaz.
Confidence and confidence building suffer from the continued effects
of ethnic cleansing. The fact that the Georgian community has not
been allowed to return to Abkhazia – apart from the Gali district
which used to be predominantly Georgian anyway – makes inter-community
contacts (which are key to confidence building) and implementation
of joint measures impossible. Thus the political environment continues
not to be conducive to major breakthroughs, even if a first attempt
of reconciliation was made on 25 October 2007 when a first senior-level
meeting between the Georgian State Minister of Conflict Resolution Issues
and the
de facto Akhazian
Foreign Minister met in Sukhumi after more than a year, following
Tbilisi's agreement to release seven Abkhaz militaries detained
during the 20 August 2007 clash with Georgian Interior Ministry
forces
. This meeting resulted in an agreement
to resume quadripartite weekly meetings
.
326. In parallel to the resumption of bilateral contacts, it would
also be desirable to work on small confidence building projects
and to alleviate trade restrictions. Finally, there remains a great
deal of work to do with civil society and NGOs, both of which are
needed to create preconditions for peace and reconciliation.
6.3.2.1. Conditions of return of the
IDPs
327. The civil war of 1992-1993 led to a massive departure
of the then ethnically majority Georgian population as well as other
ethnic groups such as the Greek, the Estonians, the Armenians or
the Azeris from Abkhazia, constituting an ethnic cleansing. Almost
half of the pre-war population of 535,000 people were forcibly displaced,
mostly to Georgia and Russia.
328. Almost the entire population of the Gali district, totalling
some 79,000 mostly ethnic Georgians was displaced. Since 1999 an
estimated 45,000 persons have returned to the Gali district. The
Gali district constitutes currently the only area where the IDPs
return even if the political situation is not considered conducive
to their return
.
The IDPs return only semi-legally, without support from the Georgian
government. Their return is tolerated by the Abkhaz authorities,
but they do not enjoy any rights from them either. Many IDPs return
as seasonal workers for the harvest period only. The old Soviet
propiska serves as proof of former residence
and it also gives the returnees the right to apply for the "citizenship
of Abkhazia".
329. The Law on "Citizenship of the Republic of Abkhazia" was adopted
by the Abkhazian de facto Parliament in
October 2005. It restricts the possibility of acquiring or maintaining
dual citizenship other than that of the Russian Federation. This
excludes the option of returnees to the Gali district to keep their
Georgian passport when acquiring Abkhaz "citizenship". We were told
by the UNHCR office that nobody was forced to take Abkhazian passports
(which have no international validity in any case). The de facto Abkhaz authorities themselves
confirmed that the law was not very strictly observed in the Gali
district, and that most returnees were in possession of both Georgian
and Abkhazian passports.
330. The Abkhazian citizenship is, however, linked to compulsory
military service within the "Abkhaz Army". There is information
from various international and Georgian sources that alleged forcible
recruitment of ethnic Georgians to Abkhaz military forces is taking
place in the Gali district. The de facto Abkhaz
authorities denied these allegations, pointing to the fact that
only Abkhaz citizens were drafted. Some local representatives of
the returnee community explained to us, however, that the problem
existed and that it was the reason why almost no man aged 18 to
40 resettled permanently in the Gali district.
331. Education continues to pose a serious problem: schools are
scarce and teaching takes place in Russian only. Hence many Georgian
returnee families send their children to school in Zugdidi. Despite
the promise of de facto President
Bagapsh to the Council of Europe Commissioner of Human Rights in
February 2007 that he had given an order to the "Ministry of Education"
of Abkhazia to open Georgian-language schools in the Gali district,
we were told that no such school had been established. We visited
ourselves a small school in Tsikiri village in the Gali district
where all families interviewed were Georgian. However, they told
us that they were not allowed to teach in Georgian nor use any Georgian
textbooks. The textbooks that we inspected all followed the Russian
school curricula and were very Russia-patriotic in their content.
332. The living conditions of the returnees remain extremely poor,
with deficient housing, limited economic opportunities and general
lack of public services. But the situation is not much better in
the collective centres in nearby Zugdidi, where the IDPs live in
crammed conditions. Nevertheless, many IDPs prefer staying in the collective
centres as they receive a tiny state allowance (14 GEL) and allowance
for electricity and water bills.
333. The general security situation as well as the human rights
record in the Gali district remain precarious. Many killings, kidnappings,
extra-judicial detentions, etc allegedly happen – in particularly
during harvest periods and elections – and impunity reigns. The
distrust of victims in the effectiveness and willingness of the de facto local authorities to investigate,
combined with politicised misinformation, increases the returnees' feelings
of insecurity.
334. No ethnic Georgians have been able to return to other parts
of Abkhazia. Having unilaterally declared independence and being
concerned about losing their current demographic majority, the Abkhaz
say they are prepared to countenance the return of large numbers
of Georgians only under strict conditions. They claim that they
will reject the return of those who fought in the conflict and underline
that "those who return have to know that they return to a republic
with its own laws and identity
".
335. The property issue remains a serious concern. Tens of thousands
of destroyed and unoccupied derelict houses all around the Abkhazian
countryside as well as in Sukhumi bear a gloomy testimony of the
violence of the past war in Abkhazia. The Georgian authorities are
concerned about the reported accelerated privatisation of property
belonging to ethnic Georgians who fled Abkhazia. The courts appear
to reject as inadmissible claims filed by owners displaced by the
armed conflict since 1992 for restitution of their illegally occupied
property. The recent UN Security Council's Resolution 1781 (2007)
adopted on 15 October 2007 reaffirmed that "
the
importance of such people's [IDPs'] return to their homes and property
and that individual property rights have not been affected by the
fact that owners had to flee during the conflict and that the residency
rights and the identity of those owners will be respected" .
336. In response, in March 2006, the Minister of Refugees and Accommodation
launched a programme called "My House", according to which IDPs
can register their land titles in a state inventory, and thus ascertain their
property rights in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
337. According to the same Ministry, the IDPs living in Georgia
proper currently constitute 6% of the population, numbering 232,623
IDPs from Abkhazia and 12,673 IDPs from the Tskhinvali region, i.e.
in total 245,296 IDPs. A vast majority of IDPs live in collective
centres housed in public buildings where conditions are very poor.
Others live with relatives, friends, rent flats or have purchased
their own houses. In 2006, the Georgian government announced the
creation of the State Commission on elaboration of an IDP National Strategy
with the support of the international community and civil society
organisations. The National Strategy has since been adopted and
an Action Plan should be ready by the end of 2007. This Action Plan
will address all aspects of displacement – housing, employment,
social issues and legal status. The government has stressed that
integration of IDPs does not hinder their future return to their
former residences
.
6.4. Challenges ahead
338. It emanates from the above that the obstacles to
successful resolution of the two conflicts on the Georgian territory
are numerous and motivated by zero-sum considerations by many of
the stakeholders involved in the peace process. The process itself
appears fundamentally flawed: the overall policy of appeasement
has not delivered results, the existing mechanisms – whether it
be the format of the negotiations and peacekeeping or effective
and independent investigation of border incidents – have proved
ineffective, and there is no international consensus on the current
nature of the conflicts or ways on how to solve them. The result
is a status quo and stalemate on "negotiations about how to negotiate".
The price of the status quo is however
very high. It therefore proceeds that a proper independent international
analysis would be necessary in order to assess why and where the
process has gone wrong.
339. A peace process can be effective only as long as it is deemed
impartial and equitable by all conflicting sides. For reasons discussed
above, the Russian domination over the mediation (through its veto
right in the UN or OSCE) or peacekeeping of these conflicts is obsolete
and reflecting the geo-political realities of the past decade when
western interests in the region were minimal. Today the geo-strategic
realities are different in the South Caucasus and the wider Black
Sea regions, which results in an evident need for internationalisation
of the mediation and peacekeeping structures applying to the "frozen
conflicts". This does not mean the entire elimination of the Russian
contingent in place, but under a clear international mandate. The
role of the European Union as mediator should also be significantly
enhanced in this process.
340. Four years ago, Georgia affirmed the Euro-Atlantic integration
– and notably NATO membership – as its highest foreign policy goal
and embarked on reforming the country in order to achieve this goal
as fast as possible. Four years into that process, this goal enjoys
outstanding public and political support in the country. The international
community should recognise and respect Georgia's aspirations in
this regard, as their continued progress towards desired goals will
also uphold guarantees for common security, democracy and governance
through the rule of law.
341. Finding a solution to the conflicts is central to the Georgian
government's policy. Its actions are based on legitimate concerns
of building up a sovereign state in its full integrity and right
to exert control over its territory. Moreover, public opinion in
Georgia is not easily ready to accept any solution which goes beyond
the official policy lines, and which does not involve full reintegration
of the separatist territories. Notwithstanding these constraints,
the Georgian government should show more openness to compromise
and creating a more pragmatic atmosphere among its people. It needs
to work on changing perceptions; and this can best be achieved through
understanding and consideration of the fears and objectives of the
other side. It is especially important for Georgia to create favourable
conditions for the Abkhaz and South Ossetians to overcome century-old
fears of forced 'Georgianisation' and to offer security guarantees
to facilitate trust. The approach of seeking to isolate, blockade
and engage in hostile rhetoric towards these populations has not
proved successful in terms of moving towards a solution of the conflicts
. Strengthening confidence-building
on the contrary will promote refugee and IDP return, which would
constitute considerable progress.
342. On their part, the separatist leaders, supported by the Russian
authorities, should also seriously engage in a one-to-one result-oriented
dialogue with the Georgian authorities. It is moreover the lack
of substantial and pragmatic dialogue that is pushing the Georgian
side to be creative in finding new "administrative solutions".
343. Finally, the Russian authorities need to understand that provocative
actions or targeted international law violations with a purpose
of "testing the patience" of the other side have no place in conflict
settlement and will only flash back negatively on the country itself.
Similarly, sanctions, boycotts or any other excessive means of "punishment"
are not effective tools to resolve conflicts, and can instead –
indeed like verbal provocations – have disastrous consequences.
7. Further steps in the monitoring
process
344. Two years after our previous report, our overall
impression is that the authorities have made fast and substantial
progress towards complying with their obligations and commitments.
On formal grounds, practically all commitments pertaining to the
remaining issues of
Resolution
1477 (2006) have been fulfilled. Nevertheless, some important shortcomings
still persist in areas referred to in the various chapters of this memorandum.
345. Raising democratic standards and creating proper conditions
for the opposition in the parliament as well as tolerance towards
political opponents in public life are the key priority areas for
us before we can consider closing the full-scale monitoring procedure.
We expect Georgia to live up to democratic standards of conducting
free and even more importantly – fair elections based on proper
political competition – in 2008. Notwithstanding minor shortcomings,
we are pleased that the electoral legislation has been amended to
this end.
346. Georgia should put all efforts into building up sustainable
state institutions, characterised by strong administrative capacity
and ability to resist any political fluctuation.
347. The country also needs more decisive and far-reaching efforts
as regards its judiciary system, proper mechanisms that guarantee
the independence of courts and prosecution, combating corruption,
or decentralisation. It would also need to improve its track record
in other areas of human rights such as the conditions of detention,
prevention of torture, or respect of minority and religious rights.
Contributing to finding a peaceful solution to the conflicts in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia would be an extra guarantee for building
up a prosperous and modern state.
348. All major reforms are on their way. However, creating an appropriate
legislative framework is certainly important, but not enough. The
political will accompanying its implementation will be the determining
factor in breaking with old habits and mentalities.
349. Georgia has entered one of the most critical stages in its
reform process. As long as it continues on a democratic path, it
will succeed no matter who will win the presidential and parliamentary
elections in 2008. However, any resorting to violence may jeopardise
all achievements of the previous years. Hence steering the country
on the democratic course is the key task for the government today.
Reporting committee:
Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member
States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)
Reference to committee: Resolution 1115 (1997)
Draft resolutionunanimously
adopted by the committee on 22 January 2008
Members of the committee:
Mr Serhiy Holovaty (Chairperson),
Mr Leonid Slutsky (1st Vice-Chairperson),
Mr György Frunda (2nd Vice-Chairperson),
Mr Konstantin Kosachev (3rd Vice-Chairperson),
Mr Aydin Abbasov, Mr Pedro Agramunt,
Mr Jaume Bartumeu Cassany, Mrs Meritxell BatetLamaña, Mr Ryszard Bender, Mr József Berényi, Mr Aleksandër Biberaj, Mr Luc Van den Brande, Mr Patrick Breen,
Mr Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Mr Sergej
Chelemendik, Ms Lise Christoffersen,
Mr Boriss Cilevičs, Mr Georges Colombier, Mr Valeriu Cosarciuc, Mrs Herta Däubler-Gmelin,
Mr Joseph Debono Grech, Mr Juris Dobelis,
Mrs Josette Durrieu, Mr Mátyás Eörsi, Mr Per-Kristian Foss, Mr
Jean-Charles Gardetto, Mr József Gedei, Mr Marcel Glesener, Mr Charles Goerens, Mr
Andreas Gross, Mr Michael Hagberg, Ms Gultakin Hajiyeva, Mr Michael Hancock, Mr Davit Harutyunyan, Mr Andres Herkel, Mr Kastriot Islami, Mr Miloš Jeftić, Mrs Evguenia Jivkova, Mr Ali Rashid Khalil,
Mr Andros Kyprianou, Mr Jaakko Laakso,
Mrs Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger,
Mr Eduard Lintner, Mr Pietro
Marcenaro, Mr Mikhail Margelov, Mr Bernard Marquet, Mr Dick Marty, Mr Frano Matušić, Mr Miloš Melčák, Mrs Assunta Meloni, Mrs
Nadezhda Mikhailova, Mr Neven Mimica,
Mr João Bosco Mota Amaral, Mr Zsolt Németh, Mr Theodoros Pangalos,
Ms Maria Postoico, Mr Christos
Pourgourides, Mr Andrea Rigoni, Mr Dario Rivolta,
Mr Armen Rustamyan, Mr Oliver Sambevski, Mr Kimmo Sasi, Mr Andreas Schieder, Mr Samad Seyidov, Mrs Aldona Staponkienė,
Mrs Elene Tevdoradze, Mr
Mihai Tudose, Mr Egidijus Vareikis,
Mr Miltiadis Varvitsiotis,
Mr José Vera Jardim, Mrs Birutė Vėsaitė, Mr Robert Walter, Mr David
Wilshire, Mrs Renate Wohlwend,
Mr Boris Zala, Mr Andrej Zernovski.
N.B.: The names of the members who took part in the meeting
are printed in bold
Secretariat of the committee:
Mrs Ravaud, Mrs Chatzivassiliou, Mrs Odrats, Mr Karpenko.