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Report | Doc. 11724 | 01 October 2008
The consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia
Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)
Summary
The Monitoring Committee condemns the outbreak of the war between Georgia and Russia, two member states of the Council of Europe, and deplores the human suffering caused by it. During the war and in its aftermath, international law principles, the Statute of the Council of Europe and accession commitments undertaken by both states have been violated.
In the view of the committee, the outbreak of the war on 7 August 2008 was the result of a serious escalation of tensions, with provocations and ensuing deterioration in the security situation, which had started much earlier. Truth is a prerequisite for reconciliation. Since the facts surrounding the outbreak of the war are disputed by both Georgia and Russia, they should be established, in an objective manner, by an independent international investigation.
The report condemns the recognition by Russia of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a violation of international law and Council of Europe statutory principles. In addition, the act of recognition and the subsequent signing by Russia of friendship and co-operation treaties with the de facto authorities in Tskhinvali and Sukhumi hinder the effective deployment of humanitarian aid. The committee reaffirms its attachment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and calls upon Russia to withdraw its act of recognition.
Human rights and humanitarian law violations committed in the course of the war by both sides are an issue of concern. The committee is especially concerned about credible reports of acts of ethnic cleansing committed in ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia and the “buffer zone” by irregular militia and gangs which the Russian troops failed to stop.
Dialogue is the best way forward for the solution of any conflict and for fostering stability in the long-term. But it requires political will on both sides and cannot be pursued in isolation of concrete actions. Some basic conditions for the dialogue have to be established and observed. Full implementation of the peace plan, including withdrawal of the Russian troops to positions ex ante the conflict, is essential. In addition, full deployment of EU and OSCE monitors into South Ossetia and withdrawal by Russia of the recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, would be minimum conditions for a meaningful dialogue.
A. Draft resolution
(open)1. The Parliamentary Assembly
is firmly committed to the principles embodied in the Statute of
the Council of Europe: democracy, human rights and the rule of law,
as well as to principles of state sovereignty, the right to territorial
integrity and the inviolability of frontiers of states. Respect
of these principles is an obligation incumbent upon all member states
of the Council of Europe.
2. When joining the Council of Europe, both Georgia and Russia
took on the commitment to settle conflicts by peaceful means and
in accordance with the principles of international law.
3. The Assembly condemns the outbreak of war between two member
states of the Organisation and deplores the human suffering caused
by it.
4. The Assembly is conscious that, although the outbreak of the
war on 7 August 2008 may have come unexpected to most of its members,
it was the result of a serious escalation of tensions, with provocations
and ensuing deterioration in the security situation, which had started
much earlier. Steps to reduce tensions were not taken and the possibility
of military intervention became the option for both sides in the
conflict. This is unacceptable for the Assembly. The Assembly is
of the view that the peacekeeping format in the end proved that
it could not fulfil its intended function and peacekeepers effectively
failed in their mission to protect the lives and property of the
citizens in the conflict area. It therefore regrets that earlier
calls to discuss a change in the format of the peacekeeping and
conflict resolution process were rejected by the South Ossetian
and Russian sides.
5. However, the start of shelling of Tskhinvali by the Georgian
military, on 7 August 2008, initiated a new level of escalation,
namely that of open and full-fledged warfare. The use of heavy weapons
and cluster munitions, creating grave risks for civilians, constituted
a disproportionate use of armed force by Georgia, albeit within
its own territory, and as such a violation of international law
and Georgia’s commitment to resolve the conflict peacefully.
6. At the same time, the Russian counter-attack, including large-scale
military actions in Central and Western Georgia and in Abkhazia,
equally failed to respect the principle of proportionality and international humanitarian
law and constituted a violation of Council of Europe principles,
as well as of statutory obligations and specific accession commitments
of the Russian Federation as a member state. It led to the occupation
of a significant part of the territory of Georgia, as well as attacks
on the economic and strategic infrastructure of the country which
can be deemed to be either a direct attack on the sovereignty of
Georgia and thus a violation of the Statute of the Council of Europe,
or an attempt by Russia to extend its influence over a “near abroad” state
in violation of its accession commitment to denounce such a concept.
7. In this respect, the Assembly considers that, from the point
of view of international law, the notion of “protecting citizens
abroad” is not acceptable and is concerned by the political implications
of such a policy by the Russian authorities for other member states
where a substantial number of Russian citizens reside.
8. The Assembly believes that truth is a precondition for reconciliation.
Since the facts surrounding the outbreak of the war are disputed
by both Georgia and Russia, they should be established, in an objective manner,
by an independent international investigation. The Georgian authorities
have indicated that they would welcome such an international inquiry
and the Russian members of Parliament have also indicated that they would
not object to this proposal. This investigation should not be limited
to the outbreak of the war but should also focus on the years leading
up to the conflict.
9. The Assembly condemns the recognition by Russia of the independence
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a violation of international law
and Council of Europe statutory principles. The Assembly reaffirms
its attachment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia
and calls on Russia to withdraw its recognition of the independence
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and respect fully the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Georgia as well as the inviolability
of its frontiers.
10. The Assembly particularly deplores that the recognition of
independence was prompted by the unanimous demand of both houses
of the Parliament of the Russian Federation, the State Duma and
the Council of the Federation. It is seriously concerned that the
act of recognition as well as the recent subsequent signing by Russia
of friendship and co-operation treaties with the de facto authorities in Tskhinvali
and Sukhumi, hinder the implementation of the EU brokered cease
fire agreement, as well as the provision of humanitarian aid and
monitoring of the implementation of the cease-fire agreement by
independent monitors.
11. The Assembly is concerned about the human rights and humanitarian
law violations committed by both sides in the context of the war,
such as the intentional or avoidable killing or wounding of civilians,
as well as destruction of property. In particular, the use of indiscriminate
force and weapons by both Georgian and Russian troops in civilian
areas can be considered war crimes that need to be fully investigated.
12. Russia appears to have failed in its duty, under the 1907
Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, to prevent
looting, maintain law and order and protect property in the areas
under the de facto control
of its forces. In this respect, the Assembly notes that Russia bears
full responsibility for human rights and humanitarian law violations
in the areas under its de facto control.
In the light of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights,
this also concerns acts committed at the behest of the de facto authorities in Tshkinvali.
13. The Assembly is especially concerned about credible reports
of acts of ethnic cleansing committed in ethnic Georgian villages
in South Ossetia and the “buffer zone” by irregular militia and
gangs which the Russian troops failed to stop. It stresses in this
respect that such acts were mostly committed after the signing of
the cease-fire agreement on 12 August 2008 and continue today.
14. The total number of deaths and persons wounded has been the
subject of controversy. The most recent independent estimates indicate
that 300 persons were killed and approximately 500 were wounded
on the Russian side, 364 persons were killed and 2,234 were wounded
on the Georgian side. These figures are far lower than those initially
advanced in particular by Russia. 14 persons remain missing from
the conflict on the Georgian side and 6 persons are missing on the
South Ossetian side. The International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC),
however, continues to receive tracing requests from families of
the missing.
15. Some 192,000 persons were displaced as a consequence of the
war. The Assembly is concerned that a total of 31.000 displaced
persons (25.000 from South Ossetia and 6.000 from Abkhazia) are
considered to be “permanently” unable to return to their original
place of residence. These numbers should be seen in the context
of the approximately 222,000 persons who remain displaced from the
previous conflict in the early 1990’s.
16. The Assembly welcomes the role played by the Council of Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights who traveled to the region in August
and September 2008, organised the exchange of prisoners and spelled
out six principles for urgent protection of human rights and humanitarian
security. The Assembly supports fully these principles.
17. The Assembly welcomes the initiative of the Swedish Chairmanship
of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers which inter alia convened an informal
extraordinary meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 24
September 2008 in order to prepare the response of the intergovernmental
sector of the Organisation to the crisis.
18. The Assembly further welcomes the fact that the European Union
(EU), under the French Presidency, has been actively involved in
the wake of the conflict and recalls its earlier calls to this effect
in its Resolution 1603 on the honouring of commitments and obligations by Georgia,
adopted in January 2008. The Assembly further invites the European
Union to strengthen its own monitoring mission on the ground and
give it a mandate and resources not only to monitor, but also to
protect persons and property.
19. The Assembly calls on the Russian authorities to allow EU,
as well as OSCE monitors to have access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
which are under the de facto control
of the Russian Federation. In addition, differences about the role
of EU monitors in the so-called “buffer zone” may lead to an even
further deterioration of the security situation in this area, impeding
the return of displaced persons after Russian troops have withdrawn
from it.
20. The Assembly welcomes the quick reaction of the international
community in providing assistance to the region. It welcomes the
fact that the Russian authorities have provided generous support
to refugees from South Ossetia and the Georgian authorities have
similarly mobilised many resources to meet the immediate needs of
those persons displaced within Georgian territory under their effective
control. However, the Assembly is concerned that the recognition
by Russia of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is hindering the
effective deployment of humanitarian aid in these areas.
21. In view of the above-mentioned considerations and taking into
account in particular the findings of the Ad Hoc Committee of its
Bureau, which visited Georgia and Russia in the context of the war
from 21 to 26 September 2008, the Assembly urges Georgia and Russia
to:
21.1. implement unconditionally
all points of the EU-brokered cease-fire agreement. This implies,
in particular, the obligation for Russia to withdraw its troops
to positions ex ante the conflict
and refrain from any action of provocation to justify maintaining
the presence of Russian troops in the so-called “buffer zone”;
21.2. enable OSCE and EU monitors to be deployed into South
Ossetia and Abkhazia; and withdraw its recognition of independence
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia;
21.3. co-operate fully in the establishment of an independent
international investigation to look into the precise circumstances
surrounding the outbreak of the war; this initiative should be without
prejudice to the work of inquiry committees set up or to be set
up within their own Parliaments, which the Assembly fully supports;
21.4. participate unconditionally in the Geneva talks scheduled
for 15 October regarding the modalities of the stability and security
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In this respect the Assembly regrets
that these talks will now only take place at an expert level;
21.5. refrain from inflammatory discourse and take steps to
entertain good neighbourly relations;
21.6. ensure effective respect for all human rights under the
European Convention on Human Rights and humanitarian norms under
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols on the territories
under their de facto control;
21.7. investigate all allegations of human rights violations
committed during the war and in its aftermath and hold the authors
to account before the domestic courts;
21.8. make full use of available means of peaceful conflict
resolution, including as appropriate the European Court of Human
Rights, the International Court of Justice and the International
Criminal Court, in order to resolve the underlying conflict situation;
in this context, implement the interim measures ordered by the European
Court of Human Rights on 12 August 2008, upon the request of the
Georgian government, as well as any forthcoming judgments of the
Court concerning alleged violations of human rights relating to
the conflict.
22. The Assembly calls on all parties to the conflict, namely
Georgia, Russia and the de facto authorities
in South Ossetia to:
22.1. take urgent
measures to guarantee the security of all persons within the region
of South Ossetia, and those in the so-called “buffer zone”. The de facto authorities in South Ossetia
and the Russian forces have, in particular, the obligation to:
22.1.1. stamp out lawlessness (including
physical assault, robbery, kidnapping, harassment, looting and torching
of property), in accordance with Article 43 of the Hague Conventions
of 1907 and the IV Geneva Convention of 1949;
22.1.2. provide, without delay, UNHCR and all humanitarian organisations
with unhindered access to the areas affected by the conflict, in
particular in the region of South Ossetia and the so-called “buffer
zone”. All organisations providing humanitarian assistance in these
areas should be guaranteed safety.
22.2. remove all mines and unexploded ordnance. This implies
all parties to the conflict exchanging information on the use and
location of such materials, and also the involvement of experts
on mine and ordnance location and removal;
22.3. co-operate fully with all international monitoring missions
whether from the UN, the OSCE, the EU, the Council of Europe or
other international body and grant these organisations full access
to the conflict regions;
22.4. ensure that all persons displaced by the conflict should
have the right to return on a fully voluntary basis and to refrain
from using displaced persons as a political pawn when tackling the
issue of return. Furthermore all internally displaced persons should
have the right to return in safety and dignity, or to resettle voluntarily
or integrate locally;
22.5. release and exchange, immediately, prisoners of war and
other persons detained as a result of the conflict, without requiring
reciprocity from any other side;
22.6. solve the issue of missing persons from the recent and
earlier conflict, ensuring that the issue is treated as a humanitarian
issue and not a political issue. Furthermore, establish a multilateral
co-ordination mechanism with functioning commissions for missing
persons;
22.7. take concrete measures to fully and effectively implement
the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’ six principles
for urgent protection of human rights and humanitarian security developed
after his August 2008 visit to the region.
23. The Assembly calls on all member states and states with observer
status with the Organisation to:
23.1. intensify
their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims
of the conflict, including:
23.1.1. the
pledging and delivery of aid and assistance for immediate urgent
needs and those of a more long-term nature;
23.1.2. assistance covering basic needs, accommodation, health
care, including care for trauma victims, support for the livelihood
of victims, etc.;
23.1.3. particular support for vulnerable persons, including children,
the aged and the sick and infirm.
23.2. keep under the spotlight the needs of the 222,000 persons
who remain displaced from the earlier conflict over Abkhazia and
South Ossetia as well as those displaced from earlier conflicts
in the North Caucasus;
23.3. formally condemn the ethnic cleansing taking place in
the areas under the effective control of Russian forces and of the de facto authorities in South Ossetia;
23.4. ensure, to the extent they are also members of NATO, that
the NATO assessment of the military build-up with respect to this
war be made public;
23.5. make available to the independent international investigation
into the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the war all relevant
satellite data they may have in their possession.
24. Because of the human rights violations and the humanitarian
challenges resulting from the conflict between Russia and Georgia,
the Assembly invites the Bureau to ensure that the Assembly remains
seized of the matter through its competent committees and step up
its monitoring procedure with respect to both countries.
25. The Assembly resolves to convene an international conference
to reflect on establishing and improving existing early warning
systems to prevent the escalation of conflicts into full-fledged
wars.
26. The Assembly invites the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe to consider the establishment, possibly in consultation
with the Commissioner for Human Rights, of a special human rights
field mission of the Council of Europe with unhindered access to
all areas affected by the war.
27. The Assembly invites the Council of Europe’s Development Bank
to consider action with a view to assisting refugees and displaced
persons, as well as contributing to reconstruction in the areas
affected, including in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
28. The Assembly is convinced that the establishment of a dialogue
is the best way forward for the solution of any conflict and for
fostering stability in the long-term. This holds true for this particular
conflict. However, dialogue requires political will on both sides
and cannot be pursued in isolation of concrete actions. Therefore, some
basic conditions for the dialogue have to be established and observed.
Full implementation of the peace plan, including withdrawal of the
Russian troops to positions ex ante the
conflict is essential. In addition, full deployment of EU and OSCE
monitors into South Ossetia and Abkhazia and withdrawal by Russia
of the recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
would be minimum conditions for a meaningful dialogue.
29. In order to promote such a dialogue, the Assembly will consider
setting up under its aegis a special PACE Ad Hoc Committee, in which
both Georgian and Russian parliamentarians will participate, to
serve as a forum for discussing their differences and proposing
ways to put an end to the current impasse and look towards the future.
B. Draft recommendation
(open)1. The Parliamentary Assembly
refers to its Resolution…. on the consequences of the war between Georgia
and Russia in which it welcomed inter
alia the initiative of the Swedish Chairmanship of the
Committee of Ministers to convene an informal extraordinary meeting
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 24 September 2008 in order to
prepare the response of the intergovernmental sector of the Organisation
to the war between Georgia and Russia.
2. The Assembly recalls in this respect the 1994 Declaration
of the Committee of Ministers on compliance with commitments accepted
by member states of the Council of Europe which refers to the statutory responsibility
incumbent upon itself for ensuring full respect of commitments in
all member states, without prejudice to other existing procedures,
including the activities of the Parliamentary Assembly and conventional control
bodies.
3. The Assembly therefore recommends to the Committee of Ministers
to:
3.1. develop an Action Plan
and take concrete measures to respond to the crisis between two
member states of the Organisation and, consequently, within the
Organisation itself, taking into account the Organisation's mandate
and expertise;
3.2. consider specific action to ensure full respect of commitments
undertaken by both Georgia and Russia, including reinforced field
presence and a human rights mission on the ground.
C. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Van den Brande and Mr Eörsi, co-rapporteurs
(open)1. Introduction
1. Immediately following the outbreak
of the war between Russia and Georgia on 7 and 8 August 2008, and
acknowledging the unique challenge to principles and values of the
Council of Europe that a war between two of its member states represented,
the President of the Assembly requested the co-rapporteurs from
the Monitoring Committee for Russia and Georgia to visit the respective
countries under their responsibility. The co-rapporteurs for Georgia,
Mr Mátyás Eörsi and Mr Kastriot Islami, visited Tbilisi and Gori
from 18 to 21 August and one of the co-rapporteurs for Russia, Mr Luc
van den Brande, visited Moscow and Vladikavkaz from 20 to 22 August.
2. The Bureau of the Assembly, at its meeting on 5 September
2008, decided, on the basis of a unanimous proposal submitted by
the five chairpersons of the Assembly’s Political Groups, on behalf
of their groups, to recommend to the Assembly to hold a debate under
urgent procedure during the 2008 fourth part-session on “Consequences
of the war between Georgia and Russia”; and proposed to refer this
matter to the Monitoring Committee for report and to the Political
Affairs Committee, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights and
the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population for opinion.
3. At that same meeting, with a view to obtaining a better understanding
of the facts regarding the exact sequence of events on 7 and 8 August,
and the circumstances that led to them, as well as the political
situation in the immediate aftermath of the hostilities, the Bureau
of the Assembly decided to set up an Ad Hoc Committee to study the
situation on the ground in Russia and Georgia from 21 to 26 September
2008. The Ad Hoc Committee was composed of the co-rapporteurs of
the Monitoring Committee for Russia, myself and Mr Theodoros Pangalos
(Greece, SOC); the co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee for
Georgia, Mr Mátyás Eörsi (Hungary, ALDE) and Mr Kastriot Islami
(Albania, SOC); the Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee,
Mr Göran Lindblad (Sweden, EPP/CD); the Chairwoman of the Committee
on Migration, Population and Refugees, Ms Corien Jonker (Netherlands,
EPP/CD); the Chairman of the Socialist Group, Mr Andreas Gross (Switzerland);
the Chairman of the Unified Left Group, Mr Tiny Kox (Netherlands);
and the First Vice-Chairman of the European Democrat Group, Mr David
Wilshire (United Kingdom).
4. The delegation visited the Russian Federation from 21 to 23
September 2008 and, subsequently, Georgia from 24 to 26 September
2008. During their visit in the two countries, the delegation met
with high-level state authorities, representatives of international
organisations, as well as representatives of civil society and diplomatic
community. In addition, during the visit in Georgia, the delegation
visited the so-called “buffer zone” and South Ossetia. The findings
of the delegation are an integral part of this report.
5. Other parts of the Council of Europe also provided an immediate
response to the conflict. The Chairman of the Committee of Ministers,
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, visited the conflict area jointly
with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Mr Terry Davis,
from 11 to 13 August 2008. Moreover the Swedish chairmanship convened
an informal meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in New York
on 24 September 2008. The Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner,
Mr Thomas Hammarberg visited the conflict area from 22 to 29 August
and subsequently from 25 to 28 September 2008, and played an active
role in addressing the humanitarian and human rights issues as a
result of the conflict. The active role of the Swedish Chairmanship
and the Human Rights Commissioner should be welcomed. In addition,
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities paid a visit to the
region.
2. Background
6. The conflict over South Ossetia
started following the declaration of independence of Georgia, and, subsequently,
the abolition of the autonomous status of South Ossetia by the Georgian
Government at that time, when violent clashes broke out in 1991
between Georgian troops and South Ossetia separatists militia. In
order to avoid a large-scale confrontation with Russia, Georgia
accepted, in 1992, a cease-fire agreement – the so-called Sochi
agreement – that left part of South Ossetia under the de facto control
of the separatist forces. As part of the cease-fire agreement, a
peacekeeping force consisting of Russian, Georgian and Ossetian
(both North and South) troops was set up and, in 1992, the Organisation
of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) established a mission
to monitor the peacekeeping operation. In addition an OSCE-Joint Control
Commission, with Georgian, South and North Ossetian and Russian
participation, was established as the main negotiation mechanism
to maintain peace.
7. While the escalation of the conflict into a fully fledged
war between Georgia and Russia came totally unexpected, tensions
between the two countries had been seriously escalating for some
time before the outbreak of the war. It is clear that the war between
Russia and Georgia did not start on 7 August 2008.
8. It will be difficult to pinpoint an exact date when the tensions
started to escalate and develop to a point that military conflict
became the option for both parties in the conflict. However, a key
date is 6 March 2008, when Russia unilaterally withdrew from the
1996 CIS treaty on the imposition of economic sanctions on Abkhazia.
9. This was followed, on 21 March 2008, by a Resolution passed
in the Russian State Duma asking the authorities to consider the
recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This
call was rejected at that time by the Russian authorities, but,
on 16 April 2008, the then President Putin of Russia issued a decree
instructing the Russian authorities to establish direct official
and legal links with the de facto authorities in the breakaway regions
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The latter decree was denounced by Georgia
as a de facto attempt to annex Georgian territory and led to strong
criticism from the international community.
10. The exact reasons for these Russian decisions, which undeniably
increased the tensions between the two countries are as yet unclear.
The unilateral recognition of the independence of Kosovo by several
Western countries, as well as the prospect of a Membership Action
Plan for Georgia to enter NATO would appear to have had a non-negligible
influence on such a decision.
11. The aforementioned actions by the Russian Federation not only
increased the tensions, and further deteriorated the bilateral relations
between Georgia and Russia, but, together with the mass distribution
of Russian passports to the inhabitants of the two breakaway regions
undoubtedly also encouraged the separatist leadership of these regions
to step up the confrontation and reject a negotiated solution to
the conflict. As a result, the security situation in the two regions
deteriorated sharply. In addition, these actions led to an uncessary
exchange of inflammatory language that did nothing to improve the
already tense relations between the two countries.
12. The security situation deteriorated further following the
decision of the Russian authorities to send, while remaining within
the numerical limits allowed under the 1994 CIS agreements, an additional
number of “peacekeeping” troops into Abkhazia in May 2008, including
heavy artillery and paratroopers. Furthermore, on 31 May 2008, the
Ministry of Defence of the Russia announced that it was sending
300 unarmed members of the Railway Forces into Abkhazia to repair
the Sukhumi–Ochamchire railroad link. Both these actions led to
an outcry from the Georgian authorities and were also strongly condemned
by the international community.
13. In the meanwhile, the security situation in South Ossetia
continued to deteriorate, with provocations and violent incidents
on both sides, including sniper and bomb attacks and attacks on
Georgian and South Ossetian villages with small arms and light artillery
fire. It is clear that the peacekeeping format established with
the Sochi agreements had broken down and that the peacekeepers were
not fulfilling their intended role of protecting the civilian population
and maintaining order in their area of deployment. In addition,
the failure of the peacekeeping format, as well as the actions by
the Russian authorities mentioned above, appear to confirm the assertion
that Russia had become a partner in the conflict and could no longer
be seen, or maintain, its role as an unbiased mediator. However,
repeated calls from the Georgian authorities to change the peacekeeping format
were met with a rejection from the Russian and South Ossetian sides.
14. Aware that the situation was spinning out of control, the
German Government proposed a peace plan for Abkhazia, but the talks
failed when the Abkhaz de facto authorities refused to participate
in peace talks scheduled in Berlin in July 2008. In addition, proposals
for peace talks by the European Union and OSCE between Georgia and
the South Ossetia de facto leadership broke down in July 2008, when
the proposals were rejected by the South Ossetian de facto leadership.
15. In early August, the security situation sharply deteriorated,
and began to run out of control when, on 1 August, 5 Georgian policemen
were injured by car bombs in South Ossetia. On the same date, several
people died in clashes in Tskhinvali and ethnic Georgian villages.
Between 3 and 5 August, the South Ossetian de facto authorities
began to evacuate the civilian population from Tskhinvali and surrounding
areas. On 7 August, ethnic Georgian villagers in South Ossetia were
advised by their leadership to leave the area.
16. The exact sequence of events, as well as the circumstances
that led to them, are the subject of great controversy between Russia
and Georgia, with diametrically opposed views being expressed.
17. According to the Russian authorities, the tension and outbreaks
of violence, involving small arms and light artillery fire, between
the Georgian and South Ossetian sides had been steadily escalating
over the summer months mainly as a result of, but not exclusively,
Georgian provocations and this despite all efforts by the Russian
Peacekeepers to calm both sides down and bring them back to the
negotiating table. At approximately 22:38 on 7 August, the Georgian
authorities then initiated an unprovoked and, in their opinion, clearly
premeditated, full-scale military attack on Tskhinvali and Ossetian
villages in the security zone, including a “massive and indiscriminate”
shelling with heavy artillery and multiple rocket systems of Tskhinvali.
When reports of heavy civilian casualties and attacks on Russian
Peacekeepers became clear, the Russian authorities launched their
counter-offensive and sent troops through the Roki tunnel into Georgia.
18. According to the Georgian authorities, tensions in South Ossetia
had been steadily escalating for several months as a result of provocations
and attacks on Georgian villages by South Ossetian separatist forces,
which were not prevented by Russian Peacekeepers. Repeated attempts
by the Georgian side to stop the hostilities by peaceful means were
met with a refusal from the South Ossetian side, with the tacit
approval of the Russian Peacekeepers. On 6 and 7 August, the escalations
reached unprecedented heights, which risked destabilising the country.
When, on 7 August in the late evening, the Georgian authorities
received multiple intelligence reports that Russian military troops,
including tanks and heavy artillery, were crossing the Roki tunnel
and building up in South Ossetia, a counter-attack was launched
in self defence of the Russian invasion of Georgian territory.
19. The Russian authorities strongly deny that Russian troops
passed the Roki tunnel before the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali
and point out that the intelligence information to that effect made
public by the Georgian authorities is widely considered to be at
best inconclusive and not independently verified. Regrettably, Russia and
the United States, countries with considerable satellite intelligence
capability, claim that they do not possess any satellite images
that could help either confirm or contradict the Georgian assertion
that Russian troops passed the Roki tunnel prior to the attack on
Tskhinvali.
20. The Russian authorities have made public what they allege
to be captured Georgian military plans for the invasion of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the Russian opinion, these plans are the
proof that the attack on South Ossetia was planned and prepared
well in advance. The Georgian side strongly denies any prior preparation
and planning for such an invasion. It should be considered that
military forces in most, if not all, countries would have plans
for hypothetical military situations that could occur, and that
therefore, even if these plans were genuine, the existence of such
plans would not per se constitute the proof that the attack on Tskhinvali
was premeditated and prepared in advance. Moreover, members of the
international community in Georgia asserted that the level of disorganisation
during the Georgian military action in South Ossetia, as well as
the chaotic retreat, would seem to belie the notion that this attack
was prepared well in advance. NATO has made an assessment of the
conduct of the hostilities that could shed light on the question
of preparation. It is regrettable that this assessment remains classified.
21. In view of the complexity of the situation, these diametrically
opposed views, the fact that Georgia and Russia contest each other’s
versions and the negation by both sides of any share of responsibility,
it is clear that only an independent international investigation
can bring clarity to the exact sequence of events on 7 and 8 August
as well as the circumstances that led to the outbreak of armed hostilities
between Georgia and Russia. It is essential that these facts are
established. Truth is a prerequisite for any start of reconciliation between
these two member states of the Council of Europe.
22. As mentioned the war did not start on 7 August, however it
clear that, irrespective of what provoked it, the shelling of Tskhinvali
by Georgian troops with heavy artillery and multiple rocket launchers
signalled the start of the outbreak of open warfare between Georgia
and the Russian Federation.
23. Following the start of the shelling of Tskhinvali, Russia
retaliated with a counter-offensive and, after several days of heavy
fighting, Russian forces not only drove Georgian military forces
out of South Ossetia, but also occupied a large part of Georgia
to the West and South of the conflict zone. Subsequently, Russian
forces also began to attack strategic economic and civilian targets
deep inside Georgia itself, including railroads, bridges and the
harbour of Poti, which is situated a considerable distance from
the conflict zone.
24. When the war started over South Ossetia, Abkhaz separatist
forces began, on 8 August 2008, to attack Georgian troops in the
Kodori Gorge and, reportedly with the help of Russian military forces,
drove the Georgian military troops out of the Georgian held parts
of Abkhazia.
25. The Russian incursion in Georgia was only halted with the
signing of the cease-fire agreement, brokered by President Sarkozy
of France on behalf of the European Union, by Presidents Medvedev
and Saakashvili on 12 August 2008.
26. Leaving aside the circumstances that led to this war, and
irrespective of whether Georgia’s military assault on Tskhinvali
was justified or not, the Russian response was disproportionate
and went far beyond what was needed to restore peace and protect
civilian lives. This disproportionate military response, together
with the unjustified destruction of the economic and strategic infrastructure
of Georgia and the repeated public calls for regime change in Georgia,
is either a direct attack on the sovereignty of Georgia or an indication
that Russia intends to restore its direct and decisive influence
over Georgia with the intention to restore the concept of the “near
abroad” in violation of its accession commitments.
3. Cease-fire agreement and immediate aftermath of the war
27. In the cease-fire agreement
brokered by President Sarkozy, Georgia and Russia agreed:
- not to resort to force;
- to a definitive halt to the hostilities;
- to make provision for free access for humanitarian assistance;
- that Georgian Forces must withdraw to the places where they are usually stationed;
- that the Russian armed forces will be pulled back to the line preceding the start of hostilities. While awaiting an international mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures;
- to the opening of international discussions on security and stability modalities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
28. According to the cease-fire agreement, Russian troops were
to withdraw immediately to their pre-war positions and strengths.
However, despite assurances from President Medvedev of Russia to
the contrary, the withdrawal of Russian troops did not start immediately
after the cease-fire agreement was signed and at the time of the
visit of the Assembly co-rapporteurs for Russia and Georgia to Moscow
and Tbilisi respectively, the withdrawal of Russian troops had not
yet started. In fact the destruction of the economic and strategic infrastructure
of Georgia by Russian troops continued unabated.
29. The definition of additional security measures to be implemented
by Russian peacekeeping forces, as mentioned in point 5. of the
cease-fire agreement, led to conflicting interpretations between
the Russian authorities, on the one side, and the Georgian authorities
and international community, on the other side. The Russian authorities
gave this a broad interpretation that would allow them to maintain
a wide range of checkpoints outside the conflict zone deep inside
Georgia. As a result, Russian troops assumed de facto control over
the main East-West and North-South transport arteries, which was
considered unacceptable as it significantly undermined Georgia’s
sovereignty. In response, President Sarkozy of France sent a letter
to both Presidents Saakashvili and President Medvedev on 16 August
2008, clarifying the definition of “additional security measures”
as agreed during the cease-fire talks. In this letter, President
Sarkozy made it clear that these measures could only be implemented
within the limits of a couple of kilometres outside the administrative border
of South Ossetia -excluding explicitly any other part of Georgia-;
would be of a temporary character; would take the form of patrols
by peacekeeping forces authorised under the 1992 Sochi agreement;
and could under no circumstances include major urban centres or
transport links.
30. On 25 August, the Federal Assembly of Russia (State Duma and
Council of the Federation) unanimously voted to urge President Medvedev
to recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Subsequently,
on 26 August, President Medvedev issued a decree by which the Russian
Federation recognised the independence of the self-proclaimed republics
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This recognition was widely condemned
by the international community, as it violates the principle of
the territorial integrity of Georgia, is in contravention of international
law, as well as the obligations of Russia as a member state of the Council
of Europe, and contradicts the cease-fire agreement signed by President
Medvedev.
31. Given the delay in observing the cease-fire agreement, President
Sarkozy, joined by Mr José Manuel Barroso, President of the European
Commission, Mr Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, and Mr Bernard Kouchner, French Minister of
Foreign and European Affairs, travelled to Moscow on 8 September
2008, to press the Russian authorities unconditionally to implement
the cease-fire agreement. During this meeting, it was agreed that
Russia would withdraw its troops from the areas adjacent to Abkhazia
and South-Ossetia within 10 days after the deployment of an EU monitoring
mission on 1 October 2008, would allow UN observers to remain in
Abkhazia and allow OSCE monitors access to all of their previous
areas of deployment, including South Ossetia, and agreed to the
start of the talks under point 6 of the cease-fire agreement, on
15 October 2008.
32. The unilateral recognition of the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia by the Russian Federation has a direct impact on the
implementation of the cease-fire agreement. The Russian authorities have
made it clear that the presence of Russian troops in these regions
is no longer governed by the cease- fire agreement but by bilateral
agreements between Russia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On 18 September,
Russia signed Friendship and Co-operation treaties with Abkhazia
and South Ossetia that inter alia enable the establishment of Russian
military bases in both regions. The Russian authorities have indicated that
they plan to station up to 4000 troops in each of the regions, in
clear violation of the cease-fire agreement.
33. The recognition by Russia of the independence of these two
regions also complicates the provision of humanitarian aid, as well
as the monitoring of the implementation of the cease-fire agreement
by independent monitors. International organisations are refused
entry into South Ossetia via Georgia, while EU and OSCE monitors
are prevented from entering South Ossetia and Abkhazia at all. Despite
the agreement of 8 September, talks about OSCE observers on their
area of deployment have broken down, with access to South Ossetia
being the sticking point and the Russian authorities have made it
clear that the EU monitors will not be allowed to enter South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, despite EU insistence that their mandate covers the
whole of Georgia, including the breakaway regions.
34. It should be noted that the unilateral recognition of independence
extended the control of the de facto authorities in Tskhinvali over
the Akhalgori District in South Ossetia, which was not subject to
the Sochi agreement and therefore was under full and recognised
control of the Georgian authorities before the war.
35. The opinion of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population
will contain a detailed examination of the humanitarian consequences
of the war. However, in the initial phases of the conflict, around
35,000 to 40,000 South Ossetian refugees were recorded in North
Ossetia. This refugee stream was managed in a very efficient manner
by the Russian authorities, thereby avoiding a humanitarian crisis
in North Ossetia. Most of these refugees have now returned to their
place of residence, while an estimated 2,000 remain in North Ossetia with
their families
36. There is a some confusion regarding the exact number of IDPs
that this war caused inside Georgia. According to different sources,
the conflict initially led to more than 140,000 IDPs in Georgia,
of which 60,000 currently remain. Another 29,000 are expected to
be able to return when Russian troops have withdrawn from the so-called
“buffer zone” 
and
security for the population has been re-established. A total of
31,000 IDPs (25,000 from South Ossetia and 6,000 from Abkhazia)
are considered to be “permanently” unable to return to their original
place of residence, mainly ethnic Georgians from the areas under
de facto control of Tskhinvali and Sukhumi. These numbers should
be seen in the context of the approximately 222,000 already existing IDPs
from these areas a result of the 1992 conflict.
and
security for the population has been re-established. A total of
31,000 IDPs (25,000 from South Ossetia and 6,000 from Abkhazia)
are considered to be “permanently” unable to return to their original
place of residence, mainly ethnic Georgians from the areas under
de facto control of Tskhinvali and Sukhumi. These numbers should
be seen in the context of the approximately 222,000 already existing IDPs
from these areas a result of the 1992 conflict.37. The humanitarian situation is further exacerbated by the uncertainty
regarding the “buffer zone”. The current serious security vacuum
needs to be urgently addressed, but there seem to be conflicting
views regarding the role of the EU Monitors and Georgian police
forces. While the EU is sending strictly civilian monitors to observe
the security situation, and considers it to be the role of the Georgian
law enforcement forces to provide security to the population in
that area, the Russian authorities seem to be of the view that civilian
protection will be also the responsibility of the EU Monitors and
have reservations about the idea of armed Georgian police in this
area. This issue needs to be urgently resolved to avoid an even
further decline of security in this area.
38. The number of deaths as a result of the conflict is a matter
of controversy, although all sides agree that the initial high numbers
were inflated. Independent reports put the total number of deaths
around 664. However, it should be stressed that even one victim
is a victim too many
39. Widespread and large-scale looting, assaults and destruction
of property broke out in Georgian villages in South Ossetia and
the “buffer zone” mainly after the signing of the cease-fire agreement.
Witness reports indicate that these crimes were committed by South
Ossetian irregular troops and gangs, but also by so-called volunteers
from the Northern Caucasus. Russian troops are not reported to have
been involved in the looting and burning themselves, but were reported
to have done nothing to stop these practices, often turning a blind eye.
These accounts were confirmed by independent reports from Russian
human rights organisations who had been present in South Ossetia
both during and after the outbreak of hostilities. The widespread
looting and destruction of property was also confirmed by the Assembly
delegation that visited several villages in South Ossetia and the
so-called “buffer zone” on 25 September 2008.
40. In the report after his visit to the conflict area, between
22 and 29 August, the Human Rights Commissioner presented six principles
for urgent protection of human rights and humanitarian security,
which we fully support:
40.1. The
right to return of those who fled or were displaced must be guaranteed.
This requires that their safety is protected and that their homes
are made liveable again. The repair of damaged houses is an urgent
priority. Affected persons have the right to be informed about relevant
developments and no one must be returned against their will.
40.2. Those who fled or were displaced must be ensured adequate
living conditions until they can return home. This requires competent
coordination of the assistance from both governmental and intergovernmental
actors. Not only material needs but also psychological and psycho-social
damages must be addressed.
40.3. The whole area affected by the warfare must be de-mined.
Cluster bombs, mines, unexploded ordnances and other dangerous devices
must be located, removed and destroyed. Until this is done the targeted
terrain must be marked and the population clearly informed about
the dangers. The parties to the conflict need to declare what type
of weapons and ammunition were used, when and where. International
contribution to this effort will be required and should be welcomed
by both parties.
40.4. Physical assault, torching of houses and looting must
be totally stopped and persons responsible for such crimes apprehended
and held to account. The problem of the ‘policing vacuum’ in the
so-called buffer zone between Tskhinvali and Karaleti must be resolved
urgently.
40.5. Prisoners of War, other detainees and persons stranded
in unsafe situations must be protected and rescued through continued
humanitarian efforts. The established mechanism for dialogue and mutual
exchanges of such cases should be kept in place and fully supported,
also by the international community. There is a need to establish
a coordinated system for assembling and acting upon information
on missing persons.
40.6. International presence and assistance are needed in the
area affected by the conflict. The programs of UNHCR, UNICEF, ICRC
and other agencies should be supported and the OSCE be given authority
and resources to expand its mission. Apart from cease-fire observers
and police presence there is a need for specialised human rights
monitors – who could also operate in coordination with the domestic
ombudsmen. The protection of minorities must be a key priority and
positive inter-community relations must be encouraged.
41. The systematic nature of the looting and destruction of property
in South Ossetia, together with indications from the de facto leadership
in Tskhinvali that ethnic Georgian IDPs are not welcome to return,
even if they take on citizenship of the self-proclaimed state as
demanded by the de facto authorities, is a clear indication that
ethnic cleansing is taking place in South Ossetia. This is confirmed
by reports from international humanitarian and relief organisations,
as well as human rights organisations and the diplomatic community
in Georgia, who have reported systematic acts of ethnic cleansing
of Georgian villages in South Ossetia by South Ossetian irregular
troops and gangs. Reports have been received that, in some cases,
complete villages have been bulldozed and razed. This pattern also
seemed to be confirmed by the visit of the PACE delegation to the region,
which saw that the Georgian village of Ksuisi in South Ossetia had
been completely looted and virtually destroyed.
42. The reports of ethnic cleansing are extremely worrying. It
should be stressed that, even if Russian troops have not been directly
involved, Russia, under international law, bears full responsibility
for any crimes and human rights violations that are committed on
the territories that are under its effective control.
43. The initial phase of the armed hostilities reportedly saw
the indiscriminate shelling of Tskhinvali with heavy artillery and
multiple rocket launchers by the Georgian military. Indeed, during
its visit to Tskhinvali the delegation of the Assembly saw several
residential areas, as well as public buildings, that had been completely destroyed
by indiscriminate shelling by Georgian troops in the initial phases
of the war as well as in the course of subsequent battles between
Georgian and Russian troops over the city. It should stressed that
the use of indiscriminate force and weapons in civilian areas by
both sides can be considered a war crime and a full investigation
in order to establish the facts in this respect should be initiated.
4. The commitments and obligations of Georgia and Russia and the consequences of the war
44. The war between Russia and
Georgia poses one of the most serious challenges to the Council
of Europe and its principles and values in recent times. It is clear
that that there have been serious violations of the Statute of the
Council of Europe as well as the obligations and commitments that
Georgia and Russia assumed when acceding to the Council of Europe.
45. State sovereignty, the right to, and respect for, territorial
integrity as well as non-aggression, are central principles of international
law. The respect thereof is a core obligation under the Charter
of the United Nations Chapter I, Article 2 and Chapter VI and form
part of member states' general obligations under the Statute of the
Council of Europe, as well as commitments made when joining the
organisation. These same principles are contained in the Declaration
of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating states included
in the Helsinki Final Act to which both Russia and Georgia are signatory.
46. When acceding to the Council of Europe Georgia and Russia
committed themselves to settle the conflict over South Ossetia and
Abkhazia by peaceful means. In addition Russia committed itself
to settle outstanding border disputes according to the principles
of international law and to “denounce as wrong the concept of two different
categories of foreign countries, where some are treated as a zone
of special influence called the “near abroad””.
47. It goes without saying that these commitments imply that both
countries should maintain good neighbourly relations and respect
each other’s rightful interest for peace and security.
48. South Ossetia, as well as Abkhazia, are integral parts of
Georgia. Therefore the military actions undertaken by Georgian forces
during the conflict took place within Georgian territory. The argument
of Russia that Georgian military actions amounted to ”illegal use
of force” leading to the right to self-defence under the UN Charter
has therefore no legal ground, as the military actions undertaken
by Georgia on its territory cannot be seen as an aggression towards
Russia which would trigger the latter’s right to self-defence.
49. The assertion that Russia had to act in “self-defence” to
protect its citizens residing in another state is in contravention
of international law. The large-scale military action by Russia
against Georgia can in no way be justified on these grounds.
50. It is clear that both Russia and Georgia have violated their
commitment to settle their disputes by peaceful means.
51. As for Georgia’s actions on its own territory, they are subject
to international human rights and humanitarian law, including the
European Convention on Human Rights. The manner in which Georgia
acted in seeking to re-gain effective control over a part of its
territory is raises serious questions about its adherence to these
obligations.
52. The use of indiscriminate force and weapons by both Georgian
and Russian troops in civilian areas can be considered war crimes
which must be fully investigated.
53. The unilateral recognition by Russia of the self-proclaimed
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia violated the principles
of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and is in
contravention of international law, the Statute of the Council of
Europe and the obligations of Russia as a member state of this organisation.
54. The large-scale looting and destruction of property as well
as patterns of ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia are a direct violation
of international humanitarian and human rights law. It should be
stressed that, even if Russian troops have not been directly involved,
Russia, under international law, bears full responsibility for any
crimes and human rights violations committed on the territories
that are under its effective control.
5. Conclusions and recommendations
55. The outbreak of the war between
the Russian Federation and Georgia poses a serious challenge to
the Council of Europe and its Assembly. The Assembly cannot fail
to condemn the violations of international law, the Statute of the
Council of Europe and the commitments of both member states of the
organisation. At the same time, it should not and cannot close the
dialogue with, and between, Russia and Georgia.
56. It is clear that the war did not start on the 7 August and
that the peacekeeping process had broken down before that date and
tensions had seriously escalated. Peacekeepers failed in their intended
role to protect the civilian population in the conflict area and
to resolve the conflict between the opposing sides. As a result,
mutual provocations and inter-ethnic violence prevailed over the
principle of achieving a negotiated and lasting peace.
57. Taking into account the complexity of the situation, the diametrically
opposed views of the parties in the conflict, the mutually exclusive
national public discourses, the negation by both sides of any share
of responsibility, it is essential that an independent international
investigation be initiated to establish the facts regarding the
exact sequence of the events on 7 and 8 August, as well as the circumstances
that led to the outbreak of the war and the precise responsibility
of each of the parties in this conflict. Truth is a prerequisite for
reconciliation.
58. The unilateral recognition by Russia of the independence of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia is a violation of international law and
the principles of the Council of Europe. It must therefore be condemned.
In addition, such unilateral recognition is in violation of the
cease-fire agreement and hinders the resolution of the conflict The
Assembly should call upon Russia to withdraw its recognition of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
59. Both sides should fully implement the six points of the cease-fire
agreement without any delays, preconditions or reservations.
60. It is clear that both sides did not do enough to prevent the
war and that grave human rights violations were committed and continue
to be committed up to this day. There can be no impunity for these
violations and alleged ethnic cleansing. The Council of Europe has
an important role to play in this respect. All alleged human rights
violations should be investigated and perpetrators held to account
before the courts. In this respect it is clear that the Russian
Federation bears full responsibility for the protection of civilians
in the territories that are under its effective control and therefore
for the crimes and human rights violations that are committed against them.
The use of indiscriminate force and weapons by both Georgian and
Russian troops in civilian areas can be considered war crimes that
need to be fully investigated.
61. The war between Russia and Georgia has undeniably geopolitical
consequences and will have a profound effect on international relations
with the Russian Federation. The opinion of the Political Affairs Committee
will contain a detailed analysis of these issues. However, it is
clear to us that this war and the reaction of the international
community, including that of the Assembly, will have a direct impact
on other unsolved conflicts in our continent. The Assembly should
make it univocally clear that any escalation of these conflicts
into war is unacceptable.
62. The Assembly is convinced that the establishment of a dialogue
is the best way forward for the solution of any conflict and for
fostering stability in the long-term. This holds true for this particular
conflict. However, dialogue requires political will on both sides
and cannot be pursued in isolation of concrete actions. Therefore, some
basic conditions for the dialogue have to be established and observed.
Full implementation of the peace plan, including withdrawal of the
Russian troops to positions ex ante the
conflict, full deployment of EU and OSCE monitors into South Ossetia
and withdrawal by Russia of the recognition of independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, would be minimum conditions in this respect.
Reporting committee: Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)
Reference to committee: Ref. No. 3489 of 29 September 2008
Draft resolution unanimously adopted by the committee on 30 September 2008
Members of the committee: Mr Serhiy Holovaty (Chairperson), Mr György Frunda (1st Vice-Chairperson), Mr Konstantin Kosachev (2nd Vice-Chairperson), Mr Leonid Slutsky (3rd Vice-Chairperson), Mr Aydin Abbasov, Mr Avet Adonts, Mr Pedro Agramunt, Mr Miloš Aligrudić, Mrs Meritxell Batet Lamaña, Mr Ryszard Bender, Mr József Berényi, Mr Aleksandër Biberaj, Mr Luc Van den Brande, Mr Jean-Guy Branger, Mr Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Mr Sergej Chelemendik, Ms Lise Christoffersen, Mr Boriss Cilevičs, Mr Georges Colombier, Mr Telmo Correia, Mr Valeriu Cosarciuc, Mrs Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Mr Joseph Debono Grech, Mr Juris Dobelis, Mrs Josette Durrieu, Mr Mátyás Eörsi, Mrs Mirjana Ferić-Vac, Mr Jean-Charles Gardetto, Mr József Gedei, Mr Marcel Glesener, Mr Charles Goerens, Mr Andreas Gross, Mr Michael Hagberg, Mr Holger Haibach, Ms Gultakin Hajiyeva, Mr Michael Hancock, Mr Davit Harutyunyan, Mr Andres Herkel, Mr Raffi Hovannisian, Mr Kastriot Islami, Mr Miloš Jevtić, Mrs Evguenia Jivkova, Mr Hakki Keskin, Mr Andros Kyprianou, Mr Jaakko Laakso, Mrs Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Mr Göran Lindblad, Mr René van der Linden, Mr Eduard Lintner, Mr Younal Loutfi, Mr Pietro Marcenaro, Mr Mikhail Margelov, Mr Bernard Marquet, Mr Dick Marty, Mr Miloš Melčák, Mrs Assunta Meloni, Mrs Nursuna Memecan, Mr João Bosco Mota Amaral, Mr Theodoros Pangalos, Ms Maria Postoico, Mr Christos Pourgourides, Mr John Prescott, Mr Andrea Rigoni, Mr Armen Rustamyan, Mr Indrek Saar, Mr Oliver Sambevski, Mr Kimmo Sasi, Mr Andreas Schieder, Mr Samad Seyidov, Mrs Aldona Staponkienė, Mr Christoph Strässer, Mr Mihai Tudose, Mr Egidijus Vareikis, Mr Miltiadis Varvitsiotis, Mr José Vera Jardim, Mrs Birutė Vėsaitė, Mr Piotr Wach, Mr Robert Walter, Mr David Wilshire, Mrs Renate Wohlwend, Mrs Karin S. Woldseth, Mr Boris Zala, Mr Andrej Zernovski.
N.B.: The names of the members who took part in the meeting are printed in bold
Secretariat of the committee: Mrs Chatzivassiliou, Mr Klein, Ms Trévisan, Mr Karpenko